Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Soviet Military Power 1991

    Uploaded by

    georgetacaprarescu
    13 views62 pages
    Soviet Military Power 1991

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    Soviet Military Power 1991

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    13 views62 pages

    Soviet Military Power 1991

    Uploaded by

    georgetacaprarescu
    Soviet Military Power 1991

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 62
    GENERAL ua 1991 ITARY Serosror » FORCES 1991 MILITARY FORCES TRANSITION NOTICE AS THIS REPORT GOES TO PRESS, THE LONG-TERM IMPLICA: ‘TIONS OF THE FAILED COUP FOR THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ARE NOT YET CLEAR. IT SEEMS APPAR- ENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE DRAMATIC AND SUDDEN SHIFT OF POLITICAL POWER TO THE REPUBLICS AND THE EXTENSIVE PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND WILL. HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY POLICY. AS A RESULT, SOME OF THE AS- SESSMENTS IN THIS PUBLICATION ARE SUBIECT TO GRADUAL OR EVEN SUDDEN CHANGE. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVEIT WORTHWHILE ATTHIS CRUCIAL STAGE TO HAVE AN ACCOUNTING OF SOVIET MILITARY FORC: IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COUR, AND THIS REPORT PROVID:S ‘A BASIS FOR EVALUATING FURTHER CHANGES THAT COULD ‘OCCURIN THE WAKE OF THECOUP AND INTHE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOVIET STATE. ADDITIONALLY, THE VERY NAME OF THE ‘COUNTRY IS IN QUESTION. IN THIS REPORT, THE NAMES “USS2" AND “SOVIET UNION" MAY NEED TO BE READ AS THE "FORMER USSR” OR “FORMER SOVIET UNION.” Contents i Preface Chapter “The Sovet Miltary in Transition 6 Chapter it Economie Factors Afeting the Soviet Miliary 8 Chapter I Soviet Strategie Forces » Chapter 1V Soviet General Purpose 4 ‘date ne coped TUT Se itp ne Tempero Preface We will lvays remember the images of August 19-21, 1991 — Russian Republic President Bors Yeltsin atop a tank during the first hours of the Soviet coup declacing his defiance ofthe puch, thousands of Moscow's citizens forming lines again the tanks that threstened to move against the Russian Parliament, and Soviet Present Gorbachev renming to Moscow as the coup failed. But above all else, we vill femember the tiumph of democracy over the coup plots, the states of Lenin bang Pulled tothe ground, and the strets filed with people celebrating the prospect of felf-government. These events reflected what the world had witnessed in Prague, East Berlin, and other East European cites in 1989 and 1990 —the ejection of comminsm and the succes of those seeking liber. Is difiul to escape a feeling of euphoria over these events andthe collapse of the repressive fstiutions tat eontolled Soviet life for over 70 yeas. Tete ate row ‘many new opportunities for democratic growth inthe former Soviet Union However, even thovgh the coup failed, many underlying politi, interethnic, nd economic problems remain. This enormously complex society sueiches across II time zones, Comprises overa hundred different ethic groups, and has population of 275 milion that long suffered under an incompetent politcal system and endured the hardships and distortions a centrally planned economy. Neither economic reformsto move his Society toward market system, not pois! referm to establish effective instiuions tnawerable tothe people, will come about overnight. instead, Miltary Forces n Transition concentrates on the bare-bones faci of ha ‘county's armed forces. It is a snapthot of those eapabliles in August 1991, with Post-coup updates where we ean provide them. We believe thatthe report provides as fnuch informaton as possible, information certain tobe the subject of policy debit. “Thisdetal canbe valuable to both American and Soviet citizens, as well sto interested readers aroundthe world. We have accordingly made a numberof observations about ‘how Soviet cereal authorities and the republics are laying the groundwork for reshap ‘ng military responsibilities inthe aftermath ofthe coup. "The mportnceof sucha document was broughthometo me during my fis fal “Visit to the Soviet Union as Secretary of Defense in October 1990, I met with 140. -sommitees of he USSR Supreme Soviet dealing with defense and ternational issues. ‘The seston itself was unprecedented. After [made bref statement, we hada vigorous ‘bined principle of drafting, in which apart ofthe Force ‘would be volunteers and & part conscips. Loboy has taken a slightly more radical position, stating he favors professional anny and is working to end the draft altogether. If implemented, the transition 10 & more professional force may incease the overall quality of the Soviet military CONCLUSION The Soviet military isnow confronted with a number of staggering uncertainties. With the era of Cold War ‘confrontation at an end and the thest of superpower ‘confrontation greatly diminished, is immediate task is to attempt to preserve an allunion armed forces in the ‘midst of the competing claims by the republies to 16 dismantle significant components. As republic military ‘oreesarenow arealiy,cemer ad republileaders must fetermine what their size wil be and what, f ny, contrition they will make to allunion defense. Wall they play a role in a unified defense plan, or will hey ‘essentially funtion as heavily srted police forces? The Aispostion of military garrisons ified, ports, tan ing areas, and equipment depos in the republics will have tobe resolved, Provisions willhave tobe made for further withdrawals from the republics, and adtional ‘scarce resources wil have t0 be found to cover the ‘expenses involved ‘Themiliay High Command faces a number of other pressing problems onthe home front as well. Itmusttry {o find remedies to the roving problem of feeding, housing, and clothing is frces, problem exacerbated by theangoing withdrawal of ishuge occupying armies from Eastem Europe. The military leadership must also determine how to deal with the eurrent unpopularity of ality service and the problem of daftresitance, and hhow it will trae, tan, and motivate «higher quality ‘of conscript who ean operate the inreasingly techies ‘weaponry ofthe future. The leadership will have to determine the likely ature of future external treats to the Soviet stat, and ‘within the confines of economic and poliialrstrin', structure its remining fees to mect these threats f the Wet i tll perceived as the most Hikely potntat fdversay, should the bosis of Soviet military might ternain a strategie nuclear deterrent ad large ut tech nologically unsophistiated ground forces ot should it atempt to transition o a grester emphasis on hh tech missile weaponry and CL capabilities o beable to fightthe airspace war? Ifthe later how willthe iia ister sufficient economie resources to sustain such development? IF it cannot, should it forego a large ‘onventiona capability and ely on an exclusively ms lest deterret? ‘The future ofthe military is inextricably linked to the outcome of the eurent political and economie criss gripping Soviet society. The state ofthe econ: ‘oiny wil be a cttcal determinant of the level and ‘quality of resources availabe forthe military. A po Tica resolution of center periphery relations, in the form of the Union Treaty, status of forsee sgresments, land other politcal arrangements, will determine the future pertiipation ofthe republics in providing man power foranallunion military at well ebbing rights nd eccnomie support fr all-nion Force stationed in those republics. The miltary will udoubedly attempt toweigh in heavily on esenomic and politcal decisions Chapter Minter f Detere Neral of Attn ‘evenly Shapeshmibon hit of General Salt Mindi oboe Miniter of Defense usin Repuie ‘ey General ‘New senoe military leader are commited to telorm, but he wil fce 3 mumbo dlls in tanforing the Soviet sity ‘Stabler Marshal haposinko theft vation oftro head the Defense Minin, ending the en a ry ee {nth post Army General Labo, 2 Tormer commande of the Wsraw Fac Combined Stl har been tuted in fell Soviet Imei nea theft genie reformers inthe mito Thess lesen ili replace senor mibary leaders who supped FRecoap ts net enn reel ley econ el bc megtiinror ents crvcceig free eects Siicnt rae e However itis unlikely thatthe military wil again enjoy ite prioity of yesteryea, The extent to which genuine military reform ii plemented will hve e major impact on future military apablity. The lage proecied force cuts and reorgani- zation of services, branches, and military disits will Serve to steamline the force. ‘As this repor is published, the Soviet military con atets ay the Rusdan Defense Minster wil undoitedy play's tinue intransiton. The ultimate size, shape, and overall capability of the future force cannot at this time be predicted with any certainty due tothe instability not nly in the military but also in Soviet society. It ppeats thatthe forse ie headed toward a significant ‘eduction in size. Its potential to project conventional power beyond its border wil be eonsderably las than inthe past, although ite general purpose free structure ‘remains the largest in Eutope Its stratepic nuclear capa- bilities wil continue to pose a formidable treat. Economic Factors Affecting the Soviet Military ‘The moderation of Seve trees forees cer ‘ecinc, despite the poor sate ofthe Soviel econony. INTRODUCTION ‘Where the hopes of Soviet economic reform and progress once rested inthe unsuppotive hands of Com ‘unst Paty and military leaders the post-coup leader. ship appears prepired to embrace matket principles It also appears that the once privileged and dominant position of the defense sector in the Soviet economy ‘ill be displaced by increasing republic influence over 8 cin ofthe T-16D Blackjack bomber has shown cnlymodest economic decisions. While the abandonment of hal measures that gestured toward reform but did litle {o aller the system fs clearly an imporant sign, the implementation of market priniples, while prom ising an eventual solution, will be dificult im the short term, ‘This chapter cxamines the sate ofthe Soviet econ ‘amy asitentered the period of political change marked by the Augustcoup, While ite is known abouthow the plans and programs ofthe Soviet military wil eventi- ally be affected by new politcal and economic realities, this chapter provides basis for assessing future changes, ‘THE SOVIET ECONOMIC CHALLENGE ‘The USSR entered severe economic recession in 1980, Serious regional shortfalls in fod atd consumer goods ereonly one reflection of the economic Sowntm, ‘According to former Prime Minister Valentin Povlow, speaking in early 1991, industrial production i onthe {hvesholdof such ossesin balfa year that we wil tain thelevelof devastation a inthe period ofthe Civil Wa Pavloy went on fo state thatthe ralroads are “half ‘uined,” the telephone system is on the "verge of break: ‘down, and the water and Heating systems are “barely Furtioning.” Reasons forthe economy's poor condition ate mui faceted. Decades of investment priorities skewed to promoting the rapid builé-ap of military power stripped the economy of the resources necessary to ene 9 bread, modernized economic infastuctre tat could support both civilian and military requtements. Gor- bachev's confusing and at times contradictory attempt atreform acelerated the economy's decline by relaxing ‘central contols without decisively eatablishing market mecharisms. Delay and indecision over how fast to Inttte market reforms led by late 1990 tothe wide spread recognition, even by reformers, thatthe time had pasted fora rapid shift to @ market economy. In 1990, the economists Yavlinsiy and Shatalin drafted radical plan to transition the Soviet economy from a centrally planned command model to one based on free markets in only $00 days. Concluding thatthe radical economic reform would precipitate economic collapse render the ental goversment largely iclevant, anid lend to the break up ofthe union, conservatives inthe party and government retrenched, force the defeat of the radical 500-Day economic reform progam, atid stymied many ofthe potentially beneficial marke-orented aspects of reform. Inthe aftermath of the filed August coup, the Soviet ieadershiphas accepted he needtomarkeize the ‘economy. Chapter I SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING Soviet military expenditures fll about 6 percent in real tems in 1990, scoring to Wester estimates, It ‘comparison with 1988, miltary outlays were down shout 12 percent. Weapon procurement expenditure, ‘which account for about half of total Soviet military pending, bore the bulk ofthe reduction, falling about {0 percent in 1989 and a further 10 percent in 1990. The largest reductions over the two-yenr period were eo

    You might also like