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The Student’s Guide to
Cognitive Neuroscience
Reflecting recent changes in the way cognition and the brain are studied, this
thoroughly updated fourth edition of this bestselling textbook provides a
comprehensive and student-friendly guide to cognitive neuroscience. Jamie
Ward provides an easy-to-follow introduction to neural structure and function,
as well as all the key methods and procedures of cognitive neuroscience, with
a view to helping students understand how they can be used to shed light on
the neural basis of cognition.
The book presents a comprehensive overview of the latest theories and
findings in all the key topics in cognitive neuroscience, including vision,
hearing, attention, memory, speech and language, numeracy, executive
function, social and emotional behavior and developmental neuroscience.
Throughout, case studies, newspaper reports, everyday examples and student-
friendly pedagogy are used to help students understand the more challenging
ideas that underpin the subject.
New to this edition:
•• Increased focus on the impact of genetics on cognition

•• New coverage of the cutting-edge field of connectomics
•• Coverage of the latest research tools including tES and fNIRS and new
methodologies such as multi-voxel pattern analysis in fMRI research
•• Additional content is also included on network versus modular
approaches, brain mechanisms of hand–eye coordination, neurobiological
models of speech perception and production and recent models of
anterior cingulate function.
Written in an engaging style by a leading researcher in the field and presented in

full color including numerous illustrative materials, this book will be invaluable
as a core text for undergraduate modules in cognitive neuroscience. It can
also be used as a key text on courses in cognition, cognitive neuropsychology,
biopsychology or brain and behavior. Those embarking on research will find
it an invaluable starting point and reference.
This textbook is supported by an extensive companion website for
students and instructors, including lectures by leading researchers, links
to key studies and interviews, interactive multiple-choice questions and
flashcards of key terms.
Jamie Ward is Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of

Sussex, UK. He is the author of a number of books on social and cognitive
neuroscience and on synesthesia, and is President of the British Association
of Cognitive Neuroscience.
The Student’s Guide to
Cognitive Neuroscience
To find additional tools to master the concepts and terminology covered in

The Student’s Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience, visit the companion website
for the fourth edition, available at:
www.routledge.com/cw/ward
What you will find on this website:
For students:
•• Videos and links to interviews, lectures, documentaries, and studies

• Simulations of key experiments
• Interactive multiple-choice quizzes for each chapter
•• Flashcards to test your knowledge of key terms.
For instructors:
•• Lecture guides
• Downloadable PowerPoint teaching slides
•• Additional quiz questions and answers.
THE STUDENT’S GUIDE
TO COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
Fourth Edition
JAMIE WARD
Fourth edition published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2020 Jamie Ward
The right of Jamie Ward to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with Sections 77 and 78
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be
trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for
identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Psychology Press 2006
Third edition published by Psychology Press 2013
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-1-138-49052-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-49054-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-351-03518-7 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon, UK
Visit the companion website: www.routledge.com/cw/ward
Contents
About the author ix

Preface to the fourth edition xi
1 Introducing cognitive neuroscience 1

Cognitive neuroscience in historical perspective 2
Does cognitive psychology need the brain? 10
Does neuroscience need cognitive psychology? 12
From modules to networks 13
2 Introducing the brain 19

Structure and function of the neuron 19
The gross organization of the brain 24
The cerebral cortex 28
The subcortex 30
The midbrain and hindbrain 32
3 The electrophysiological brain 35

In search of neural representations: single-cell recordings 36
Electroencephalography and event-related potentials 41
Mental chronometry in electrophysiology and cognitive
psychology 46
Magnetoencephalography 52
4 The imaged brain 55

Structural imaging 56
Functional imaging 58
From image to cognitive theory: experimental design 63
Analyzing data from functional imaging 72
Interpreting data from functional imaging 75
Why do functional imaging data sometimes disagree with
lesion data? 77
Brain-reading: is “Big Brother” round the corner? 80
vi CONTENTS
5 The lesioned brain and stimulated brain 87

Dissociations and associations in neuropsychology 90
Single-case studies in cognitive neuropsychology 93
Group studies and lesion-deficit analysis in neuropsychology 97
Animal models in neuropsychology 100
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 102
Transcranial electrical stimulation (tES) 110
6 The developing brain 115

Structural development of the brain 118
Functional development of the brain 122
Nature and nurture of individual differences 129
7 The seeing brain 143

From eye to brain 144
Cortical blindness and “blindsight” 149
Functional specialization of the visual cortex beyond V1 152
Recognizing objects 156
Recognizing faces 164
Vision imagined 171
8 The hearing brain 175

The nature of sound 177
From ear to brain 178
Basic processing of auditory information 181
Music perception 186
Voice perception 191
Speech perception 193
9 The attending brain 203

Spatial and non-spatial attentional process 204
The role of the frontoparietal network in attention 208
Theories of attention 217
Neglect as a disorder of spatial attention and awareness 224
10 The acting brain 233

A basic cognitive framework for movement and action 234
The role of the frontal lobes in movement and action 235
Ownership and awareness of actions 242
Action comprehension and imitation 246
Acting on objects 249
Fronto-striatal and cerebellar networks in action 258
CONTENTS vii
11 The remembering brain 265

Short-term and working memory 266
Different types of long-term memory 271
Amnesia 273
Functions of the hippocampus and medial temporal
lobes in memory 279
Theories of remembering, knowing and forgetting 287
The role of the prefrontal cortex in long-term memory 292
12 The speaking brain 299

Spoken word recognition 301
Semantic memory and the meaning of words 307
Understanding and producing sentences 316
Retrieving and producing spoken words 323
13 The literate brain 331

Visual word recognition 334
Reading aloud: routes from spelling to sound 341
Spelling and writing 352
Does spelling use the same mechanisms as reading? 356
14 The numerate brain 359

Universal numeracy? 360
The meaning of numbers 362
Models of number processing 374
15 The executive brain 385

Anatomical and functional divisions of the prefrontal
cortex 387
Executive functions in practice 390
The organization of executive functions 398
The role of the anterior cingulate in executive functions 411
16 The social and emotional brain 415

Theories of emotion 416
Neural substrates of emotion processing 424
Reading faces 434
Understanding other minds 440
References451
Author index 515
Subject index 517
About the author
Jamie Ward is Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Sussex,

UK. He completed degrees at the University of Cambridge (1991–1994) and
the University of Birmingham (1994–1997). He subsequently worked as a
Research Fellow at the University of Sussex (1997–1999) and as Lecturer and
Senior Lecturer at University College London (1999–2007). His principal
research interest lies in the cognitive neuroscience of synesthesia, although
he has published on many other topics, including frontal lobe function,
memory and disorders of reading and spelling. His research uses a number
of methods in cognitive neuroscience, including human neuropsychology,
functional imaging, EEG and TMS. His other books include The Frog Who
Croaked Blue: Synesthesia and the Mixing of the Senses and The Student’s
Guide to Social Neuroscience. He is the founding editor of the journal,
Cognitive Neuroscience, and is currently President of the British Association
of Cognitive Neuroscience (BACN).
Preface to the
fourth edition
The motivation for writing this book came out of my experiences of teaching
cognitive neuroscience. When asked by students which book they should buy,
I felt that none of the existing books would satisfactorily meet their needs.
Other books in the market were variously too encyclopedic, too advanced or
not up to date, or gave short shrift to explaining the methods of the field. My
brief for writing this textbook was to provide a text that presents key ideas
and findings but is not too long, that is up to date and that considers both
method and theory. I hope that it will be useful to both lecturers and students.
In writing a book on cognitive neuroscience I had to make a decision as
to how much would be “cognitive” and how much would be “neuroscience.”
In my opinion, the theoretical underpinnings of cognitive neuroscience lie
within the cognitive psychology tradition. Some of the most elegant studies
using methods such as fMRI and TMS have been motivated by previous
research in cognitive psychology and neuropsychology. The ultimate aim of
cognitive neuroscience is to provide a brain-based account of cognition, and
so the methods of cognitive neuroscience must necessarily speak to some
aspect of brain function. However, I believe that cognitive neuroscience has
much to learn from cognitive psychology in terms of which theoretically
interesting questions to ask.
In Chapter 1, I discuss the current status of cognitive neuroscience
as I see it. Some of the topics raised in this chapter are directly aimed at
other researchers in the field who are skeptical about the merits of the newer
methodologies. I suspect that students who are new to the field will approach
the topic with open-mindedness rather than skepticism, but I hope that they
will nevertheless be able to gain something from this debate.
Chapter 2 is intended primarily as a reference source that can be referred
back to. It is deliberately pitched at a need-to-know level.
Chapters 3 to 5 describe in detail the methods of cognitive neuroscience.
The aim of an undergraduate course in cognitive neuroscience is presumably
to enable students to critically evaluate the field and, in my opinion, this
can only be achieved if the students fully understand the limitations of the
methods on which the field is based. I also hope that these chapters will be
xii PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION
of use to researchers who are starting out in the field. This fourth edition has
been updated to include the latest research tools (such as tES, transcranial
electrical stimulation) and the latest research methodology (such as multi-
voxel pattern analysis, MVPA, in fMRI research).
Chapters 6 to 16 outline the main theories and findings in the field. I hope
that they convey something of the excitement and optimism that currently
exists. This fourth edition represents a substantial update. The order of the
chapters has been changed to bring development much earlier on (as it deals
with general issues relating to brain structure and function). These chapters
were also extensively updated to take into account the rapid changes in this
field, notably the links with genetic methods and connectomics. Vision and
hearing are now consecutive chapters (Chapters 7 and 8), which link well to
the following chapters on attention and action.
The following topics have either been added for the first time or
extensively updated: network versus modular approaches (Chapter 1),
magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Chapter 3), functional near-infrared
spectroscopy (fNIRS) (Chapter 4), visual imagery (Chapter 7), parietal
lobe mechanisms of sensorimotor transformation (Chapter 10), recent
neurobiological models of speech perception and production (Chapter
12), developmental dyslexia (Chapter 13) and the neuroscience of racial
biases (Chapter 16).
In addition, we have created a demonstration library of cognitive tests
(www.testable.org/ward) with thanks to Constantin Rezlescu. Within the
textbook, we provide more guidance to web resources via new feature boxes in
the text, as well as via our dedicated webpage (www.routledge.com/cw/ward).
Jamie Ward
jamiew@sussex.ac.uk
Brighton, UK, March 2019
CH A P TE R 1
Introducing cognitive
neuroscience
CONTENTS
Cognitive neuroscience in historical perspective 2

Does cognitive psychology need the brain? 10
Does neuroscience need cognitive psychology? 12
From modules to networks 13
Summary and key points of the chapter 16
Example essay questions 16
Recommended further reading 17
Between 1928 and 1947, Wilder Penfield and colleagues carried out a series
of remarkable experiments on over 400 living human brains (Penfield &
Rasmussen, 1950). The patients in question were undergoing brain surgery
for epilepsy. To identify and spare regions of the brain involved in movement
and sensation, Penfield electrically stimulated regions of the cortex while
the patient was still conscious. The procedure was not painful (the surface
of the brain does not contain pain receptors), but the patients did report
some fascinating experiences. When stimulating the occipital lobe one patient
reported, “a star came down toward my nose.” Upon stimulating a region near
the central sulcus, another patient commented, “those fingers and my thumb
gave a jump.” After temporal lobe stimulation, another patient claimed, “I
heard the music again; it is like the radio.” She was later able to recall the tune
she heard and was absolutely convinced that there must have been a radio in
the operating theatre. Of course, the patients had no idea when the electrical
stimulation was being applied—they couldn’t physically feel it or see it. As
far as they were concerned, an electrical stimulation applied to the brain felt
pretty much like a mental/cognitive event.
This book tells the emerging story of how mental processes such as
thoughts, memories and perceptions are organized and implemented by the
2 THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
FIGURE 1.1: A timeline for

the development of methods 1800
Phrenologists put forward their localizationist manifesto
and findings relevant to
1820
cognitive neuroscience, from
phrenology to present day. 1840 First nerve cell described (purkinje, 1837)
1860 Broca (1861) publishes paper on language localization
Applying electrical currents to dog cortex causes movement

1880
(Fritsch & Hitzig, 1870)
1900 EEG developed as a research tool (Berger, 1929)
Action potential discovered, enables single-cell recording

1920 (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1939)
Cognitive psychology emerges (influential publications by
1940
Broadbent, Chomsky, Miller and others)
1960 CT (Hounsfield, 1973) and MRI (Lauterbur, 1973) imaging developed
in vivo blood flow measured in humans, enabling PET (Reivich et al., 1979)
1980
First study of TMS reported (Barker et al., 1985)
2000
BOLD response reported enabling fMRI development (Ogawa et al., 1990)
2010 Attempt to map all major connections of the brain (Human Connectome Project)
brain. It is also concerned with how it is possible to study the mind and brain,
and how we know what we know. The term cognition collectively refers to
a variety of higher mental processes such as thinking, perceiving, imagining,
ONLINE RESOURCES speaking, acting and planning. Cognitive neuroscience is a bridging
discipline between cognitive science and cognitive psychology, on the one
To discover more
about Wilder Penfield hand, and biology and neuroscience, on the other. It has emerged as a distinct
and his pioneering enterprise only recently and has been driven by methodological advances that
research, watch the enable the study of the human brain safely in the laboratory (see Figure 1.1).
videos found on the It is perhaps not too surprising that earlier methods, such as direct electrical
companion website stimulation of the brain, failed to enter into the mainstream of research.
(www.routledge.com/
cw/ward). This chapter begins by placing a number of philosophical and scientific
approaches to the mind and brain in a historical perspective. The coverage
is selective rather than exhaustive, and students with a particular interest
K EY TERMS in these issues might want to read more deeply elsewhere (Wickens, 2015).
The chapter then provides a basic overview of the current methods used
Cognition
A variety of higher in cognitive neuroscience. A more detailed analysis and comparison of the
mental processes such different methods is provided in Chapters 3 to 5. Finally, the chapter attempts
as thinking, perceiving, to address some of the criticisms of the cognitive neuroscience approach that
imagining, speaking, have been articulated and outlines how it can move forward.
acting and planning.
Cognitive neuroscience C O G N I T I V E N E UROSCIE NCE IN HISTORICAL
Aims to explain cognitive
processes in terms of
PER S PEC T I V E
brain-based mechanisms.
Philosophical approaches to mind and brain
Mind–body problem
The problem of how a Philosophers, as well as scientists, have long been interested in how the brain
physical substance (the can create our mental world. How is it that a physical substance can give
brain) can give rise to our rise to our sensations, thoughts and emotions? This has been termed the
sensations, thoughts and
mind–body problem, although it should more properly be called the mind–
emotions (our mind).
brain problem, because it is now agreed that the brain is the key part of
Introducing cognitive neuroscience 3
the body for cognition. One position is that the mind and brain are made KEY TERMS
up of different kinds of substance, even though they may interact. This is
known as dualism, and the most famous proponent of this idea was René Dualism
The belief that mind
Descartes (1596–1650). Descartes believed that the mind was non-physical
and brain are made up
and immortal whereas the body was physical and mortal. He suggested that of different kinds of
they interact in the pineal gland, which lies at the center of the brain and substance.
is now considered part of the endocrine system. According to Descartes,
Dual-aspect theory
stimulation of the sense organs would cause vibrations in the body/brain that The belief that mind and
would be picked up in the pineal gland, and this would create a non-physical brain are two levels of
sense of awareness. There is little hope for cognitive neuroscience if dualism is description of the same
true because the methods of physical and biological sciences cannot tap into thing.
the non-physical domain (if such a thing were to exist). Reductionism
Even in Descartes’ time, there were critics of his position. One can The belief that mind-
identify a number of broad approaches to the mind–body problem that still based concepts will
have a contemporary resonance. Spinoza (1632–1677) argued that mind and eventually be replaced by
brain were two different levels of explanation for the same thing, but not two neuroscientific concepts.
different kinds of thing. This has been termed dual-aspect theory and it
remains popular with some current researchers in the field (Velmans, 2000).
An analogy can be drawn to wave–particle duality in physics, in which the
same entity (e.g., an electron) can be described both as a wave and as a particle.
An alternative approach to the mind–body problem that is endorsed
by many contemporary thinkers is reductionism (Churchland, 1995; Crick,
1994). This position states that, although cognitive, mind-based concepts (e.g.,
emotions, memories, attention) are currently useful for scientific exploration,
they will eventually be replaced by purely biological constructs (e.g., patterns
of neuronal firings, neurotransmitter release). As such, psychology will
eventually reduce to biology as we learn more and more about the brain.
Advocates of this approach note that there are many historical precedents in
which scientific constructs are abandoned when a better explanation is found.
In the seventeenth century, scientists believed that flammable materials
contained a substance, called phlogiston, which was released when burned.
This is similar to classical notions that fire was a basic element along with water,
air and earth. Eventually, this construct was replaced by an understanding
of how chemicals combine with oxygen. The process of burning became
just one example (along with rusting) of this particular chemical reaction.
Reductionists believe that mind-based concepts, and conscious experiences
in particular, will have the same status as phlogiston in a future theory of the
brain. Those who favor dual-aspect theory over reductionism point out that
an emotion would still feel like an emotion even if we were to fully understand
its neural basis and, as such, the usefulness of cognitive, mind-based concepts
will never be fully replaced.
Scientific approaches to mind and brain

Our understanding of the brain emerged historically late, largely in the
nineteenth century, although some important insights were gained during
classical times. Aristotle (384–322 bc) noted that the ratio of brain size to body
size was greatest in more intellectually advanced species, such as humans.
Unfortunately, he made the error of claiming that cognition was a product of
the heart rather than the brain. He believed that the brain acted as a coolant
system: the higher the intellect, the larger the cooling system needed. In the
Roman age, Galen (circa ad 129–199) observed brain injury in gladiators and
noted that nerves project to and from the brain. Nonetheless, he believed that
mental experiences themselves resided in the ventricles of the brain. This idea
went essentially unchallenged for well over 1,500 years. For example, when
Vesalius (1514–1564), the father of modern anatomy, published his plates
of dissected brains, the ventricles were drawn in exacting detail, whereas the
cortex was drawn crudely and schematically (see Figure 1.2). Others followed
in this tradition, often drawing the surface of the brain like the intestines. This
situation probably reflected a lack of interest in the cortex rather than a lack of
penmanship. It is not until one looks at the drawings of Gall and Spurzheim
(1810) that the features of the brain become recognizable to modern eyes.
FIGURE 1.2: Drawings of the brain from Vesalius (1543) (top), de Viessens (1685) (bottom left) and Gall and Spurzheim
(1810) (bottom right). Note how the earlier two drawings emphasized the ventricles and/or misrepresented the cortical surface.
Gall (1758–1828) and Spurzheim (1776–1832) received a bad press, KEY TERMS
historically speaking, because of their invention and advocacy of phrenology.
Phrenology had two key assumptions: first, that different regions of the brain Phrenology
The failed idea that
perform different functions and are associated with different behaviors; and
individual differences in
second, that the size of these regions produces distortions of the skull and cognition can be mapped
correlates with individual differences in cognition and personality. Taking onto differences in skull
these two ideas in turn, the notion of functional specialization within the shape.
brain has effectively endured into modern cognitive neuroscience, having Functional specialization
seen off a number of challenges over the years (Flourens, 1824; Lashley, Different regions of the
1929). The observations of Penfield and co-workers on the electrically brain are specialized for
stimulated brain provide some striking examples of this principle. However, different functions.
the functional specializations of phrenology were not based on controlled
experiments and were not constrained by theories of cognition. For example,
Fowler’s famous phrenologist’s head had regions dedicated to “parental
love,” “destructiveness” and “firmness” (Figure 1.3). Moreover, skull shape
has nothing to do with cognitive function.
Although phrenology was fatally flawed, the basic idea of different FIGURE 1.3: The
parts of the brain serving different functions paved the way for future phrenologist’s head was
developments in the nineteenth century, the most notable of which are Broca’s used to represent the
(1861) reports of two brain-damaged patients. Broca documented two cases hypothetical functions of
different regions of the brain.
in which acquired brain damage had impaired the ability to speak but left
© Photos.com/Thinkstock
other aspects of cognition relatively intact. He
concluded that language could be localized to
a particular region of the brain. Subsequent
studies argued that language itself was not a
single entity but could be further subdivided
into speech recognition, speech production
and conceptual knowledge (Lichtheim, 1885;
Wernicke, 1874). This was motivated by the
observation that brain damage can lead either
to poor speech comprehension and good
production, or good speech comprehension
and poor production (see Chapter 12 for full
details). This suggests that there are at least
two speech faculties in the brain and that
each can be independently impaired by brain
damage. This body of work was a huge step
forward in terms of thinking about mind
and brain. First, empirical observations were
being used to determine the building blocks
of cognition (is language a single module?)
rather than listing them from first principles.
Second, and related, they were developing
models of cognition that did not make direct
reference to the brain. That is, one could infer
that speech recognition and production were
separable without necessarily knowing where
in the brain they were located, or how the
underlying neurons brought these processes
K EY TERMS about. The approach of using patients with acquired brain damage to inform
theories of normal cognition is called cognitive neuropsychology and
Cognitive remains influential today (Chapter 5 discusses the logic of this method in
neuropsychology
detail). Cognitive neuropsychology is now effectively subsumed within the
The study of brain-
damaged patients to term “cognitive neuroscience,” where the latter phrase is seen as being less
inform theories of normal restrictive in terms of methodology.
cognition. Whereas discoveries in the neurosciences continued apace throughout
Information processing
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the formation of psychology as a
An approach in which discipline at the end of the nineteenth century took the study of the mind
behavior is described in away from its biological underpinnings. This did not reflect a belief in
terms of a sequence of dualism. It was due, in part, to some pragmatic constraints. Early pioneers
cognitive stages. of psychology, such as William James and Sigmund Freud, were interested
in topics like consciousness, attention and personality. Neuroscience has had
virtually nothing to say about these issues until quite recently. Another reason
for the schism between psychology and biology lies in the notion that one can
develop coherent and testable theories of cognition that do not make claims
about the brain. The modern foundations of cognitive psychology lie in the
computer metaphor of the brain and the information-processing approach,
popular from the 1950s onwards. For example, Broadbent (1958) argued
that much of cognition consists of a sequence of processing stages. In his
simple model, perceptual processes occur, followed by attentional processes
that transfer information to short-term memory and thence to long-term
memory (see also Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). These were often drawn as
a series of box-and-arrow diagrams (e.g., Figure 1.4). The implication was
that one could understand the cognitive system in the same way as one
FIGURE 1.4: Examples of box-and-arrow and connectionist models of cognition. Both

represent ways of describing cognitive processes that need not make direct reference to the
brain.
could understand the series of steps performed by a computer program, and KEY TERMS
without reference to the brain.
The notion that the brain contains different regions of functional Modularity
The notion that certain
specialization has been around in various guises for 200 years. However,
cognitive processes (or
one particular variation on this theme has attracted particular attention regions of the brain) are
and controversy—namely Fodor’s (1983, 1998) theory of modularity. restricted in the type of
First, Fodor makes a distinction between two different classes of cognitive information they process.
process: central systems and modules. The key difference between them Domain specificity
relates to the types of information they can process. Modules are held to The idea that a cognitive
demonstrate domain specificity in that they process only one particular process (or brain region)
type of information (e.g., color, shape, words, faces), whereas central is dedicated solely to
systems are held to be domain independent in that the type of information one particular type of
processed is non-specific (candidates would be memory, attention, executive information (e.g., colors,
faces, words).
functions). According to Fodor, one advantage of modular systems is that,
by processing only a limited type of information, they can operate rapidly, Interactivity
efficiently and in isolation from other cognitive systems. An additional Later stages of processing
can begin before earlier
claim is that modules may be innately specified in the genetic code. Many
stages are complete.
of these ideas have been criticized on empirical and theoretical grounds. For
example, it has been suggested that domain specificity is not innate, although Top-down processing
The influence of later stag-
the means of acquiring it could be (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Moreover,
es on the processing of
systems like reading appear modular in some respects but cannot be innate earlier ones (e.g., memory
because they are recent in evolution. Others have argued that evidence for influences on perception).
interactivity suggests that modules are not isolated from other cognitive
Bottom-up processing
processes (Farah, 1994).
The passage of informa-
The idea of the mind as a computer program has advanced over the tion from simpler (e.g.,
years along with advances in computational science. For example, many edges) to more complex
cognitive models contain some element of interactivity and parallel (e.g., objects).
processing. Interactivity refers to the fact that stages in processing may Parallel processing
not be strictly separate and that later stages can begin before earlier Different information is
stages are complete. Moreover, later stages can influence the outcome of processed at the same
early ones (top-down processing, in contrast to bottom-up processing). time (i.e., in parallel).
Parallel processing refers to the fact that lots of different information Neural network models
can be processed simultaneously (by contrast, serial computers process Computational models
each piece of information one at a time). Although these computationally in which information
explicit models are more sophisticated than earlier box-and-arrow processing occurs using
diagrams, they, like their predecessors, do not always make contact with many interconnected
nodes.
the neuroscience literature.
COMPUTATIONAL AND CONNECTIONIST MODELS OF COGNITION
In the 1980s, powerful computers became widely accessible as never before. This enabled cognitive
psychologists to develop computationally explicit models of cognition (that literally calculate a set of
outputs given a set of inputs) rather than the computationally inspired, but underspecified, box-and-
arrow approach. One particular way of implementing computational models has been very influential;
namely the neural network, connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) approach
(McClelland et al., 1986). These models are considered in a number of places throughout this book,
notably in the chapters dealing with memory, speaking and literacy.
Connectionist models have a number of architectural features. First, they are composed of arrays
of simple information-carrying units called nodes. Nodes are information-carrying in the sense
that they respond to a particular set of inputs (e.g., certain letters, certain sounds) and produce a
restricted set of outputs. The responsiveness of a node depends on how strongly it is connected
to other nodes in the network (the “weight” of the connection) and how active the other nodes
are. It is possible to calculate, mathematically, what the output of any node would be, given a set
of input activations and a set of weights. There are a number of advantages to this type of model.
For example, by adjusting the weights over time as a result of experience, the model can develop
and learn. The parallel processing enables large amounts of data to be processed simultaneously.
A more controversial claim is that they have “neural plausibility.” Nodes, activation and weights
are in many ways analogous to neurons, firing rates and neural connectivity, respectively. However,
these models have been criticized for being too powerful in that they can learn many things that
real brains cannot (Pinker & Prince, 1988). A more moderate view is that connectionist models
provide examples of ways in which the brain might implement a given cognitive function, and
they generate new predictions that can then be tested. Whether or not the brain actually does
implement cognition in that particular way will ultimately be a question for empirical research in
cognitive neuroscience.
K EY TERM The birth of cognitive neuroscience

Nodes It was largely advances in imaging technology that provided the driving force
The basic units of neural for modern-day cognitive neuroscience. Raichle (1998) describes how brain
network models that are imaging was in a “state of indifference and obscurity in the neuroscience
activated in response to community in the 1970s” and might never have reached prominence if it were
activity in other parts of
not for the involvement of cognitive psychologists in the 1980s. Cognitive
the network.
psychologists had already established experimental designs and information-
processing models that could potentially fit well with these emerging
methods. It is important to note that the technological advances in imaging
not only led to the development of functional imaging, but also enabled
brain lesions to be described precisely in ways that were never possible before
(except at postmortem).
Present-day cognitive neuroscience is composed of a broad diversity of
methods. These will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. At this
juncture, it is useful to compare and contrast some of the most prominent
methods. The distinction between recording methods and stimulation
methods is crucial in cognitive neuroscience. Direct electrical stimulation of
the brain in humans is now rarely carried out as a research tool, although
it has some therapeutic uses (e.g., in Parkinson’s disease). The modern-day
equivalent of these studies uses stimulation across the skull rather than
directly to the brain (i.e., transcranially). This includes transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) and transcranial electrical stimulation (tES). These will
be considered in Chapter 5, alongside the effect of organic brain lesions.
Electrophysiological methods (EEG/ERP and single-cell recordings) and
magnetophysiological methods (MEG) record the electrical and magnetic
properties of neurons themselves. These methods are considered in Chapter
3. In contrast, functional imaging methods (PET, fMRI and fNIRS) record
4 Naturally
MEG & ERP Functional MRI occurring
3 PET
lesions
Brain
2
Spatial resolution (log mm)
Map 1 TMS
Column 0
Multi-unit
Layer –1 recording
Neuron
–2
Dendrite
–3 Single-cell
recording
Synapse
–4
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Millisecond Second Minute Hour Day
Temporal resolution (log seconds)
FIGURE 1.5: The methods of cognitive neuroscience can be categorized according to their
spatial and temporal resolution.
Adapted from Churchland and Sejnowski, 1988.
physiological changes associated with blood supply to the brain, which evolve
more slowly over time. These are called hemodynamic methods and are
considered in Chapter 4.
The methods of cognitive neuroscience can be placed on a number of
dimensions (see Figure 1.5):
KEY TERM
•• The temporal resolution refers to the accuracy with which one can
measure when an event is occurring. The effects of brain damage are Temporal resolution
permanent and so this has no temporal resolution as such. Methods The accuracy with which
one can measure when
such as EEG, MEG, TMS and single-cell recording have millisecond
an event (e.g., a physio-
resolution. fMRI has a temporal resolution of several seconds that logical change) occurs.
reflects the slower hemodynamic response.
THE DIFFERENT METHODS USED IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE

Method Method type Invasiveness Brain property used
EEG/ERP Recording Noninvasive Electrical
Single-cell (and Recording Invasive Electrical
multi-unit) recordings
TMS Stimulation Noninvasive Electromagnetic
tES Stimulation Noninvasive Electrical
MEG Recording Noninvasive Magnetic
PET Recording Invasive Hemodynamic
fMRI Recording Noninvasive Hemodynamic
fNIRS Recording Noninvasive Hemodynamic
K EY TERM •• The spatial resolution refers to the accuracy with which one can measure
where an event is occurring. Lesion and functional imaging methods
Spatial resolution have comparable resolution at the millimeter level, whereas single-cell
The accuracy with
recordings have spatial resolution at the level of the neuron.
which one can measure
where an event (e.g., a •• The invasiveness of a method refers to whether the equipment is located
physiological change) is internally or externally. PET is invasive because it requires an injection of
occurring. a radio-labeled isotope. Single-cell recordings are performed on the brain
itself and are normally only carried out in non-human animals.
D O ES C O G N I T IVE PSYCHOLOGY NE E D THE BRAIN?

As already noted, cognitive psychology developed substantially from the
1950s, using information-processing models that do not make direct reference
to the brain. If this way of doing things remains successful, then why change?
Of course, there is no reason why it should change. The claim is not that
cognitive neuroscience is replacing cognitive psychology (although some
might endorse this view), but merely that cognitive psychological theories
can inform theories and experiments in the neurosciences and vice versa.
However, others have argued that this is not possible by virtue of the fact
that information-processing models do not make claims about the brain
(Coltheart, 2004b; Harley, 2004).
Coltheart (2004b) poses the question:
Has cognitive neuroscience, or if not might it ever (in principle, or

even in practice), successfully used data from cognitive neuroimaging
FIGURE 1.6: One could take
many different measures in
to make theoretical decisions entirely at the cognitive level (e.g. to
a forced-choice response adjudicate between competing information-processing models of some
task: behavioral (reaction cognitive system)?
time [RT], errors, eye- (p. 21)
movements) or biological
(electromyographic [EMG], Henson (2005) argues that it can in principle and that it does in practice. He
BOLD response in fMRI or
argues that data from functional imaging (blood flow, blood oxygen) comprise
electrical activity in EEG). All
measures could potentially
just another dependent variable that one can measure. For example, there are a
be used to inform cognitive number of things that one could measure in a standard forced-choice reaction-
theory. time task: reaction time, error rates, sweating (skin conductance response),
Adapted from Henson, 2005. muscle contraction (electromyograph), scalp electrical recordings (EEG) or
By kind permission of the hemodynamic changes in the brain (fMRI)—see Figure 1.6. Each measure
Experimental Psychology Society.
will relate to the task in some way and can be
used to inform theories about the task.
Eye-movements EEG To illustrate this point, consider an
example. One could ask a simple question
RT
such as: Does visual recognition of words and
letters involve computing a representation
fMRI that is independent of case? For example,
does the reading system treat “E” and “e” as
equivalent at an early stage in processing or
are “E” and “e” treated as different letters until
EMG some later stage (e.g., saying them aloud)? A
way of investigating this using a reaction-time
measure is to present the same word twice in the same case (e.g., RADIO-
RADIO) or different case (e.g., radio-RADIO) and compare this with
situations in which the word differs (e.g., mouse-RADIO, MOUSE-RADIO).
One general finding in reaction-time studies is that it is faster to process
a stimulus if the same stimulus has recently been presented. For example,
if asked to make a speeded decision about RADIO (e.g., is it animate or
inanimate?), performance will be faster if it has been previously encountered.
Dehaene et al. (2001) investigated this mechanism by comparing reaction-time
measures with functional imaging (fMRI) measures. In this task, the first word
in each pair was presented very briefly and was followed by visual noise. This
prevented the participants from consciously perceiving it and, hence, one can
be sure that they are not saying the word. The second word was consciously
seen and requires a response. Dehaene et al. found that reaction times were FIGURE 1.7: Both reaction
faster to the second word when it follows the same word, irrespective of case. times and fMRI activation
Importantly, there was a region in the left fusiform cortex that shows the in the left fusiform region
same effect (although in terms of “activation” rather than response time). demonstrate more efficient
This is shown in Figure 1.7. In this concrete example, it is meaningless to processing of words if they
are preceded by subliminal
argue that one type of measure is “better” for informing cognitive theory
presentation of the same
(to return to Coltheart’s question) given that both are measuring different word, irrespective of case.
aspects of the same event. One could explore the nature of this effect further Adapted from Dehaene et al.,
by, for instance, presenting the same word in different languages (in bilingual 2001.
speakers), presenting the words in different locations on the screen and so on.
This would provide further insights into the nature of this mechanism (e.g.,
what aspects of vision does it entail? Does it depend on word meaning?).
However, both reaction-time measures and brain-based measures could be
potentially informative. It is not the case that functional imaging is merely
telling us where cognition is happening and not how it is happening.
Another distinction that has been used to contrast cognitive psychology
and cognitive neuroscience is that between software and hardware,
respectively (Coltheart, 2004b; Harley, 2004). This derives from the familiar
computer analogy in which one can, supposedly, learn about information
processing (software) without knowing about the brain (hardware). As has
been shown, to some extent this is true. But the computer analogy is a little
misleading. Computer software is written by computer programmers (who,
incidentally, have human brains). However, information processing is not
written by some third person and then inscribed into the brain. Rather, the
brain provides causal constraints on the nature of information processing.
This is not analogous to the computer domain in which the link between
software and hardware is arbitrarily determined by a computer programmer.
To give a simple example, one model of visual word recognition suggests
that words are recognized by searching words in a mental dictionary one
by one until a match is found (Forster, 1976). The weight of evidence from
cognitive psychology argues against this serial search, and in favor of words
being searched in parallel (i.e., all candidate words are considered at the same
time). But why does human cognition work like this? Computer programs can
be made to recognize words adequately with both serial search and parallel
search. The reason why human information processing uses a parallel search
and not a serial search probably lies in the relatively slow neural response
time (acting against serial search). This constraint does not apply to the fast
processing of computers. Thus, cognitive psychology may be sufficient to
tell us the structure of information processing but it may not answer deeper
questions about why information processing should be configured in that
particular way. The biological constraints imposed by the brain shape the
nature and limitations of cognition.
D O ES N EU RO S CIE NCE NE E D COGNITIVE

PS YC H O LO G Y ?
It would be no exaggeration to say that the advent of techniques such as
functional imaging has revolutionized the brain sciences. For example,
consider some of the newspaper headlines that have appeared over the
years (Figure 1.8). Of course, it has been well known since the nineteenth
century that pain, mood, intelligence and sexual desire are largely products of
processes in the brain. The reason headlines such as these are extraordinary is
because now the technology exists to be able to study these processes in vivo.
Of course, when one looks inside the brain one does not “see” memories,
thoughts, perceptions and so on (i.e., the stuff of cognitive psychology).
Instead, what one sees is gray matter, white matter, blood vessels and so
on (i.e., the stuff of neuroscience). It is the latter, not the former, that one
observes when conducting a functional imaging experiment. Developing a
FIGURE 1.8: The media

framework for linking the two will necessarily entail dealing with the mind– loves to simplify the findings
body problem either tacitly or explicitly. This is a daunting challenge. of cognitive neuroscience.
Many newspaper stories
Is functional imaging going to lead to a more sophisticated understanding
appear to regard it as
of the mind and brain than was achieved by the phrenologists? Some of counterintuitive that sex,
the newspaper reports in Figure 1.8 suggest it might not. One reason why pain and mood would be
phrenology failed is because the method had no real scientific grounding; the products of the brain.
same cannot be said of functional imaging. Another reason why phrenology Sunday Times, 21 November
failed was that the psychological concepts used were naïve. It is for this reason 1999; Metro, 5 January 2001;
The Observer, 12 March 2000.
that functional imaging and other advances in neuroscience do require the
insights from cognitive psychology to frame appropriate research questions
and avoid becoming a new phrenology (Uttal, 2001).
The question of whether cognitive, mind-based concepts will eventually
become redundant (under a reductionist account) or coexist with neural-
based accounts (e.g., as in dual-aspect theory) is for the future to decide.
But for now, cognitive, mind-based concepts have an essential role to play in
cognitive neuroscience.
F RO M M O D ULES T O N ET WO R KS
What does the future of cognitive neuroscience look like? Although nobody
knows for sure, much current research is centered on understanding the mind
and brain as a network. A network is a dynamically changing pattern of
activity over several brain regions. Rather than thinking of the brain as a
single network, there might be a multitude of different networks which are,
themselves, switched on or off depending on the kind of thought or behavior KEY TERM
that is needed. Thus, not only do brain regions have a degree of functional Connectome
specialization, but entire networks may also have some specializations. A comprehensive map
This network approach is exemplified by current efforts to map the human of neural connections
in the brain that may be
connectome (Sporns, 2011). The Human Connectome Project was launched
thought of as its “wiring
in 2010 at a cost of over $40M. The aim is to try to map out the pattern diagram.”
of connectivity in the human brain at a macro, i.e., millimeter, scale (rather
than the micro level of individual synapses). The project is based on MRI
techniques that measure structural connectivity (essentially white matter
fibers) and functional connectivity (essentially correlated patterns of brain
activity between regions). By scanning and testing thousands of people it will
ONLINE RESOURCES be possible to identify differences in the connectome that are linked to disease
Delve deeper and also, of particular relevance here, to understand how these networks
into the Human support cognitive function. This can be done by, for instance, linking
Connectome Project individual differences in the connectome to individual differences in specific
(humanconnectome.
cognitive abilities (Barch et al., 2013). Thus, it is not just an enterprise for
org) and watch TEDx
talks on connectomics biologists and neuroimagers—it also requires the input of psychologists who
by Jeff Lichtman and understand cognition. A complementary approach is to map the connectome
David van Essen. Visit at the micro scale of individual synapses. This is a daunting prospect as there
the companion website are 1010 neurons linked by 1014 synaptic connections (Azevedo et al., 2009).
at www.routledge.
By comparison, the size of a human genome is far smaller (3×109). Aside
com/cw/ward.
from the sheer scale of this challenge, there is no obvious way of interpreting
the connectome “code” (unlike the genome where there is a simple mapping
between the code and the proteins they create).
K EY TERM Of course, networks are nothing new. Networks were there from the start
Graph theory in the form of black-box-and-arrow diagrams. However, the contemporary
A mathematical tech- and emerging landscape looks very different from this. Firstly, the network
nique for computing the architecture that supports cognition is derived from biologically based
pattern of connectivity (or observations of the structural and functional connectome. This is supported
“wiring diagram”) from a by advanced mathematical tools such as graph theory (Bullmore & Sporns,
set of correlations.
2009). This essentially creates a wiring diagram, rather like a subway map,
in which some brain regions act as central hubs within the network (where
several subway lines cross, in that analogy) and other regions are less
connected (the suburbs, in that analogy). Secondly, there has been a shift
away from conceptualizing the hubs in the network as highly specialized
units. Instead, brain regions might perform a range of different functions
depending on which other parts of the brain they are communicating with.
A good example is Broca’s region itself which, whilst everyone agrees it is
important for language, seems to also be involved in other cognitive processes
such as detecting musical violations (Koelsch et al., 2006).
Does this mean that the era of functional specialization, stretching from
phrenology through to Broca and Penfield, is now over? This is certainly
not the case. It has even been argued on first principles that if the brain is a
network then the different hubs in the network must have different functional
specializations (Sporns & Betzel, 2016), except in the hypothetical scenario
that all regions in the network connect equally strongly to each other (in which
case each hub is identical). However, the function assigned to a region may
be harder to map onto simple cognitive concepts in this new framework. For
instance, the function of a brain region may be something like “integrating
vision and speech” rather than “a store of words.”
Thus, the central challenge for cognitive neuroscience for the future is
to develop new ways of describing the relationship between brain structure
(notably connectomics) and function (i.e., cognition and behavior). Barrett
and Satpute (2013) offer a useful summary of three different approaches as
shown in Figure 1.9. In the first scenario (a), there is a very simple one-to-one
mapping between different brain regions and different cognitive functions.
FIGURE 1.9: Three different ways in which different brain structures might be mapped to
different functions (tasks and processes). In (a) there is a one-to-one association between
brain structure and function whereas in both (b) and (c) a network of regions may make
different contributions to a given function. In (b) the network consists of specialized units
that interact, but in (c) the network consists of interactions between nonspecialized units.
From Barrett and Satpute (2013).
Few researchers would endorse such a view. In the second scenario (b), there
is still a high degree of specialization of brain regions but multiple regions
need to interact to generate a cognitive function. In the third scenario (c)
there is far less specialization of regions and cognitive functions are generated
by the interaction of multiple networks (with each network having some
specialization). Barrett and Satpute (2013) favor this third option, although
others argue that the cognitive architecture of the brain is more like the
second option (Vytal & Hamann, 2010).
SUMMARY AND KEY POINTS OF THE CHAPTER
•• The mind–body problem refers to the question of how physical

matter (the brain) can produce mental experiences, and this
remains an enduring issue in cognitive neuroscience.
•• To some extent, the different regions of the brain are specialized
for different functions.
•• Functional neuroimaging has provided the driving force for
much of the development of cognitive neuroscience, but there
is a danger in merely using these methods to localize cognitive
functions without understanding how they work.
•• Cognitive psychology has developed as a discipline without
ONLINE RESOURCES making explicit references to the brain. However, biological
measures can provide an alternative source of evidence to inform
Visit the companion
cognitive theory and the brain must provide constraining factors
website at www.
on the nature and development of the information-processing
routledge.com/cw/ward
for: models of cognitive science.
•• Attempting to map the human connectome, and link it to
•• References to key
papers and readings
cognition, is the greatest challenge for the next generation of
•• Video interviews cognitive neuroscientists. Although old concepts will remain (e.g.,
on key topics the idea of functional specialization), they may be understood in
with leading entirely new ways.
neuroscientists
Wilder Penfield and
Michael Gazzaniga,
and philosopher Ned EXAMPLE ESSAY QUESTIONS
Block
•• Multiple-choice
questions and •• What is the “mind–body problem” and what frameworks have
interactive flashcards been put forward to solve it?
to test your •• Is cognitive neuroscience the new phrenology?
knowledge •• Does cognitive psychology need the brain? Does neuroscience
•• Downloadable need cognitive psychology?
glossary
Another random document with
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We know his heroic resistance in Africa, not only against Caesar, but
against the furious men of the republican party, who were always
ready to commit some excess. We know how he would not accept the
pardon of the victor after Thapsus, when he saw that all was lost, and
killed himself at Utica.
His death made an immense impression in all the Roman world. It
put to the blush those who were beginning to accustom themselves to
slavery; it gave a sort of new impulse to the discouraged republicans,
and revived opposition. During his life-time, Cato had not always
rendered good service to his party; he was very useful to it after his
death. The proscribed cause had henceforth its ideal and its martyr.
Its remaining partisans united and sheltered themselves under that
great name. At Rome especially, in that great, unquiet, restless city,
where so many men bowed the head without submitting, his
glorification became the ordinary theme of the discontented. “The
battle raged round the body of Cato,” says M. Mommsen, “as at Troy
it had raged around that of Patroclus.” Fabius Gallus, Brutus, Cicero,
and many others no doubt whom we do not know, wrote his eulogy.
Cicero began his at the request of Brutus. At first he was repelled by
the difficulty of the subject: “This is a work for Archimedes,” said he;
[301]
but as he advanced, he took a liking to his work and finished it
with a sort of enthusiasm. This book has not come down to us: we
only know that Cicero made a complete and unreserved apology for
Cato. “he raises him to the skies,”[302] says Tacitus. They had,
however, disagreed more than once, and he speaks of him without
much consideration in many passages of his correspondence; but, as
often happens, death reconciled everything. Besides, Cicero, who
reproached himself with not having done enough for his party, was
happy to find an opportunity of paying his debt. His book, that the
name of the author and that of the hero recommended at once, had
so great a success that Caesar was uneasy and discontented about it.
He took care, however, not to show his ill-humour; on the contrary,
he hastened to write a flattering letter to Cicero to congratulate him
on the talent he had displayed in his work. “In reading it,” he told
him, “I feel that I become more eloquent.”[303] Instead of employing
any rigorous measure, as was to be feared, he thought that the pen
alone, according to the expression of Tacitus, ought to avenge the
attacks that the pen had made. By his order, his lieutenant and friend
Hirtius addressed a long letter to Cicero, which was published, and
in which he controverted his book. Later, as this answer was not
thought sufficient, Caesar himself entered the lists, and, in the midst
of the anxieties of the war in Spain, he composed the Anti-Cato.
This moderation of Caesar has been justly praised: it is not
common with men who possess unlimited authority, and the
Romans justly said, that it is seldom a man is contented to write
when he can proscribe. The fact that he detested Cato adds to the
merit of his generous conduct. He always speaks of him with
bitterness in his Commentaries, and although he was accustomed to
do justice to his enemies, he never misses an opportunity of decrying
him. Has he not dared to assert that in taking up arms against him,
Cato gave way to personal rancour and to the desire of revenging his
electoral defeats,[304] when he well knew that no one had more
generously forgotten himself in order to think only of his country!
This was because there was more than political disagreement
between them, there was antipathy of character. The defects of Cato
must have been particularly disagreeable to Caesar, and his virtues
were those that Caesar not only did not seek to acquire, but which he
could not even understand. How could he have any feeling for his
strict respect for law, for his almost servile attachment to old
customs? he who found a lively pleasure in laughing at ancient
usages. How could a prodigal, who had formed the habit of
squandering the money of the state and his own without reckoning,
how could he do justice to those rigorous scruples that Cato had in
the handling of the public funds, to the attention he gave to his
private affairs, and to that ambition, so strange for that time, of not
having more debts than assets? These were, I repeat, qualities that
Caesar could not comprehend. He was, then, sincere and convinced
when he attacked them. A man of wit and pleasure, indifferent to
principles, sceptical in opinion, accustomed to live in a frivolous and
polished society, Cato could scarcely appear to him anything else
than fanatical and brutal. As there was nothing that he put above
refinement and politeness of manners, an elegant vice suited him
better than a savage virtue. Cato, on the contrary, although he was
not a stranger to literary culture and the spirit of society, had none
the less remained at bottom an old-fashioned Roman.
Notwithstanding their power, society and letters could not entirely
overcome that bluntness, or if you will, that brutality of manner that
he owed to his constitution and his race, and of which we find
something even in his finest actions. To cite only one example;
Plutarch, in the admirable narrative that he has given of his last
moments, relates that, when a slave refused, through affection for
Cato, to give him his sword, he knocked him down with a furious
blow by which his hand was covered with blood. To the eyes of a
fastidious man like Caesar, this blow revealed a vulgar nature, and I
am afraid prevented him understanding the grandeur of this death.
The same contrast, or rather the same antipathy, is found in all their
private conduct. While Caesar’s maxim was to pardon everything in
his friends, and he therefore pushed complacency so far as to shut
his eyes to their treasons, Cato was too exacting and particular with
regard to his. At Cyprus he did not hesitate to fall out with Munatius,
his life-long companion, by showing an offensive distrust of him. He
was, no doubt, in his household, a model of honour and fidelity; yet
he did not always maintain that respect and regard for his wife that
she deserved. We know how he gave her up without ceremony to
Hortensius, who had asked him for her, to take her again without
scruple after Hortensius’ death. How different was Caesar’s conduct
with regard to his, although he had reason to complain of her! A man
had been surprised at night in his house, the affair came before the
courts, he might have avenged the outrage, but he preferred rather to
forget it. Called as a witness before the judges, he declared he knew
nothing about it, thus saving his rival in order to preserve his wife’s
reputation. He only divorced her later, when the report of the
intrigue had blown over. This was acting like a well-bred man of the
world. Here again, between Cato and him, it is the least scrupulous
and in the main the least honourable of the two, the fickle and
libertine husband, who, by reason of a certain natural delicacy,
appears in a more advantageous light.
This contrast in conduct, this opposition of character, seem to me
to explain the way in which Caesar writes of Cato in his book, even
better than all their political disagreements. The fragments of it that
survive and the testimony of Plutarch, show that he attacked him
with extreme violence, and that he tried to make him at once
ridiculous and odious. But it was useless, it was lost labour. People
continued, notwithstanding his efforts, to read and admire Cicero’s
book. Not only did Cato’s reputation survive Caesar’s insults, it
increased still more under the empire. In Nero’s time, when
despotism was heaviest, Thrasea wrote his history again, Seneca
quotes him on every page of his books, and to the end he was the
pride and model of honest men who preserved some feeling of
honour and dignity in the general abasement of character. They
studied his death even more than his life, for they needed then,
above all, to learn how to die, and when this sad necessity presented
itself, it was his example they set before their eyes, and his name that
was in their mouths. To have sustained and consoled so many noble
hearts in these cruel trials is assuredly a great glory, and I think that
Cato would not have desired any other.
III.
The conclusion to be drawn from Caesar’s conduct after Pharsalia,

and from his relations with Cicero, is, that he wished at that time to
draw nearer to the republican party. It was difficult for him to act
otherwise. As long as it was a question of overturning the republic,
he had accepted the support of everybody, and the worst men had
come to him by preference. “When a man was eaten up with debts
and in want of everything,” said Cicero, “and if, besides, he was
shown to be a scoundrel capable of daring anything, Caesar made
him his friend;”[305] but all these unprincipled and unscrupulous
men, excellent for upsetting an established power, were worth
nothing in setting up a new one. It was impossible that Caesar’s
government should inspire any confidence as long as some
honourable persons, whom men were accustomed to respect, were
not seen with the master and alongside these adventurers, whom
they had learnt to fear. Now, honourable men were chiefly found
among the vanquished. We must add that it was not Caesar’s idea
that one party alone should profit by his victory. He had no ambition
to work, like Marius or Sulla, for the triumph of a faction: he wished
to found a new government, and he invited men of different opinions
to aid him in the enterprise. It has been asserted that he sought to
reconcile parties, and great compliments have been paid him for it.
The praise is not altogether just: he did not reconcile them, he
annihilated them. In the monarchical system, that he wished to
establish,[306] the old parties of the republic had no place. He had
cleverly used the dissensions of the people and the senate to
dominate both; the first result of his victory was to put them both
aside, and we may say that after Pharsalia, there was only Caesar on
one side, and the vanquished on the other. This explains how it was
that, once victorious, he made use indifferently of the partisans of the
senate and those of the democrats. This equality which he
established between them was natural, since they had all become,
equally and without distinction, his subjects. Only he well knew that
in accepting the services of the old republicans he should not have
instruments always tractable, and that he would be obliged to allow
them a certain independence of action and speech, to preserve, at
least outwardly, some appearance of a republic; but that in itself did
not give him much uneasiness. He had not that invincible
repugnance for liberty that princes have who are born to an absolute
throne, and who only know its name to dread and detest it. He had
lived with it for twenty-three years, he had become accustomed to it,
he knew its importance. Therefore he did not seek to destroy it
entirely. He did not silence, as he might have done, the eloquent
voices that regretted the past; he did not even impose silence on that
harassing opposition that tried to respond to his victories by jeers.
He allowed some acts of his administration to be criticized, and
permitted men to give him advice. This great mind well knew that a
country becomes enervated when the citizens are rendered
indifferent to public affairs, and lose the taste for attending to them.
He did not think that anything solid could be established on passive
and silent obedience, and in the government that he founded he
wished to preserve something of public life. Cicero tells us this in a
curious passage of his correspondence: “We enjoy here a profound
calm,” he writes to one of his friends; “I should rather prefer,
however, a little honest and salutary agitation;” and he adds: “I see
that Caesar is of my opinion.”[307]
All these reasons decided him to take one step further on that path
of generosity and clemency on which he had entered after Pharsalia.
He had pardoned the greater number of those who had borne arms
against him; he invited some of them to share his power. At the very
time that he was recalling the greater part of the exiles, he appointed
Cassius his lieutenant; he gave Brutus the government of Cisalpine
Gaul, and Sulpicius that of Greece. We shall speak further on of the
first two; it is important, the better to appreciate Caesar’s policy, to
rapidly make known the third, and to inquire how he had become
worthy of the favours of the conqueror, and in what manner he
profited by them.
Servius Sulpicius belonged to an important Roman family, and
was the most celebrated lawyer of his time. Cicero gives him this
great praise, namely, that he was the first to bring philosophy into
the law, that is to say, that he bound together all those minute rules
and precise formulas of which this science is composed, by general
principles and comprehensive views.[308] Accordingly he does not
hesitate to place him much above his predecessors, and more
especially, over that great family of the Scaevolas, in which as it
seemed Roman jurisprudence had been up to that time incarnate.
There was, however, a difference between them and Sulpicius, which
it is important to notice: the Scaevolas had given to Rome, lawyers,
augurs, pontifs, that is to say, they excelled in the arts that are
friendly to tranquillity and peace; but they were also very active
citizens, resolute politicians, valiant soldiers who courageously
defended their country against conspirators and against the
foreigner. They showed themselves, in their busy life, competent for
all affairs and equal to all situations. Scaevola the augur, when Cicero
knew him, was still, notwithstanding his age, a vigorous old man,
who rose at daybreak to meet his country clients. He was the first to
arrive at the Curia, and he had always some book with him, that he
read so as not to remain idle while waiting for his colleagues; but the
day that Saturninus threatened the public tranquillity, this learned
man who loved study so much, this infirm old man who supported
himself with difficulty, and could only use one arm, seized a javelin
with that arm, and marched at the head of the people to the assault
of the Capitol.[309] Scaevola the pontif was not only an able lawyer, he
was also an upright administrator whose memory Asia never forgot.
When the farmers of the taxes attacked his quaestor Rutilius, guilty
of having wished to prevent them ruining the province, he defended
him with an admirable eloquence and vigour that no threat could
shake. He refused to leave Rome at the time of the first proscriptions,
and abandon his clients and their business, although he knew the
fate that was awaiting him. Wounded at the funeral of Marius, he
was dispatched a few days later near the temple of Vesta.[310]
However, such men were not exceptional at Rome. In the best times
of the republic, the complete citizen had to be at once agriculturist,
soldier, administrator, financier, advocate, and even jurist. There
were no specialists then, and we should be forced to make now-a-
days four or five different persons out of one ancient Roman; but in
the period of which we are now speaking, these diverse aptitudes that
were then required in a single man were separated: each man gave
himself to a special science, and we can begin to divide men of study
from men of action. It is difficult to say whether the reason of this
was that men had lost the energy of their character; or perhaps we
should think that since the masterpieces of Greece had been made
known, and each science had become more complicated, one man
could not any longer bear the burden of all united? However this
may be, if Sulpicius was above the Scaevolas as a lawyer, he was far
from having their firmness as a citizen. Praetor or consul, he was
never anything more than a man of learning and chamber practice.
In circumstances that require resolution, every time it was necessary
to decide and to act, he was ill at ease. We feel that this honest and
gentle soul was not made to be the first magistrate of a republic in a
period of revolution. His fondness for always playing the part of
conciliator and arbitrator in that time of violence ended by exciting
laughter. Cicero himself, although he was his friend, quizzes him a
little, when he shows us this great peacemaker starting off with his
little secretary, after having looked over all his lawyers’ rules, to
intervene between the parties at the time these parties only desired
to destroy one another.
Caesar had always thought that Sulpicius was not of a character to
oppose him vigorously, and had early worked to attach him to
himself. He began by making an ally in his house, and a powerful
ally. It was a matter of common talk at Rome, that the worthy
Sulpicius allowed himself to be led by his wife Postumia; Cicero, who
likes to repeat scandals, several times tells us this. Now, Postumia’s
reputation was not spotless, and Suetonius places her name on the
list of those women who were loved by Caesar. She is one of a very
numerous company; but this fickle man, who passed so quickly from
one mistress to another, had this singular privilege, that all the
women whom he abandoned, remained none the less his devoted
friends. They forgave his infidelities, they continued to take an
interest in all his successes, they put those immense resources of
ingenuity and persistency which belong only to a woman who is in
love, at the service of his policy. It was no doubt Postumia who
decided Sulpicius to work for Caesar during the whole time that he
was consul, and to oppose the vehemence of his colleague Marcellus
who wished another governor of Gaul to be appointed. However,
notwithstanding all his weaknesses, Sulpicius was none the less a
sincere republican, and when the war had broken out, he declared
against Caesar, and left Italy. After the defeat, he submitted like the
rest, and he had resumed his usual occupations, when Caesar sought
him out in his retreat in order to appoint him governor of Greece. It
was certainly impossible to find a government that suited him better.
A residence in Athens, at all times agreeable to the rich Romans,
must have been especially so at this time when that city was the
asylum of so many illustrious exiles. Sulpicius could at the same time
have the pleasure of hearing the most celebrated rhetoricians and
philosophers of the world, and could talk of Rome and the republic
with eminent persons like Marcellus and Torquatus, and thus satisfy
all his tastes at once. Nothing could have been more pleasing, we
should have thought, to this scholar and man of letters, whom
chance had made a statesman, than the exercise of extensive power,
without danger, combined with the most refined intellectual
pleasures in one of the grandest and most beautiful countries in the
world. We should, therefore, have thought that Caesar had done the
most agreeable thing for him, in sending him on duty to that city
where the Romans usually went for pleasure. Yet it does not seem
that Sulpicius appreciated these advantages. He had scarcely arrived
in Greece, when he was discontented at having gone, and longed to
depart. Evidently it was not the country that displeased him, he
would not have thought himself better off anywhere else; but he
regretted the republic. After having so timidly defended it, he could
not console himself for its fall, and blamed himself for serving him
who had overturned it. These feelings are clearly expressed in a letter
that he wrote to Cicero from Greece. “Fortune,” he tells him, “has
taken from us our most precious possessions; we have lost our
honour, our dignity, and our country.... In the times in which we live,
those are most happy who are dead.”[311]
When a timid and moderate man like Sulpicius dared speak thus,
what must others not have said and thought! We can guess this when
we see how Cicero writes to the greater number of them. Although he
is addressing officials of the new government, he does not take the
trouble to hide his opinions; he freely expresses his regrets, because
he well knows they are shared by those to whom he is writing. He
speaks to Servilius Isauricus, the proconsul of Asia, as to a man
whom the absolute power of one does not satisfy, and who wishes
some restraints to be put on it.[312] He tells Cornificius, the governor
of Africa, that affairs are going ill at Rome, and that many things
happen there which would pain him.[313] “I know what you think of
the lot of honest people, and of the misfortunes of the republic,” he
writes to Furfanius, the proconsul of Sicily, in recommending an
exile to him.[314] These persons, however, had accepted important
offices from Caesar: they shared his power, they passed for his
friends; but all the favours they had received from him had not
thoroughly attached them to his cause. They made their reservations
while serving him, and only half gave themselves up to him. Whence
could this opposition come, that the new government met with
among men who had at first agreed to take a share in it? It proceeded
from different motives which it is easy to point out. The first,
perhaps the most important, was that this government, even while
loading them with honours, could not give them what the old
republic would have given them. With the establishment of the
monarchy an important change in all public employments was
accomplished: the magistrates became subordinate officials.
Formerly, those elected by the popular vote had the right to act as
they pleased within the sphere of their functions. A fertile power of
initiative inspired every rank of this hierarchy of republican
dignitaries. From the aedile to the consul all were supreme within
their own limits. They could not be so under an absolute
government. Instead of governing on their own account, they were
only the channels, so to say, by which the will of a single man acted
to the ends of the earth. Certainly public security gained much by the
cessation of those conflicts of authorities, which had continually
troubled it, and it was a great advantage for the provinces that
absolute power had been taken away from their greedy governors.
Nevertheless, if the governed profited by these reforms, it was
natural that the governors should be discontented with them. From
the moment that they were only entrusted with the execution of the
orders of another man the importance of their functions diminished,
and this sovereign and absolute authority whose weight they always
felt, finally vexed even the most submissive. If ambitious men
complained of the diminution of their power, honest people did not
get accustomed so easily as might have been expected to the loss of
their liberty. In proportion as they left Pharsalia behind, their regrets
became more lively. They began to get over the surprise of the defeat,
and gradually recovered from the fear it had caused them. During the
moments that immediately follow those great disasters in which men
have expected to perish, they give themselves up entirely to the
pleasure of living, but this pleasure is one of those to which men
accustom themselves so quickly, and which are taken so much as a
matter of course, that they soon cease to be sensible of it. All those
terrified people who on the morrow of Pharsalia desired only
tranquillity, when it had been given them, wished for something else.
As long as men are uncertain of their life, they do not trouble
themselves to know if they shall live free, but when once life is
assured, the desire for liberty returns to all hearts, and those who
served Caesar felt it like the rest. Caesar, we know, partly satisfied
this desire, but this satisfaction did not last long. It is as difficult to
halt on the road to liberty as on that to absolutism. One favour
granted makes men desire another, and men think less of enjoying
what they have obtained than of lamenting what they lack. It was
thus that Cicero, who had welcomed Caesar’s clemency with
transports of joy, and who saluted the return of Marcellus as a sort of
restoration of the republic, soon changed his opinion and language.
As we get on further in his correspondence, he becomes more bitter
and more revolutionary. He who had so severely condemned those
who “after having disarmed their hands did not disarm their
hearts,”[315] had his own heart filled with the bitterest resentment. He
said on every opportunity that all was lost, that he blushed to be a
slave, that he was ashamed to live. He attacked with his pitiless
raillery the most useful measures and the most just acts. He laughed
at the reform of the calendar, and pretended to appear scandalized at
the enlargement of Rome. He went further. On the day that the
senate ordered Caesar’s statue to be placed beside those of the
ancient kings, he could not avoid making a cruel allusion to the
manner in which the first of these kings had perished. “I am very
glad,” said he, “to see Caesar so near to Romulus!”[316] And yet it was
scarcely a year since, in his speech for Marcellus, he had implored
him in the name of the country to watch over his life, and had said
with much feeling, “Your safety is ours!”
Caesar, then, had only malcontents around him. The moderate
republicans, on whom he reckoned to aid him in his work, could not
resign themselves to the loss of the republic. The exiles whom he had
recalled to Rome were more humiliated by his clemency than
grateful for it, and did not give up their resentment. His own
generals, whom he loaded with riches and honours, without being
able to satisfy their cupidity, reproached him for his ingratitude, and
even plotted his death. The common people, at last, of whom he was
the idol, and who had so cheerfully granted all his demands, the
people themselves began to withdraw from him; they no longer
welcomed his victories with the same applause as formerly, and
seemed to be afraid that they had made him too great. When his
statue was placed beside those of the kings, the multitude, who saw it
pass, remained mute, and we know that the news of this unusual
silence was spread by the messengers of the allied kings and nations
in all the countries of the world, and caused it to be believed
everywhere that a revolution was at hand.[317] In the provinces of the
East, where the last soldiers of Pompey were hiding, the fire of civil
war, which was smouldering rather than extinct, constantly revived,
and these perpetual alarms, without leading to serious danger,
prevented the public tranquillity becoming settled. At Rome, Cicero’s
works, in which he celebrated the glories of the republic, were read
with enthusiasm; anonymous pamphlets, which had never been
more violent or more numerous, were eagerly sought. As happens on
the eve of great crises, every one was discontented with the present,
unquiet about the future, and prepared for the unforeseen. We know
in how tragical a manner this strained situation terminated. The stab
of Brutus’ dagger was not altogether, as has been said, an
unpremeditated incident and a chance; it was the general uneasiness
of men’s minds which led to and which explains such a terrible
catastrophe. The conspirators were but little over sixty in number,
but they had all Rome for their accomplice.[318] All this disquietude
and rancour, those bitter regrets for the past, those disappointed
ambitions, this baffled cupidity, this open or secret hatred, those bad
or generous passions of which men’s hearts were full, armed their
hands, and the Ides of March were only the deadly explosion of so
much stored-up anger. Thus events frustrated all Caesar’s projects.
He did not find safety in his clemency, as he thought; he failed in that
work of conciliation that he had attempted with the applause of the
world: he did not succeed in disarming parties. This glory was
reserved for a man who had neither his breadth of genius, nor his
generosity of character—for the crafty and cruel Octavius. This is not
the only time that history shows us the sad spectacle of the success of
ordinary men where the greatest have failed; but in enterprises of
this nature success depends above all on circumstances, and it must
be admitted that they singularly favoured Augustus. Tacitus tells us
the principal cause of his good fortune, when he says, speaking of the
establishment of the empire: “There was almost no one left who had
seen the republic.”[319] The men over whom Caesar aspired to reign,
on the contrary, had all seen it. Many cursed it when it troubled the
tranquillity of their lives by its storms and agitations; almost all
regretted it as soon as they had lost it. There is, notwithstanding the
perils to which it exposes men, a singular charm and attraction in the
habit and exercise of liberty which cannot be forgotten when once it
has been known. It was against this inextinguishable memory that
the genius of Caesar was shattered. But after the battle of Actium, the
men who had looked upon the grand scenes of liberty, and who had
seen the republic, no longer existed. A civil war of twenty years, the
most murderous of all those that have ever depopulated the world,
had destroyed them almost all. The recollections of the new
generation did not go further back than Caesar. The first sounds it
had heard were the acclamations that saluted the conqueror of
Pharsalia, of Thapsus, and of Munda; the first spectacle that had
struck its eyes was that of the proscriptions. It had grown up among
pillage and massacres. During twenty years it had daily trembled for
its property or its life. It thirsted for security, and was ready to
sacrifice everything for repose. Nothing attracted it towards the past,
as the contemporaries of Caesar had been attracted. On the contrary,
all the memories of the past which survived only attached it more to
the government under which it lived, and when by chance it turned
its eyes backwards it found many subjects for fear without any
subject for regret. It was only under these circumstances that
absolute power could peaceably succeed the republic.
BRUTUS
HIS RELATIONS WITH CICERO

We should not know Brutus without Cicero’s letters. As he has
never been spoken of with composure, and as political parties have
been accustomed to screen their hatred or their hopes under his
name, the true features of his character were early effaced. Amid the
heated discussions that his mere name raises, while some, like
Lucan, exalt him almost to heaven, and others, like Dante, resolutely
place him in hell, it was not long before he became a sort of
legendary personage. To read Cicero brings us back to the reality.
Thanks to him, this striking but indistinct figure, that admiration or
terror have immoderately enlarged, becomes more defined and takes
human proportions. If it loses in grandeur by being viewed so close,
at least it gains something by becoming true and living.
The connection between Cicero and Brutus lasted ten years. The
collection of letters they wrote to each other during this interval must
have been voluminous, since a grammarian quotes the ninth book of
them. They are all lost, with the exception of twenty-five which were
written after the death of Caesar.[320] Notwithstanding the loss of the
rest, Brutus still holds such a large place in the surviving works of
Cicero, and especially in his correspondence, that we find in it all the
elements necessary for becoming well acquainted with him. I am
going to collect these references, and to re-write, not the narrative of
Brutus’ entire life, which would oblige me to dwell upon very well-
known events, but only the history of his relations with Cicero.
I.
Atticus, the friend of everybody, brought them together. It was
about the year 700, a short time after Cicero’s return from exile, and
in the midst of the troubles stirred up by Clodius, one of those vulgar
agitators like Catiline, by whose means Caesar exhausted the
strength of the Roman aristocracy that he might one day overcome it
more easily. Cicero and Brutus occupied at that time very different
positions in the republic. Cicero had filled the highest offices, and in
them had rendered eminent services. His talents and his probity
made him a valuable auxiliary for the aristocratical party to which he
was attached; he was not without influence with the people whom his
eloquence charmed; the provinces loved him, as they had seen him
more than once defend their interests against greedy governors, and
still more recently Italy had shown her affection by carrying him in
triumph from Brundusium to Rome. Brutus was only thirty-one; a
great part of his life had been passed away from Rome, at Athens,
where we know that he devoted himself earnestly to the study of
Greek philosophy, in Cyprus, and in the East, where he had followed
Cato. He had not yet filled any of those offices which gave political
importance, and he had to wait more than ten years before thinking
of the consulship. Nevertheless Brutus was already an important
person. In his early relations with Cicero, notwithstanding the
distance that age and official position set between them, it is Cicero
who makes the advances, who treats Brutus with consideration, and
who seeks his friendship. One would say that this young man had
given rise to singular expectations, and that it was already vaguely
felt that he was destined for great things. While Cicero was in Cilicia,
Atticus, pressing him to do justice to certain claims of Brutus, said:
“It would be something if you only brought back his friendship from
that province.”[321] And Cicero wrote of him at the same period: “He
is already the first among the young men; he will soon be, I hope, the
first in the city.”[322]
Everything in fact seemed to promise a splendid future for Brutus.
A descendant of one of the most illustrious families of Rome, the
nephew of Cato, the brother-in-law of Cassius and Lepidus, he had
just married one of the daughters of Appius Claudius; another was
already married to Pompey’s eldest son. By these alliances he was
connected on all sides with the most influential families; but his
character and manners distinguished him even more than his birth.
His youth had been austere: he had studied philosophy, not merely
as a dilettante and as being a most useful discipline for the mind, but
like a wise man who wishes to apply the lessons that it gives. He had
returned from Athens with a great reputation for wisdom, which his
virtuous and regular life confirmed. The admiration that his virtue
excited was redoubled when his surroundings and the detestable
examples he had resisted were considered. His mother Servilia had
been the object of one of the most violent passions of Caesar,
perhaps his first love. She always held a great sway over him, and
took advantage of it to enrich herself after Pharsalia by getting the
property of the conquered awarded to her. When she became old,
and felt the powerful dictator slipping from her, in order to continue
to rule him, she favoured, it is said, his amours with one of her
daughters, the wife of Cassius. The daughter who had married
Lepidus, had no better reputation, and Cicero tells a merry tale about
her. A young Roman fop, C. Vedius, going through Cilicia with a
great train, found it convenient to leave part of his baggage with one
of his hosts. Unfortunately this host died; seals were put on the
traveller’s baggage along with the rest, and to begin with, the
portraits of five great ladies were found in it, and among them that of
Brutus’ sister. “It must be admitted,” said Cicero, who did not lose an
opportunity for a joke, “that the brother and the husband well
deserve their names. The brother is very stupid (brutus) who
perceives nothing, and the husband very easy-going (lepidus) who
endures all without complaint.”[323] Such was the family of Brutus. As
to his friends, there is no need to say much about them. We know
how the rich young men of Rome lived at that time, and what
Caelius, Curio, and Dolabella were. Among all this dissipation the
rigid integrity of Brutus, his application to business, that disdain for
pleasures, that taste for study to which his pale and serious
countenance bore witness, stood out in higher relief by the contrast.
Accordingly all eyes were fixed on this grave young man who
resembled the others so little. In approaching him men could not
help a feeling that seemed ill suited to his age: he inspired respect.
Even those who were his elders and his superiors, Cicero and Caesar,
notwithstanding their glory, Antony who resembled him so little, his
opponents and his enemies, could not escape this impression in his
presence. What is most surprising is, that it has survived him. It has
been felt in presence of his memory as it was before his person; living
and dead he has commanded respect. The official historians of the
empire, Dio, who has so roughly handled Cicero, Velleius, the
flatterer of Tiberius, all have respected Brutus. It seems that political
rancour, the wish to flatter, and the violence of party have felt
themselves disarmed before this austere figure.
While respecting him, they loved him. These are sentiments which
do not always go together. Aristotle forbids us to represent heroes
perfect in all points in the drama, lest they should not interest the
public. Things go in ordinary life very much as they do on the stage; a
sort of instinctive dread holds us aloof from irreproachable
characters, and as it is usually by our common failings that we are
drawn together, we feel very little attraction towards a man who has
no failings, and are content to respect perfection at a distance. Yet it
was not so in the case of Brutus, and Cicero could say of him with
truth in one of the works that he addresses to him: “Who was ever
more respected and loved than you?”[324] And yet this man without
weaknesses was weak for those he loved. His mother and sisters had
great influence over him, and made him commit more than one fault.
He had many friends, and Cicero blames him for listening too readily
to their advice; they were worthy men who understood nothing of
public affairs; but Brutus was so much attached to them that he
could not protect himself against them. His last sorrow at Philippi
was to learn of the death of Flavius, his overseer of works, and that of
Labeo, his lieutenant; he forgot his own self to weep for them. His
last words before his death were to congratulate himself that none of
his friends had betrayed him: this fidelity, so rare at that time,
consoled his last moments. His legions also, although they were
partly composed of old soldiers of Caesar, and he kept them tightly in
hand, punishing plunderers and marauders, his very legions loved
him and remained faithful to him. Even the people of Rome
themselves, who were in general enemies of the cause he defended,
showed their sympathy for him more than once. When Octavius
proclaimed the assassins of Caesar public enemies, every one sadly
bowed their heads when they heard the name of Brutus pronounced
from the rostrum, and in the midst of the terrified senate which
foresaw the proscriptions, a voice dared to declare that it would
never condemn Brutus.
Cicero fell under the charm like the rest, but not without
resistance. His friendship with Brutus was troubled and stormy, and,
notwithstanding the general agreement of their opinions, violent
dissensions arose between them more than once. Their
disagreements are explained by the diversity of their characters.
Never did two friends resemble each other less. There never was a
man who seemed made for society more than Cicero; he brought into
it all the qualities that are necessary for success, great flexibility of
opinion, much toleration for others, allowance enough for himself,
the talent of steering with ease between all parties, and a certain
natural indulgence that made him understand and almost accept
everything. Although he made bad verses, he had the temperament
of a poet, a strange mobility of impression, an irritable sensitiveness,
a supple, broad, and quick intellect which conceived promptly, but
quickly abandoned its ideas, and passed from one extreme to another
at a bound. He did not make a single serious resolution of which he
did not repent the next day. Whenever he joined a party he was only
quick and decided at the beginning, and gradually cooled down.
Brutus, on the contrary, had not a quick intelligence: he usually
hesitated at the commencement of an enterprise and did not decide
at once. Slow and serious, he advanced step by step in everything,
but, once resolved, he was so absorbed in his conviction that nothing
could divert him: he isolated and concentrated himself in it, he
excited and inflamed himself for it by reflection, and at last listened
only to that inflexible logic that drove him to realize his purpose. He
was one of those minds of which Saint-Simon says that they have an
almost ferocious consistency. His obstinacy was the real source of his
strength, and Caesar well understood it when he said of him: “All
that he wills he means.”[325]
Two friends who resembled each other so little must naturally
have clashed at every opportunity. Their first differences were
literary. It was a custom then at the bar to divide an important case
among several orators; each took the part best suited to his talents.
Cicero, obliged to appear often before the judges, went with his
friends and pupils, and gave out to them part of his work in order to
be able to get through it. He was often satisfied with keeping the
peroration for himself, in which his copious and impassioned
eloquence was at home, and left them the rest. It was thus that
Brutus pleaded at his side and under his direction. Brutus, however,
was not of his school: a fanatical admirer of Demosthenes, whose
statue he had placed among those of his ancestors, and nurtured on
the study of the Attic masters, he sought to reproduce their graceful
severity and vigorous strength. Tacitus says that his efforts were not
always happy: by dint of avoiding ornament and pathos he was dull
and cold, and by too eagerly seeking precision and strength he
became dry and stiff. These faults were repugnant to Cicero, who
always saw in this type of eloquence, which was founding a school, a
criticism of his own, and tried by every means to convert Brutus; but
he did not succeed, and on this point they never agreed. After the
death of Caesar, and when something else than literary discussions
was in question, Brutus sent his friend the speech he had just
delivered in the Capitol, and begged him to correct it. Cicero took
good care not to do so: he knew too well by experience the self-
esteem of the literary man to run the risk of offending Brutus by
trying to do better than he. Besides, the speech seemed to him very
fine, and he wrote to Atticus that nothing could have been more
graceful or better written. “Yet,” added he, “if I had had to make it I
should have put more passion in it.”[326] Assuredly Brutus did not
lack passion, but it was in him a secret and repressed flame that only
touched the nearest, and he disliked to give the rein to those
powerful emotions and that fiery pathos without which one cannot
carry away the multitude.
He was not then a docile follower of Cicero, and we may add that
neither was he an accommodating friend. He lacked pliancy in his
relations with others, and his tone was always rough and abrupt. At
the commencement of their intercourse, Cicero, accustomed to be
treated with great respect even by the highest personages, thought
the letters of this young man were curt and haughty, and felt hurt.
This was not the only complaint he had to make of him. We know the
great consular’s irritable, suspicious and exacting vanity; we know to
what a degree he loved praise; he gave it to himself liberally and he
expected it from others, and if they were slow in giving it he was not
ashamed to ask for it. His friends were generally indulgent to this
harmless failing, and did not wait to be invited by him to praise him.
Brutus alone resisted; he prided himself on his candour, and spoke
out what he thought. Accordingly Cicero often complains that he was
chary of his praises; one day indeed he was seriously angry with him.
It was a question of the great consulship, and of the discussion in
consequence of which Lentulus and the accomplices of Catiline were
executed. This was the most vigorous action of Cicero’s life, and he
had a right to be proud of it, since he had paid for it with exile. In the
narrative that Brutus gave of the events of this day he depreciated
the part that Cicero had played in them to the advantage of his uncle
Cato. He only praised him for having punished the conspiracy,
without saying that he had discovered it, and contented himself with
calling him an excellent consul. “Poor praise!” said Cicero angrily;
“one would think it came from an enemy.”[327] But those were only
small differences arising from wounded self-esteem, which might
easily be made up; we must now mention a graver disagreement that
deserves to be dwelt upon, for it suggests some serious reflections on
the Roman society of that period.
In 702, that is to say, a short time after the commencement of his
relations with Brutus, Cicero went out as proconsul to Cilicia. He had
not sought this office, for he knew what difficulties he should find in
it. He set out decided to do his duty, and he could not do it without
bringing on his hands at the same time the patricians, his protectors,
and the knights, his protégés and clients. In fact, patricians and
knights, usually enemies, agreed, with a singular unanimity, in
plundering the provinces. The knights, farmers of the public revenue,
had only one thought: to make a fortune in five years, the usual
duration of their contract. Consequently they exacted without mercy
the tax of a tenth on the productions of the soil, a twentieth on
merchandise at the ports, the harbour dues, the tax on pasture-lands
in the interior; in fact, all the tribute that Rome had imposed on the
conquered nations. Their greed respected nothing. Livy wrote this
terrible sentence about them: “Wherever the ‘publican’ penetrates,
there is no more justice or liberty for any one.”[328] It was very
difficult for the wretched cities to satisfy these insatiable financiers;
almost everywhere the municipal coffers, ill administered by
incompetent, or pillaged by dishonest magistrates, were empty.
Money, however, had to be found at any price. Now, of whom could
they borrow it, except of the bankers of Rome, who had been for a
century the bankers of the whole world? It was to them therefore that
they applied. Some were rich enough to draw from their private
fortune money to lend to foreign cities, or sovereigns, like that
Rabirius Postumus, for whom Cicero had pleaded, who furnished the
king of Egypt with the money necessary to reconquer his kingdom.
Others, in order to run less risk, formed financial companies, in
which the most illustrious Romans invested their funds. Thus,
Pompey had a share for a considerable sum in one of those joint-
stock companies founded by Cluvius of Puteoli. All these money-
lenders, whether private individuals or companies, knights or
patricians, were very unscrupulous, and only advanced their money
at enormous interest, generally 4 or 5 per cent. per month. Their
difficulty consisted in getting paid. As it is only men who are quite
ruined who accept these hard terms, the money lent on such high
interest is always subject to risk. When the date of payment arrived
the poor city was less than ever in a position to pay: it employed a
thousand pettifogging tricks, spoke of complaining to the senate, and
began by appealing to the proconsul. Unfortunately for it, the
proconsul was usually an accomplice of its enemies, and took his
share of their profits. The creditors who had secured his co-operation
by paying him well, had then only to send into the province some
freedman or agent who represented them; the proconsul placed the
public forces at the service of private interests, gave this agent the
title of his lieutenant, some soldiers, and full powers, and if the
insolvent town did not quickly come to some satisfactory
arrangement, it suffered the horrors of a siege and of official pillage
in time of peace. The proconsul who refused to lend himself to these
abuses, and who intended, according to Cicero’s expression, to
prevent the provinces perishing, naturally aroused the anger of all
those who lived by the ruin of the provinces. The knights, the nobles,
who no longer got their money, became his deadly enemies. It is true
he had the gratitude of his province, but this did not amount to
much. It had been remarked that, in those Eastern countries “trained
by a long servitude to loathsome flattery,”[329] the governors who
received most adulation, and to whom they raised most statues were
precisely those who had robbed the most, because they were the
most dreaded. Cicero’s predecessor had completely ruined Cilicia:
consequently they thought of building him a temple. These were
some of the difficulties to which an upright governor exposed
himself. Cicero extricated himself with honour. Seldom was a
province so well administered as his under the Roman republic; but
he only brought back from it some gratitude, little money, and many
enemies, and very nearly quarrelled with Brutus.
Brutus, though we can scarcely believe it, had a hand in this traffic.
He had lent money to Ariobarzanes, king of Armenia, one of those
small princes that Rome charitably allowed to live, and to the town of

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The Student s Guide to Cognitive

Neuroscience 4th Edition Ward

The Student’s Guide to Social Neuroscience 2nd Edition

Cognitive Neuroscience 4th Edition Marie T. Banich

Cognitive Neuroscience 5th ed The Biology of the Mind

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A Student s Guide to Liberal Learning James V. Schall

New to this edition:

•• Increased focus on the impact of genetics on cognition

Written in an engaging style by a leading researcher in the field and presented in

Jamie Ward is Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of

To find additional tools to master the concepts and terminology covered in

What you will find on this website:

•• Videos and links to interviews, lectures, documentaries, and studies

About the author ix

1 Introducing cognitive neuroscience 1

2 Introducing the brain 19

3 The electrophysiological brain 35

4 The imaged brain 55

5 The lesioned brain and stimulated brain 87

6 The developing brain 115

7 The seeing brain 143

8 The hearing brain 175

9 The attending brain 203

10 The acting brain 233

11 The remembering brain 265

12 The speaking brain 299

13 The literate brain 331

14 The numerate brain 359

15 The executive brain 385

16 The social and emotional brain 415

Jamie Ward is Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Sussex,

Cognitive neuroscience in historical perspective 2

FIGURE 1.1: A timeline for

1860 Broca (1861) publishes paper on language localization

Applying electrical currents to dog cortex causes movement

Action potential discovered, enables single-cell recording

Scientific approaches to mind and brain

FIGURE 1.4: Examples of box-and-arrow and connectionist models of cognition. Both

COMPUTATIONAL AND CONNECTIONIST MODELS OF COGNITION

K EY TERM The birth of cognitive neuroscience

THE DIFFERENT METHODS USED IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE

D O ES C O G N I T IVE PSYCHOLOGY NE E D THE BRAIN?

Has cognitive neuroscience, or if not might it ever (in principle, or

D O ES N EU RO S CIE NCE NE E D COGNITIVE

FIGURE 1.8: The media

SUMMARY AND KEY POINTS OF THE CHAPTER

•• The mind–body problem refers to the question of how physical

The conclusion to be drawn from Caesar’s conduct after Pharsalia,

HIS RELATIONS WITH CICERO

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About the author ix

1 Introducing cognitive neuroscience 1

2 Introducing the brain 19

3 The electrophysiological brain 35

4 The imaged brain 55

5 The lesioned brain and stimulated brain 87

6 The developing brain 115

7 The seeing brain 143

8 The hearing brain 175

9 The attending brain 203

10 The acting brain 233

11 The remembering brain 265

12 The speaking brain 299

13 The literate brain 331

14 The numerate brain 359

15 The executive brain 385

16 The social and emotional brain 415

Cognitive neuroscience in historical perspective 2