Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought

this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This

bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted
on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

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The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8
a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected
to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair
(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep.
Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when
put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the

order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep.
Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced
that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end
of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of
Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify
the conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I
want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for

one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

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 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock,

Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until

four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of
audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately
after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which
petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound
system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division
on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of
the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as
certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996,
also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted.
According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1)
in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line
13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified
on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while
in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published
version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum
because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other
versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However,

there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in
order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the

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respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the
word "approved" appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference

committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House
rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35
and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call for the
years or nays,but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to
prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in
violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's
question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's
motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep.
Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in
violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5the
Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question
which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued
that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption
of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation
at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the
session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to
prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the
Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering
the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of
discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a

4
reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of
the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In

addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers
and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the
Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of
its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the
courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such
as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary
precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion,
were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his

certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under
the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the
sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr.
Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground
for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there
was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of
the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.

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Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct
its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At
any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.'"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to
the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It
is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a

6
mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority
extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred
upon it by the Constitution."

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution
and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly.Having
made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the
subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last
resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."

In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in
a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such
action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of procedure."

In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it

appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain
whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We
think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective
branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If
there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893

Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before
a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that

7
in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote,
suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court
of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the
suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the
requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature

should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own
rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for
the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures.
It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only
at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh
and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty
manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature
thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a
rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings,
could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it
was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature,
and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v.
State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W.
187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54
Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former
Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of
Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved. 18

8
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our

government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into
an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline
the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's

sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII,
§1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is
an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case
and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. §5 and, therefore, to the
requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those
relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we
have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our
Art. VIII. §1 power.

9
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of

the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There
being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this,
however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval
of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report should
have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the
members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this
case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the
fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically

requires that in case such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has
pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the
bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs
Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino
and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous

action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned,
this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it

10
 has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then
a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his
attitude is nor on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or
constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the
Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any
motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the
House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody
wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many
are in favor and how many are against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way

would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter
for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best
procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for
the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
following instances; upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval
of the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nays had already
been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration

allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent
adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session
was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment
until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least

11
have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is
that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared

the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of
Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected

to its approval except Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own

making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon,
petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an
obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in
form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to
precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to
any further consideration of the question. 31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in
signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the
House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase
"grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief
Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power
granted to the courts by Art. VIII. §1 extends to cases where "a branch of
the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of

the House with which the Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the
claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
12
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the
quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum. 34

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in
this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep.
Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was
approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral
conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora
objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is
said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Tañada would have voted in
favor of the conference committee report. 37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification
by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and
learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by
Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim
either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one
case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by
the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill
has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment
to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39This
Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the
misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they

13
 have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction.
Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking
the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on
the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill
sent to the President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously"
inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such
cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. §26(2) of the Constitution that
"upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42

In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is

cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule
rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it
was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the

massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of
evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure

from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the
Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on

14
the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our
decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four
new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.)
Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the
Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is

confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows
that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A.
No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required
by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment,
affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall,
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the
Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are

required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this
Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as
"public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be
public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been
declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote
period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As
already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving

15
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made
in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek
the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240.
In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body. 49

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr.,

JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., concurs in the result.

Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of

judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the
determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme
Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not
have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the

16
 awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The
term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our
jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or
despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional
proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose
province the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is
vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the
internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of
government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by
the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation,
let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule
and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial
power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over,
and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to
be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of
discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues —
is shown to have attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino

vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455,
etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I
am not backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not
elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as
an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm stance
in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration,
involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax
measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the

17
Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues,
both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of
which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At
any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each
and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching
upon substantive issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be
recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial
breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional
requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage
of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly
put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and
the precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position
then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise
sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as
presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because
I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they
were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for
their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled
bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is
not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or

not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having
been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I
see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance
on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining
to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress
and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of
words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating
more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the
essence and substance of the law itself .

18
 Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural
legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure
are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts —
whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or
whatever — not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a
court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative
procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to

substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its
tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and
the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition
even by its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were
actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the
Court's review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which
provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." We are also
guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was

applied. In this respect, I showed that the introduction of several
provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not
only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited
power of the conference committee but that the Constitutional
proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill
was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that
judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the
Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the
same principle which should have justified the Court in questioning
the actuations of the legislative branch.

19
 At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the
aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentinodissent. At the same time, I
realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true
in the instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of

Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant
petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of
the House's business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to
the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage
of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining that
substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No.
8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of
the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was
effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not
that the substance thereof offends constitutional standards. This
being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous
argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as
regards "substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of
its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted
under the circumstances of instant petition.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr.

Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar.
Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-
justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive
as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution
and the winds of changing time.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the
principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of
power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the

20
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a

window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held:

xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each

house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that
day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the

Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the
clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker
with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
21
 better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within
the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of
any other body or tribunal.

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the

validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional.
Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the
test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not
violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule
XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.

Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith,

the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate
was in issue, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator

voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the
same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next
two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a
notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall
have been sent to the President before the expiration of the
time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the
motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to
request the President to return such notification to the Senate.
Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid
on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a
final disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be

returned by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of
the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or

22
 while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate.

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal

Power Commission has been confirmed by the US Senate. The
resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President who then
signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however,
reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President
refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdictionover
the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the
question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable
rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected
the Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it
must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a

construction different from that adopted by the Senate itself
when the present case was under debate is a serious and
delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution commits to
the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the
function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A
rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of
the vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for
public office, moreover, should receive from the Court the most
sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above stated,
against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We
are confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the
attempted reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the Senate
itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of immediate
notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to
proceed to perfect the appointment.

Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls
within the test spelled out in Ballin.

23
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United
States. 4 Christoffel testified before the Committee on Education and
Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a
communist and was charged with perjury in the regular court. He
adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum
when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was
convicted in view of the judge's charge to the members of the jury
that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that —

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at

least thirteen members of the said Committee, and that "at least
that number must have been actually and physically present . . .
If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did
meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1,
1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of
them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised
as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not
remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the
existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided
that before the oath was administered and before the testimony
of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13
members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon
session . . . .

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the

jury to assume there was a continuous quorum simply because it was
present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the
House rules, a quorum once established is presumed to continue
until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, defined theissue as "what rules the House had
established and whether they have been followed." It held:

xxx xxx xxx

Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative

business is of course none of our concern, and by the same

24
token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter
of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may
protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is
rather what rules the House has established and whether they
have been followed. It of course has the power to define what
tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that
establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that
by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume
that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though
the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible
finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which

defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years.
An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to
inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime
charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An
element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the
presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so
instructed the jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal
a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the
trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that there were "actually and
physically present" a majority of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by

a finding that there was a majority present two or three hours
before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of
evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law
that a quorum need not be present when the offense is
committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and
practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental
right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of
all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal
that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that
such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.

25
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and
practice that a quorum once established is presumed to continue
unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the
Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view
commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.

The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the
case of Yellin v. United States. 5Yellin was indicted on five counts of
willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was
convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress on four
counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit. Oncertiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that
the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which
provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-committee, duly
appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might
endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the
reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such
witness in an executive session for the purpose of determining the
necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter
in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, held:

xxx xxx xxx

Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial

review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been
violated. This is especially so when the Committee's practice
leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When
reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be
distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the witness'
reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does
what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a
defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness
was deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is
not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for
prosecution in Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too exacting

26
 to require that the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying
its own rules.

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary

has pruned the "political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker
v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a
petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that
"the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government
order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional
authority."

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts

to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of
our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not
granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not
also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases
involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it
provided:

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding

filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of

27
 the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question
defense in national security cases. To a great degree,
it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of
government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new
power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following
postulates:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of

this provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the
sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter

on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
28
 jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only
a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,

which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute political question.

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this

Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated
the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the
President and the legislators being elected by the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg

to disagree for the view misses the significant changes made in
our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we
discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically
changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great
branches of our government — the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security
of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law
shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
the security of tenure of its Members." It also guaranteed fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating

the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with screening
the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of

29
confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken away
from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific
time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary — ninety (90) days from
the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court
and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of
recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of
vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate appointments
in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was
given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law." And to
make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of
government more watertight, it prohibited members of the
judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing quasi
judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution
strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the
powers of the two other branches of government, especially the
Executive. Notable of the powers of the President clipped by
the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power
is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power
may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.

The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of

the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this
court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught
us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul

acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion,
the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to

30
 activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this
Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress — this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty
by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration

to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls
us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power
or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts.
In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case
at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and
not the experience of foreigners.

II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied
on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at
bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted
by both Houses, signed by the proper officers of each House and
approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two Houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus
attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him.

31
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written
Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the government, and
the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial — as
emanating from the highest tribunal in the land — are placed on the
same footing and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment
of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England,
theconclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an
ad of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority
that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same
forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law
that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation. 11

Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important
mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or
affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor
of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the
enrolled bill unless there affirmativelyappears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one
or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have
adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill
is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted.
The prima faciepresumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional
requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be
received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud
or mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of

the enrolled bill. The modern rationalefor the enrolled bill theory was
spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,

and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the

32
 two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction
of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is
deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that
has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a
bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries,
on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon the
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the

enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of
convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of
evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many
cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every
act published as law is to be tested by examining its history, as
shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will
be an amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling
in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged
uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also
justified on the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are
conducive to mistake, if not fraud.

These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in
various jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr.

33
Justice Regalado cited some of the leading American cases which
discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the enrolled
bill theory, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive

presumption of validity originally attributed to that doctrine has
long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On
the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder
the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole expository
of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and
valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to
inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of
which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required
to furnish the evidence.

In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of

Florida declared

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by

the legislative offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the
bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and
when it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers,
contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such
provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade
vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

This Court is firmly committed to the holding that

when the journals speak they control, and against
such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is

the decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department
of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are
extensively reproduced hereunder.

34
. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the
validity of a long line of decisions of this court which created
and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.

xxx xxx xxx

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain

procedures that the legislature must follow before a bill can be
considered for final passage. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky,

a court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by
the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this

provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the
governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the
propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three
reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was
reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal
branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience
prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to
preserve its records and anticipated considerable complex
litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General
Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final
bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the
legislature. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a

result of judicial whim. There are fourhistorical bases for the
doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was
not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is
one of the three branches of government, the courts, being
coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts
35
are valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated, record-
keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing
of equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given
efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as expressed
by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it

has not been without its critics. From an examination of cases
and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1)
Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not
favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present case)
produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional
provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic record-keeping devices now used by legislatures
remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule
disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth
and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch
of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled
bill doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine

of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta
movere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents
and to disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not
inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of
error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky
834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the

question to be decided and the extent of the
disturbance of rights and practices which a change
in the interpretation of the law or the course of
judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations
are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons
"for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to go
from one doubtful rule to another," and whether or
not the evils of the principle that has been followed

36
 will be more injurious than can possibly result from
a change.

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not

grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has
been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded,
and with it the rule it supports.

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty

decision, the poor record-keeping of the legislature, has
disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in
record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders,
electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment,
printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and
the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the
General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible
records.

It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate

in today's modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact
that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is
done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not
deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that
so provides.

Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various

branches of government requires that we shut our eyes to
constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in
government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the
Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the
constitution is "void." The proper exercise of judicial authority
requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional and
to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that
under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our
obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the
constitution — by any person, corporation, state agency or
branch or government — are brought to light and corrected. To

37
 countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices
when confronted with violations of our constitution is not
acceptable to this court.

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which

Professor Sutherland describes as the "extrinsic
evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima
facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such
presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence establishing that constitutional
requirements have not been met.

We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases

following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that
there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill
is valid. . . .

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once

unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that
starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the
conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving
only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by
any authoritative source of information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill

doctrine. It was in the 1947 case ofMabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this
Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a
duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling in Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which

is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde,"
as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends,
however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and
"formaldehyde," and that the members of Congress intended to
38
 exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished product, citing
in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615;
Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19,
1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled bill — which
uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we
cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones
of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to

the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:

. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what

really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official
acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be
cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner would
like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After
all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for

39
 which seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be
effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a
matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes
but of a Sherlock Holmes.

Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the

enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be

understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which
the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the
journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters
entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now
decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in
the event of any discrepancy.

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the

enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices

of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department
of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this
declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing

sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It
is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
40
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it
is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution
says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown
vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
"makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage
and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is
not attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has
'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory

but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that
there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity
of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue.
It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In
such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is

no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true
that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and
resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were
not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and
signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such

41
 amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the
manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the
President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary

rationale in the case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 24 In
this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary
appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this
contention, this Court ruled:

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism

for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with

the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving
the precise differences between the two houses.
Even where the conference committee is not by rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate.
These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian
power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).

42
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report
on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President
Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House
of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses
of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not

inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Gimenezlaid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on
the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case
of U.S. vs.Pens, where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the

Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the

petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and
the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.

43
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et
al and its companion cases. 25Involved in the case was the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill
doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7716. It held:

xxx xxx xxx

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal

validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its
favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an
enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but
also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite
votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of
the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is
no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In

fact in one case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted
the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate in view of the fad that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled
bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in
effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the

passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even inTolentino, Mr. Justice

44
Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made
that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now
time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no
longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There
are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one,
the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated
because in England there is no written Constitution and the
Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United
States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the
enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in
lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the
enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.
In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in
embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long been
repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show
that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the
conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not
all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in
the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987
Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live
not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our
Constitution also adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule
which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored.
And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to
pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality
of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its
fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot
dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the
search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima
facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing
justice based on truth.

III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable.
Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed

45
 by the public respondents to justify granting said petition. As the
ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint that
petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The
petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the
Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the
House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to
question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They
are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact
laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the
House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment
call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the
Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Davide, Jr., J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of

judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the
determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme
Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not
have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the
awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The
term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our
jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or
despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional
proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose
province the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is
vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the
internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of
government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by
46
 the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation,
let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule
and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial
power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over,
and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to
be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of
discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues —
is shown to have attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino

vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455,
etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I
am not backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not
elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as
an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm stance
in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration,
involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax
measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues,
both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of
which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At
any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each
and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching
upon substantive issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be
recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial
breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional
requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage
of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly
put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and
the precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement

47
of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position
then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise
sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as
presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because
I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they
were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for
their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled
bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is
not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or

not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having
been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I
see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance
on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining
to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress
and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of
words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating
more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the
essence and substance of the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural

legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure
are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts —
whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or
whatever — not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a
court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative
procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to

substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its

48
 tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and
the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition
even by its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were
actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the
Court's review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which
provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." We are also
guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was

applied. In this respect, I showed that the introduction of several
provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not
only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited
power of the conference committee but that the Constitutional
proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill
was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that
judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the
Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the
same principle which should have justified the Court in questioning
the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the

aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentinodissent. At the same time, I
realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true
in the instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of

Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant
petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of
the House's business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to
the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage
of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining that

49
 substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No.
8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of
the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was
effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not
that the substance thereof offends constitutional standards. This
being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous
argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as
regards "substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of
its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted
under the circumstances of instant petition.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr.

Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar.
Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-
justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive
as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution
and the winds of changing time.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the
principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of
power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a

window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held:

xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each

house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears

50
 that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that
day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the

Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the
clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker
with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within
the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of
any other body or tribunal.

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the

validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional.
Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the

51
test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not
violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule
XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.

Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith,

the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate
was in issue, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator

voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the
same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next
two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a
notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall
have been sent to the President before the expiration of the
time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the
motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to
request the President to return such notification to the Senate.
Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid
on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a
final disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be

returned by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of
the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or
while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate.

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal

Power Commission has been confirmed by the US Senate. The
resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President who then
signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however,
reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President
refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdictionover
the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the

52
question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable
rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected
the Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it
must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a

construction different from that adopted by the Senate itself
when the present case was under debate is a serious and
delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution commits to
the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the
function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A
rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of
the vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for
public office, moreover, should receive from the Court the most
sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above stated,
against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We
are confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the
attempted reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the Senate
itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of immediate
notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to
proceed to perfect the appointment.

Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls
within the test spelled out in Ballin.

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United

States. 4 Christoffel testified before the Committee on Education and
Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a
communist and was charged with perjury in the regular court. He
adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum
when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was
convicted in view of the judge's charge to the members of the jury
that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that —

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at

least thirteen members of the said Committee, and that "at least
53
 that number must have been actually and physically present . . .
If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did
meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1,
1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of
them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised
as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not
remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the
existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided
that before the oath was administered and before the testimony
of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13
members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon
session . . . .

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the

jury to assume there was a continuous quorum simply because it was
present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the
House rules, a quorum once established is presumed to continue
until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, defined theissue as "what rules the House had
established and whether they have been followed." It held:

xxx xxx xxx

Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative

business is of course none of our concern, and by the same
token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter
of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may
protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is
rather what rules the House has established and whether they
have been followed. It of course has the power to define what
tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that
establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that
by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume
that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though
the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible
finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.

54
 We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which
defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years.
An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to
inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime
charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An
element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the
presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so
instructed the jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal
a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the
trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that there were "actually and
physically present" a majority of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by

a finding that there was a majority present two or three hours
before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of
evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law
that a quorum need not be present when the offense is
committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and
practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental
right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of
all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal
that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that
such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.

The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and
practice that a quorum once established is presumed to continue
unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the
Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view
commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.

The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the
case of Yellin v. United States. 5Yellin was indicted on five counts of
willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was
convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress on four
counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit. Oncertiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that
the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive

55
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which
provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-committee, duly
appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might
endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the
reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such
witness in an executive session for the purpose of determining the
necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter
in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, held:

xxx xxx xxx

Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial

review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been
violated. This is especially so when the Committee's practice
leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When
reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be
distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the witness'
reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does
what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a
defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness
was deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is
not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for
prosecution in Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too exacting
to require that the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying
its own rules.

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary

has pruned the "political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker
v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a
petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that
"the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government
order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional
authority."

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts

to categorically reject the political question defense when its

56
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of
our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not
granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not
also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases
involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it
provided:

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding

filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question
defense in national security cases. To a great degree,
it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of
government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new
power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the

57
government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following
postulates:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of

this provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the
sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter

on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only
a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,

which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute political question.

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this

Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
58
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated
the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the
President and the legislators being elected by the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg

to disagree for the view misses the significant changes made in
our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we
discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically
changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great
branches of our government — the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security
of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law
shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
the security of tenure of its Members." It also guaranteed fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating

the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with screening
the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of
confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken away
from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific
time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary — ninety (90) days from
the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court
and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of
recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of
vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate appointments
in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was
given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law." And to
make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of
government more watertight, it prohibited members of the
judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing quasi
judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution
strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the

59
 powers of the two other branches of government, especially the
Executive. Notable of the powers of the President clipped by
the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power
is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power
may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.

The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of

the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this
court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught
us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul

acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion,
the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to
activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this
Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress — this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty
by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration

to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls
us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power

60
or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts.
In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case
at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and
not the experience of foreigners.

II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied
on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at
bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted
by both Houses, signed by the proper officers of each House and
approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two Houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus
attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him.

The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written

Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the government, and
the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial — as
emanating from the highest tribunal in the land — are placed on the
same footing and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment
of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England,
theconclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an
ad of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority
that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same
forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law
that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation. 11

61
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important
mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or
affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor
of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the
enrolled bill unless there affirmativelyappears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one
or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have
adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill
is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted.
The prima faciepresumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional
requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be
received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud
or mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of

the enrolled bill. The modern rationalefor the enrolled bill theory was
spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,

and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction
of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is
deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that
has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a
bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries,
on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive

62
 departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon the
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the

enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of
convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of
evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many
cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every
act published as law is to be tested by examining its history, as
shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will
be an amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling
in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged
uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also
justified on the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are
conducive to mistake, if not fraud.

These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in
various jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr.
Justice Regalado cited some of the leading American cases which
discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the enrolled
bill theory, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive

presumption of validity originally attributed to that doctrine has
long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On
the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder
the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole expository
of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and
valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to
inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of

63
which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required
to furnish the evidence.

In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of

Florida declared

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by

the legislative offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the
bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and
when it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers,
contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such
provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade
vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

This Court is firmly committed to the holding that

when the journals speak they control, and against
such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is

the decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department
of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are
extensively reproduced hereunder.

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the

validity of a long line of decisions of this court which created
and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.

xxx xxx xxx

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain

procedures that the legislature must follow before a bill can be
considered for final passage. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky,

a court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by
the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.

64
 xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this

provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the
governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the
propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three
reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was
reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal
branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience
prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to
preserve its records and anticipated considerable complex
litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General
Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final
bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the
legislature. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a

result of judicial whim. There are fourhistorical bases for the
doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was
not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is
one of the three branches of government, the courts, being
coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts
are valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated, record-
keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing
of equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given
efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as expressed
by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it

has not been without its critics. From an examination of cases
and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1)
Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not
favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present case)
produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional
provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic record-keeping devices now used by legislatures

65
remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule
disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth
and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch
of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled
bill doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine

of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta
movere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents
and to disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not
inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of
error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky
834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the

question to be decided and the extent of the
disturbance of rights and practices which a change
in the interpretation of the law or the course of
judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations
are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons
"for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to go
from one doubtful rule to another," and whether or
not the evils of the principle that has been followed
will be more injurious than can possibly result from
a change.

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not

grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has
been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded,
and with it the rule it supports.

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty

decision, the poor record-keeping of the legislature, has
disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in
record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders,
electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment,
printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and
the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the

66
General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible
records.

It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate

in today's modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact
that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is
done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not
deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that
so provides.

Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various

branches of government requires that we shut our eyes to
constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in
government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the
Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the
constitution is "void." The proper exercise of judicial authority
requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional and
to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that
under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our
obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the
constitution — by any person, corporation, state agency or
branch or government — are brought to light and corrected. To
countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices
when confronted with violations of our constitution is not
acceptable to this court.

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which

Professor Sutherland describes as the "extrinsic
evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima
facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such
presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence establishing that constitutional
requirements have not been met.

We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases

following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that

67
 there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill
is valid. . . .

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once

unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that
starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the
conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving
only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by
any authoritative source of information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill

doctrine. It was in the 1947 case ofMabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this
Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a
duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling in Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which

is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde,"
as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends,
however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and
"formaldehyde," and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished product, citing
in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615;
Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19,
1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled bill — which

68
 uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we
cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones
of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to

the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:

. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what

really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official
acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be
cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner would
like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After
all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for
which seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be
effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a
matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes
but of a Sherlock Holmes.

Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the

enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be

understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which
the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the
journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a

69
 legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters
entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now
decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in
the event of any discrepancy.

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the

enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices

of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department
of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this
declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing

sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It
is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it
is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution
says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown
vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
"makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage
and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is
not attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has
'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.

70
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory
but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that
there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity
of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue.
It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In
such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is

no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true
that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and
resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were
not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and
signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the
manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the
President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

71
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary
rationale in the case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 24 In
this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary
appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this
contention, this Court ruled:

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism

for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with

the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving
the precise differences between the two houses.
Even where the conference committee is not by rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate.
These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian
power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report

on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President
Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House
of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses
of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not

inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Gimenezlaid down the rule that the enrolled bill is

72
 conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on
the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case
of U.S. vs.Pens, where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the

Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the

petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and
the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et

al and its companion cases. 25Involved in the case was the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill
doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7716. It held:

xxx xxx xxx

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal

validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its
favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an
enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but
also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed

73
 constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite
votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of
the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is
no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In

fact in one case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted
the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate in view of the fad that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled
bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in
effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the

passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even inTolentino, Mr. Justice
Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made
that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now
time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no
longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There
are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one,
the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated
because in England there is no written Constitution and the
Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United
States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the
enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in
lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the
enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.
In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in

74
embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long been
repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show
that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the
conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not
all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in
the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987
Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live
not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our
Constitution also adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule
which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored.
And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to
pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality
of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its
fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot
dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the
search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima
facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing
justice based on truth.

III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable.
Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed
by the public respondents to justify granting said petition. As the
ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint that
petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The
petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the
Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the
House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to
question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They
are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact
laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the
House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment
call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the
Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

75
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.

Footnotes

1 JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212: Transcript
of November 21, 1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381;
Petition, p. 6 par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.

2 Rule VIII, §35. Voting. — Every member present in the

session shall vote on every question put unless he inhibits
himself on account of personal pecuniary interest therein.

Rule XVII, §103. Manner of Voting. — The Speaker shall rise to

put a question saying "As many as are in favor of (as the
question may be), say Aye" and, after the affirmative vote is
counted, "As many as are opposed, say Nay. . . ."

3 Rule XIX, §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions. — The

Speaker shall state the motion or, if in writing shall cause it to
be read by the Secretary General before being debated. A
motion may be withdrawn any time before its approval.

4 Rule XVI, §97. Recognition of Member. — When two or more

members rise at the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the
Member who is to speak first.

5 Rule XX, §121. Definition. — Questions of privilege are those

affecting the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity
or reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or
individually.

§122. Precedence. — Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions

of privilege shall have precedence over all other question,
except a motion to adjourn and a point of order.

Rule XXI, §123. Definition and Precedence. — A privileged

motion pertains to a subject matter which, under the rules,
takes precedence over others.

The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in

each case by the rules.

76
Rule XVIII, §109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. —
When a bill, report or motion is adopted or lost a member who
voted with the majority may move for its reconsideration on the
same or succeeding session day. The motion shall take
precedence over all other questions except a motion to adjourn
a question of privilege, and a point of order.

6 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

7 Rollo, p. 228.

8 Id., p. 229.

9 Art. VI, §16(3).

10 E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36

L.ED. 321 (1862); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F. 2d 582 (1978);
Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F. 2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n. 675 F. 2d 1282 (1982). See
also Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

11 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v.

Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630.

12 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).

13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).

14 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis
added).

15 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).

16 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891 ) (emphasis added).

17 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

18 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE

PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188-189 (1977); Pacete v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58
(1971).

77
19 Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, chairman of the Committee
on Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, in 1 RECORDS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of
July 10, 1986).

20 Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos

v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia,
42 SCRA 448 (1971).

21 Co. v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,

199 SCRA 692, 701 (1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849,
857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis
added).

22 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

23 United States v. Ballin , Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36

L.Ed. at 324-25; State v. Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).

24 United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).

25 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F. 2d 539, 549 (1985).

26 Art. VI, §26(2).

27 Id., §16(4).

28 Id., §27(1).

29 Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.

30 INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED AND ANNOTATED 331
(1963); REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF
PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 157-158, 172-173 (1963).

31 Rule XIX, §13.

32 I RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION

436 (Session of July 10, 1986).

78
33 ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF
PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

34 PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE

335 (1953).

35 Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p.

14; Rollo, p. 16.

36 Ibid.

37 Petition, p. 14; Rollo. p. 16.

38 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

39 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40 Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE TREATISE ON THE

LAW ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is
preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this locus
classicus. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 834
(James Chadbourne, ed. 1972).

41 EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA

at 672, Cf. Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).

42 Philippine Judges Ass'n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710

(1993); Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131.

43 Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA

347 (1963); Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754
(1968).

44 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 (James H.

Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS
ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J.
FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454
(1973).

45 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed.
249, 303 (1891).

79
46 The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1)
The yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill (Art.
VI, §26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any question, at the
request of one-fifth of the members present (Id., §16(4)); (3) the
yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President's veto
(Id., §27(1); and (4) the President's objection to a bill which he
has vetoed. (Id.)

47 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v.

Smith, 44 Ohio 348 (1886).

48 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.

49 Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n. 675 F.2d

1282.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

1 235 SCRA 630.

2 Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to

the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in
its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an
enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but
also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite
votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a state had been "smuggled" in the printing of the
bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is
no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In

fact in one case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted
the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled
bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in
effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

80
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government."

3 Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we
have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and with their observance the courts have no concern." Our
concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution
for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are
concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully
observed in these cases."

4 Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.

5 Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1 144 US 1 (1891).

2 The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was

passed in violation of House Rule XV which provided that
members present in the chamber but not voting would be
"counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business."

3 286 US 6 (1932).

4 338 US 89 (1948).

5 374 US 109 (1963).

6 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116
(1966).

81
7 235 SCRA 630.

8 Supra.

9 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.

10 Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W.

Virginia 523 [1897].

11 Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see

also Note on ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The
rule of conclusiveness is similar to the common law rule of the
inviolability of the Sheriff's return. The Sheriff is considered as
an officer of the King just as a parliamentary act is deemed as a
regal act and no official can dispute the King's word. Dallas,
Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed.,
pp. 408-418 (1972).

12 Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.

13 Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).

14 See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236

Ind. 298, 140 N.E. 2d 220 [1957].

15 Op. cit, footnote No. 2.

16 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence,

S. 1350 (3rd ed. 1940).

17 63 Miss 512 (1886).

18 Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).

19 Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.

20 78 Phil. 1 (1947).

21 7 SCRA 374.

22 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.

82
23 56 SCRA 714.

24 227 SCRA 703.

25 Supra.

26 Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and

Puno dissented.

27 See writer's dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

28 Op cit.

29 Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.

83