POLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope BILL OF RIGHTS Pens atacand Due process might as wall provide a sort of a “Swiss Army Knife" quarantes given its adaptability and flexibility as a legal argument. The Dus Process Clause is a handy legal {00 for the protaction of the valued rights to life, Iberty and property, and al other freedoms and liberties that inhere or adhere to them. It provides both a saleguard to ensure fairness in the proceedings that may be taken towards the deprivation of any liberty or property interests, or the impairment of any other right or freedom, a6 well as the ‘Quarantes of reasonableness in the enactment of laws and other regulations, “Persors” Parson inckides both ctizens and alens, natural and juridical. it may not encompass, however, the foetus, or the unbom child though the 1987 Constitution has thought it advieablo to provide proteation for the unbom togathor with its mother. “The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the Ife of the unborn from conceotion was to prevent ihe Legislature: from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise.” Bepublican nature of the state Further, even the decedent is entitied to some form of protection in so far as his or her estate is concerned. And, while life, liberty and property are all protected, the extent of the care and importance they get are not the same — some things are simply worth much more than others. Thus, when property rights come into conflict with human rights, the former must gve way to the latter. “[WIhen freedom of the mind is imperiied by law, it is freadom that commands a momentum of respect; when Property is imparied, it is the lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisaly reverse the presumption of consttutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values: within the due process clause,” Hietarchy of Constitutionally protected rights ‘The Court also stated that, ‘based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys. precedence over the right to properly, The reason is obvious: Ife is replaceable, property is rot. When the state or LGU's exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail” As between right not to join labor organizations, the Court had this 10 sy: “In the herarchy of constitutonal values, ths Court has repeatedly held that tha right to abstain {rom joinng a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of encouraging unionism as an instrument of socal justice.” Also, “iho law recognizes that the enjoyment of a private reputation is 2s much a constitutional ight as the possession ot i, liberty or property.” Levels of Scrutiny 1. deferential or rational relationship test, 2. intermediate or heightened scrutiny, 8. strict scrutiny Determining whether there is sufficient justification for the government's action depends very much on the level of scrutiny used, “ifthe liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the valiity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.” Deferential review Taws are upheld if thay rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, without courts seriously inguiring into the substantiaity of uch interest and examining the aornatve means by which the objectives could be achieved, Intermediate review ‘The substantality of the govemmental interest is seriously looked into and the avalabiily of less restrictive alternatives are considered. ‘Strict scrutiny ‘The focus 1S on the presence of competing, rather than substantial governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. Strict scrutiny is a judicial standard for determining the quality {and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental readoms. It is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of ‘speech, gander, or rave and facial challenges are allowed {or this purpose. The Court has also declared: “[Ojonstitutional due process: demands a higher dagree of clarity when infringements on. Ie or tberty are intended. ... in the matter of statutes that aprive a person of physical liberty, the cemand for a ‘clearer standard in sentencing is even more exacting” (Cases involving property it must also bo understood that a final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recocnized and protected by law under the due process clause of the Constitution —it is LPOLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope vested interest which the government should recognize and protect, and of which the individual coukt not be doprived arbitrarily of without committing an act of injusties. Note: Where an employee retires and mosis the elgibilty requirements under the law, he acauires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process cause. \ Note further: While one may not be deprived of what is his vested right, the same may be lost if such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence, such as in legal separation where the guilty spouse may end forfeiting his sha in the fruits of the conjugal property. Procedural and Substantive Due Process Procedural Due Process _| Substantive Due Process: essentidly directed at | drectsd basally at those officers who auiudicate who enact the laws refers to the guarantees of | goes to the very power of faimess in the process of | the authorities to come up. determining whetheranght, | with rules and other liberty or freedom is to be | strictures under which man impaired or otherwise taken | may live and enjoy the away blesshgs of a dvilzed sociaty, including the price that he has to pay to sta Procedural Due Process Procedural dus provass requires a determination of what process is due, when itis due, and the degree of what is due” What may be requied for purposes of judicial procesdings would not be the same in administrative proceedings. E.g. In rolation to investigation of students in military schools, the Court eaid: “Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an adirinistrative hearing in the military academy. It has: been said that the mission of the military is uniaue in the sense that its primary business i t0 fight or bs ready to fight’ wars snould the occasion arise, and that ever-procaduraizing military daterninations naccssatily ives sdldiers less time to accomplish this task. Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro, Jr. 486 SCRA 66 (2006) It was held that where a judge entertains an unorthodox belef system ~ such as believing in “psychic visions,” and in dwarfs, and in being able to write while on trance, of having baen sean by several paople in two places at the same time, and of foreseang the future because of hs. power of “psychic phenomenon” ~ the same indubitably shows his inabifty fo function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Such belie's, specially so when acted upon by tha judge, are so at odds with the entical and impartial thinking required of a magistrate. The jusiciary is Certainly not the proper place for such a person to stay. Rubin 2013) ‘The Court pointed out: “It must be bore in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Arti II, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal bocause unquestionably, every litigant is ontitlad to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartal judge. All the cother elements ot cue process, like notice and hearhg, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. Corpus-Cabochan, 702 SCRA 330 ‘Substantive Due Process “void-for vagueness” doctrine It is *most commonly stated to the affect that a statute establshing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definitoness that persons of ordinary intelligence ccan understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be nvoked against that specie of legistation that fs utterly vague on ts face, .0., that which cannot be clarified eitner by a saving clause cr by construction.” A statute or act may be said to be vagus when it lacks comprehensible standards thet_men of commen. inteligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and Giffer in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects — it violates due process for fellure to accord parsons, especially the parties tagoted by it, far notice of what conduct to avoid; and, i leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an atbitrary flexing of the Goverment muscle. (Overtreaath doctrine This doctrina decroas that a govarnmantal purpose may ‘not bs achieved by means which sweep unneoessarly broady and thereby invade the area of protected froodome, The Court recognized the right of a parson with the condition of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) or intersexuality, to have her birth cerificate corrected to indicate the gender that such persons may think he or she has, which ic diffrent from what was indicatad at the moment of birth. It is a recognition of such person's liberty to choose what he or she realy is. It was neted that the current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be dassified either as a male or as @ female, but the Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. “Ultimately, we are of the view that where the parson is 2POLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope biologicaly or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender Gasification would be what the individual, tke respondent, having teached the age of majority, with good reason thinks cf his/her sex, Respondent here thinks of humeelt as a male and considering trat his body produces. high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as. being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth incenclusive. It is at maturity that the gander of such persons, ike respondent, is xed.” ‘Staiutory Due Process ‘The Court has also come up with the concept of statutory due process in order to distinguish it from constitutional due process. In Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 323 SCRA 445 (2000), the Court held that ‘the dismissal of an employee who was separated for ‘cause without affording him the notice required by law was considered ineffectual until validated by final judgment. in effect, the employee would be deemed still an employee in the meantime, and accordingly entitied to his wages until bis dismissal would have been affimed. The Court majority in that case was also emphatic that such dismissal was. ot a violation of due process as the guarantee in the Bill fof Rights is directed against governmental action, not private acts, Then, in Agabon v. Netional Labor Relations Commissin, 442 SCRA 673 (2004), the Court characterized tho diemiesal without complying with tho notice requirement as a violation of due process. Republic v, Albios, 707 SCRA 584 [2013] If a mamiaga of convenience — €.g,, for the acquisition of foreign citizenship — does not work out as planned, could that bo a ground for declaration of nulity? No, the Court rulod in thie caso. "Motivos for entering into a marriage aro varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of Ife that a couple chooses ta lead. Any attempt to regulate ther Hestye would go into the realm cf their right to privacy and would raise serious Constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows: married couplss to structure thelr rrarriages in almost any ‘way thay se fit, 10 Ive together or ive apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and 50 on, Thus, mariages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, suchas converiance, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requistes, are equally valid.” Thus, although the marriage may be considered a sham or ‘raudulent for the purposes of immigration, itis not void ab initio and continues to be vaid and eubsisting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US. (No, 14.556, 26 June 2015 ‘The US. Supreme Court recogrized the right 1o same-sex mariage. i part of the prctected tery Interests of indludiis, means by which they define and express their idenity. The Court also noted that the institution of matriage has evolved over time. The Gout held that “the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected. This analysis compels tho conclusion that samo-cax couples may exercise the right to many. The four pptinciples and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.” It went to hold that "[a] first premise of the Court's relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” Further, “fa] Second prinepie in this Cours jurisprudence js that the right to many i fundamental because it supperts a ‘woperson unicn unlike any other in ite imporance to the commtted incividuals” And, “(a third asia for protecting tho right to mary ie that it safeguard children and families and thus draws mearing from related rights of chikirearing, procreation, and education.” Ukimetaly, “fourth and finaly, this Court's cases and the Nation's traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order” Accordingly, “[lJhe Imitation of marriaga to opposite-sex couples may long have saamed naturel and just, but its inconsistenoy with the central ‘meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. With that knowledge must come the recognition that awe, cluding same-sex couples from the martiage fight impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.” Samahan ssibong Kabataan v ‘ity, 835 Restrictions on minors may be upheld even as they may not apply to their elcers, While minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults. They are aways subject to the authority or custody of anothar, such as their parenl’s and/or guardian’s, and the State. As parens patiiae, the Stata regulates and, to a ceitan extent, rostricts tho minore’ oxorcico of their rights. Alco, “[ejonsidering that the right to travel is a fundamental fight in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the stvict scrutiny testis the applicable test.” And. under this test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise Of a fundamental right or operaies 10 the disadvantage of @ suspect lass. is presumed unconstitutional, Thus, the goverment has the burden of proving that the classtication () is necessary to achive 2 compeling State interest, and (i) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen isnarrowy tailored to accomplish the interest.” The Slate's mandate to protect and care for children as pavensPOLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope ppatriae constitute compaling intsrasts to justify reguiations by the State. AAs for the requirement to adopt the bast restrictive means, the Court explained: “The second requitoment of the strict scrutiny test stms from the fundamental promise that citizans should not be hampered from pursuing legtimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional nights, While Tights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal oF only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compoling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narowly drawn {0 avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.” ‘The guarantee of equal protection is no argument for absolute equally, for what It only assures Is legal equality. Valid Classifications inherent in the applicaticn of the Equal Protection Crause is ‘the nead for valid classifications so as to determine who or what could property be groupsd together for particular treatment, and excluding all others, Mirasol_v, Department_of Public Works and 490. 18 (201 “To begin wih, classification by iselfis not prohibited,” and then went cn to state that "[njot all motorized vehicles are Created equal.” In this regard, the classification must be related to the very purpose of the law and that there should be substartial distinctions which make for real diferences. Gender mey be relevant in regard to certain Classifications but not in others. Age, legitimacy, academic Performance, courses of study, offce and status, and other bases for classifcation may make for some valid differences at timos, but not so under other situations and climes, and so on. And, what may be constitutional when seen from one perspective may not be so from another vantage point, Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013) Republic Act No. 9262 (2004) (An Act Detining Violence ‘Against Women and Their Chiddren, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties The‘efor, and for Other Purposes) was asealled for being allegedly viclative of the guaranty of equal protection in the sense that it doss not similarly protect man who are victim of the same acts which are criminalized by the law. The Court said the equal protection clause is not violated since thee is a valid basis for classification. There is a substantial distinction between men and women in this particular arca. “The unequal power relationship botwoon women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to bs victims cf violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudioa against women all make for real Giferences justilying the classification under the law: Moreover, women are the “usual” and “most lcely" victims ‘of violenos. On the other hand, no relable estimates may bbe obiained cn domestic abuse and vfolence against men in the Philipoines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men wil not even attempt to report the situation. Moreover, “tlhe mere fact that ‘he legislative classification may resut in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for ‘very classification of parsons oF things for regulation by Jaw produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.” Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Export Association, Inc., 800 SCRA 313 (2016) ‘The Davao City ban on zerial spraying as an agiculua practice was invalidated for being unreasonable as well as being violative ot the Equal Protection Clause. And the Court had occasion to discuss undsrinclusivaness and ‘overinclusiveness. “The occurrence of pesticide diift is not limited to aerial sprayng out results from the conduct of any mode of pesiicide application. Even manual soraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconveniences, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the ‘environment. ‘Aban against aerial spraying doas nol weed out the harm that th ordinanos soaks to achiove. In the process, the ‘ordinance suffers ftom beng ‘underinclusive” because the classification does not indude al individuas tainted with the came mischief that the law socks to eliminate, ‘A classification that is drasticaly undsrinelusive with respect to tha purpose or end appears as an tational means to the legislative end because t poorly serves the intended purpose of the law." Further, “false from its being uncerinclusve, the assailed ordinance also tend t0 bbe ‘overinclusive’ becausa its impending implementation wil affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the legslatve purpose. Its implomontation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a. wider range of individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpase of the law. It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies imespectve of the ‘substance 10 be aarialy applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. . .. The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicdes and regardless of the agricultural activity being ‘performed bacomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relaion to the purported inconvenience, Giscomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance socks to address”POLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope Pationaio Tho right to speak one's mind tresly is a highly valued freedom in a republican and derrocratic society. If the people are realy to be the source of power, and that sovereignty resides in them, then they should rightfuly determine the fate of the nation. But they can only do the same if they are fee to know and leam and to discuss matters unfettered by restrictions piaced on then by the government. Freedom of the Press the press is at the forefront of expression, for without it dissemination could hardly be had. "The best gauge of a ‘ree and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media” Without the mass media to broadcast and propagate a person's ideas or speech, it would be more Ike flowers born to blush unseen, wasting their sweetness in the desert air ‘Pror Restraint or Censorship In keeping with the underlying rationale for the freedom, this guarantas basically prohibits the State from exercising prior restraint or censorship. If the people are to decide, they must be allowed access to all availablo ideas and information, and not simply be given a sanitized version, At the same time, the fleedom also means a cortesponding check on subsequent punishment Otherwise, ‘teedom to speak unhindered may become a trap if @ punishment so eagerly awaits a few steps away. ‘Thus, only those which are clearly outside the scope ot {fee expression may be subject to senctions, \ Privileged Commurications lt exempts the person communicatirg from prosecution. It has been said that the enumeration under Art. 954 of the: Revsed Penal Code is not an exclusive ist of qualifiedly privieged communications since ‘fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged, The rule fon privileged communications had is genesis not in the rration's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guarantesing freedom of speech and of the ppress. It has also baen held that the civic duty to see to it that public duty is cischarged faithfully is inconsistent with requirements pacing on ctzens the burden of proving good motives and justfiable ends in airing their plaints, comments or eriticisins. tical_ and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque II, 535 SCRA 265 007) Chief Justics Puno, in his concurring opinion wrote: "write ‘to elucidate another reason why the absolute ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes found under Sections 4() ard 11 of A.O. No. 2006-0012 (RIRA) should ba struck down, The advatisng and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly fals within the ambit of the tem corrmercial speech ~ that ts, speech that proposes lan oconemia transaction. This is a soparate category of ‘speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of ‘expression but is nonetheless entited to protection” ‘Any parameters for commercial speech protection? Wel, yes. C.J. Puno made reference to the four-part analyss of Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Sowice Commission, 447 U.S, 557 (1980): "To begin with, the commercial speech must ‘concern lawful activity and not be misleading’ if it is to be protected under the First Amendment. Next, the asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If bot of thase requirements are met, It must next be dotormined whether the stato roguletion directly advances the government interest assorted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to sarve the interest.” ‘So what would all hese lead to? “I proffer the humble view that the absolute ban on advertising prescribed under Sections 4(f) and 11 of the RIRR is unduly restrictive and is, ‘more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young childron. it ought to be eetf-evident, for inetance, that the advertisement of such products which are strictly informative cuts too deep on fres speach. The laudable concern of the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify the absouute, overarching ban, Facial Challenges The case of Estrada v, Sandganbayan discussed the concepts of facial challenge and overbreadtn, explaining that a facial challenge is alowed to be made to a vague statute and 10 one which is overbroad because of possible “‘cniling effect’ upon protected speech. ‘The theory is that ‘fwJhen statutes regulate or proscribe sspaech and no readily apparent construction suggests itso as a vehicle for rehabittating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be reguiated by a statute drawn with narrow specifiy.” The possible hharm to society in permiting coma unprotected speech to {g0 unpunished is outweighed by the pessibilty that the protected speech of others may be detored and porcsived grievances lft to fester because ofthe inhibitory efects of overy broad statutes.POLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope Overbreadth Doctrine “[T]he overbreadth doctiine is an analytical oo! developed {or testing ‘on thei faces’ statutes in free specch cases, also known under the Amevican Law as First Amendment cases.” The Court also noted: “Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the vallty of a law that ‘relects legitimate state interest in mainiaining Comprehensive contro! over harmful, constituionaly Unprotected conduct’ Undoubtedly, lawese violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘hamnful and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facil overbreadth ave entertained in cases invdving statutes which, by thai terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, entertained at al, have boon curtaled when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied 40 protected conduct... .(Flecial invalidation of laws is considered a0 ‘manifestly strong modicina,” to bo used ‘sparingly and only as a last resort and is ‘generally disfavored’ The reason for this is obvious. Embedkdod in the traditional rules governing consttutional adjudication is the princiole thet a person to whom a law may be appisd weil not be heard to challenge @ law on the ground that it may concevably be appled uncorstitutionaly to others, 6, inather situations not befora the Court." David v. Macapagal-Arrovo The Court said: “Assembly’ means a right on the part of the citizens to mest peaceably for consultation in respect 10 public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican insttution and complements. the right of speech. AS in the case of freedom of expression, ths right ic not to bo limited, much lace doniod, excopt on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. in other words, ike other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the fight to assemble is not subject to previous restraint censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior Issiance of a permit or authorization from the government authoriins except, af course, ifthe assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itsef, may be validly required. The ringing truth hare is that patiioner David, at al, were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not commiting any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the Imitation of that right. AS can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and viclaln 07 BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct Disini, Juv. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237 014) This case tackled the constitutionalty of the Cyberorime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA. No. 10175). The Court uphold some provisions but struck down others, Among those provisions upheld were those penalizing illegal access, data interference, cybersquatting, privacy and identity theft, cybersex, child pornography and oyboribl. It declared unconstitutional, however, the provisions on spam and aiding or abetting the commission of a ‘eaberorime, take-down clause, as well as those on realtime collection of trafic data for using a standard that practically authorizes @ general search warrant. jocese of Bacolod _v. Com: jon_on Electi 47SCRA 1 (2015), ‘As pat of the Catholle Church's opposition to the Reproductive Heath bil, tre poiitioners put up a tarpaulin measuring 6° by 10° with the heading “Conscience Vote” whereby they listed those who voted for (Team Patay) or against (Team Buhay) the bil The COMELEC told the petitioners to pul it down since it violated the imitations set for campagn materials, ramely, that it should be no bigger than 2’ by 3.’ Was the COMELEG? The Court sad NO. “There is no reason for the stata to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin oss not affect anyone aisa's constitutional rights.” Moreover, “ne guarantee of freedom of expression to indivicuals without any rolationship to any politcal candidate should not be held hostage by the possibilty of abuse by those seeking to be elected.” Further, “fJegulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which ara, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social ‘issue that the public must consider curing elections is uncorstitutional” The Court also declared: *Speech with oltical consequences Is at the core of the freedom of ‘e@pression and must be protected by this court.” z B x. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 441 (2015) The Issue was about the ban on the posting of campaign materials in publ traneports and private traneport terminals. The Court held that there was an invalid ‘content-neutral regulation — the restriction imposed by the COMELEC was greater than necessary to adlvance government interest, Moreover, regulation of franchise does not extend to regulation of other aspects of private ownership. (Hare, the Court also had occasion to discuss the Captive Audience Doctrine - “that when a listener cannet, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, tho speech can bo restricted. The ‘captive-audience’ doctrine recogrizes that a Istener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in 6POLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoKded A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shiald the public from scme kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the Lunwiling viewer oF auditor 1 avcid exposure”) Government Speech Dectrine The US. Supreme Court applied itn Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 US. 460 (2009), and, Walker v. Texas Div, Sons of Confederate Veterans, ine., 576US.__ (No. 14-144, 18 June 2015). In this case, a private group insisted that a municipality is duty bound to allow the Placement of 2 permanent monument ina city park in which other donated monuments were previously erected. The US. Supreme Court held, however, that although a. park is 2 traditional public forum for spaeches and other transitory expressive acts, the display of a permanent monument 1 a publle park Is nat a form of expression to which forum analysis appliss. Instead, tha placament of a permanent monument in a publc parks best viewed as a ‘fom of government speech and is therefore not subject to, scrutiny undor the Free Speech Clause. “Tho Free Speech Clause restiicts government regulation of private speech; it does nct regulate government speech.” Heckler’s Veto This may come in the form of restrictions on speach because the adverse or violent reactions of those who do rot like or agrea with the message. In effect, it is the interest of those who oppose the speech that is given more mportance. Hence, hecklers veto may be considered inconsistent with the guaranty of the freedom of expression, In 2015, two terrorist brothers went to the editorial offices of the French satirical magazine Chariie Hebdo. They killed several editors and caitooniats. This ‘was due to having been offended by the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed published by the magazine, The response of the French Government was to go after the terrorists, who they eventually Killed. If the government instead told the remaining editors of Charlie Hebdo to stop whet they were doing since they were antagonizing the Muslims, that would have been a form of a heckler's veto because the right to speak would have been sacrificed in aver of peace and quiet, je the covemment may nagetiate with the owner for the acquisiton of the latter's property, such a procedure: may not alvays result in a successful transaction, however, especialy If hee is need for more expedtious action, or, the owner may simply be disincinad to ssl Thus, this cosrcive power of the government to take property even if the owner opaoses, provided the same is {or public uso and there is payment of just compensation. Accordingly, questions on expropriation may deal with issues of necessity, or aibitrary exercise, as well as the justness and timeliness of tha payment for the property taken. As for judicial determinaticn of just compensation, the Court has reverted 10 the old rule that the same is a judictal function, not one to be simply determined by looking at what is indicated in the tax declaration. Pubic Use With regard to “public use,” the same has also been construed to have a more expansive meaning — ike public Interest, publie bone, public wotfaro, public corwonienco = 50 as to cover certain purposes which could not have ‘been included in the past, such as tourism, ard setting up the bithplace of a known religious bader as a National Hestorcal Landmark Republic_v._Ortigas{and Company _Limited This case succinctly captures all that we have previously statec: ‘Dolinsated roads and strests, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for pubic use, remain private ‘and will remain as such until convayed to the government ‘by donation or through exproptiation proceedings, AN ‘owner may not be forced to donate his or her property ‘even If it has been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even. cchooss to retain said propertigs.” \cienda_Luisita, Ine. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 670 SCRA 392 (2012) Hacienda Luisita tied to comply with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law by giving shares of stock in the corporation rather than actually distributing lands by means of a “stock distribution plan’ (SDP). The SDP was subsequently invalidated, however, and the lands were placed under compubory acquisition in 2006. The issue that cropped up is the value to be used ~ that of 1989 ar 2006? ‘The Court said, itis the former. The date of “taking” is 21 November 1989, the date when Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARO) approved the Haciensa’s SDP in view of the fact that this is the time that the farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in the Hacienda. To be precisa, those lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. Such approval is akin to a noticesPOLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope of coverage - it operates and takes the place of a notice of coverage ordinary issued under compulsory acquisition. Secretary of the Department _of Public Works and Highways v. Tecson, 700 SCRA 243 (2013) an CRA 389 (20) The property was taken way back in 1040 by the government for the purpose of using it as part of a national highway without the courtesy of any expropriation procesdings being initiated. In 1994, the owners asked for the payment of just compensation but they were not happy with the offer of the government so they went to court to recover their property. When the case eventually reached the Supreme Court, the photal issue to be resolved was the valuation to be used - the value at time of taking (1940), oF value at the time of the recovery suit more than fifty yaare later (1905)? “Just compensation is ‘the fair velue of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.’ This rule holds true when the property is ‘taken before the fling of an exoropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation.” Accorsingly, “just campansation due respondents in this case should, thersiore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940." But is it not unfair 10 the landowners, makina use of the value in 1940 (P=0.70/sq. m) instead of the vaue of ,500 at the time the action was fled? No, the Court expained: “While cisparity in the above amounts. is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receving such outdated valuation after a -very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding against the cruel effects of belated claim. The ‘concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of exeropfiaticn.” Then the Court added that there must be payment of interest, at the rate of 6% per annum, to be computed from 1940 until ful payment. On motion ‘or reconsideration, the Court adced exemplary clamages and attomey’s fees, as well as an admonition on need for timely payment Payment of interest Rektive to taking of property but compensation being delayed. there is need for payment of interest of the amount due as a manner cf somehow approximating the “jusiness” of what has to be pald. The interest rate has been set al twalve per centum (12%) per annum, to be ‘computed from the time of taking to the date of payment, which rate should hep elrinate the constant fluctuation and inflation1 19 of the value of currency ovar time, Aborted Expropriation Ih case of an aborted expropriation, there is need to pay disturbance compensation, not jist compensation. “The expropriator who has taken possession of the property subject of expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable ‘compansation to the landowner for the period of such Possession although the proceedings had been Ciiscontinued on the ground that the pubic purpose for the ‘expropriation had meenwhila ceasad.” (Repubtc v. Heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, 745 SCRA 40 (2015). ‘And, when the expropriation is discontinued, such as when “the taxing of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the expopration complaint should be Gismisead by the trial court. Tho case wil procead only if the trial court's order of expropriation became fal and. executory and the expropriation causes prejudice to the property owner” (National Power Corporation v. Posada, 752 SCRA 550 (2015) Inverse condemnation Tris an action to racover just compensation from tha State €r its expropriating agency. It “is @ cause of action against ‘a govemmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by tho governmental ofendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of ‘eminent domain has bsen attempted by th taking agency. While the typical taking occurs when the government acts. to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctring of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a. {aking may occur without such formal procesdings. The phrase ‘inverse condemnation, as a_—_common understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply occribes an action that is the ‘inverse! or ‘reverse’ of a. condemnation proceeding” Democratic and Republican State ‘A iizen in a democrat and republican state, where soversignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, may consider it his, birthright to be free from unwarranted and unreasonable intrusions into his life, residence and activities. He would. ‘not want to have a Big Brother looking over his shoulders, ‘and minding his affairs. ‘Privacy The guarantea aganst unreasonable searches and ‘seizures upholds that expectation of privacy.POLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope Search Warrants iT requires thal before ary searches or seizures be had, the same must be, as a general rule, accompanied by a warrant, issued by one who is disinterested and detached from the task of law enforcement. Probable Cause But even in the issuance of such warrants by a judge, the magistrate is not that free to simply issue it for no reason at all or on timsy grounds. He must have probable cause for the same, which he must deterrrine personally by carefully examining the complainant, his witnesses and ‘other supporting documents. Further, reasorableness also goes to the manner of serving and executing it. Accordingy, not because one is armed with 2 warrant that he would now have the perfect right to simply barge info houses or dwelings ke the gestape. He must abide by the “knock and announoo” procedure. As much as posse, he must stil do it in a civilzed manner, uniess his life or sefety may be in danger, oF the evidence would likely be destioyed by any delay, Exceptions to the Requirement of a Search Warrant 1. search ndent to a lawlul arrest 2. search of maving vehicles 3. the plain view doctrine 4. airport searches Warrantless Arrest In flagrante delicto ~ the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paraaraoh ~ he knows for a fact that a crime has just been commited “hot pursuit” the Court has pointed out that “iffom the current phrasoclogy of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section 5(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word just! oonnoting immediacy, and second, the werrantiess arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on piobable cause to be storrrined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowedge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed f. ‘escaped prisoner ‘Search Warrant Proceeding ‘A soarch warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a oriminal action or the commencement of a prosecution, The proceeding is not one against any person, but is sold for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It's a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. Itresembles, in some respect what is commonly known as John Dos proceedings. Further, private complainants can participate in these proceedings ~ they may appear, patticipata and flo pleadings 10 maintain, inter alla, tho validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibilty of the propos seized in anticipation of a criminal caso to be filed. As for the search warrant itself, the Court said that it is 2 legal process which has been likened to 2 wait of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant enidenoe of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases. of pubic prosecutions A search ‘warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. Search warrants refer to personal property, Can human remains be proper subject of search warrants? Yes, the Court ruled in Laud v. People, 741 ‘SORA 239 (2014), Personal property in the contex! of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court refers to the thing's mobilty, and not to its capacity to bo owned or allonated bby 2 particular person, Human remains can be transported from place to place, and they qualify under the phrase “subject of the offense”given that they prove the crime’s. corpus defoti, ‘Search incident to lav/ful arrest The lawful arest is a precondition. It is the armst that justifes the incidental search. Thus, where there is no arest to speak ct, there could be no incidental search. (Goo, 0.9,, Luz v. People, 667 SCRA 421 2012}, and, Homar v, People, 788 SORA 584 (201). Wf a person is arrested, can the contents of the cell phone he might be holding be searched? No, the US. Supreme Court said in Ploy v. Califomia, 573 US. __ (No. 18-192, 25 June 2014), Gell phones pace vast Quantities of parsonal information literally in the hands Of individuals. A search of the information on a cell phone: bears litte resemblance to the type of bist physical ‘search. A warrant would be needed to justify such a search f one is to be made. ‘Dela Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655 (2014), Where the anest had notring to do with drugs, then the alice could not require the individual to undergo a drug test, “The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons. ‘apprehended or arrastad ‘or any unlawful act, but only for unlawiul acts listed under Article I of RA. 9165.” Tho (Court explained that [a] person apprehended or arrested’ ccannet literally man any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and. understood in consonance with R.A, 9165. Section 15 compiehends persons arrested of apprehended for unlawiul acts listed under Article I of the law. Otherwise, ‘tomake the “phrase 'a petson apprehended or arrested’ in Section 15 applicable to all parsons arested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under P.A. 0165 bbut for all other crimes, is tantarnaunt to a mandatory drug 9POLITICAL LAW [Bil of Rights | Atty Rene B. Goroope testing of all parscns apprehended or arrested for any crime.” People v. Sapla (G.R. No. 244045, 16 June 2020) ‘The Court held that “law enforcers cannot act solely on the bass of confidential or tipped information. A tip is stil hearsay no matter how relable ii may be. It is net sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.” It also made reference to People v. Comprado, 860 SCRA 420 (2018). that in search of moving vehicles, the vehicle is the tarot and nota spectic persons. Sabio vy. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 (2006) “Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impamissible unless excused by lw and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our carwiction that the right to privacy is a ‘constitutional right’ and ‘the ight most valued by civilized men,’ but also from our adherence 10 the Universal Declaretion of Human Rights which mandates that, ‘no one shal be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy’ and ‘everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks,” Writ of Habeas Date The Rue on the Wit of Habeas Data ic directed at the problem when a person's right to privacy in fe, liberty and security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or ‘omission of @ public official or employee, or of @ private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, Raliets may include the enjoining of the act complainad of, or the deletion, destruction, oF rectification of the erroneous data or information. Data Privacy Act of 2072 (RA. No. 10173) This law provides added protection and safeguards to the ‘expectations of privacy of evaryene, especialy in the infomation age where the intemet is so much a part of ‘everybody's Ives, and by which so much personal information could be gathered and possibly misused and abused, Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, 737 SCRA 92 2014) ‘This case pointed out that the wait of habeas data “was designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.’ Its a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private incividuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her ‘correspondences, or about his or ner family. Such indivicual or entity need not be in tha business of collecting ‘or storing data. And, in order to properly protect one's especiation of privacy in the use of the social networking platioms, ho or sho must provide the necessary sefeguards, paticulatly in the privacy settings. If one exposes himself or herself too much in these social networks, then there would no ight to complain about Violation of the expectations of privacy. 0