CCommunieated December 15th 1068, 1, Pwo Concept of Nepation. 4 Condes « simple proposition of the subject predicate frm, such the proposition th a thing = has «property P. Wha i tho nepation tt tis proposition! Init that ¢ has not the property P, or St that har the property not-P! People who have had some teining in modern logic ray think the question quite futile, Yt has become. the received ‘or orthodax view among logsisns that negation refers tou proposition as ‘whole, and that there a no alienation of not-P of w thing a distin ‘rom the denial that P is roe ofthis thing “Aristotle took diferent view ofthe attr. ie clean, he sys in ‘one place, what Ie notowhita" (ed Jove o Seve) and it i not white? (ei fe Beds) moan diferent things (rar enpaie) and one i 42 ‘fimetioa, the other a denial» What Aristotle has in mind when making this detncion ean, I balive, beste explained oa fllows: Things which ‘ee capable of having colour are either white or not-white. Bot things ‘which heve no colour at all such a ai, or eoands or names, are neither white nor noth “Arisotle thus makes a distinction between the propuiton sti not the eave that aie Pv and st ithe cago that 2 is not-Ps, But the two propositions, though distinc, are not unrelated, sor fit etre to way, [rile otark te not-whit’ te alo true to ay ite not whit» Th prparing thle paper for puloton T hav ben much indebd to Me, ‘ater Goch wn hs a in typigt snd mae impetantisn an etl ero Se fr came Raney agement gat repting not Ps priate ‘in ete Php of Lagal Atm 5212 (018, quoted from Berd ‘Baw ope end Rota by BG Mah, Rew are Se) in ‘Sma ware neces ny th hs to bo then fo aply to tw Wola ‘operons Uh p23) aa Pe Ste‘ Hs Wri ‘the proposton sit ithe cane that aia not-P i loge stronger hy rental, the propition nti mol the care tht 2s Ps “Ewe eal the fo peopeitions im question negations or negsing propoatons, we suey distinguish betwown strong and weak negation 4 ‘urang nogetion i an affirmation an well ws denial. We can call it ‘negative affirmation or 4 mingaffimmion. Ta the cat of subjects ‘rallnt propostons we nay alo speak of firming a negative prdicta) Gropert) of the subject, — Wea negation is smealye a denis 12. Tein ely note tha for ubjeot-prodinte) proposition si irony negation the to-aled Law of Bxcuded Middle doce ot hol ‘From chest tat ite pot tue to any ofthat in P, it dove nt flo ‘Bt Ge tuto ny Cat 2 nb P. a atte mentions two cues in which, ascrding to him, fom ci! fatatood of nein Pv thre doc not fllow tho trath of ee not Ph ‘The one cau fr whan tho subject docs not ext If Socrates dove no ‘Bin the proposition Socrates lx ae, an he proposition crate Sots ree, Aritotle expe. But, on this eme anatption of not] ‘tence, the proportion ourten i hot (=well ie nob ewe, ba | ele to. a “Thc sooond cae occurs, when the subject exists but air of oppodtes P and nol, cant bo matazally pediateds of i Fi genet comiions of tare pedication are not made ler by ‘ule, Disaming wach oppoaies which he cal paisa private ‘esnye hat ro donot mean by othe’ that which bas not testy 2 ‘rbg Bind tha which hae nt sight, bat rte hat which ha not tat crught tthe time when by nar it abou, Far here ere some eeatares ‘Think t birth ae without ight and without tet, but are not called TDhikles or blind» Asrming that sls and owe azo such contra eee See uamit ot an Intermediate (towel il and sot Sey then on Ariel's vw, either Socrates i ie or Socrates ie Trib rl'be tron, if Soren exit But of the pr of positive and Tehicve prpmtionswonrates blinds and WGocrtes has wight tf orth cave hut one mast beta, Socrates exists, Th abject must “i Movennached thewtage when by nase tahould have ight, Atte, tata Satan aot ei Ca, Be (the Lage of oation * T anderitand, would not have said of « new-bom baby tht iti bling, nor ie good taoge to ny 80 4, Anvwas noted in Satin 2, Aristotle was of the opinion that, if the subject dons not ext, then neither aris Pr nor vee not-P is ene But the wes willing to cll both propositions flo. ‘On this point Aristotle might be accused of obscuring a dstinstion| hich in other contort he mark. Teen tho distinction between the cage Tne af Pra not tas becuse «dose not exe or beonuse P eannet bo ‘aturally predientod oft, ond the ease when sis Pv isnot tue because rot P et be (ely) peedated of A convenient woy of racking this ‘itineton in language (torminalogsaly) woud be to say that eis Pi Jali only in the sar when 3 a not-Pe i rv Tahal adopt this termiologeal saggetion —~ thus departing from Avistate T all say that when nather the postive nar tho negative ‘Sirmation ove, then alo neither fae, Bath ar removed frm truth td falaeood. ‘Let a propoiton be oiled semovede from tut, when neither nor fts strong negation is tree, and semioveds from flachood, when neither it nor it strong negation jefe, Then we note that on Aristotle's view ‘propositions may he removed from truth but never from falshod, ‘Wheres on our view, «proposition which removed from tuth i ther by alno removed from falechod. Tem thas sggesting « distinction between flacload and non-ruth, ‘parallel to the ditnetion between strong aad Weak nogation, between Degatie alfirmation and denial. To make the first ditinetion, if one ‘ake the socond and the third, owems very nataral indeed One reason ‘thy Avil fled to make fight have boo his predominant intrest {hn predation and comparstive noglst of matters which olong to what js nowndays called propositional lope. "Plechood thas sronger notion then non-trath. I proposition nfo, also not true, But not any proposition which isnot true i Trial expsly mnie he La of Ral Ml nthe form which ny De rrpaatne bat) al propains — ~~ arith oe ‘poten CSc OLDE —| shah aya antiga ioe — Sil ey ihr what tue what naan Bet pang of podcton be Tinea he Law Held ble ony Shower om wens De a. ‘Sago tty pve prt ser belng otha aot ona OE Met Ioit beer on sje wont dr ati deny eno Pen‘ wm Write ‘pv facto alto fle, A proposition can be amerelyy not true, without ‘ing spose fe 4. Aa ws alpny noted (p. —), the distinction between negative fimoation and nil, which wo find in Aratotle, and thus alo the ‘itinctone between strong and weak negation, between the flo and the nome, which we based oni, ace unfamiliar to moder lope. The ‘esl of la Prin tontd ns oqsivalen to the affirmation of wis not-P, ‘Non-mombership in» lass ienifad with membership inthe comple mentary clus. "The disappearance ofthe ditinetion between the two kinds of megtion| fiom modern loge i, however, by no means « mutta of mere neglect. Tis, gary atleast, n consequence of importent developments within logical since tel, Taba fer to thee developments, In «crude and schematic manner aa a replacement of the Avstottian dichotomy tre {alo ty what T propaie to call the Rosedian techotomy teut-fae sesninglen "Thoe things of whic, on Asetote's view ite rato deny tha they ao, eay, while, but ale afrm thas thy are not-whita, may, nob wR ‘atarlly, be rgarded a things £0 which the prdicnt weiter hus no “pplication whaisoorer — not even for pirpones of denial. Subjoot and ‘reat imply odo not mnths To aay of «sound that tis white and to (Zp that it ie not omaly make wo sense, On thie view, the distinction Tntwoon things which are not-white and things which are not white ‘ates, ad ts pce in taken by a dstintion between things which tre nat white and things of which whitenom cannot be sigaficantly ‘firmed or denied a all "The introduction int logle of the Ruslan tichotomy has been Ile on one ofthe tajoradvanoss inthe story of the eabject® T do ‘ot wis to lapse the attement. Bu it shoud be obmered thatthe ‘Aristotelian dichotomy need not blind wt to the distinctions of logeal ‘atogory or tyPe which the tichotamy was later invented to eater for. ‘The diatnction between the two kinds of negation largely serves the same parpowe: “Compare the number 7s not nedh and athe rntance the number 7 ‘notre! is meanings. Which ie the Better way of expressing the truth 7 Has Heiconbch, Brrnd Ramet Log, p30 in The PAorshy cf Dern o by TA hip, Hranton tod Ong 108) sweat 1S no tnt dawn of hs dunt edmunds cover of moter oie (the Lagi of Negation 1 ture It may be objste tothe frst mode of expansion that it obscures fun important diference, es the differen betwenn athe wayy in which ‘he number 7 not red and the way in which his hoo i not red (bat, tay, yellow) Bu this acouaton beoomes unjustified, i we keep In mind ‘he diatinetion between the to kinds of negation whieh wo have called ‘he trong and the wel, betwoon nt bing red boasiae not capablo of Inavng a clour at all, and boing note becane of possating some othe colo “Adlanavantage ofthe Rassliantichotomy seems to me tobe that it _umoves from mesningl dlcoure forms of expresion which have «us thd which furthermore may be sid to have lpia lations vo admitedly ‘measingful propositions. "The meaningful meeninglos distinction has ‘bon badly misused in modern philosophy, and should whenever posible, ‘be abandoned in favour of more dlaciinatng lpia tes, One such tool, Troggst, x = new theory of negation. {5 Before we proceed to construct «formal lg with two negations, ‘we ought to make clearer statement of tho ground on which the dstine- ‘on tetoon negative affirmation and (ere) denial, between the (epoitivelys) flee and the (muealys) non-trae, may be Desed in the ‘prleule ease (Lam not now aiming ata reconstruction of views hl ‘by Aristotle or by any other logan inthe past.) ‘Aietoile, wo ove coan, giv hints of least two grounds on which the distinction may be based. One ie that tho subject of the propoition {povsbly doesnot exist, Another ie that when the aubjet exist It may be och tht the predate cannot be naturally predated of i ‘in moder log, we have ls seen, one sometimes makes adstnction ‘betwen the fal and the meaningless which ean be eaid to answer {intent end porpee, to Ariat datinetion between negative afimation ‘and (omer) dela. But onthe question how tbe distinction shoud be ‘made in the particular ea, rather, tio hee been anid by modern logicans. What I am going to say hereon the dlstinction will wdmittely be ery invTisint Taba Lint aye to the minim which 1 think is ‘eoded to justify the coor of the formal laws of (weak snd) strong _negtion which Tam going to propode subsequently in the paper. further flevelopment of the Hess, which I propose inthis Satin, wll have to ‘eva fata publiestions. "Tho (interesting) probes raised by the case when the oubject dose: a . Hoon Wright a ot exist wil not be diseased here at all, I shall only romask that it ems fo me that one must ditinguish between situations where th bjt doen not exit sbeouse ofthe nature ofthe care and etuatian | tuber the aubject dose not exit sbecanse ito heppene, The former ‘the case win the abject belongs inthe world of fetion or tal or (on ont ‘lw of the mater) mythology. The latter ia the eave when th sbjeut ‘belongs inthe word of ely ut x epershsbl, and ae either oss to bear not yet come into existence, at ther be an individual 2 and two propertice Sand P, and It ‘tbe tue that xin 8. Thal refer to a the bj to a the ebjpet- ‘property or gems, and to P as the prdica. Considering now which Feltin 2 may have to P, four posible cases may be dintingithe! 1. The mere fact that is Settee the quustion whether Ss P gaily, Tht 2 eS entails (by Hao) that in not P. Por exemple ‘he mere foc that ie «triangle entalle cht 2 not square "The mere fact that 2 is 8 gettin the quetion whether 2 ie 8 postily. That ze 5 ental (by tel} that =I P. or example: the ‘mere fut that ra brother entails tht 2 mle i. The mee fact that in 8 doce nok ote the quetion whether 2 in Pcither way; but we know which investigations or tee have to be ‘cared ut on rin order to aucertain whether» ir Por not. Ror example ‘the mere fact that zie (grownup) man does not settle the question ‘whether hee Boglh-speaking or nt, But we know whieh further fats ‘bout; in edition to tho fact that e ls human, would show Ut he “Bnglsh-spenking, ~ and we know how to find out these fact. fe. The mere fact that = $ dove not acta th queetion bother = ‘i P either way; and ontil we know romthing more about than that The eS, we do nat oven know how to tackle the question, For example: ‘he rere fact that eis amma, doesnot tell us wheter 8 mah some other ypedes. If r+ man, thore i oom for investigations to ind ‘out whother se Bnglokapenking oF not. zl, say, dog, the question ited “nthe frat of these four cases I shall say thatthe subject property ot ‘gone 5 i lion to th predicate P, inthe tcond that 5s frinazlly ‘Spproprat to P, in the thied that Si xrinseally appropriate to P, andi the fourth that Sisneithor alin nor eppeopeate to P The genus steangl fe allen to the predate wequre,sbrother i intrinsically appropiate to niles, smote Je oxteascally appropiate to slnglshspekings, nd’ smammal bs neither alon nor appropiate to Fnglishspesings (nthe Logie of Negation . ‘That a given genus i alien or appropriate to given predicate could = adopting stem from Wittgenetain ~ be eles grommatia festare ‘of the. genus (and the proticata). A genus which is aon to ilven predicate by our prevent criteria for jding the presence of thie _redieate inv subject, may ducome appropriate by extending the criteria oes to make them appeals to membre of this genta, The llennees ot ‘ppropeintanes of «genus to prodicats i, in other words, not founded nly sn the nature of things. It als dependent upon our ux of language "The above eluldatons ofthe notions of lieness and sppropritenset se approximate and provisional only, but thay wil have lo slice for ‘present puspoows. T shall for example, not stop hore to consider the ‘meaning ofthe phraso the mero facts and entail by tals ae wad in fd i, orth meaning of snow and sscertaine aa used in Beal fbverved that T am not taking it for granted thet any property will ‘Quay ee gonus.T think that gonera possess ditinglching fetares ‘which Bae not been mentioned here Itz belongs toa gens which fallen to P, then «canna belong to ‘another genus which a intrinsically appropiate to P. But it may belong to some genus which ie extenaclly appropriate to P. For example strangle is alent equare, but if «triangle, is alow polygon, and ‘he gene spolygom ia extrinsealy appropriate tthe predicas moquares, ‘We know how to find out whether a given polygon i equare or nt, — eg, by counting the numberof it sides If belongs to gunue whichis ellen to P, It yet nad no belong to ‘ny genus whichis extrnscally appropriate to P. Ix atnally does not Yelong to ony gonus at all which le (Iavnsially or extinialy) ppropcinte to, shall sy tht ie removed from he range application ofthe pricateP. Por example: the genus sdop, ae we already noted, lo rot appropiate to the prodinteenglsh-sponkingy, and although there fre genera (eg. sama) to which both dogs and men belong, no dog Delonge to any ganus which ia appropiate to snglsh-poaking. If Belong to no. gonan which i (intrinsically or extzinsealy) ‘propriate to P, then and then only sll T say that the proposition sis Pris (neither trae nor fale bot) merely ot true,‘ say, for ‘xample, that tie neither tue nor fale that els pleonous sto ey some ‘ooh thing a thats a mumber snd tat ambere are rather intsnwclly ™ On noon of aing by any page Te Conse of Entiat, pitt =n Lp! Std Land 18.» 2. wn Woot Doienons nor are thize aay mess of finding out supon investigation, whether they ate poisonous or nt {follows by contrapostion tat the proposition es Pes lther true ‘or fal fan only if» belongs to some gens which intially oF cxtrinsaly, appropriate to P) ‘er belong to some genta which ls appropiate to P but xis not P, ‘then and then only aball Tsay that the proposition 12 Psi aie or, ‘whlch I regard ag meaning the same, thet te proposition we nots i tro, To my, fr example, thet i fale that is poisonous (or tue {hat.ris not-poisonou) thot o aay come such thing te thatthe make x fe not polanous, oF the drag 2, othe lnur = "To which gr tho in th true proposition wis note belong, is however not lui from the proposition tf. The genus can either bo {ally asumed tbe clear from the context or overtly mentioned by tho Introduction of tome guaiying attribute of x into the proposition, for xample sth mon Tehall ony thet «proposition ofthe type eis not-Ps hasan open oF unelrmined woe long as the gents of Ue aubjet romans unspecified. {istheefore not poset come ta now the truth uch a proposition, cither by mathematic proof or by empirial olesrvation, until the fubjet ne bncome assigned to a genus which ie appropiate to the predite, ‘Since mot-Ps in the proportion eri not-Ps maybe regarded as the name oft nageivo predate which is being aimed ofthe wabject it'may be aed which genera are appropiate to this prdicato not tod how they are related to the genera which are appropriate to the ‘rodinteP. Thal answer this question by saying Unt tho ganere which 1s exrnezlly appropiate to not are the very same genera which te etvineally appropriate to P. (But i fellows from st above thet 1 genus, which io ttrinscly appopsiate to P must be alien to nol, tot that» gen which I inteoaelly appropiate ta not-P must be alin to P) "This viow ofthe quetion which genera are appropriate to not P is ‘naturel one 4 take; and it it seome to me, rflotd in the ordinary {uc of languoge. eke, for exanpl, the predates rwells and est-woll “Another word forthe lata ils Now, which are the things which aril ‘or not! Obviously the vory same things which are well or note ‘ie-men and animals and, maybe, plant fo, Tt follows from this tt, ‘eva but another word for mot-wall, 20s walle but another word fr nthe Lage of Noun ” snot, And from tive two fet it follows that the doubly negative ‘rediose mot-not well ie the same aa wr, andthe doably nega ‘predicate sot not ile the same saan, Wo shall ater have say more "bout this principe that the doubly negated predinte eden to the ‘prodioute Heal ‘Although the flehood ofthe propeition that xf P requires that = ‘longs to ome gee which ie extrinsially appropiate to P, this dos rot, of couan, exelude the poablty that x lz belongs to rome genus ‘whichis dnteulally sppropiste to not-P apd thus allen to P. For Ceample: If aie weiter, then ie fmale(— not male). Th gona alters fs fnrinseally sppropriate to the podioate somes, and tharefro alin {tamale But the proposition that za mao isin this ease, false and not ‘merely not tru, se, becane faa itr, then zl alo «ing, ‘And the gon seihings Ss extetlelly appropriate to the predicate tales (or sna “From what has boon said the reader may easily extract that if © ‘belongs fo no genus whish ie appropriate to‘, then = aio belongs tomo ‘genus which intrnaollyappropat to not-P. From this gain follows ‘That if' thing is removed fom the range of application ofthe predicate P, then te alin semoved from the range of eplinton of not-P. 4 ahoold be noted that two gener, Sand 8%, may both be (tciaalaly or extrinscally) appropiate to « predicato P, without {ing mataelly sppropeine fo one another as gens and predicate. For ‘vample:‘The gon wake ie appropriate to the peediest moisonous, {tnd 2 nthe gent sdrogy. Any sake le polznous or not-poeonous, and Snerly any drug. But to say of sanake that ina drug or of «dg that ‘ise enake in meaninglom, the eubject ie removed from the rings of application of the predicate. Teehould also be noted that th relation of being appropriate isnot symmetrical. The guts may be appropriate tothe prediate Pend ot ‘P aol be a genns whichis appropriate to the predate 5, Of any make ivcan bo truly or fey and thats poisonoer. But not of any polonous ‘hing can tbe truly or fel end thet ae make. (for example, this fennot be mid of drop) "Let we anaume hat the proposition ure Pye trues it then certain that «must pons somo property which dos a, by ite ufo aa ‘round for judging thats e Pt If the stawer t the above question is negativ, than it may happen ‘that ans which ls P doesnot belong to any gen which is exiinsially” 6. wm Weg appopcate to P. And if thie astally happens, I shall ny that Pis an | inate gous "Por example: Ar there any Savstgations which can show, whather ‘an entity of some genus ls oe not w number, whether ii o ie not @ Dhyslal objet, whether ti of isnot mental event! Ifthe answer x ogative, we shall have to adit that nambers, physical objess, and ental vente are ulkimate gener. "Tho question which are the ultimate genera and whether there aze ny, Teall not disase hero, Bat T shal kon with the posit chat ignore may te lkinae "Teellows fom what bas bon a hat, If Pie an ultimate geno, then the propotiton that 2 ix ean neverbe falas (and the proposition that iris not P never true). or example: If numbers constitat an ultimate feu then ean never be false to sy of en >that ti » number. The [reposition that xine number ether ie tus or ela the subjects removed fom the range of application ofthe predicate Table! not the complenest or complement-poperty of P. The ‘et that, sf P ivan ulkimste geno, then not-P dows not apply to anything, Tall expres by saying that olimate genera Base no complements Properie whic ae at ultimate gener ll have oomplnments. But the complement of « property may be emly, — and thus in & sense non tistnt, That the eouplemant of P is empty means cbt to prediate ‘not-P of aay in any genua which x appropriate to P i ae (Bo say that here is no uch property athe component of Pi utterly Aiferont fom saying that nothing ponsser tho propery which isthe tonmplent of The two car of non-existence are of « diferent gical eategory) Wie have in this section ditcusod only singular propositions of the subject predicate form, The srng negations of uch propositions, we have tid (pt and 10), ace themeeves of tho subject predicate form, Thus Singular eubjetprediosto proposition are ofthe two main types is ‘Prand win not Ps "The weak negations of subjet-padicate propositions are not then selece of tho subject pediate form. The sense of stongly negating [propositions which ate themselves weak negations of other proportions Fite not been dieused. For example: We have not diacused the itine- tion in meaning between ti fale that 2 ls not Ps end itis nt tre (nthe Laie of Notion » thet is not Px Bot T shall proceed on the assumption that wich = fivtneion can be significantly made. ‘Singular propsitions of the relational form have not been discus citior But wo serume thatthe diatinetin bebween strong and wel ‘negation is applicable to them to, in Iter ction we hall lesa fn some detail how the distinction between the two negetions may be applied to general (quantified) propositions LL, Negation in he Logic of Proposition. 46. thie section we shall conider weak end strong negation in ropaitonal loge (PL) "Th loge af weak nogtion T propose to identity with the lava for negation which bold aslo, two valued, propositional loge. sall enonforth refer to thie yet of lgie, nang the abbreviation CPL, "fnegetion in OPI is understood as weak negation in our snte, the ‘nortan ofthis ogi are not the toe and the fale, but the tus and ‘he non-tru. This modification in the interpretation of the system is noteworthy. ‘Por wouk negation there holds the following Law of Rxcuded Mile: {eis ru that any given proposition aie ether tre or notte "Por weak negation there olde the following Law of Contradiction: {ein wot true of eny propeition that i is both trae and not trae, "Por wosk aegtin, finaly, thre holds the fllowing Law of Double Negation: It is troe that I's given propostion ais tus, then i snot frve thot «isnot tr, ad wie sera ‘For week negation T shall we the rymbol 1m», for conjunction », {or dlajantion ev, far material mplieation +>, and for material equi- valence ‘Por strong negation Leal we the game eymbo sis used for negation fn Intuition lola, ee Fs. ‘The law of arong negation aze not the laws of mignon of CPD. Strong negation entails weak negation. If x popostion flo, ti not tr, be if « proposition isnot teae, it doesnot necessarily fellow ‘has it fle. Tis beonute ofthis relationship tatwoan th two negations thatthe “Law of Contention fy but the Law of Bxcladed Mido i not valid for song nogetion. Tee notte, soorpting the ditinotion between thea 0.1. con Weight toro kinds of nogtion, that any given proposition iether two oF fl. Bot ence any propution which if i albo notte, and no propos: tion ean be bth trasand not ru, it follows a oro that nlite ean any ropition be both true and fae Tr the Law of Double Negation valid fr strong negation! The gueetion| Avge int two, Ii fle that epropztion sf, ith proposition Sn queton than tue! Teall anrwer syn for reasons which have already {in Seton 5) boon implicitly piven: Lava the eject pedionte proposition that xin A. "Tae then the ‘ropritionthit xe not, and Tl athe proposition that «isnot no ‘Assume that this third proposition ie te (or, which meant the same, ‘sume that the second propoition is fase). This assumption entails, scoring to what wa eld above (p. 10), thx! 2 belongs to some gents which in extrnseally sppopriat to the predicate not But the genera Ich are extsinially appropiate to not we sid (p20), ae the very Shine genera which are exringoally appropriate to the predcato 4 "Thus # will blog to some genue which le extzinsiclly appropriate to the predicate A. Any member of such a gens, and therefore leo, i ‘eta to be either A or not-d. Tt wae aueumod thet is not-notd. ‘Sine strong noetion ental weak nepation it follows that 2s not nod. ‘And therefore, tinge 2 ust be eithe? Aor hot-d and ia not the later, it follow tht zs A. Horowth hasbeen proved thatthe proponiton that ‘Fin A i ental by the strong negation of its strong negation, "Tshall erome without argument that the seme holds good for ‘proportions which re not of the subject-predioate form eit la the once that ifs proportion i true, chen it ie fale thai it {alot Tehllanewer fr tha following reasons already imply given: ‘Lata again be the enbjot predicate propeition that eis A, We shall ‘scum tht this proposition le true and that 4 isan ultimate genus. (dn example could bo: isa numbers) Then itis clear that TV a or the ‘proportion tat 2 ie not not A cannot be tre, For this net propeation ‘reruppowes for ite truth that 2 belongs to some genus which {xtrinially appropiate to the predite not, which in its tam ‘prouppones that belongs to some gens which ie oxtrinsialy {Sppopeste to the predate 4, But the exiatnco of a genus which i ‘xtrinially appropiate to A contradicts the narampalon that 4 i an ‘lkiate geno, (CE above p. 11.) Hence, if isan ultimate genus, the proprition that is A dose not ental the strong negation of le strong, the. | (nthe Logie of Nagution {now proceed to the construction in olines of «logical clea which, lacking better name, I shall call the Extended Logic of or BLP. ‘The symbols of ELP are the symbole of CLP and the symbol for teong negation "The formulse of ELP are propositions variables 6,6, ¢,.-. and moleetar complexes which ae formed of such vasibles withthe aid of {rtheaonnedives andjor the aymbol for strong negation. (We need not thre state the feline reeursive definition in fall) 6 & prefixed to formulae inthe samo manner ae mois prefixed. “he axioms of BLP we take the fllowing four formal: AL Vee ~0) 48. Ja ~e. 43 Ylevje Tae Tb, Ab Vara. ‘Tho frst axiom says that formal contradiction i falehood. (By formal contadietions I mean the conjunction of» propsition and its ‘Fen nogtion.) Te eocond axon nys tha trong negation entalls weak Tegation or that if «proposition e fb, then it is alao not true, Th third ‘elo says that strong negation is conjanetlvely istebtiv with regard te disunctions or that edijanetion of propositions is false send only if ‘ite disunct individually are fale, The fourth ax, finally, i the ‘ouble negtion principle that ii fle that x proposition fle, hen ‘hin propaition is true "The theorems of ELP are al forma which reoursvelyaniayone or several ofthe following three conditions: ‘Ri. The formals is obisinable from an exiom or theorem of EL by sottitating for some jroponitonal viable init some formulae of ELP. “Re, The formals i » consequent na matedal implication formu, which staf an anos of theorem end whore antecedent isan axiom (rs theorem of BLP. “23. The formal is obtainable from an exiom or a theorem of BLIP by substituting for (or) some formula ni another formula, whch {2 tautslogicallyequiveleat to the ft. (That two formal are taxto- Iogielly equivalent should mean that their material equvalenoe formula ‘ehy be ablained from «tautology of CLP by sabuitating for ite Prepositions variblos formulae of ELP.) "Tne conditione which formals have to eatloy in order to qualify axro ©. Hoon Wek ‘heorem could alternatively be deveited as roles of infrenos a tran formation is tho uowal Ral of Sobtitition ad 2 the Rule of Detach. sent (or mae nen), Thee maybe caled base rate of al formalin ‘reasoning whatecover. 23 hae «somewhat more spesal ats, It moy be ‘ered # Kale of Svetttion of Identiti, (Only a few theorems of ELP willbe mentioned: Brom A1 and 42, with tho aid of BY end 2, we Obtain the theorem ~{o & ~a), Te can be called the Wesk Lew of Ontradstion for Wale ‘Negation. 7 ital coald be called the Strong Law of Contadition for Week Negetion “A2 is tautlogouny equivalent vo ~(1a & ~ ~a), Tak ~~ a is tantlogouly equivalent to ~~ a & Ta, and ~~ to a. Thus from A2 with the aid of wo obtaln ~{a.&"Ta), Tie may be cll the Weak, ‘Law of Contradiction for Strong Negation ‘The following terminlogy wil be adopted Taball say that a and ~a or the true end the non-trveare opposed to one another as weak coir ‘itor, ad that a und a or the true and the fle ro opposed to one fsnother as strong cotradicoris, — ‘The option between strong ‘ontradictores is «species of oppoiton betwosn conirare, Te is relly coen that al tullgir of CLP are theorems of BLP. "This fellowe fom the fuck that ~(a ~ a) theorem and Ue fac hal all teutolages of CLP are tautologically equivalent to one another Strong negation, like weak negation, le conjuncivly datibative with regard to disunetions, (43.) But strong negation, unllke weak negation, ie not disjuntively distibative with reard to conjunctions HE le.&6)~~a and from CLP. ‘maa The lee threo formulae in conjunction yield (by CL) ~ Tara which ie taualgialy aquivalent to ar Ta, But av Ta fs not @ theorem of ELP. If it were, we abould ouide A2 slzo have ~0-+1.4, and weak and strong nogation would be equivalent. ‘Although io d)+>"1av 16 dote not hold, the weaker form Vay Tb e.8) holds fm ELP. This ie esly proved. By CLP and 3 we have ‘Vass Wekbvae ~b), By AS and CLP wo have ‘Wakdvak ~¥)> Tees). Combining these two theorems we got (by CL) Ta (a). By parallel argent we prove Tb» Va 9) Combining the lst two theorems we get (by CLP) Taw 15+ a & 8) ae (On the Lagi of Neption ” 17. BLP can be stranuatads into & ayntom of modal lps, Strong negation answer, in the tansationy, to imposiilty, woak negation of rong negation to omy, and strong negation of weak negation to newest "et feb the aymbl for ponsiility.Assarding to the orthodox view fn modal logio, + af will then be aymbo for impossibility, and s\'M ms a aymbol for noooity. Aran abbreviation fr the last symbol ‘we may alao use No, The tratlation of BLP nto a modsleyetem is sccompliohed by replacing the symbol +1, wherever it occurs ina frmala OF ELP, by the combination of aymbole s~ af If the axioms of ELP are thus stranlateds, wo obtain ~ after some minor Wanaformations by wire ofthe rules of CLP — the formal: Ar. ~Mee~o) 4a, a> Ma. AB. Ma bos May Mb, fe, NMtera. ‘The fret axiom says that «formal conradtion ie an impos. ‘Tho second axiom saye the i a propotion i rue, then it ls posable the so-alled ab case ad pose-pensple. The third axiom says that « Aisjunction a poeblo and only flat oe ofthe disjunct i pone ‘he Prinsple of Distribution for possiblity. The fourth axiom, finaly, say that if propoition is necessarily pombe, ten ie ews, "Tho theorems of thle modal logie ate thove and only thowe forme ‘which ecusively stay th conditions E21 of theoemhood in RLP. (a the formulations of the rule, for sLPs read intend sthis system of ‘modal logics) “Te from the asioms ofthis model logic we omit A€, wo gt » sytem which i related to, but weaker then, the syetom 82 of €. I. Levis and ‘the ayrlem whith T have laowhere! celled the Syste 2 ‘fwo roplao Ad’ by an axons Mo > Ma, tothe effect that posible posibility entails possiblity, wo got « weakened form of Lewis's $4 (ey Syetem 0 "If we replace A¢' hy an axiom Ve Na, to the effect that possibie ecmay entails nec, we got weakened form of Lewir'e 5S (my System 30. Bae Bay in Medel Lo, Arte 1951 Sn pay Appandi I,” soe Wot 4 ‘The weakened ays difr from the systems M, 1, and 0” in 1] thot they renee. the ilerchangeability of equivalent formlae in|? ‘theorems to tatcogial equvslnone Gn CLP) and rete the nessa. tion of theorems to tastaogie (lm CLP). 7 1 the frat restriction i removed, if any two provably equivalent formulae may be vuelto for one another in v theorem, and if we place 4f by MNa~> Na, then iti easily proved thot 27Ma—> Me ibe theorem. Te may now leo be proved tht, if we replace Ad by IMa~» Na, then ony formoln of higher orders, any formule contain: ing iterated or overlapping modal opertar, a oquvalent to aformala of ‘he fet order. the encond restriction fs removed, ce if any proved forme se may become nectatated Into w forms »Nf, then replacing A” by res oe Sd of the System A, and replncing A€ by ‘Bina —> a gives uw 85 oF the Sytam I. If either rstristion ie removed bat Ad’ ls retained, then modality comes racuous, fa any formula of the modal loge im question may ‘be ahown to be equivalent toa formal of CLP ‘The decison proba of ll thee modal logis, and hence alto of ELP, can be solved by adaptations ofthe general method, which is described In An Kara in Modal Loic and thare applied tothe Systems 1", tnd Mee Yor the atke of avoiding misunderstanding it shosld be strenod ‘hat the interpretation of ELP as a modal calclus doce not mean that four notion of strong negation wells ie a species of impossibility. Tt ‘rou therfore be atenosles undertaking to try to ames the plausibility Of BLP ae a theory of negation by trying to assess the plausibility (on intuitive oe wont oer grounds) ofthe coresponding modal ealulus ws ‘theory of aout, possibility, and imponsbilty. And bot obsorved in Darticolar tht aoceping the dovble negation law 44 for strong negation ‘om inno way commit us tothe view that Mara oF that necesney ‘osribiity enti truth were «reasonable law forthe modal notions. ‘The distintion tetween strong and weak negation can bo made the point of departre for new contrtive efforts in modal log 2 Ope ely pp OT (nthe Logie of Negation » (on the eosiveds view, the proposition that a given proposition i “impossible is the negation ef th proposition that te given propetion i poatblo, and the proposition that a given proposition is icssry 1s the negation of th propeition thatthe negation ofthe given propa ‘ion ie patible. Accepting this view, the question may be rated whether ‘magatiom here mesne weak or etong negation. “Ss a plaulble anewer to thir question I would suggest that ‘mpossiility bo rgarded se the strong negation of pansy, and that ‘tho necasity of proposition be regerded aa the impossibly of ite ‘weak negation. To thief would add thid sfundamental rations, whi ‘cannot be deduced from the tw first, os that poblty be regarded a= ‘he trong negation of impasatlty. 1 fllows fom thee reatonshipe that ‘the proparition that a given proposition i posible eth strong nngaton ‘of the proposition that Uhe was negation of the given proposition le Tn a modal ogi, which observes these relationships between the notions of possibility, impossibility and noveaty, we should ave the foquvalences Macy IV wa and Naes TM ~ 6. But T aba not in ‘this place inquire more closely into the nature of medal logics which ‘obeorve the tlalonahipe in question, IIL, Negation in Quantication Theory. 5. We now proceed to diseussing week and strong negation in ‘quaniieaton theory. Yor the cake of simplicity, the tratment will be confined to ‘quantification of ‘proportions ‘of the ubjes-predonte form only. ‘Guantitieation ofthis rerteotd kind may be called monadie or simple ‘Trivaly, CLP ean be interpreted asa ealeutus of properties instead of propositions: To distinguish the Interpretations, we aball uae capital letters 4, B,... 80 vasisbles for properties. The symbols for truth- apotions of propostions wil alo be wo for the coresponding presence fanetions of properties" "We prsent in outlines clea whish may be called the slasicle logio of monadie quantifietion, of CLAQ: = er ie omeepton of eomyound yroperties a spremce funtion me my 33 Glos, quted en oval» 6. on Writ bole of CLM are property varabes, truth-sonnestives, and ‘he to quantifier 9Us dB ‘By an atomieformols of CLMQ we understand a formule which i ‘obtained by prefixing either Us orto (atomle o molecala) formula ‘of GLP. (GLP te now being interpreted at a calelas of properties.) ‘By & molecular formula of CLMQ we understand e formals whichis forme of ate formulae of CLMQ by means of trth-connetivs. "By « formula of CLMQ we understand an atomic or a moleclar formula of CLMQ. "The axioms of CLMQ are the following four formals: BL Wher ~B~ A, BE. UA Byes VAL UB. Bs UAB Bh BAG ~A), “Theft xi cold a be oad and replaced by dnton fst cnn quien ene fh thr gti a west nos. ‘he thd oxen amount to an trampen tint Unie of Discourse cmp. We may ont in-rhih cur wget weed fave whi inden ft ental samen Te ay be ‘Rouge ht ho eet sro no para gel “he tnres of CMG wel oma we rely aioe x ever af he fllorng fo sono: “ihe fouled om a ttloy of CLP Dy abetting forte rats frmsae of CLMQ. 132." formaln ts cbtaiae fom an svom or theorem of CLO ty baiting fr some vr nome fra of CLE. ‘Ea Ty fran th conga n matron fr wiih ean aso or tha and whan tse an oom Gre chrom of lag ‘pd Te formu nbn om an axiom or hore of CLMQ by slutitating for some CLP-eusahish oro in some other Lastrma whieh iim CLP, prorat eqn to th fit Tr ne rl fo the eet thos the sae login of (wed) qunteaion bund athe malo of propntons. RE and eget rte Sr Seen th ie of Lagi rth Tp. 8 on sae mle for quan te nthe Ten of (On the Logie of Nagution ” ‘aro the usual rules of variable sibatision and of detachment (rads pone). 4 isto tho effect thet tautalgouly equivelent nance of ‘Properties are intersubattatable, ‘We now proceed to tho incorporation of strong negation within logic of monale quantification, Tho rytem thus originating we bal ell the Extended Logie of Monndic Quastifeation or ELMQ. "The symbols of ELMQ are the symbols of CLM and the symbol fr strong negstion +1 ‘Tevaly, ELP can be interpreted a «callus of properties istend of propositions ‘By an atomic forma of BLMQ wo understand «formula which i obtained by pofixing either sUs or +B» to formula of BLP. ‘By s molecular formula of ELMQ we understand formula which i formed of atomic formulae of EIQ by means of rath connectives andr the yo for strong negation +7, By a formule of BLMQ we understand an atomic or a moleelar Uae BWA. (2. BAU ~A. 03, UA & By UA a UB, (04, BA Byes BAY BB. 05. Ua Ba, 06. ~ BAR ~ A), ‘The incrnce in axioms as compared to CLM might be characteraed ‘by saying that BY of CLAMG or the axiom ofthe sintorefinabiity of the ‘quantifier ie eplt into the two axioms C7 and 02 of ELMO ac that, as ‘consequence ofthis, BY of CLAQ or the distribution axiom as to be pli neo the two exiome C2 and Od. Tn CLMQ the ditibativity of the ‘existential quantifier in regard o dixjunetion coud be deed from the Aistibutvity ofthe universal quantifier in rogerd to conjanction with the aid of tho sinterdofinabilitys axiom. In ELMQ the ditibution ‘rnaiple foreach quantifier has to be stated axiomatlaly- BS and 0 fre the same, So ae B4 and C5. ‘The theorems finally, of BLM areal the formulae which reursively tatinfy one or several of the following four condiions: ‘Rd The formal i obtainable from a theorem of ELP by mbetitting for Su vasiables formulae of BLMQ.2 0. en Weg _R2, ‘The forma is obtainable from ar axiom or a theorea of ELMQ ty subetititng for some verses init some formulae of ELP. 223. The ful the consequent i a rater lplcaion foe ‘hich tea an axiom or theorem and whose antecedent is an axiom, ra theorem of ELMQ 'R4. "Tho forma obtainable fom an axiom or theorem of EIMQ ty aubattting for sme ELP-ormula which onaurs in it some other ELPformuls which i, in ELP, provably oquvalent with the first. “RI ie a rule to tho fect that the extended logio of (mona) qunttication ie bated on th extended logo of propositions. 2 and 23 ste the ural rales of aabatittion and detachment RA ie to the effet ‘that name of properties, which aro provably equivlant in BLP, are Internat ‘The axiom CF eaye that everything has 8 ontsin property, i and nly if, it (positively) fle Uh something (or that there rise 8 ‘hing whieh) has not got this property. And the axiom C2 sys that fomathng (or tat there exits a thing which) has» certain property Ay, and only fe opoativey) flo that ain bas (or that everything haa nc) got thie property "There le © certain presiption to thik that If one takes sthings ‘unrestricted, it oould never happen tht (literally) eerthingpossaeed ‘certain property 4. There are no euch properties, one woul alo be inlined to ony. (On the other hand come undeniable that, even i one taka things ‘unvestrietedly, it may happen thet somthing and aio that nothing Doseemed a ertain property A. Suoh propatice there are, one wosld ‘wish to my. ‘The arymmetry which we heve noted here is worth discuming. It ‘howe light an the notion which we have of buing «property. ihn exemple fs property, which st poseesed by anything, woul ‘bescetanrs There are no cents (we belive). Thu tetra of every- ‘hing inthe wold that ie nots ountaar. Does this amount to sying that there isu mroperiyy which belong to everything? "Tho answer depends upon whether we wih to callat beings contaurs * property or not If we call t= property, and tale thing mresteetedly, we ehould have to ay, fer example, that Ii aproperto of that its ot » conten, ‘The things which ae not centaurs may be dlvided Into two groups, ‘sthings whic are no-centurs and things which are not eentaurs Bat (nthe Logie of Naguton 2 tho not notsentaus, Which things are to be called notcentanrs agin Aepends upon which genera are rognded ae appropriate to the predicate eentaur. Tet us assumo, fr the eake of argument that the. gone ‘imal is appropeate. Then all animale would be not-contars, and ‘nothings (elmals ad others) would be octane, And the moon inounts fo saying that al ings (animale and othes) are not conten ‘Now it sms to me tobe « plusble mggetion sbout these ofthe word mpropariys to ray that absence of & property in thing constitutes presence af aneputive property in that thing, if eheenoe means strong negation; but tht absnte of «property doesnot constitute preeence of a anegstive property, sf absence means weak hegation (ver absence) Thos, easing that adesthe name a property, #1 ds In alo the name of property, but »~ Avent, (Cf. above pnd 12) — 1f this eugestion Se adopted we ean sy tha, although al things eee in not being contour, the doesnot mean hat thay all won common ‘hacactevstio (property) sabomce of centsurhoods. ‘What as boon sid i, of course, not intended to deny truth to propositions of the form sUAs of our eaeulu, For ade may be 8 complex Involving the symbol». for weak negation The propotionseverything isnot a centanrs is of tho type sas. What we did was only to provide ‘roand for saying that not any tre proposition of the type lat must entered a maning that ll gn She wre «property ‘We consude thie suction withthe proofs of some theorems concern- Ing the motaal relations ofthe two quantifiers in RLMQ 0 UA ~ BWA, Bh» ~U WA. ‘These relations fellow fom O1 and O2 by virtue ofthe fat that trong negation entails weal negation. o UA ~ BTA, « BAW, Proof of (8): ‘We fist prove the lemma that, if the canjunetion of two properties ‘xt, then etch ofthe two propertioinividally exist Bld & 8)» Bd, ‘By virtue of CLP we have BA & B)-> E(4 & #) + B(d & ~ B), From ‘hin we obtain fin, by virtuo of C4, B(A & B)—» BA & By Ak ~B}, and secondly, by virtue of 24, Bid & 8)» BAPs 0. om Wet “By virtue of BLP we have 14.03"1A & ~ A. Thus, by virtue of B, swe ali have BT As BCT A & ~ A), By vst of CLP and the lemma ‘Thich we proved abore, we got ftom this BV A> B ~ A. rom (1) we ‘blain through oontreposion B~ A> ~ UA. Thus we also have B1A—+~Ud, Prom this we olfain throogh contrepanition UA» MHA or (0) QED. Tn a cloetlyanalogour mannor wo prove () "Thee noetallment relation between UA end 1/81, nor between BA and VOT. "Tn CLO the following variant ofthe Law of Bxshudd Middle holds UAH ~A. Tt sayy that any given property either belongs to all ‘things of there ison (ot lest one) thing to which the property in terion doesnot belong, Tee = pola of tia form of the nw that {Tennent dnfr a proposition of exience from the rejection of & ropition of wiser, should be noted that this variant ofthe Law of Bxcladod Mile in not valid ELMQ. Neither Udy B ~ nor UAB Aare theorems GEEIMQ, Bat TUA-+H ~ ia a thorem. Thus Som the falolaad ‘ofthe proposition that everything e A we may infor that ther x wome {hing whic not. The ference fom tho rejection of propoition of Universality toa proposition ofexiktono ith, onthoprneples of ELMO, jilted or not soonding ax the univers proposition is rjected on the {round thet ie (pole) fale, or onthe ground Uti i (merely) ot rue. ‘Beit obeorved, finally, that neither U(A v ~ A) noe (A ¥ ~ A) ao theorems of ELMQ, Thos neepting UA—> EA dos not, in BLMQ, ‘commit us to the view thatthe univers of things is not empty. 9. In this Section we shall be considering some interpretation of the scagiale andthe eatended logic of mons quantifietion. (CLA cat be interpreted asa madal lp, We conesive of, .. a8 ‘abs for propeitions, of Us a8 rpmbol for necelty, aad of «Be {sa symbol for pouty, In order to indicate the difference of inter- ‘rotation, wo may aguin te lower eae lettre, forth variable, {Sd replaoe the symbol Us hy aN and the symbol aBe by «lf. The ‘ondlion of theoremhood RI—24 remain unchanged, (In the frmula- ton of the rls, fr CLMQe ead instond wis system of mods! loi, sd for 90 oad 1.) ‘The apstem of modal lage which is thus iaomorphous with CLMQ (nthe Logis of Negation 5 ‘might bo called tho tlic logic of first order (or nonterated) modali- ‘ee Ite the ryrtm which Thave elowhere called the Syatem 21." Lis the comman sre of « multitude of alternative modal logics ray, asx group, bo ealled the sclandealssyatome of model logie™ {CLM cam als be Interpreted aa a deo lpi, je aw logo of the notions of obligation, permiion, and probibition™ We concaive of (4,B,--- 00 vaviable for (general characteristics of) acts, of Ue as & tyme for obligation, and of ws axa symbol for prmlslan. Ta order to fndiate the difference of Interpretation, wo may replace the eymol 10 by 1On and the nymbol als by Phe conditions of thecrembood [RI~BS ar the same as fn CLMQ, ‘Thurs are to ways of interpoting BLMQ as modal logic On Both interpretations we onesie of 4, B,-- 0 propastion variable, of w ‘is monning neces, and of of ae meaning posbliy. Tn the frat modal interpretation of ELMO, +s zemains untranslated, We then get a modal logio whith makes nan ‘of two nepatlons. Ta this ‘modal loge, the notions of neceuty, polity, and imposiility have {ocone another the lations which we Briefly dewribed atthe end of Section 7. Tn the cond modal interpretation of ELMQ, «Ts to is translate. Tt ‘is translated in the same way as in the modal interpretation of ELP, ‘is, by the combination of symbole #~ Af. We then get modal logic ‘th ly slates negation, but oe in which nevertheless the relations ‘between the nations neseasty,poeiilty, and impeasbilty i diferent fom what i i in the slenseaa modal systems. In thle new syste, the nosey of x proposition (Na) is eqalvant, not tothe impoesbiity ‘hat the negation of this proposition shoald be tae (~ 3 ~), but to the imponsity thatthe negation of the propaition should be (even) omible (~ MM ~a) andthe poasiblity of w proposition (Ma) is ‘Squlvalnt, nt tothe negation (ony) of the novelty of tho propostion’s ttgation ("~N ~a), but to tho negation (oven of the pasibilly ofthe ‘ecealy ofthe propeition’s nogation (~ AE ~ 2) T shall not here stop to conider in closer detail the alterative ynteme of toda lglo which atv interpretations of ELMQ, Wa Banyo Mal op pp 829. ease No Sn Mota Lene Zit i, 9 "Tia tarpon Inde a aioate von ofthe eater prevent ny paper DetesLagion Mind 60, 100 pled i Lape Sao 61 oo Wri [BLMQ can further be interpreted as dente lpi. We conosive of A,B,_s ts raricles for (gearel sharecterinton of) asta. Wo rope Gs by 10 orth sym froblgstion, and aBs by sP or the symbol for Permian. ‘The deontssyetam ha two negations, weak nd etrong. Te Ssioms are the flowing Tie formalae: OF, O41 P A On. Pav 10 ~ C8. O14 & B) 40d & OB. (8. Play Byes PAW PB. (08. 04->PA 06. ~ Pik ~ A ‘The conditions of theorembood RI—R¢ of HLM are transferred to ‘thi new dent loge "The ayrtam of dao loge ths sisomorphice vo ELAQ constitutes, fn my opinion, an intreting elteratie to the deonte log which sisomorphio to CLM, te character of the dont lope which ie un interpretation of the slic logo of menadie quantifttion that init the notions of ‘obligation, pertinson, aod prohibition ar interdefinable (withthe ad of ‘weak gation). A peeminon is hen regarded asthe abnence of certain ‘rotibition, and prohibition ne the abenes of «carta permission, "Ths vw ofthe mataalrlaion of tho basi deonti concept categories of norm may, however, be challenge. ‘One may argue that mes absence of © prohibition doesnot yet amount to. permison. And aaa tha meres absence of permission dows rot yet constitute prohibition ‘On tho bass of rach argurents one can make a alitinetion between swab and arong permission, and similaely betweon weat and song ‘reibition. "The ek norte const Inthe tere abeence of Uh conteary roms. The strong norma ypeitivelys state rules of ection ‘These distinction between the two kinds of prmission and prohibition can be expres in # deoatelogle which makes us of two kinds of ‘egation. Let ue serum that obligaton and prohibition are related a in theo deontis nate” The, if 90s eth rymbol fr obligation, 00 ~» ‘vil be the eymbol fr proibition. »P) lathe eymbel for permission. Bat +~ Ps ie not now, as in the old eystom, an alternative way of, STW nen prada Duet Lain 8 the Lapse of Newstin ” ‘eymboliing prohibition. The equivalent of 0 ~2is11 Ps. Noriss~O ~+ forthe symbol for abenao of probibition now, os in theoldayeem, eq taut to 42s or the symbol for Fermimlon. The equivalent of «Ps i {TO ~e. ‘hat an act le probiited meane that it in vpontivly> not [permitted snd not that itis omereye not permitted. And tht aa act Je permed means Uh te pontvelyy not prohibited and not that it 1a ymerlyy not prohibited. strongy or spdtivey permision and ‘prohibition may alo be called expla or sera, (But then it ehould ‘be noted thet © strong permission or prohibition can be a lice! fomwequence of some other nor and fv ts sen aald to bo simpli» sand ot expats) “Jas as one ean distinguith between sto be not As and mot to bo As ‘oe can inlay distinguish between st do not-dv and mat to do AB. or example: If isthe act of opening tho window, then todo A is to tive, as zeul of aston, that the window i open, to donot ls to thiove, through aston, that the window isnot open (i. lose), and not to do ls not to achieve thatthe window i open, eg. bewase i is ‘ready open, or besasee oe dose ot succeed in opening itor because fone does something ele which has nothing a all o do withthe window. els clear that closing the window entail not opening i, but not wie “Tau the distinction betwoon the two negations may be used in done logic to mati a ditintion letween nat fo do and fd nat. 00 As may ‘now be red a i obligatory to do not-Ae and oO ~ Av ny bo read i ‘obligatory not to do av. The later, but wa tho former, is equivalent to fit ts frbidden to-do. dx. Only deontic logic which obeerves Uht ‘itnation between sot to dos and sto do note can adequately expres ‘the reltion between th notin of obigtion andthe notin of preibitin. APPENDIX Remarks on Intuitonst Logi. "The theory of strong nogetion, which Ihave outlined in tls paper, ‘elated, both in some of te alms and i its formel features, tothe intuitionnt theory of negsion. ‘Comparioon between the two theoras of negation is made dificult by the fact that fntulionistTogie embodies init formalism only one* 2. en Wet ‘onoept of negation, Inuitionist writers wenn to admit that there is ‘ore then on kind of negation in wo in menningfl dieoure. Bat they ‘lao think, {FT understand thom ight, that there ie only one correct ose (of negation in mathematic. Tt is ofcourse, quite legitimate to construct « farmal sytem which ‘ontana nly intaMtonit negation, and no other. (Just as it would be Dmible to conruet« formalin which contains only strong negation in zy seme.) But each » formalin har severe drawbacks. Fist of all it tay make it eppear that It and CLP ae two competing or rival theories ‘Shout one and tho eame objet, negation. I scema to me tat thi is how Intuition writers have tended to view the matter. Whereas in fact the ‘theories teat of diferent objets, ez. tr conepts of negation, A second ‘ndventage i that formal eystem, which uses only a mnon-laleny ance of negation, i diffi to handle and wnperepeuove. Ana thirdly, {Wk aot outa that everyting which we may want to ey about rome ‘hain nopaton concept an be adequately expressed without che aid of eam negation. T would meintaln that any formalism, which mploye ony nonsaeial nogtion, will find i very hard t0 avoid ‘oauonal confusion between its concept of gation and negation in CLP. Ie onoept of negation therefore ie likely to be an unhappy hybrid fof laaealogation and. some concept which must be sharply Ainingaished fom it “ntitonet propositional ogi Tahal cll ILP and intuitions theory of mona qonnsfieeionT sall cll TLMQ* "Nogetion in TLP bas many formal propertie in coinmon with strong negation in ELP. For neithr eoneapt of negation isthe Law of Bxchuded Middle vad. Por both the Law of Contradition olde good. The de Morgan laws which are valid for Sntaltonist negation are, moreover, easly the. came. as. the de Morgan laws which are valid for Strong negation. (La. the only de Morgen. aw which does not bold in ‘ther ILP or ELP isthe formula ‘le & 8) Tav 10) "Bot thee are conspieuous diferences. In nlthr system doos the quivelence ae 1 Ta hld, but whereas LP eosepis a=» 112 but not Piece, BLP accopta Tara but not a> 11a Wie A Haring stor (Amster 16th, p18 1 Yor cca fn propel lpe and qeanitoton tery Soke phaa aks a vist en 80 ate ene ser (she Logi of Negation ” 1627, both n BLP and TEP, e translated as meaning impossibility, ‘one can deseribe the dtfrene by waving that ELP accept the principle f@-> MNo or that i's propaaton ia tre, then itis posibly necesary (Gee axiom Ad’ on p. 17), whereas ILP acepts the principle o> Nila tor that ss propolis ie true, then ite necesnily possible. Tho econ ‘ringple (or ite stongthening into « srot mplcatio) ie sometimes refered #0 under the name of Brouwer's Law. "Te was stedy (above p. 18) noted thet acceptance of the principle ‘Vea for strong negation in no way commits us to holing that NMa—>o(= a> Mia) 8 resonable formula for the modal notlons ‘of poniility and neonsty. Nor cont, T elev, bo said tobe a relevant batt of the intltionat program to maintain tat a> Va or that rat, entais neceeaary posible law of modal lope Te would therfore be ‘lta ft to try to devi batwoon the rival slain of KELP and ILP {theories of nogation by trying to decide (on Intltve or some other (rounds) which, I any, ofthe two prinipes of modality old good for the notions of poasbty and necesity. ‘My retsons for accepting T1a—>a bat not @-+ 11a were given ‘ove. (Sen Seetion 6 p. 14) Th intsitionin erature T have not bean abl to find any elaborate statement of reason, why a> should be scepled. Thue Heyting {nin work Intuition only mays that sis lene that rom pit flows ‘hat ponte that pis imposible, Relying merely on an sntltives notion of impossibility, Ifind thi to bo very far from cer. On th other ‘band it secre tome laut to eay that fom pit mst fellow Uti ie tol rue that pi impomtbe, and therefore als tat it snot tue tht {sfloe. "Thinking in terms of Ue two nagatons the weak and the song, ‘one ay etualy suspect «confusion here between the frmula (of BLP) n+ ~Taand a> 1] The iret anys that ifs proposition stun, then {bis aot flee. It ew theorm of ELP. By veto of i If we have proved (aay sntationiteally) © thee a, than we have also proved ~ Ta: “nor the proposition that the thesis fae, we may ala al the atitbis ‘of a, Thus we oan say tht proving a thesis entalsdeproving ite ant- thei, Tt mmy be asked: e thie no al that intsitonit logic elaime! fe ther i no disagrooment in olan. here between ILP and ELP. "The reasons, why intatoniam doesnot sacept tho formola 11 a—+a have to do with the fatuitlnist view of inverse root Trane.» 0. won Wet Disproving the antithala of given thesis need not yet amount t proving the thee, This fda isin areoment with tho priate of ELP, ese of refuting the antithos of given thos, wiz, ~'Ta and 11a, "The stronger refutation entails thatthe than has become etabliched. ‘The question may be aie, whothar thle entaliment i intitionistioally ‘valid Ta order to answer the question, we would first have to aasig rele meaning to the ditnetion between the wo kinds of nogation, ‘wn applied fo propositions about numbers. And this would fore us to ‘onder the conditions of appropriates ofthe various species (gener) ‘of number to given nuber theoreti predicates, (CL. above Beetion 5.) doce no stm tome unplauile to think Ut ono could distinguish Tetwoan wet and stony negation of propestions about numbers in a ‘manner which would ake the eoreloson from 11. to aintitonstinly ‘toeptale Ifthe gestion tered at to bo tuo, one could sy that the rejected formela Ta» a of ILP roaly covers so oe, which cannot ‘bedntngulhed in ILP boon ofthe poverty ote eymbaism, and that thee ae the cares which n ELP ae exprened by the formulae ~ Tara ‘nd Tle respectively, OF thom BLP rejete tho fist but accepts ‘he second ‘Between TLMQ and ELMO likewic there are conepeuous similariiee ‘nd dieenoe. In neither system in Ua v E'1 A wtheorer. On the other Ihibd UA-> TET A and EA—>1 01.4 are thoreme of TMQ but not (F ELMQ. Thinking in terms of the ro negations, the weak and the Sizong, it seoms pesable to suggest that the inbitionlets’ acceptsnce ff the formulae abosld be interpreted as moaning acceptance of Ans WB wa tod BA-+ 0 ~, which ore theorems of ELMO. nad March 1280 | 1