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Gulf Studies 3

Mahjoob Zweiri
Md Mizanur Rahman
Arwa Kamal Editors

The 2017 Gulf

Crisis
An Interdisciplinary Approach
Gulf Studies

Volume 3

Series Editor
Md Mizanur Rahman, Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
This series is dedicated to serving growing academic interests in the dynamic,
complex and strategically important Gulf region, offering a publication platform to
scholars in the region and globally. The series takes an interdisciplinary approach to
documenting the changes taking place in the Gulf societies, and examines the
evolving relationship between the Gulf and other regions. The series advances non‐
Western perspectives in studying the Gulf societies, and their interactions with the
rest of the world. The series includes work being done on the member states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely: Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, in addition to Iran, Iraq, and Yemen.
The series accepts proposals for monographs, edited volumes and handbooks that
provide an understanding of the Gulf societies’ contemporary social, economic, and
political landscapes. The series covers a wide range of topics within four broad
themes, as follows:
Social and Cultural Issues in the Gulf:
Demography, migration, citizenship, gender, culture and identity, urbanization,
education, new media, unemployment, youth, family, women empowerment,
leadership, aging, human rights, sports, Islamic ethics, and Islam and society
Politics and Security in the Gulf:
Gulf defence and security, the GCC integration, democracy and political reform,
Gulf politics and political systems, the GCC’s foreign policy
Energy and Economics in the Gulf:
The political economy of the Gulf, economic diversification, international
investments, international trade, knowledge economy, energy security and geopol-
itics of energy, renewable energy development, environmental regulations,
infrastructure and urban planning, Islamic finance
The GCC and the World:
The GCC and Iran, the GCC and Africa, the GCC and South Asia, the GCC and
East Asia, the GCC and Southeast Asia, and the GCC and Western Powers

More information about this series at https://www.springer.com/series/16417

Mahjoob Zweiri Md Mizanur Rahman
• •

Arwa Kamal
Editors

The 2017 Gulf Crisis

An Interdisciplinary Approach

123
Editors
Mahjoob Zweiri Md Mizanur Rahman
Qatar University Qatar University
Doha, Qatar Doha, Qatar

Arwa Kamal
Qatar University
Doha, Qatar

ISSN 2662-4494 ISSN 2662-4508 (electronic)

Gulf Studies
ISBN 978-981-15-8734-4 ISBN 978-981-15-8735-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard
to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Disclaimer: This is an academic volume, designed to offer an objective understanding of the multifaceted
nature of the Gulf crisis. The views expressed in individual chapters of this volume are those of the
authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors. The editors assume no responsibility of
liability for any errors or omissions in the content of individual chapters.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
Preface and Acknowledgements

The political rift that opened between the Gulf countries in 2017 may be considered
unique in its nature. In the holy month of Ramadan, without forewarning, three Gulf
countries plus Egypt lay siege to Qatar, expelling Qatari citizens from their own
territories and banning their citizens from travelling to Qatar, or indeed from
expressing any sympathy or support towards that country. This unprecedented act
by the Gulf countries, as well as from other states which joined the offensive,
created what has come to be known as the Gulf Crisis 2017—although the crisis is
ongoing as of writing—and set in motion events which have had serious political,
economic, and social consequences. While the dispute created a security dilemma
for the region, casting a shadow over the status as well as the future of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), and throwing Gulf relations into turmoil, it was also
felt more widely, in view of the fact that the Gulf region has 60% of the world’s oil
reserves, so impacting the dynamics of the international community; the regional
instability has therefore become a crucial global issue.
This volume has thus been produced with the aim of providing a comprehensive
understanding of the Gulf Crisis, covering its influence on the economy, politics,
security, and society of the Gulf States, and surveying how it impacted domestic,
regional, and international relations. Hence the selection of our title, The 2017 Gulf
Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Although a number of books and articles
have been written about the Gulf Crisis, what is exceptional about the present
volume is that it offers wider scope to think about the conflict. The holistic as well
as the interdisciplinary nature of the book facilitates viewing matters from different
angles, which is prudent as well as practical when studying such multilayered and
multifaceted events. This text was a year and a half in the making and has been
reviewed carefully by academics renowned in the fields represented therein. The
chapters have been authored by knowledgeable and productive scholars from dif-
ferent disciplines, hailing from different academic institutions worldwide. They
have all contributed to putting a vast amount of integrated information together in
one text. The three editors of the volume are academics in the Gulf Studies Center
at Qatar University. We hope that this volume will be a valuable reference for
researchers and policy experts, and a useful source for scholars, academics, and

v
vi Preface and Acknowledgements

advanced students in the wider field of social sciences, who desire to ask questions
about the causes, consequences, and reality of the Gulf Crisis 2017.
We would like to acknowledge the proof-reading assistance of Qatar University
Press.

Doha, Qatar Mahjoob Zweiri

Md Mizanur Rahman
Arwa Kamal
Contents

1 The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Mahjoob Zweiri, Md Mizanur Rahman, and Arwa Kamal

Part I Gulf Security

2 Underlined Vulnerabilities of the Gulf Region:
A New Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Mahjoob Zweiri and Betul Dogan-Akkas
3 Qatar–Turkey Rapprochement: Challenging the Regional Status
Quo in the Gulf Security Sub-complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin
4 Qatar Crisis: GCC States’ Perception of Regional Powers . . . . . . . 51
Noof Rashid ALDosari
5 Transformations of the Gulf Security Landscape After the Gulf
Crisis: A Geopolitical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Nayef bin Nahar Al-Shamari and Hamad Al-Mohannadi
6 The Cyber Operation Against Qatar News Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
James Shires
7 Trans-Gulf Resonances: The Central Role of Egypt in the Saudi
Dispute Over Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Moisés Garduño García

Part II Threat Perception

8 Evolving Threat Perceptions and Changing Regional Dynamics
in a “Post-GCC” Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Kristian Ulrichsen

vii
viii Contents

9 Popular Sentiments and Elite Threat Perception in the Gulf:

Iran in the Public Discourse in Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Éva Ádám
10 The GCC, Iraq, and Iran: Perception of Threats Before
and After the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Shaikha Majed Al-Moslemani

Part III Developing Strategic Relations and Shifting Political

Alliances
11 The Qatar–Iran–Turkey Nexus: Shifts in Political Alliances
and Economic Diversification in the Gulf Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Robert J. Riggs
12 Look Middle, Look East! The Future of GCC Strategic
Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Shareefa Al-Adwani
13 The Malaysia–Qatar Relationship: The Perspective from
Malaysia—An Emerging Middle Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Ishtiaq Hossain and Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri

Part IV Foreign Policy Dynamics in a Post-GCC Era

14 Competing Radicalisms: A Comparison of Saudi and Iranian
Foreign Policies After 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Mahjoob Zweiri and Majed Al-Ansari
15 The Gulf Crisis: Turkey’s Soft Power in the Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Nesibe Hicret Battaloğlu
16 Iran’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy in Response to Regional Crises:
The Case of the Blockade Against Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Mehran Haghirian

Part V Qatar’s Economic Strategies in the Face of the Blockade

17 The Gulf Blockade: A Fifth Qatari Economic Stage
is Imminent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Moustafa Amin Mohammed Ali
18 To What Extent Has the Sovereign Wealth Fund Assisted Qatar’s
Security and Foreign Policy in Resisting the Blockade? . . . . . . . . . 303
Fahad Al-Marri
19 The Role of Qatar Airways in the Economic Development
of Qatar: Before and During the Gulf Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Catalina Petcu
Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Mahjoob Zweiri is the Director of the Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University,
where he is also an Associate Professor in Contemporary Politics of the Middle
East. Before joining Qatar University in 2010, Dr. Zweiri was a Senior Researcher
in Middle East Politics and Iran at the Center for Strategic Studies, University of
Jordan. He was also a visiting professor at the School of Government and
International Affairs at Durham University. From March 2003 to December 2006 he
was a Research Fellow and then Director of the Centre for Iranian Studies in the
Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University. Dr. Zweiri
has more than 60 publications in the areas of Iran and Contemporary Middle East
History and Politics. In addition to Arabic, Dr. Zweiri is fluent in Farsi and English.

Md Mizanur Rahman is Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Program, Qatar

University. Rahman is a sociologist by training, working on international migration
of labour, diaspora, migration policy, and other related fields of migration with a
focus on the Gulf states and South and Southeast Asian countries.

Arwa Kamal was a research Assistant at the Gulf Studies Center, Qatar
University. She earned BA in English Literature from Qatar University and MA in
Audiovisual Translation from Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar. She was
involved in language editing and translation at the Gulf Studies Center, Qatar
University. She is currently pursuing Ph.D. program.

Contributors

Éva Ádám is an international relations manager and a researcher at the Antall

József Knowledge Center in Budapest, Hungary. He is an expert on international
relations with a specialization in Arab and Iranian affairs. He holds degrees from the

ix
x Editors and Contributors

Corvinus University of Budapest and from Eötvös Loránd University. He is a Ph.D.

candidate at Eötvös Loránd University, focusing on the relationship between
Islamic legal theory and modern political thought in Tunisia.
Moustafa Amin Mohammed Ali is a research scholar at the Gulf Studies pro-
gram, Qatar University. His areas of research interest include Islamic finance,
sovereign funds, and wealth management. He holds an MSc in Islamic Economics
and Finance from Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU). Prior to enrolling in
Ph.D. studies, Moustafa worked as a research assistant in the Faculty of Islamic
studies at HBKU. Moustafa has received several awards for research excellence,
some of which culminated in publishing his research on “Educational Readings in
the Thoughts of Ibn Taymiyyah.”
Shareefa Al-Adwani is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the
Department of International Relations and the Director of the Center for Gulf
Studies at the American University of Kuwait (AUK). She completed her Ph.D. in
Political Science at the University of California, Davis in June 2016, focusing on
the two fields of International Relations and Quantitative Methods. She earned her
second MA in Political Science from the same university in March 2016. Her
current research projects involve (1) the investigation of GCC socio-political
phenomena and their changes over time using recently available government data,
and (2) the use of various new and existing cross-sectional time-series data to
investigate domestic factors in international cooperation, treaties, and agreements.
She has written for Kuwait’s RAI Institute for Strategic Studies and Research,
earned a grant from the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences, and is
a member of the Advisory Board for the New Kuwait Public Relations Committee
(NKPRC). In her current position at AUK she teaches courses related to Kuwaiti
foreign policy, international law and organisations, politics and women in the
Middle East, and quantitative methods, and has served as the Acting Chair of the
Steering Committee for the Masters in International Relations.
Majid Al-Ansari is an Assistant Professor of Political Psychology, and is manager
of the Policy Department at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute
(SESRI), Qatar University. He received his Ph.D. and master’s degree in social
change from the University of Manchester, his thesis being entitled “A Minority of
Citizens: The Effects of Religious, Social and Political Values on Trust in
Expatriates in Qatar.” Al-Ansari has previously served at the Qatari Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and with various civil society institutions. His research interests
include public opinion surveys, social resources, political and religious values,
charity work, and political analysis of domestic and regional issues. He has
contributed extensively as a political analyst on different television channels such as
Al Jazeera, BBC Arabic, Russia Today, Al Araby TV, and Qatar TV. In addition,
Al-Ansari writes weekly political articles for the Qatari daily Al Sharq.
Editors and Contributors xi

Noof Rashid Al-Dosari is a research scholar at the University of Essex,

Department of Government. She holds a master’s degree in Public Policy from
Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar, and has a Bachelor’s degree in English
Literature and Linguistic/International Affairs. In her Ph.D. thesis, which deals with
Iranian and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign policy discourse, she
examines Gulf States’ political discourses and the role of Khalijism in influencing
GCC foreign policy-making towards Iran. She is currently on leave to lecture at the
Qatar University Department of International Affairs Public Policy Program. She
was an associate at the Silatech organization, 2014, and a part-time research
assistant in the Research Centre for Islamic Legislation and Ethics, Education City,
2013. Her research interests include: public policymaking, policy studies, institu-
tionalism, government, foreign policy, discourse theory and discourse analysis,
political ideology, Iranian political studies, and Arabian Gulf politics.
Fahad Al-Marri is a research scholar at the University of Warwick, and Senior
Advisor in the President’s Office at Qatar’s Pension Funds, as well as a member
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Al-Marri holds a master’s degree in
Public Administration (MPA). He has published articles in several prestigious
journals and made research contributions at international conferences. His latest
research paper is “The Impact of the Oil Crisis on Security and Foreign Policy in
GCC Countries: Case Studies of Qatar, KSA and UAE,” published with the Arab
Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). His Ph.D. thesis is titled: “The
Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in GCC Countries’ Security & Foreign Policy,”
and his research interests are: security studies, international relations, foreign policy
analysis, Middle Eastern security and foreign policy, sovereign wealth funds, and
soft power.
Shaikha Majed Al-Moslemani is working as an Administrative Coordinator at
Qatar University. Her research concentrates on Gulf issues and international affairs,
particularly between Iran and the Gulf region. She started her career as an
Academic Adviser in 2013, and has been involved in different research projects
involving society, culture, and regional integration in the GCC states.
Nayef bin Nahar Al-Shamari is the Director of the Ibn Khaldon Center for
Humanities and Social Sciences at Qatar University. He holds a BA in Sharia and
Islamic Studies from Qatar University, and an MA and Ph.D. in Islamic Banking
from the International Islamic University, Malaysia, as well as a Ph.D. in Political
Science from the same university. He has authored seven books and more than a
dozen articles on various topics including Islamic and Sharia studies, political
science, and the geopolitics of the Gulf.
Nesibe Hicret Battaloğlu is a research scholar at the Middle East Technical
University (METU) Area Studies Program. Battaloğlu completed her master’s
studies at the Qatar University Gulf Studies program in 2016. Her research interests
are the international relations of the Gulf, Iran–GCC relations, and identity and
xii Editors and Contributors

foreign policy in the GCC states. Battaloğlu’s most recent publication is titled
“Alliances and Regionalism in the Middle East after Arab Uprisings: An
Assessment of the Durability and Fragility of the Gulf Cooperation Council,” in
Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, edited by
Magdalena Karolak and Nermin Allam (Palgrave, 2020).
Betül Doğan Akkaş is a Ph.D. candidate at Qatar University Gulf Studies Center,
from where she also obtained her MA, with a thesis entitled “Securitization of
Qatari Foreign Policy.” She completed her BA in International Relations at Bilkent
University. Following her undergraduate studies, she conducted field research in
Jenin, Palestine. Her research interests include foreign policymaking, security, and
social transformation in the Gulf Countries. Her contributions, mainly focusing on
international relations in the Middle East region, have appeared as op-eds, journal
articles, and book chapters.
Moisés Garduño García is a full-time professor at the Faculty of Political and
Social Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He
holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary Arab and Islamic Studies from the Autonomous
University of Madrid, a master’s degree in Asian and African Studies with a
specialization in the Middle East from El Colegio de México, and has a BA in
International Relations from UNAM. After conducting postdoctoral research in the
Center for Research and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS),
Mexico, he served as head of the Department of Asian Languages of the National
School of Linguistics, Translation, and Foreign Languages of UNAM. He belongs
to the National Research System of Mexico, and he holds certificates in Arabic
language from the National School of Translators of Toledo, and in Persian
Language Studies from the Dekhoda Institute of the University of Tehran.
Mehran Haghirian is a Ph.D. student at Qatar University’s Gulf Studies program
and a Graduate Research Assistant at the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and
Social Sciences. He has a master’s degree in International Affairs from the
American University’s School of International Service in Washington, DC, with a
research focus on Iran and the Persian Gulf region.
Ishtiaq Hossain is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Political
Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), teaching courses
in International Relations while also serving as postgraduate coordinator in the
department. He is the editor of Intellectual Discourse, a Scopus-listed flagship
journal of the IIUM. Author of nearly 60 articles in indexed journals, as well as
books, in 2018 he was recognised as one of the top researchers and postgraduate
thesis supervisors in the IIUM. Before joining the IIUM, Dr. Ishtiaq served as a
Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the National University of
Singapore. He was also a visiting professor at the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University, and the Department of Politics at the
University of Waikato, New Zealand. His latest major research report, published in
Editors and Contributors xiii

2018, was entitled “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy under the Pakatan Harapan
Government: The First Hundred Days.” Dr. Ishtiaq Hossain is currently engaged in
writing research reports on China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) policy, and is
writing a textbook titled Muslim International Organizations.
Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Selçuk
University and has an MA in Political Science from the University of
Missouri-Columbia, where he was a Fulbright scholar. Currently he is an Assistant
Professor at Necmettin Erbakan University in Konya. His primary research interests
include politics in the Middle East and Africa, international political economy,
international security, and human rights and democratisation.
Catalina Petcu is a Research Associate at Qatar University. Her research expe-
rience extends across a variety of topics, such as communication technologies,
political economy, and mental health in Qatar. Her master’s thesis on the economic
development of Qatar focused on the aviation industry, and she has published three
co-authored chapters on media development and communication. She is currently
involved in several projects concerning media in Qatar, culture and economy in the
Gulf, and mental health in the non-clinical population of Qatar.
Robert J. Riggs is a geopolitical risk analyst and an independent scholar whose
primary research focuses on the construction and maintenance of socio-political and
religious authority in Arabic-speaking Shi‘i communities the interplay of identity
politics and the political economies of the MENA region. He also has published
research articles on the history, power, and economics in Ottoman-controlled Najaf
(ca. 1500-1920), globalisation’s effects on Shi‘a leadership structures, and the Shi‘a
shrine cities of Iraq. He is the founder of Global Intelligence Insights LLC, a firm
specialising in cultural and geopolitical risk analysis.
James Shires is a Research Fellow with the Cyber Security Project at the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. His research
examines cybersecurity in the Middle East, focusing on the interaction between
threats to individuals, states, and organisations, new regional dynamics, and
cybersecurity expertise. He also holds a DPhil in International Relations from the
University of Oxford, having submitted his thesis on cybersecurity in Egypt and the
Gulf states in August 2018. He has won awards for cybersecurity papers from
the German Marshall Fund and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He
holds an MSc from Birkbeck College, University of London, and a BA from the
University of Cambridge.
Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri is an Assistant Professor in the Department of
Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). She
received her Ph.D. from IIUM, her master’s degree from the London School of
Economics and Political Science (LSE), and her undergraduate degree from the
University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include political Islam, Middle
Eastern politics, political parties, and democratisation. Her latest publication is
xiv Editors and Contributors

entitled “From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A Comparison between Rashid

Ghannouchi and Anwar Ibrahim,” in Intellectual Discourse, vol. 26, no. 2 (June
2018). She is currently conducting research entitled “Gender Discrimination among
Professionals in the State of Selangor, Malaysia.”
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is a Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East.
Working across the disciplines of political science, international relations, and
international political economy, his research examines the changing position of
Persian Gulf states in the global order, as well as the emergence of longer term,
nonmilitary challenges to regional security. Between 2006 and 2008 he worked as
senior Gulf analyst at the Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, and was co-director
of the Kuwait Program on Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf
States at the London School of Economics from 2008 until 2013. Having published
extensively on the Gulf, his books include Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and
the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (Columbia University Press, 2011) and Qatar
and the Arab Spring (Oxford University Press, 2014). In addition, he is the author
of The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 1914–22
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and The First World War in the Middle East (Hurst &
Co, 2014). His most recent books include The Gulf States in International Political
Economy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and The United Arab Emirates: Power,
Politics, and Policymaking (Routledge, 2016). His articles have appeared in
numerous academic journals, including Global Policy and the Journal of Arabian
Studies, and he consults regularly on Gulf issues for Oxford Analytica and the
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. He also writes regularly for the
Economist Intelligence Unit, openDemocracy, and Foreign Policy, and authors a
monthly column for Gulf Business News and Analysis. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen
holds a doctorate in history from the University of Cambridge.
List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Illustration of different research approaches to the question

of perception in international relations and foreign policy
analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 56
Fig. 15.1 Positive perception towards Turkey: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
the UAE, and Oman (Source TESEV polls 2011, 2012,
and 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 262
Fig. 18.1 Composition of real GDP by Sector
(Source Callen et al. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 304
Fig. 18.2 Economic share of GCC countries
(Source Al-Mawali 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 306
Fig. 18.3 Ranking: liquified natural gas exporters
(Source Krane and Wright 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 309
Fig. 18.4 SWF types and asset allocations (Source IMF 2012) . . . . . . . .. 312
Fig. 18.5 GCC country allocation of direct investments
(Source Boston Consulting Group 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 315
Fig. 19.1 Qatar Airways’ air corridors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 338

xv
List of Tables

Table 1.1 A 13-point list of demands, presented to Qatar, to resolve

the crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3
Table 5.1 Area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia compared to the GCC
Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 85
Table 5.2 Population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia compared
to other GCC Countries (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 85
Table 6.1 Suggested search terms on “Qatarileaks” website in English
and Arabic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 109
Table 12.1 2016 Top import and top export destinations for each GCC
member (World Bank Data 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 200
Table 12.2 2016 top import and top export destinations for each GCC
member, excluding superpowers and other GCC members
(World Bank Data 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 201
Table 12.3 2016 Top import and top export destinations and amounts
for each GCC member, excluding superpowers and other
GCC members (World Bank Data 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 202

xvii
Chapter 1
The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction

Mahjoob Zweiri, Md Mizanur Rahman, and Arwa Kamal

On 5 June 2017, three member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain—as well as Egypt, issued a
coordinated statement severing all relations with Qatar. This “Quartet” closed their
airspaces to the Qatar national airline (Qatar Airways), as well as banning Qatari
vessels and vehicles from their territorial waters and lands. The boycott soon became
a “Qatar blockade,” as the Quartet closed off access to Qatar, with an embargo on air,
sea, and land traffic to and from the peninsula. At the same time, they declared Qatari
officials and nationals stationed in their countries persona non grata and ordered them
to leave, while calling urgently on their own citizens living in Qatar to return home.
Among the countries of the GCC, Oman and Kuwait were the only GCC nations
not to break off ties with Qatar: refusing to align with any party, these two countries
called for restraint and took initiatives to resolve the crisis (Krieg 2019a; Ulrichsen
2018; Doumar et al. 2017).
In prosecuting the blockade, the Quartet accused Qatar of assisting Islamist groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza, and Islamist fighters in
Syria, Libya, and Yemen. They also accused Qatar of supporting terrorist groups and
having an overly close relation with Iran, the regional rival of Saudi Arabia, and of
using Qatar’s national network Al Jazeera to foment protest, especially during the
Arab Spring in 2011 (Al Khalifa 2019; Baabood 2019; Davidson 2019; Doumar et al.
2017). In its initial reaction, Qatar asserted that there was “no legitimate justification”
for the blockade, adding that it constituted a “violation of its sovereignty.”1,2
The response by the international community initially was mixed, with global
powers generally asserting that this was an internal matter for the GCC (Bakir 2019;
Boussois 2019; Kettner 2019). The South China Morning Post quoted analysts as
saying the crisis would complicate China’s efforts to reach a free-trade deal with the
region (Wong 2017); while Germany’s foreign minister sought to defuse the crisis by

M. Zweiri · M. M. Rahman (B) · A. Kamal

Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
e-mail: mizan@qu.edu.qa

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 1

M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_1
2 M. Zweiri et al.

meeting with his Saudi counterpart.3 There was no doubt, however, that this sudden
move by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt had engendered a crisis that not
only affected the region but had implications for the entire world.4
The initial six months saw significant efforts by the Qatari Government to resolve
the crisis: in an interview with CBS News, the Emir of Qatar said that he would be
willing “to walk 10,000 miles toward the brothers, if they walk one meter toward
reconciliation.”5 Yet the blockading countries, led by Saudi Arabia, continued to
increase the pressure, using their global influence to persuade other countries (mostly
third world) to sever relations with Qatar (for a comprehensive analysis, see Quilliam
2019). Yemen, Maldives, Mauritania, Comoros, and the eastern government of Libya
led by Khalifa Haftar responded positively to the Saudi request. For a time Senegal did
likewise, although it would later restore full relations with Qatar. Jordan, Djibouti,
Chad, and Niger chose to downgrade their diplomatic ties with Qatar rather than
break off completely. The Quartet also embarked on a campaign across the globe,
and in particular in Washington, to damage the image of Qatar.6
The blockade aimed ostensibly to extract concessions from Doha, including the
closure of Al Jazeera, curtailing its international influence. A 13-point list of demands
was drawn up and presented to Qatar on 22 June 2017, in essence requiring Qatar to
do the following: scale down diplomatic and military ties with Iran and shut down
the Turkish military base; sever ties with regional ideological organizations (Muslim
Brotherhood and others); cease funding to groups and individuals that the Quartet
considered terrorists, and hand over their nationals who had fled to Qatar for fear of
political persecution; shut down Al Jazeera and other news outlets such as Arabi21,
Rassd, and others; stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from the Quartet and
stop aligning Qatar’s military, political, social, and economic policies with them; and
cease contact with opposition groups in the Quartet (see Table 1.1).
Qatar denied the accusations that it supported and financed terrorism, demanding
that the Saudi-led bloc present evidence to the contrary; it also refused to shutter the
state-sponsored news channel Al Jazeera, citing the right of the freedom of the press.
The list prompted Marwan Bishara, senior political analyst at Al Jazeera, to remark
“This is clearly not just a question of demands, but an insult.”7 Perhaps realizing
that the excessive nature of the 13 demands rendered them in effect superfluous, on
18 July 2017 the Quartet withdrew them in favor of what came to be known as “six
broad principles,” by which the Quartet meant: combating extremism and terrorism;
prohibiting all acts of incitement which spread and promote hatred and violence;
committing fully to the Riyadh Agreement; accepting and following all outcomes of
the Arab–Islamic–US summit held in Riyadh in 2017; refraining from interfering in
internal affairs of the Quartet; and agreeing to confront all forms of extremism and
terrorism that posed a threat to international peace and security (Table 1.1).
Qatar also sought international assistance, turning to the Turkish and Iranian
governments for their support. Saudi Arabia regards the Islamic Republic of Iran,
which is majority Shi’ite, as its main rival in the region, and sees it as a threat to
regional stability. Within the context of their long-running rivalry, Iran stands to gain
from Saudi Arabia’s ongoing blockade on Qatar. The Saudis and Emiratis, in turn,
came to realize that isolating Qatar would not be easy and could ultimately backfire
1 The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction 3

Table 1.1 A 13-point list of demands, presented to Qatar, to resolve the crisis
1 Scale down diplomatic ties with Iran and close the Iranian diplomatic missions in
Qatar, expel members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and cut off military and
intelligence cooperation with Iran. Trade and commerce with Iran must comply with
US and international sanctions in a manner that does not jeopardise the security of the
Gulf Cooperation Council
2 Immediately shut down the Turkish military base, which is currently under
construction, and halt military cooperation with Turkey inside of Qatar
3 Sever ties to all “terrorist, sectarian and ideological organisations,” specifically the
Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL, al-Qaeda, Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as the Nusra
Front) and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Formally declare these entities as terror groups as per
the list announced by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt, and concur with all
future updates of this list
4 Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organisations that have been
designated as terrorists by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, US and other countries
5 Hand over “terrorist figures,” fugitives and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, Egypt and Bahrain to their countries of origin. Freeze their assets, and provide
any desired information about their residency, movements and finances
6 Shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations
7 End interference in sovereign countries’ internal affairs. Stop granting citizenship to
wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Revoke Qatari
citizenship for nationals where such citizenship violates those countries’ laws
8 Pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other financial losses caused by
Qatar’s policies in recent years. The sum will be determined in coordination with Qatar
9 Align Qatar’s military, political, social and economic policies with the other Gulf and
Arab countries, as well as on economic matters, as per the 2014 agreement reached
with Saudi Arabia
10 Cease contact with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and
Bahrain. Hand over files detailing Qatar’s prior contact with and support for opposition
groups, and submit details of their personal information and the support Qatar has
provided them
11 Shut down all news outlets funded directly and indirectly by Qatar, including Arabi21,
Rassd, Al Araby Al Jadeed, Mekameleen and Middle East Eye, etc
12 Agree to all the demands within 10 days of list being submitted to Qatar, or the list will
become invalid
13 Consent to monthly compliance audits in the first year after agreeing to the demands,
followed by quarterly audits in the second year, and annual audits in the following
10 years
Six Broad Principles, presented to Qatar
1 Commitment to combat extremism and terrorism in all its forms and to prevent their
financing or the provision of safe havens
2 Prohibiting all acts of incitement and all forms of expression which spread, incite,
promote or justify hatred and violence
(continued)
4 M. Zweiri et al.

Table 1.1 (continued)

3 Full commitment to Riyadh Agreement 2013, the supplementary agreement, and its
executive mechanism for 2014 within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) for Arab States
4 Commitment to all the outcomes of the Arab-Islamic-US Summit held in Riyadh in
May 2017
5 To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States and from supporting illegal
entities
6 The responsibility of all States of international community to confront all forms of
extremism and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security
Source The Peninsula, Saudi-led block drops the list of 13 demands: now call for six principles,
19 July 2017: retrieved on the 13 January 2020: https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/19/07/2017/
Saudi-led-bloc-drops-the-list-of-13-demands-now-calls-for-six-principles; Al Jazeera, ‘Arab states
issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis’, 12 July 2017, Al Jazeera News/Qatar, retrieved on
5 Dec 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-
170623022133024.html

on them. Meanwhile, the government of Qatar continued to pursue unconditional

talks as the means of resolving the crisis, with Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
remarking, “[I]t is indeed unfortunate that the ongoing Gulf crisis revealed the failure
of the GCC to attain its objectives and meet the aspirations of our Gulf peoples …
[H]istory teaches us that crises are destined to pass but their mishandling may linger
and leave behind long-lasting repercussions. … [W]e need to solve the problem but
the dignity and sovereignty of Qatar come before any considerations.”8
After three years, the Gulf blockade could be seen to have had multiple negative
and positive outcomes. While the enmity between the countries involved mounted,
Qatar made significant progress towards self-sufficiency. On multiple fronts—food,
international relations, trade, and others—it has shown increasing self-reliance. This
introductory chapter is accordingly divided into three broad sections: the next section
discusses the 2017 Gulf crisis in relation to the animosity and rivalry between Qatar
and its neighbors over the last few decades. This is followed by a section on how
Qatar has managed the crisis since the early days of the blockade and has emerged as
a stronger nation as a consequence. In this context, we focus on the challenges that
the Gulf crisis posed to Qatar, and some of the opportunities that Qatar was thereby
able to seize. We briefly offer a timeline of the crisis and the major shifts in internal
and external affairs. The final section gives an outline of the present volume, with a
brief discussion about each of the main parts therein.

The 2017 Gulf Crisis: A Continuity of the Animosity

and Rivalry Against Qatar

In terms of scope and impact, the 2017 Qatar blockade may be unprecedented;
however, in terms of the nature of the intervention and the underlying intentions it
1 The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction 5

cannot be said to be anything new—it is simply a continuation of the long-running

rivalry between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain on the one hand and Qatar on
the other (Gengler 2012; Pradhan 2018; Quilliam 2019; Al-Hashemi 2019; Davidson
2019; Krieg 2019b; Ulrichsen 2019;). We can trace the antecedents of the 2017 Gulf
Crisis back to the coup in Qatar in 1996, and the antagonistic relations that have been
perpetuated thereafter (Wright 2019; Roberts 2017; Doumar et al. 2017; Ulrichsen
2018). A proper understanding of the blockade, therefore, is quite impossible if we
do not review the history of recent decades.
Qatar gained its independence from Britain in 1971, and in 1972 Sheikh Khalifa
bin Hamad Al Thani became the Emir of Qatar. Qatari foreign policy during his
leadership remained essentially within the sphere of Saudi influence. When Sheikh
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, father of the current ruler, became Emir in 1995, a
fundamental change could be perceived in Qatar’s economic and foreign policy.
Qatar’s new focus on natural gas set the country on a different path from its predom-
inantly oil-producing neighbors, and it gradually emerged from the Saudi sphere.
Under the leadership of Sheikh Hamad, whom Qataris refer to as Father Emir,
Qatar accumulated immense wealth, allowing the country to take on many devel-
opment projects and materialize the Emir’s development vision within a relatively
short span of time. Alongside the transformation in the economic sphere, Father
Amir implemented ambitious programs designed to transform Qatar into an interna-
tional power, including conflict resolution and facilitating dialogue between warring
factions. Thus, Qatar strengthened its own socio-political foundations while also
cementing its international reputation.
However, the reign of Sheikh Hamad was not smooth: he immediately had to face
two coup attempts, in 1995 and 1996, both of which were foiled, with responsibility
at least partly ascribed to Saudi Arabia. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the United
States made efforts to reduce the animosity between Qatar and its powerful Gulf
neighbors but was not entirely successful. In 2002 Riyadh recalled its ambassador
from Doha after complaining about anti-Saudi content on Al Jazeera. However, when
the Arab Spring broke out in early 2011, these countries again blamed Al Jazeera
for fueling the unrest in the region. According to Kabalan (2018: 35), the 30 June
2013 coup against Mohamed Morsi finally exposed the rift between Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and Bahrain, and Qatar.
Following a period of heightened tension after the Egyptian coup, Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Qatar in early 2014, insti-
gating a diplomatic crisis that endured for nine months. Arguably, it was the Obama
Administration which restrained Saudi Arabia and the UAE from taking further
action during this tense period. However, Qatar had to opt for reconciliation, allowing
a transfer of power from Sheikh Hamad to his son Sheikh Tamim, the current Emir
of Qatar. Qatar signed the Riyadh Agreement in November 2014 and the three GCC
countries restored relations with Doha (Kabalan 2018: 35).
On 23 May 2017, the website Qatar News Agency (QNA) was hacked, and began
releasing statements purporting to be by Emir Tamim which hailed Qatar’s relation-
ship with Iran, expressed support for both Hezbollah and Hamas, and suggested that
the newly elected President Trump would not last long in office (Kirkpatrick and
6 M. Zweiri et al.

Frenkel 2017). Although the Qatari authorities vehemently denied the authenticity
of the statements, the news was disseminated throughout the region by outlets in the
UAE and Saudi Arabia. Email messages by the Emirati envoy in Washington were
subsequently leaked, indicating that the hack had been planned and executed by the
UAE with international assistance, but this did nothing to defuse the crisis.9 Less
than two weeks after the cyberattack, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, along
with Egypt, cut diplomatic ties with Qatar.10 Thus, on 5 June 2017, the current Gulf
Crisis began.
Despite divergences on the cause of the 2017 diplomatic onslaught on Qatar, there
is strong agreement among analysts that the Saudi-led blockading Quartet would
not have acted as it did without the implicit, if not explicit, support of President
Trump (Cafiero 2019; Kabalan 2018). The night before Trump’s visit to the kingdom,
former US defense secretary Robert Gates openly criticized Qatar for supporting
Islamists, despite the fact that Qatar hosts the Al-Udeid Camp, the biggest American
airbase in the region. Marwan Kabalan argues that the election of Donald Trump in
2016 encouraged Saudi Arabia and the UAE to resume the conflict and bring it to a
decisive conclusion, and hence provided the catalyst that sparked the 2017 Gulf Crisis
(Kabalan 2018: 35). However, after almost two and a half years of blockade, Qatar’s
foreign minister was able to say that he hopes for “progress” in the efforts to resolve
the crisis, following talks with Saudi Arabia on 6 December 2019.11 However, the
UAE later dismissed any potential to resolve the crisis soon.

Qatar Under the Blockade

Since the beginning of the crisis, Qatar has taken significant steps to mitigate the
impact of the international blockade. The Qatar Government took various steps to
lessen the impact of the blockade on Qatari citizens and resident population.12 Food
supplies, a key dependency of Qatar on neighboring countries, were secured through
the promotion of self-sufficiency. The emphasis was given to self-production, which
was welcomed by many local businesspeople for whom it increased economic oppor-
tunities.13 One of the most prominent impacts of the blockade was thus related to
food and other basic necessities. The Quartet, in imposing the blockade, had expected
that because of over-dependence on other countries for food, Qatar would be placed
in extremis. However, within a few days Iran started sending food by plane, which
proved vital in weathering the initial stages of the crisis. Over only a few days, five
planes of vegetables along with three ships with 350 tons of food were sent by Iran.14
On the economic front, it was expected that the blockade would have a destructive
impact on Qatari business. In the first week of the crisis, the Qatar Stock Exchange
fell more than seven percent. That first week was marked by chaos and confusion
among governments, administrators, political figures, businesses, and migrants.15
The crisis impacted seriously upon the import sector, which fell by nearly 40%. Mean-
while, Qatar Airways, one of the region’s major long-haul carriers, which routinely
flies through Saudi airspace, diverted flights through Iranian airspace. Premier UAE
1 The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction 7

airlines Etihad and Emirates announced they would suspend flights to Qatar, as did
budget carriers Air Arabia and FlyDubai. Bahrain’s Gulf Air and Saudia joined
them.16
Further, within six months of the imposition of the blockade the Qatari admin-
istration moved towards other sources of economic development. One of these is
tourism. Qatar announced a program to allow visa-free entry for citizens of 80
countries, in order to encourage air travel and tourism. Nationals from dozens of
countries in Europe and elsewhere—including India, Lebanon, New Zealand, South
Africa, and the United States—need only present a valid passport to enter Qatar. The
liberalization of the visa regime gave Qatar the most liberal border controls in the
region.17
One of the important areas of concern was the impact of the blockade on the
proposed 2022 football World Cup, slated to be hosted by Qatar. It is important to
note that Qatar has invested heavily in football and this investment has reshaped
football boundaries globally (Thani and Heenan 2017). Although the crisis cast a
dark shadow over the possibility of the games, for the period of the first six months
the preparatory constructions were unaffected, and the FIFA President maintained
that the Qatar World Cup was not under threat.18
Among the grievances cited by boycotting countries, the Doha official news
channel Al Jazeera loomed large. Yet despite the insistence by the Saudi-led coali-
tion that Al Jazeera be closed, during the first six months the news broadcaster flatly
refused to be a bargaining point in any of the negotiations to end the blockade.
As the Qatari foreign affairs minister insisted, the Al Jazeera Media Network is an
“internal affair” and there would be no discussion about its future with nations that
were imposing a blockade on Qatar.19 At the same time, the demand for the closure
of Al Jazeera was unequivocally condemned by international, regional, and national
rights organization (Al Khalifa 2019).
Overall, the first six months of the blockade had a lighter impact on Qatar than
was expected. In fact, many economic developments were registered in the period.
The inauguration of the Hamad Port notably conferred positive benefits for locals as
well as the international community, having the potential for direct trade with Turkey,
Oman, Pakistan, and India. Qatar’s leadership was also able to generate sympathy
from the international community, and in fact bilateral relations with other countries
have almost doubled.20 Thus, after the initial confusion, the international community
extended more support than it had before. Many countries—France, United States,
Russia, Germany, Pakistan, Turkey, and others—expressed a desire for peace in the
Gulf,21 while the United Nations urged Gulf countries to “de-escalate the tensions
and to engage in direct dialogue”22 and called for “no unilateral steps” following the
major diplomatic fallout in the region.23
More interestingly, far from dividing public opinion, the crisis has united Qataris
and made Qatar’s relatively young ruler extremely popular. In an illustration of how
the crisis has brought Qataris together across tribal, sectarian, or political differences,
images of Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani can be seen everywhere, on domestic
and commercial buildings, vehicles, street signs, social media posts, etc. (Oruc 2019).
It was perhaps in view of these developments that the Saudi foreign minister Adel
8 M. Zweiri et al.

Al Jubeir acerbically remarked: “We must recognise that Qatar emerged from this
crisis faster than we expected and succeeded in winning international and regional
support in its favour due to our aggressive demands … the situation does not allow
any new measures to be taken against Qatar and we should not stop any mediation
because closing the door does not serve us.”24 Middle East expert Miroslav Zafirov
commented that “one thing is certain—so far, the blockade has failed” (Zafirov 2017:
200). Speaking to Al Jazeera, Saad al-Kaabi, CEO of Qatar Petroleum, went even
further, saying “I would like to thank the four countries for their blockade, because
it has made Qatar stronger, the people of Qatar stronger, their businesses stronger.
We will come out of this much stronger than before.”25
In the next six months of the crisis, from January 2018 till June 2018, we observe
an escalation of the tensions between Qatar and the boycotting countries. Prominent
efforts were made to demean the Qatari government’s efforts for self-sustainability
and empowerment, and there was a significant increase in propaganda against Qatar,
with a number of attempts to malign the image of Qatar using fake Twitter accounts
and hashtags.26 This period of the crisis also saw significant attempts by the Qatar
Government to ease the tension through collective efforts. Qatar urged the UN’s top
court to intercede against the UAE which, according to Qatar, had spread a “climate of
fear” among Qataris living resident therein, splitting families and causing “substantial
pain.” Doha thus appealed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to
order emergency measures to lift the restrictions imposed on Qataris in the UAE.27
The support of Iran and Turkey was also sustained in the second six months,
a support which was acknowledged by the Emir of Qatar on several occasions.28
Gradually, some countries began to restore their relationships with Qatar, Senegal
reinstating its ambassador to Qatar in August 2017 in a bid to encourage a resolution
to the crisis.29 And although most of the GCC countries remained opposed to Qatar,
Kuwait and Oman took significant steps to resolve the crisis and end the boycott.30
Remarkably, in this period the crisis indirectly enhanced the economic activity
in Qatar. During the first year, the national economy of Qatar saw a significant
increase: according to the Qatar National Bank, the national current account surplus
had widened to 6.4% of GDP, while the financial deficit had also narrowed by the
end of the first year of the conflict.31 The fiscal account deficit continued to be a
source of worry, but the impact decreased because of higher oil prices. The Ministry
of Finance reported that Qatar was estimated to go from a deficit of 1.6% GDP in
2017 to a surplus of 2.8% in 2018, based on the Economic Outlook Brief released by
the IMF in May 2018.32 As reported by the IMF, the economic blockade had not had
a serious impact on Qatar, and what impact it had was fading. Interestingly, the IMF
described the crisis as a catalyst for economic self-reliance by Qatar.33 Overall, Qatar
had competently managed growth performance despite the rift with major regional
powers.34
At no point in the first year did food become a problem for the Qatari Adminis-
tration. While Iran and Turkey actively transferred food and other products for local
consumption, Greece also offered its agro-tech expertise in support of Qatar’s self-
sufficiency plans.35 Sales of Qatari products increased 300% in the first quarter of
2018 compared with the same period in 2017.36 Local dairy companies worked to
1 The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction 9

increase their production to cover the needs of the local market, aiming to meet 92%
of local demand for milk by the end of the first half of 2018.37 In pursuit of making
Qatar self-reliant, local farms had more than doubled their aggregate production.38
Despite the crisis, assets and revenues at Qatar’s Islamic banks had in fact grown
over the previous year. The state’s four full-fledged Islamic banks, Qatar Islamic
Bank, Masraf Al Rayan, Qatar International Islamic Bank, and Barwa Bank, held
a combined 358.6 billion riyals ($96 billion) in assets in the first quarter of 2018,
an 8.8% increase from a year earlier. Their focus on Qatar’s domestic market had
clearly helped them to withstand the crisis.39 Yet despite the positive outlook for many
sectors of the economy, the aviation sector, and in particular Qatar Airways, took a
serious hit. Qatar Airways reported a loss of more than $69 m due to the blockade, in
what the airline called the “most challenging year in its 20-year history,” recording
a 19% decrease in seat occupancy on departure flights.40 The closure of Bahrain’s
airspace had been the most critical factor in this decline.41
The war of words in this period did not let up. In response to a comment by the
Saudi Crown Prince that the “Gulf crisis is a very, very, very small problem,” the head
of the Qatar Media Corporation wrote that although Qatar is geographically a very,
very, very small country, it is an independent state and is not led by outsiders; and he
commented that there was “a very, very, very big country which is not independent
and is being controlled by a very, very, very small emirate.”42
The year 2018 came to an end with another appeal by the Emir of Qatar Sheikh
Tamim to the four countries imposing the blockade to hold “unconditional” talks to
end what he described as a “flagrant” violation of international law. “The blockade
on Qatar has harmed the reputation of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the ensuing
paralysis has reflected negatively on the council’s aspired role towards regional and
global issues,” the Emir said in his speech at the 73rd UN General Assembly.43
Qatar continued to receive mild international support, and the international
community took steps to restore peace in the region; France, in particular, had been
making sustained attempts to resolve the crisis.44 Chinese diplomats and academics
praised the efforts of the Qatar Government: as the Chinese authorities observed,
Qatar had acted competently and responsibly in response to the blockade, and its
innovative approach had made the country self-reliant and mitigated the worst effects
on the Qatari population.45 Yet while the shadow of uncertainty remained, it was
decreasing in significance over time as Qatar continued to take steps towards self-
reliance. Media coverage declined in the period June to December 2018, and the
international discussion now seemed to shift away from the question of whether
Qatar supported terrorism, to cover instead matters related to Qatari self-sufficiency
and its resilient economic development.
After two years of crisis, a decline in media attention and a normalization of
the blockade could be observed. The attempts by both Qatar and the international
community to bring about a resolution having had no results, discussions of the
blockade or the cessation of the crisis dwindled. The boycotting countries maintained
their demands and held no fruitful talks, despite the continuous requests by Qatari
officials to work out a mutually advantageous way to exit the crisis.46
10 M. Zweiri et al.

At the end of the second year, Qatar officially withdrew its membership of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The breaking news
slightly rekindled interest in the issue, since it was thought that the move would
again increase the tension in the region.47
Overall, then, it is fair to say that the Qatar crisis seems to have been trans-
formed from a tragedy to an opportunity for the Qatari people. In May 2019, the
Swedish envoy to Qatar, Her Excellency Ewa Polano, praised the improvements in
food production, noting that Qatar has seen a significant increase in homegrown
agricultural products, especially vegetables and fruits, and that precisely because the
products are homegrown, prices have also decreased considerably. And alongside
food products, she noted, Qatar has become near to 100% self-reliant in the produc-
tion of milk and dairy products.48 According to the Global Competitiveness Report
2019, Qatar ranked as the second most competitive Arab economy, and globally 29th
out of 141 countries. In fact, Qatar moved up one rank from the previous year’s 30th
place and this clearly reflects the country’s continued global competitiveness.49 In
fact, the end of the second year showed that Qatar had in effect survived the assault
on its sovereignty and economy and utilized the opportunity to better position itself
on the global stage. In the face of the boycotting countries, the crisis had ironically
proved a trigger point for Qatar to become self-sufficient. Thus, it can be said that the
crisis has made Qatar stronger and more independent, not only in the areas of food,
but also in business partnerships, exports, international relations, and other important
international issues.

Structure of the Book

This book, the 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, discusses the Gulf
Crisis from a range of different academic perspectives. The overall focus of the book
is to document the changes that have occurred on different frontiers in the course
of the 2017 crisis, including security, threat perceptions, strategic alliances, foreign
relations, and socio-economic conditions. While not unaware of the risk of high
ambition, this book sets out to be a key reference for the 2017 Gulf Crisis. It is an
outcome of a conference organized in December 2018 in Qatar University by the
Gulf Studies Center, which saw presentations and in-depth debates on a wide range
of themes ranging from cyber and information security, to the role of media and
information technology in aggravating conflicts and creating political cultures, the
shifts of alliances in the region, and the long-term economic implications of this crisis
for all parties. Above all, the conference sought to offer a holistic understanding of
the siege in its political, economic, and social aspects. Reflecting the efforts of that
conference, the present volume draws on a range of different disciplines to address
the crisis from historical, political, security, societal, and economic perspectives.
The book can claim to have unique importance in documenting a Gulf Crisis which
differs from any other crisis in the history of the region. In all previous diplomatic
rifts, the maximum extent of hostilities has amounted to withdrawing ambassadors
1 The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction 11

and closing embassies in the target country. With the international siege, and in pitting
neighboring and regional countries against one country, the 2017 Gulf Crisis stands
out as a unique historical event which requires detailed analysis. The book can also
claim uniqueness through its close temporal proximity to the events it documents.
Drawing on a variety of academic frameworks, it is an attempt to set in historical
perspective, and provide a deep understanding of, events which were still very much
in development at the time of publication.
The book is divided into five parts: (I) Gulf security, (II) Threat perception, (III)
Developing strategic relations and shifting political alliances, (IV) Foreign policy
dynamics in a Post-GCC era, and finally (V) Qatar’s economic strategies in the face
of the blockade.
Part I is dedicated to Gulf Security, which was being shaken even before the 2017
Gulf Crisis broke. Part I includes six chapters that focus on a new understanding
of the vulnerability of the Gulf region, Qatar–Turkey rapprochement, GCC states’
perceptions of regional powers, transformations of the Gulf security landscape, cyber
operation, and trans-Gulf resonances. Chapter 2, “Vulnerability of the Gulf Region:
A New Understanding,” by Mahjoob Zweiri and Betül Doğan Akkaş, argues that
major disagreements and conflicts in the Gulf are affiliated with the Arab Spring and
elaborates the Gulf crisis in relation to the ramifications of those uprisings. The paper
proposes that the Gulf crisis occurred as a result of the accumulation of conflicting
approaches among the GCC states since the Arab Spring. It discusses the GCC
countries’ positions on Libya and Bahrain, and then moves on to the ramifications
of the Arab Spring, drawing on the examples of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi
interventionism, and intra-GCC rivalry. The chapter thus offers a new understanding
of the vulnerability of the Gulf region.
Chapter 3, “Qatar–Turkey Rapprochement: Challenging the Regional Status Quo
in the Gulf Security Sub-Complex,” by Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin, argues that Turkey
and Qatar sought to change the regional status quo in order to forge a new regional
security order, and to achieve this goal they cemented an alliance based on their
respective qualities as military and financial powers. The chapter claims that the
transformation in the domestic politics of the Gulf States played a decisive role in
shaping the Turkey–Qatar alliance, and contends that the Gulf security sub-complex
was reshaped in the wake of the Arab Spring. This chapter discusses the Qatar–Turkey
alliance, elaborates the concept of the security complex with specific reference to
the Gulf security sub-complex, and points to the implications of the Qatar–Turkey
alliance for the regional security sub-complex.
Chapter 4, “Qatar Crisis: GCC States’ Perception of Regional Powers,” by Noof
Rasid Al-Dosari, sheds light on the role of perceptions in the field of international
relations and foreign policy analysis with a focus on the Qatar crisis. Noof Rasid
applies discourse theory and analysis to GCC foreign policy making. The chapter
explains how actors’ perceptions have an influence on the GCC’s foreign policy
decisions.
Chapter 5, “Transformations of the Gulf Security Landscape in the Post-Gulf
Crisis: A Geopolitical Approach,” by Nayef bin Nahar Al-Shamari and Hamad bin
Ali Al-Mohannadi, examines the shifts in the Gulf security scene following the
12 M. Zweiri et al.

2017 crisis, looking primarily at three waves of security transformations: in the

range of security, in security standards, and in the balance of security. This study
evaluates and addresses existing problems in the Gulf and concentrates on three
transformations that are needed in the Gulf security scene: the transformation from
tactical security to strategic security; the transformation from traditional security to
geostrategic security; and the transformation from securitization to rational security.
The chapter concludes that the costs associated with the crisis are much higher than
that of the intra-GCC differences.
Chapter 6, “The Cyber Operation against Qatar News Agency,” by James Shires,
argues that the Qatar blockade was catalyzed by a novel use of cyber tools—the
planting of a fake story about the Qatari Emir HH Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani on the
website of Qatar News Agency (QNA), portraying the Emir as expressing support
for Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. James Shires describes this operation as an
extreme case of what he calls “hack-and-leak operations.” The chapter elaborates
how hack-and-leak operations involve both an intrusion into specific digital systems
and networks, and an attempt to influence certain audiences through the public
release of information. The impact of hack-and-lead operations is analyzed in a
tripartite framework focusing on the context, characteristics, and audiences of the
QNA operation.
Chapter 7, “Trans-Gulf Resonances: The Central Role of Egypt in the Saudi
Dispute on Qatar,” by Moisés Garduño García, provides a context to study current
relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in order to show the importance that Cairo
has for Riyadh’s economic and strategic plans in the Red Sea. The chapter presents
the extension of the dynamics of conflict in the Gulf region as a strategy to curb
the Iranian influence there. The chapter sheds light on the connections between the
Saudi security apparatus and the “deep state” in Egypt, the relations between Cairo
and Riyadh in the context of the Syrian conflict, the role of Egypt in the Saudi–
Qatar crisis of 2017, and finally the current situation in the Red Sea and the growing
strategic importance of Egypt in the new balance of power between Saudi Arabia–
UAE–Egypt, on the one hand, whose strategic policies in the Red Sea are closer to
Israel; and Qatar, Iran, and Turkey on the other.
Part II addresses the changing threat perceptions in the Gulf before and after
the crisis, and the changes in political dynamics within the GCC. Part II includes
three chapters. Chapter 8, “Evolving Threat Perceptions and Changing Regional
Dynamics in a ‘Post-GCC’ Era,” by Kristian Ulrichsen, argues that the blockade
of Qatar has widened existing cracks in the Gulf into a chasm, and has generated
unintended consequences that risk inflicting generational damage on its political and
social fabric. The chapter examines the second-order consequences of the blockade
of Qatar, arguing that there is no simple binary division within the Gulf States on any
of the regional flashpoints—such as the role of Islamists in domestic political land-
scapes, political and economic ties with Iran, or complicated relationships between
the smaller Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The chapter maps the web of overlap-
ping flashpoints, actors, and interests at stake, and argues that any attempt to impose
uniformity risks generating a further backlash both between states and, in the case
of the United Arab Emirates, among the seven constituent emirates.
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Bergen-op-Zoom in 1814, when lying wounded there, after the
unfortunate failure of that well-planned attack.’

RUMINANTIA.
The ruminants furnish, as is well known, the largest portion of our
animal food, being consumed by man alike in civilized or unsettled
countries. The domestic animals require little notice at our hands.
There are, however, some whose flesh is eaten in different countries
that are less familiar. Thus the bison and musk-ox of North America,
the reindeer of Greenland and Northern Europe—the various
antelopes, the gnu, the giraffe, and the camel of Africa, and the
alpaca tribe of South America, supply much of the animal food of the
people in the districts where they are common.
The flesh of the camel is dry and hard, but not unpalatable.
Heliogabalus had camels’ flesh and camels’ feet served up at his
banquets. In Barbary, the tongues are salted and smoked for
exportation to Italy and other countries, and they form a very good
dish. The flesh is little esteemed by the Tartars, but they use the
hump cut into slices, which, dissolved in tea, serves the purpose of
butter.
The flesh of the Axis deer (Cervus axis, or Axis maculata) is not
much esteemed in Ceylon, having little fat upon it, and being very
dry. The India samver, or musk deer, is eaten there.
The flesh of the great moose deer or elk, of North America, the
carcase of which weighs 1,000 or 1,200 lbs., is as valuable for food
as beef, but from its immense size, much of the flesh is usually left in
the forest.
It is more relished by the Indians and persons resident in the fur
countries, than that of any other animal, and bears a greater
resemblance in its flavour to beef than to venison. It is said that the
external fat is soft like that of a breast of mutton, and when put into a
bladder is as fine as marrow.
The flesh of the caribboo, a smaller animal, rarely exceeding 400
lbs., is less palatable than moose venison. Nor is the flesh of the red
or Virginian deer much better, although the venison dried is very
good.
Venison is not ‘meat’ in the parlance of the backwoodsman; that
term, as Sam Slick tells us, is reserved par excellence for pork; and
he is frequently too indolent or too much occupied otherwise, to hunt,
although deer tracks may be seen in every direction around the
scene of his daily rail-splitting operations. He considers it cheaper to
buy venison of the Indians, when there are any Indians in the locality.
But venison has some solid value even in those parts, and if salted
and smoked, would be entitled to a place among the articles of
household thrift.
Of the Arctic quadrupeds, the reindeer (Cervus tarandus) is most
valuable, its flesh being juicy, nutritious, and well-flavoured, and easy
of digestion. They abound in Greenland, and are tolerably numerous
in Melville Island.
In Sweden, roast reindeer steaks and game are dressed in a manner
preferable to that which prevails with us. The flesh is first perforated,
and little bits of lard inserted; and, after being baked in an oven, it is
served in a quantity of white sauce.
The flesh of the young giraffe is said to be good eating. The
Hottentots hunt the animal principally on account of its marrow,
which, as a delicacy, they set a high value on.
The Hottentots have a curious mode of cooking their antelope
venison, which renders it, however, exceedingly palatable. After
stewing the meat in a very small quantity of water, they take it out of
the pot and pound it between two stones until reduced to the
consistency of pap, when they mix it with a considerable quantity of
sheep’s fat, and then stew it for a short time longer. This is an
excellent way of preparing dry flesh of any kind.
‘On one occasion’ (says Lieut. Moodie), ‘after I had taken out my
share of this mess, the Hottentots added a larger quantity of fat to it
to please their own palates; and one of them ate so heartily of the
greasy mixture, that he became seriously unwell, but recovered by
chewing dry roots of the sweet-scented flag (Calamus aromaticus).
This plant is very much used by the Dutch for stomach complaints,
and they generally cultivate some of it in wet places in their gardens.’
The eland of Africa (Boselaphus Oreas) is the largest of the antelope
tribe, its size being indicated by its generic name. The bulls attain to
the height of nineteen hands at the shoulder, and frequently exceed
1,000 lbs. in weight. It fattens readily on the most meagre herbage of
the desert, and to the delicious, tender, juicy, and wholesome nature
of its flesh every hunter will bear witness, who has regaled himself
on the steaks broiled in the homely style of South African cookery,
with some of the usual condiments or spices to give them an
unnatural relish. The flesh has a peculiar sweetness, and is tender
and fit for use the moment the animal is killed.
It is hunted with avidity, on account of the delicacy of its flesh, but is
very rarely found within the limits of the Cape Colony, having been
driven beyond the Orange River by the progress of colonization.
The hartebeest, an antelope of the size of the Scotch red deer,
though now rather rare, is much prized by the African sportsman. It is
also called caama by the Dutch farmers, and is a favourite object of
pursuit with both natives and colonists. The flesh is rather dry, but of
a fine grain, more nearly resembling the beef of the ox than that of
any other antelope, except, perhaps, the so-called eland or elk of the
colonists (A. oreas, Pallas), and it has a high game flavour which
makes it universally esteemed.
The meat of the sassaby (A. lunata, Burchell), a rare species, is
tender and well tasted. The flesh of the ourebi of Southern Africa (A.
scoparia, Schreber), though dry and destitute of fat, is esteemed one
of the best venisons of the country.
The flesh of the bosh-bok, or bush goat, as its colonial name implies
(A. sylvatica, Sparrman), makes good venison, that of the breast
being particularly esteemed. The flesh of the rheebok (A. capreolus,
Lichstenstein) is dry and insipid, and relished less than that of any
other of the numerous Cape antelopes. The bush antelope (A.
silvicultrix, Afzelius) affords excellent venison, and is much sought
after on that account. The flesh of the ahu (A. subgutturosa,
Guldenstaedt) is excellent, and of an agreeable taste. That of the
gnu of South Africa is in great repute both among the natives and
Dutch settlers. Though the meat has a wildish flavour, it is more juicy
than that of most of the antelope tribe, and very much like beef.
The flesh of the alpaca and guanaco is sold in the public shambles
of Peru, Chili, &c.
Sheep’s milk is a common beverage in Toorkistan, where the sheep
are milked regularly three times a day. Goats are very scarce; cows
not to be seen; but the sheep’s milk affords nourishment in various
forms, of which the most common is a kind of sour cheese, being
little better than curdled milk and salt.
If we think ox tails a delicacy, Australians (as we have seen) like
kangaroo tails, and the Cape colonists have fat sheep’s tails
requiring a barrow or a cart on which to support them. The broad fat
tail, which often composes one-third of the weight of the animal, is
entirely composed of a substance betwixt marrow and fat, which
serves very often for culinary purposes instead of butter; and being
cut into small pieces, makes an ingredient in various dishes.
The dried flesh of the argali, or wild sheep, is in Kamtschatka an
article of commerce.
The domestic goat’s flesh is not in much favour anywhere, although
that of a young kid, three or four months old, is very tender and
delicate. Some of the goats are eaten in the Cape Colony, but the
flesh is generally lean and tough. The Malabar goat is a delicate
animal, that browzes on the rocks. It is more sought after than any
game in Ceylon, for, contrary to the general nature of the goat, its
flesh is tender and excellent when broiled.
Bison beef, especially that of the female, is rather coarser grained
than that of the domestic ox, but is considered by hunters and
travellers as superior in tenderness and flavour. The hump, which is
highly celebrated for its richness and delicacy, is said, when properly
cooked, to resemble marrow. The flesh of the buffalo, as it is
misnamed, is the principal, sometimes the only, food of numerous
tribes of North American Indians. It is eaten fresh on the prairies
during the hunt, and dried in their winter villages.
The musk-ox (Ovibos moschatus) is of much importance from its
size and palatable rich meat. It has occasionally furnished a rich
meal to arctic explorers. When they are fat, the flesh is well
flavoured, but smells strongly of musk.

CETACEA.
The flesh of the manatus is white and delicate, and tastes like young
pork eaten fresh or salted, while the fat forms excellent lard. The
cured flesh keeps long without corruption, and it will continue good
several weeks, even in the hot climate of which it is a native, when
other meat would not resist putrefaction for as many days. The fibres
and the lean part of the flesh are like beef, but more red; it takes a
very long time boiling. The fat of the young one is like pork, and can
scarcely be distinguished from it, while the lean eats like veal. The
fat, which lies between the entrails and skin has a pleasant smell,
and tastes like the oil of sweet almonds. It makes an admirable
substitute for butter, and does not turn rancid in the sun. The fat of
the tail is of a firmer consistence, and when boiled is more delicate
than the other.
Manatees, or sea calves, are found in certain parts of British
Honduras in great numbers. They are, according to my friend, Chief
Justice Temple, frequently caught and brought to the market of
Belize, where they are snapped up with the greatest avidity. He
states the flesh to be white and delicate, something between pork
and veal. The tail, which is very fat, is most esteemed. This caudal
luxury is generally soused or pickled. I do not, myself, fancy the flesh
of this brute, for it is so inhumanly human—it reminds one so much
of a mermaid, or of one of the fifty daughters of Nereus, that to eat it
seems to me to be an approximation to cannibalism. It appears
horrible to chew and swallow the flesh of an animal which holds its
young (it has never more than one at a litter) to its breast, which is
formed exactly like that of a woman, with paws resembling human
hands. But these notions would be considered highly fantastic by
those who masticate a monkey with the greatest relish, partake with
gusto of rattlesnake soup, and voraciously devour an alligator stew.
The manatus is commonly found in shallow water, at the mouths of
rivers, where it feeds upon the marine herbage which there grows in
great luxuriance. It has no teeth, but two thick, smooth, hard,
unserrated bones run from one side of the mouth to the other. I am
inclined to think that these bones might be used as a substitute for
ivory.[11]
Mr. P. H. Gosse, in his interesting little manual on the Natural History
of the Mammalia, remarks:—
‘From personal experience we can confirm Hernandez’s statement of
the excellence of the flesh of the manatee; he truly compares it to
well fatted pork, of pleasant flavour. The pursuit of it, on this account,
has rendered it scarce in many localities, where it was formerly
numerous; in the vicinity of Cayenne, it was at one time so common,
that a large boat might be filled with them in a day, and the flesh was
sold at 3d. per pound. About the middle of the last century it fetched,
at Port Royal in Jamaica, 15d. currency per pound.’
The tongue of the sea-lion (Phoca jubata) is very good eating, and
some seamen prefer it to that of an ox or calf. Thus Dr. Pernetty
(Voyage to the Falkland Islands) says,—‘For a trial we cut off the tip
of the tongue hanging out of the mouth of one of these lions which
was just killed. About sixteen or eighteen of us ate each a pretty
large piece, and we all thought it so good that we regretted we could
not eat more of it.
‘It is said that their flesh is not absolutely disagreeable. I have not
tasted it, but the oil which is extracted from their grease is of great
use. This oil is extracted in two ways; either by cutting the fat in
pieces and melting it in large caldrons upon the fire, or by cutting it in
the same manner upon hurdles or pieces of board, and exposing
them to the sun, or only to the air. This grease dissolves of itself and
runs into vessels placed underneath to receive it. Some of our
seamen pretended that this last sort of oil, when it is fresh, is very
good for kitchen uses. It is preferred to that of the whale; is always
clear, and leaves no sediment.’
Walrus meat is strong, coarse, and of a game-like flavour. Seal flesh
is exceedingly oily, and not very palatable; but by practice, residents
in the northern regions learn to relish both exceedingly.
The large tongue, the heart, and liver of the walrus (Trichecus
rosmarus), are often eaten by whalers for want of better fresh
provisions, and are passably good.
Commodore Anson’s party killed many sea-lions for food, using,
particularly, the hearts and tongues, which they thought excellent
eating, and preferable even to those of bullocks. The flesh of the
female sea-bear (Phoca ursina, Lin.) they found very delicate, having
the taste of lamb; while that of the cub could scarcely be
distinguished from roasted pig.
Sir Edward Parry was once asked, at a dinner where Lord Erskine
was present, what he and his crew had lived upon when they were
frozen in in the Polar Seas. Parry said they lived upon seals. ‘A very
good living, too,’ exclaimed the Chancellor, ‘if you keep them long
enough.’
One of the ordinary acts of hospitality and civility on the part of the
Esquimaux ladies, is to take a bird, or piece of seal-flesh, chew it up
very nicely, and hand it to the visitor, who is expected to be
overcome with gratitude, and finish the operation of chewing and
digesting the delicate morsel.
The carcase and blubber of the whale at Bahia, in Brazil, are
reduced to food by the poor.
To most of the rude littoral tribes of Northern Asia and America, the
whale and seal furnish, not only food and clothing, but many other
useful materials. The Esquimaux will eat the raw flesh of the whale
with the same apparent relish, when newly killed, or after it has been
buried in the ground for several months.
The whales on the coasts of Japan not only afford oil in great
abundance, but their flesh, which is there considered very
wholesome and nutritious, is largely consumed. No part of them,
indeed, is thrown away; all is made available to some useful purpose
or another. The skin, which is generally black, the flesh, which is red
and looks like coarse beef, the intestines and all the inward parts,
besides the fat or blubber, which is boiled into oil, and the bone,
which is converted into innumerable uses,—all is made available to
purposes of profit.
Both sperm and black whales abound on the coast of Western
Australia. Sometimes a dead whale is thrown on the shore, and
affords luxurious living to the natives. They do not, however, eat the
shark.
The natives of New Zealand, when short of food, will not scruple to
eat the flesh of the whale, when caught in their vicinity.
The deep has many food dainties as well as the land, as we shall
shortly have to notice, and among these is the porpoise, which the
reader may probably have seen dashing up our rivers, or, during a
long voyage, disporting itself amid the briny waves, and rolling
gracefully near the sides of the ship. This sea pig sometimes serves
for a feast. When caught, it is cut into steaks, dried, and put into the
ship’s coppers, with a quantum suf. of spices and condiments which
nearly overpower the oily taste. The steaks turn blackish on being
exposed to the air, but this is ‘a matter of nothing’ to those whose
daily diet is usually limited to hard biscuits and salt junk. Landsmen
may question the niceness of the palate which partakes of this
dainty, but the old adage holds true everywhere, ‘de gustibus non
disputandum.’ There is no disputing about tastes.
According to ancient records, salted porpoises were formerly used
for food in this country.
In the olden times, when glass windows were considered an
effeminate luxury, and rushes supplied the place of carpets, the flesh
of the porpoise constituted one of the standard delicacies of a public
feast. It was occasionally served up at the tables of the old English
nobility as a sumptuous article of food, and eaten with a sauce
composed of sugar, vinegar, and crumbs of fine bread. But tastes
have altered, and even sailors will scarcely touch the flesh now. M.
de Bouganville, in his voyage to the Falkland Islands, writes—‘We
had some of the porpoise served up at dinner the day it was taken,
which several others at the table besides myself thought by no
means so ill-tasted as it is generally said to be.’
Porpoises are rather dangerous enemies to the shoals of fish. A
porpoise, before taking in a barrel of herrings for its dinner, will often
whet its appetite with a cod’s head and shoulders, leaving the tail
part for some poor fisherman.
 BIRDS.
Leaving now our passing survey of the food supplies derived from
animals, we come next to birds, and, in the first order, we do not find
that any are eaten, at least, as far as my knowledge extends; indeed,
these carnivorous birds, from their habits and their food, would not
be very tempting. This, however, as we have seen in the case of
predatory animals, is no safe criterion to judge from. Probably, the
man who would feast on the flesh of a lion, or a polecat, would have
a stomach strong enough to digest slices of a John Crow carrion
vulture, an eagle, or a hawk.
In the order of Insessores, or perching birds, I may mention first—
The becafico, or fig-eater (Sylvia hortensis), a bird about the size of
a linnet, which is highly prized by the Italians for the delicacy of its
flesh, particularly in autumn, when it is in excellent condition for the
table.
There is a curious food product obtained, (not exactly, however, from
the bird,) which is in high repute in China; and that is the edible nest
of a species of swallow extensively obtained in some of the islands
of the Eastern Archipelago.
These nests are attached to the sides of rocks like those of our
martin and swallow to walls, and look like so many watch-pockets.
The eggs are white, with a slight pinkish tinge, and are generally two
in number. The nests are either white, red, or black, and the natives
maintain that these are built by three distinct species, with a white,
red, and black breast, but this is erroneous. The Malays assert
frequently, moreover, that the nests are formed from the bodies of
certain sea snakes, but the food is, without doubt, insects. The
subjoined accounts furnish the most detailed information known
respecting the collection and trade in these birdsnests.
The following description of the birdsnests’ rocks, in the district of
Karang Bollong, on the southerly sea-coast of Java, is given in the
first volume of the Journal of the Indian Archipelago, published at
Singapore.
‘The gathering of these nests takes place three times a year—in the
end of April, the middle of August, and in December. The yearly
produce is commonly between 50 and 60 piculs of 133⅓ lbs. The
business of collection is opened with great ceremony by the natives.
By the assistance of ladders and stages made of rattan, the
collectors descend the rocks and cliffs, provided with the requisite
bags to contain the nests, which are taken from the wall by the hand,
and those which are on the roof by an iron hook made fast to a long
bamboo. The birds feed upon different kinds of bloodless insects,
hovering above the stagnant waters, for which their wide open beak
is very useful. They form their nests by vomiting the strongest and
best fragments of the food which they have eaten. The nests are
weighed and packed in hampers (of 25 catties each), and labelled
with the net weight, mark of the overseer, &c., and then further
preserved and secured with strips of bark, leaves, and matting.
‘The edible birdsnests, which owe their celebrity only to the
whimsical luxury of the Chinese, are brought principally from Java
and Sumatra, though they are found on most of the rocky islets of
the Indian Archipelago. The nest is the habitation of a small swallow,
named (from the circumstance of having an edible house) Hirundo
esculenta. They are composed of a mucilaginous substance, but as
yet they have never been analyzed with sufficient accuracy to show
the constituents. Externally, they resemble ill-concocted, fibrous
isinglass, and are of a white colour, inclining to red. Their thickness
is little more than that of a silver spoon, and the weight from a
quarter to half an ounce. When dry they are brittle and wrinkled; the
size is nearly that of a goose’s egg. Those that are dry, white, and
clean, are the most valuable. They are packed in bundles, with split
rattans run through them to preserve the shape. Those procured
after the young are fledged, are not saleable in China. The quality of
the nest varies according to the situation and extent of the caves,
and the time at which they are taken. If procured before the young
are fledged, the nests are of the best kind; if they contain eggs only,
they are still valuable; but if the young are in the nests, or have left
them, the whole are then nearly worthless, being dark-coloured,
streaked with blood, and intermixed with feathers and dirt. These
nests are procurable twice every year; the best are found in deep,
damp caves, which, if not injured, will continue to produce
indefinitely. It was once thought that the caves near the sea-coast
were the most productive; but some of the most profitable yet found
are situated 50 miles in the interior. This fact seems to be against the
opinion that the nests are composed of the spawn of fish, or of
bêche-de-mer. The method of procuring these nests is not
unattended with danger. Some of the caves are so precipitous, that
no one but those accustomed to the employment from their youth
can obtain the nests, being only approachable by a perpendicular
descent of many hundred feet, by ladders of bamboo and rattan,
over a sea rolling violently against the rocks. When the mouth of the
cave is attained, the perilous task of taking the nests must often be
performed by torchlight, by penetrating into recesses of the rock;
where the slightest slip would be instantly fatal to the adventurers,
who see nothing below them but the turbulent surf, making its way
into the chasms of the rock—such is the price paid to gratify luxury.
After the nests are obtained, they are separated from feathers and
dirt, are carefully dried and packed, and are then fit for the market.
The Chinese, who are the only people that purchase them for their
own use, bring them in junks to this market, where they command
extravagant prices; the best, or white kind, often being worth four
thousand dollars per picul (a Chinese weight, equal to 133⅓ lbs.
avoirdupois), which is nearly twice their weight in silver. The middling
kind is worth from twelve to eighteen hundred, and the worst, or
those procured after fledging, one hundred and fifty to two hundred
dollars per picul. The majority of the best kind are sent to Pekin, for
the use of the court. It appears, therefore, that this curious dish is
only an article of expensive luxury amongst the Chinese; the
Japanese do not use it at all, and how the former people acquired
the habit of indulging in it, is only less singular than their persevering
in it. They consider the edible birdsnest as a great stimulant, tonic,
and aphrodisiac, but its best quality, perhaps, is its being perfectly
harmless. The labour bestowed to render it fit for the table is
enormous; every feather, stick, or impurity of any kind is carefully
removed; and then, after undergoing many washings and
preparations, it is made into a soft, delicious jelly. The sale of
birdsnests is a monopoly with all the governments in whose
dominions they are found. About two hundred and fifty thousand
piculs, of the value of one million four hundred thousand dollars, are
annually brought to Canton. These come from the islands of Java,
Sumatra, Macassar, and those of the Sooloo group. Java alone
sends about thirty thousand pounds, mostly of the first quality,
estimated at seventy thousand dollars.’[12]
Mr. J. H. Moor, in his notices of the Indian Archipelago, published at
Singapore some years ago, states, that ‘one of the principal and
most valuable articles of exportation is the edible birdsnests, white
and black. These are found in much greater abundance in and about
the Coti, more than any other part of Borneo, or from what we at
present know on the subject, all parts put together. On the western
coast they are scarcely known to exist; about Banjermassin and
Bagottan there are none; at Bataliching and Passier they are found
in considerable quantities. At Browe there is abundance of the black
kind of a very superior quality, but little of the white. At Seboo, and all
the parts to the north of Borneo, we know there is none, as I have
seen many letters from different Rajahs of those countries averring
the fact, and begging the Sultan of Coti to exchange his edible nests
for their most valuable commodities, and at his own price. Nor ought
this to create surprise, when we consider, not only the large
consumption of this article by the Cambojans, who almost
exclusively inhabit some of the largest Sooloo Islands, and the
northern parts of Borneo, but the amazing demand on the whole
coast of Cambodia, particularly of Cochin China, the principal
inhabitants of which countries are as partial to this luxury as their
more northern neighbours—the Chinese. There are in Coti and
adjacent Dyak countries perhaps eighty known places, or what the
natives term holes, which produce the white nests. I have seen the
names of forty-three. There can, however, be no doubt there are
many more likewise known to the Dyaks, who keep the knowledge to
themselves, lest the Bugis should dispossess them, which they know
from experience is invariably the case.
‘According to the accounts of the Sultan, rendered by Saib Abdulla,
the bandarree in 1834 yielded 134 piculs. The usual price in money
to the Coti traders is 23 reals per catty from the Dyaks, and 25 in
barter. The black nests may be procured in great abundance. The
best kinds come from Cinculeram and Baley Papang. The latter
mountain alone yields 230 piculs (of 113⅓ lbs.). Cinculeram gives
nearly as much. There are several other parts of Coti which produce
them, besides the quantity brought down by the Dyaks. Last year,
130 piculs paid duty to the Sultan; these left the large Coti river.
Those from Cinculeram and Bongan were taken to Browe and
Seboo. The bandarree’s book averages the annual weight of those
collected in the lower part of Coti at 820 piculs (about 1,025 cwts.)
‘The Pangeran Sierpa and the Sultan say they could collect 2,700
piculs of black nests, if the bandarree and capella-campong would
behave honestly. The Sultan, however, seldom gets any account of
what is sent to Browe, Seboo, and the Sooloo Islands, the quality of
which is far superior to any sent to European ports.’
The exports of birdsnests from Java, between 1823 and 1832,
averaged about 250 piculs a year; in 1832, 322 piculs; but of late
years the exports have not averaged half that amount; and in 1853
and 1854 there were only about 35 or 40 piculs shipped.
In the third order, Scansores, there are very few edible birds.
In the mountain of Tumeriquiri, in the government of Cumana, is the
immense cavern of Guacharo, famous among the Indians. It serves
as a habitation for millions of nocturnal birds (Steatornis caripensis, a
new species of the Caprimulgis, of Linnæus), whose fat yields the oil
of Guacharo.
Once a year, near midsummer, this cavern is entered by the Indians.
Armed with poles, they ransack the greater part of the nests, while
the old birds hover over the heads of the robbers as if to defend their
brood, uttering horrible cries. The young which fall down are opened
on the spot. The peritoneum is found loaded with fat, and a layer of
the same substance reaches from the abdomen to the vent, forming
a kind of cushion between the hind legs. Humboldt remarks that this
quantity of fat in frugivorous animals, not exposed to the light, and
exerting but little muscular motion, brings to mind what has been
long observed in the fattening of geese and oxen. ‘It is well known,’
he adds, ‘how favourable darkness and repose are to this process.’
At the period above mentioned, which is generally known at Carissa
by the designation of ‘the oil harvest,’ huts are built by the Indians,
with palm leaves, near the entrance and even in the very porch of
the cavern. There the fat of the young birds just killed is melted in
clay pots, over a brushwood fire, and this fat is named butter or oil of
the Guacharo. It is half liquid, transparent, inodorous, and so pure
that it will keep above a year without turning rancid.[13]
There is a curious bird met with in caves in the West India Islands—
as at Dominica, and the gulf of Paria, the diablotin or goat-sucker,
which, if eaten when taken from the nest, is pronounced by epicures
unrivalled; and the flesh is also considered a delicacy when salted.
It has received its popular cognomen from its ugliness, but I have not
been able to trace its scientific name.
The bird is nearly the size of a duck, and web-footed, with a big
round head and crooked bill like a hawk, and large full eyes like an
owl; the head, part of the neck, and chief feathers of the wing and
tail, are black, while the other parts of its body are covered with a
fine milk-white down; the whole appearance being very singular. The
diablotin only leaves its haunts at night time, flying with hideous
screams like the owl, which it resembles in its dislike to day-light.
The nests are made in holes in the mountains. When the palms are
in fruit, the bird becomes one lump of fat. The hideous appearance
of the bird and the strong scent once got over, it is said to be a
delicious morsel.
We have our delicate tit-bits in spitted larks, and as many as four
thousand dozen have been known to be taken in the neighbourhood
of Dunstable between September and February. What the number
sold in our metropolitan markets is annually, it is impossible to say.
But larks are taken in much larger numbers in Germany, where there
is an excise upon them, which has yielded as much as £1,000 a year
in Leipsic—the larks of which place are famous all over Germany as
being of a most delicate flavour.
In the Italian markets, besides carrion crows, strings of thrushes,
larks, and even robin redbreasts are sold.
Young rooks, when skinned and made into pies are much esteemed
by some persons, but they are very coarse eating.
One of the most delicious birds is the rice-bunting of South Carolina
(Dolichonyx oryzivorus).
The rice-bunting migrates over the continent of America, from
Labrador to Mexico, and over the great Antilles, appearing in the
southern extremity of the United States about the end of March.
Towards the middle and close of August, they enter New York, and
Pennsylvania on their way to the south. There, along the shores of
the large rivers lined with floating fields of wild rice, they find
abundant subsistence, grow fat, and their flesh becomes little inferior
in flavour to that of the European ortolan, on which account the reed,
or rice birds, as they are then called, are shot in great numbers.
When the cool nights in October commence, they move still farther
south, till they reach the islands of Jamaica and Cuba in prodigious
numbers to feed on the seeds of the guinea grass. Epicures
compare the plump and juicy flesh of this delicacy to the ortolan.
On the shores of the Mediterranean there are feathered delicacies in
the shape of the quail and the ortolan. Thousands of ortolans used to
be shipped from the island of Cyprus, packed in casks of 300 or 400,
prepared with spice and vinegar. When specially fattened for the
table, they are regarded as most delicious; but, being merely lumps
of fat, are so rich as soon to satiate the appetite of even a professed
gourmand. In the West India Islands and the Southern States of
America, the rice-bunting, as we have seen, takes its place, and is,
occasionally, found in prodigious numbers, and greatly esteemed.
The bluish flesh of the toucan, notwithstanding its enormous and
unsightly beak, is a wholesome and delicate meat; and there are no
birds that give the Trinidad epicure a more delicious morsel. It is one
of the most omnivorous of birds, and its powers of digestion and
impunity to poisons are remarkable.
Parrot pie is said to be pretty good; at least, it may be so when other
animal food is scarce.
Among the gallinaceous fowls, large numbers contribute to the
food delicacies of man. Some, like the turkey, peacock, &c., of
considerable size; others, as the pigeon tribe, form smaller tit-bits.
The game birds, the pheasant, partridge, grouse, &c., and the quail,
guinea fowl, and jungle fowl, are bagged whenever they can be
obtained by the sportsman.
The peacock enkakyll ‘was one of the famous dishes at the costly
royal banquets of old, and the receipt for dressing it is thus given:—
‘Take and flay off the skin with the feathers, tail, and the neck and
head thereon; then take the skin and all the feathers and lay it on the
table abroad, and strew thereon ground cumin; then take the
peacock and roast him, and baste him with raw yolks of eggs; and
when he is roasted, take him off and let him cool awhile, then take
him and sew him in his skin, and gild his comb, and so serve him
forth with the last course.’
As far as my own experience goes, with all the basting and sauces,
the peacock is, at best, a dry and tough eating bird.
The domestic fowls and the tame turkey require no notice here, there
being nothing curious about them, however delicate eating they may
be when properly fattened and brought to table; but there is a
species of wild turkey found in New Granada, weighing from 12 to 16
lbs., and called the iowanen, which is described by Mr. W. Purdie of
Trinidad as the most delicate article of food he ever tasted.
Dear as fowls, ducks, and eggs comparatively are, they meet, as
every one knows, with a ready sale. When we find our imports of
eggs, chiefly from France, amount to about 130,000,000 a year,
besides our nominal ‘new laid,’ or home produce,—when we learn
that the foreign poultry we receive (mixed up with not a few Ostend
rabbits) is valued at 39,000l., and that Ireland supplies us with about
150,000,000 of eggs, we begin to perceive that fowls, ducks, geese,
and turkeys must be a profitable investment to some persons, and
the capital of about 4,000,000l. we lay out on these various products
serves to gladden the heart of many a poultry breeder.
There are sent to market about nine or ten million head of poultry in
a year to supply the whole population of the United Kingdom,
shipping and all, which is not more than one-third of a fowl to each
person annually. Now, were every one to have a fowl as part food
once a month, it would require 330,000,000 more fowls or other
poultry than are at present sold.
I copy the following from what I believe to be the first fixed tariff of
provisions, in the City of London, about the second year of Edward I.
(1272.) The people had at that time great cause to complain of the
exorbitant prices demanded of them for provisions, by hucksters and
dealers, and a fixed price was found necessary by the Mayor:—
The best hen three half-pence
Pullet three half-pence
Capon two pence
Goose five pence
Wild goose four pence
Pigeons, three for one penny
Mallard, three for a half-penny
Plover one penny
Partridge three half-pence
Larks, per dozen one penny half-penny
Pheasant four pence
Heron six pence
Swan three shillings
Crane three shillings, and by
a subsequent Act one shilling
The best peacock one penny
The best coney, with skin four pence
Ditto, without skin three pence
 The best hare, with skin three pence half-penny
The best lamb, from
Christmas to Lent six pence
At other times of the year four pence.
In the time of Edward II., 1313, eggs were 20 a penny, and pigeons
sold at three for a penny.
It is curious, even to notice the London prices of poultry, two or three
centuries ago, although regard must of course be had to the
difference in the value of money now and then.
Sir James Hawes, during his mayoralty, in the year 1575, fixed the
following prices within the City of London:—
s. d.
Blackbirds, per dozen 0 10
The best capon, large and fat 1 8
Ditto, second best, being fat 1 4
The best green goose, until Whitsuntide 0 8
Ditto ditto, after Whitsuntide 0 10
Ditto, in winter, being fat 1 2
Pigeons, per dozen 1 4
Chickens, the largest, each 0 4
Ditto, second sort 0 3
The best coney rabbit, from and after the
summer 0 5
Eggs, four 0 1
Cygnets, fat until Allhalloweentide, each 6 0
Ditto, from then to Shrovetide 7 0
Cranes, the best, each 6 0
The best heron, pheasant, shoveller (duck),
and bittern, each 2 6
Turkey-cock, fat and large 3 0
Turkey chicken, fat and large 1 4
Woodcocks, each 0 6
 Snipes, each 0 2½
Hens, being fat and the best, each 0 9
Ditto, second sort 0 7
Green plovers, fat 0 4
The best wild mallard 0 6
Teals, each 0 3
At a feast given at Ely House, by the serjeants-at-law, November,
1531, (23rd of Henry VIII.) on the occasion of making eleven new
serjeants, open house was kept for five successive days. On the
fourth day, King Henry, his Queen, the Foreign Ambassadors, the
Judges, and Lord Mayor and Aldermen, were feasted, as also
numerous guests, knights, and gentlemen. Stow particularizes the
following articles and prices, in order to furnish data for computing
the relative value of money at different periods:—
s. d.
Great beeves, from the shambles
(twenty-four) each 26 8
One carcase of an ox 24 0
Fat muttons (one hundred), each 2 10
Great veals (fifty-one), each 4 8
Porks (thirty-four), each 3 8
Pigs (ninety-one), each 0 6
Capons of Greece (of one poulterer, for they
had three) ten dozen, each capon 1 8
Capons of Kent (nine dozen and six), each 1 0
Capons, coarse (nineteen dozen), each 1 0
Cocks of grouse (seven dozen and nine), each
cock 0 8
Cocks, coarse (fourteen dozen and eight) 0 3
Pullets, the best, each 0 2½
Other pullets, each 0 2
Pigeons (thirty-seven dozen), at per dozen 0 10