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    Andrew Robbins Et Al v. MCILS

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    Andrew Robbins Et Al v. MCILS

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    Andrew Robbins et al v. MCILS

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    Andrew Robbins et al v. MCILS

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    Andrew Robbins et al v. MCILS

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    51 views16 pages

    Andrew Robbins Et Al v. MCILS

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    Maine Trust For Local News
    Andrew Robbins et al v. MCILS

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    of 16
    STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. KENSC-CV-22-54 LEGAL SERVICES, etal, Defendants, ) ANDREW ROBBINS, etal. H Plainttts, ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS" v ) MOTION FOR LEAVE. TO. ) AMEND! MENT MAINE COMMISSION ON INDIGENT} THE COMPLAINT 3 ) ) Pending before the Court is Plaimiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend and Supplement the Complaint. Defendants oppose this request. For te following reasons, Plaintiffs" mation is granted in part and denied in pat. PROC! URAL HISTORY. (On March 1, 2022, Plaintifs filed a two-count Class Action Complaint for Injunetive and Declaratory Relief against the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services (*MCILS")’ and the agency's Executive Director and Commissioners. Count I of the initial complaint sought relief under 42 U.S C § 1983 for alleged violations of Class Members’ Sixth Amendment tights, asserting that Class Members were being denied thir right to counsel as a result of Defendants’ ‘ongoing failure to adequately supervise, administer, and fund indigent-defense services. Count I "The Court is aware thatthe agency has recently changed its name to the “Maine Commission on Public Defense Services.” The Cour, however, continues to refer to the agency 4s “MCILS," asthe Court has not received a motion fo rename the agency for purpases of this a ofthe initial complaint, which allege tht MCILS failed to adopt rules required by lw, was dismissed by order dated June 2, 2022. The Class was cetfied on July 13,2022. Discovery commenced and the paris thereafter engaged ina series of judicial setlement conferences and independent negtition sessions. At the request ofthe parties, this matter was temporarily stayed in March 2023 so the parties could focus on negotiating a settlement. Those negotiations resulted in two proposed Setlement Agreements for which the parties jointly asked ‘he Court wo preliminarily approve. See M.R. Civ. P.23(e. By order dated September 13, 2023, ‘he Cour declined to preliminarily approve the fest Proposed Settlement and identified various concems that prevented it fom doing so. Moreover, notwithstanding the partes attempt to adress some of those concers, the Cour likewise declined to approve the partes’ Amended Proposed Setlement forthe reasons detailed inthe Combined Order issued by the Court on February 27,2024. Of central eoncem to the Court was the Amended Setleet's failure to adequately address the shrinking roster of atomeys available to provide indigent egal services and the growing numberof unrepresented Class Members—a problem tht had emerged and/or ‘worsened since the time he inital Complaint was filed In addition to denying the panties request for preliminary stlement approval, the Court's Combined Order designated a Sublas, for case management purposes consisting of Class Members who remain unrepresented afte inital appearance or arraignment (minis any (Cass Members wo have waived thei ight to counsel), The Court furthermore directed thatthe classaction proceed in two phases: 1) in Phase 1, the Court wll adjudicate Federal and state claims and defenses regarding non-epresenation a they relate tothe Subclass above, and (2) in Phase 2, the Cour will adjudicate claims regarding the alleged systemic conditions and practices that pose an “unconstitutional risk" of deprivation of counsel, The Combined Order indicated ‘that “[mjotions may be fled to amend pleadings and add partes for Phase proceedings, identifying a March 8, 2024 deadline forthe filing of such motions, if any On March 8, 2024 Plaintiffs filed ther Motion for Leave to Amend and Supplement Complaint, shortly after which Defendants appealed the Court's February 27 Combined Order to the Law Court, The Law Court dismissed Defendants’ appeal as interlocutory by order dated May 1, 2024, Accordingly this mater has returned to this Cour, and a decision on PlinttTs™ Motion for Leave to Amend and Supplement the Complaint isin order. Count I ofthe proposed Amended Complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleges ‘thatthe originally named defendants—as well asthe State of Maine, the Attorney General, and the Governor—are violating Class Members’ Sixth Amendment rights in theee ways: (1) by failing to provide attomeys to the Subclass within a reasonable time after the right to counsel attaches and at all eritica stages ofthe proceedings; (2) by failing to develop and implement an effective system for appointment of counsel for indigent defendants; and (3) by administering the lawyerof the-day program in a manner that creates an unconstitutional rsk of ineffective ‘representation. Count Il brings claim under the Maine Civil Rights Act (°MCRA"), see S MARS. § 4682, against the same Defendant identified in Count I, asserting that Defendants have violated Class Members sights under Amiel 1, Setion 6 ofthe Maine Constitution inthe three ‘ways detailed above, Adstionaly, Plains seek rele inthe form ofa declaration that Defendants have denied Class Members the right to counsel unde the state and federal constitutions and in the form of an injunction requiring Defendants to provide Class Members with consiutonelly guaranteed counsel, inter aia In Count II ofthe proposed Amended Complaint, Plaitifs adda claim for a Petition for 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of the Subclass of unrepresented individuals. The Petition names as respondents the Sheriffs allegedly responsible for unlawfally restraining Subclass ‘members as well asthe State of Maine. Defendants oppose Plaintifs" proposed amendments ‘STANDARD OF REVIEW “Once a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend the pleading “by leave of cour,’ which ‘shall be teely given when justice so requires." Paul . Town of Liber, 2016 ME 173,49, 151 A.3d924 (quoting M.R. Civ. P.15(2). “A motion 1 amend may be denied based ‘none oF more of he following grounds: undue delay, bad faith unde prejudice, or futility of amendment.” Montgomery v. Baton Peabody, LLP, 2016 ME 48, §13, 135 A.34 106. “When a proposed amended complaint would be subject toa motion to dismiss the courts wel within its While 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the MCRA are distinct stautory regimes, the MCRA was ‘modeled after § 1983, and courts have therefore interpreted them coextensively. See Jenness, 637 A.2d at 1158 (explaining that “[tJhe MCRA was pattemed after 42 U.S.C. § 1983" (quotation ‘marks omitted); stare of Bennet. Waimuright, 48 F.3d 155, 178-79 (Ist Cir 2008) (“T]he protections provided by the Maine Civil Rights Act, including immunities, are coextensive with those afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") ‘Amended Complain—an action may be maintained aginst state agency independent of § 10985 and the MCRA. See NECEC Transmission LLC v. Bureau of Parks & Lands, 2022 ME 48, $3,281 A.34 618, as revised (Sept 8, 2022) (enertaning action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Maine Buresu of Parks and Lands, among others, where the plaintiffs alleged that retroactive application ofa cizen initiative was unconstitutional; see alsa Parker v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2024 ME 22, $4, —A.34— (concluding that it was error for Superior Court to dismiss complaint fo declaratory judgment aginst the Maine Department ‘of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife where painiffs brought justine lam seeking a declaration ‘hat Maine's Sunday hunting ban was unconstitutional). Aecordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs may pursue a claim broveht under Maine's Declaratory Judgment Act, and tha they ‘may seek declaratory and injunctive reli against MCILS for constitutional violations if proven. 11s less clear, however, whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity would foreclose such an aston against te State of Mane itself. ludge Duddy recently commented on this lack of elarity in NECEC Transmission LLC v. Bureau of Parks & Lands, observing that although the Law Court has yet to recognize an exception to soversign immunity tha allows fr suit against, Maine's constitutionally derived branches of government, 1 action seeking declaratory judge regarding constitutional” may “muddy the availability ofthe sovereign immunity defense”—partiulaly in cases where “judicial review fof State action). is} integral to the constitutional framework " No. BCD-CIV.2021-00058, 2021 WL 6125325, at *8n. 15 (Me B.CD, Dec. 16, 2021) (citing out-of-state decisions and opining that sovereign immunity may not be available in eases where “judicial review [of State ation}... intepal othe consiuionl framework”), Any claim of sovereign immunity by the Sate of Maine may accordingly be in question here, a it would seem well settled tha the State itself is constitutionally vested with an affirmative obligation to furnish counsel to indigent criminal defendants, See Gideon v. Waimeright, 372 US. 335, 342-43 (1963); Stae v. Watson, 2006 ME 80,4114, 900 A.2d 702 (“For those who cannot afford counsel, the constitutional right imposes an affirmative obligation on the State to provide court-appointed counsel ifthe defendant faces incarceration”). ‘The Court, however, declines to conclusively resolve this issue in this Order, as it is ‘mindful of the posture in which the question presents: on a motion to amend the pleadings. Thus, in view of Maine's “liberal policy towards motions to amend” and in the absence of a convincing showing that an amendment adding the State of Maine would be plainly futile, the Court will allow the addition ofthe State of Maine as a party if Plaintiffs pursue a claim for declaratory judgment secking injunctive relief Jones v Suhre, 345 A.2d 515, $18 n.5 (Me. 1975) To be clear, however the State, just like MCILS, cannot be added as a Defendant in Counts I and I ofthe proposed Amended Complaint as drafted. However, given the liberal standard of notice pleading in Maine State cours, and because the Amended Complaint does provide notice to MCILS and to the State that they ae seeking declaratory and injunctive relie based on alleged constitutional violations, they ean both be treated as defendants for purposes of 1 cause of action under Maine's Declaratory Judgment Act and will be permitted to ask for declaratory and injunctive relief apart from Counts I and Il, if any constitutional violations can be proven at trial 2. Governor Janet Mills Defendants furthermore contend that amending the Complaint would be futile to the extent it seeks to add Governor Janet Mills as a defendant, Defendants advance several arguments s to why this is s, among them, that the injunctive elif sought i unavailable pursuant to Kelly»: Curtis, 287 A.2d 426 (Me. 1972) In Kely—which considered whether the judicial branch could issue a wet of mandamus gaint the Governor—the Law Court framed th issue as follows: “When the conduct of the Governor isin question... the isue is whether our governmental system, constitutionally surtured to create thre separate and co-ordinate branches exercising sovereign power, contemplates thatthe Governor of the State, insofar ashe performs, ori required to perform, cs ins oficial capacity asthe Chief Executive, may be ordered to act bythe judicial branch {through mandamus or equivalent judicial process." dat 429, fn answering this question, the [Law Court explained that “(t]he Governor's immunity fom judicial coercion by cout order in the performance of his offical duties, ministerial or eiseretionary, has never been questioned in this State..." fd “On the contery, the principle that one co-ordinate branch of government ‘must reftin from ordering another branch to perform its oficial dy has been re-aimed” a ‘Thus, under the Court's reading of Kelly, the Governor, asthe Chef Executive, is accorded special eatment under Maine law and cannot be ordered to act though an injunction or other judicial process issued by the Court Accordingly, the Court coneludes tha the injunctive relief sought by Plants is nt available against the Governor, Moreover, the Court finds that complete reli may be afforded without the addition ofthe Governor asa pay. The Court therefore denies Plains’ Motion to Amend to the extent is seks to add Governor Mills asa defends in this action 3. Attorney General Aaron Frey Defendants nex asset that it would be futile to permit the addition ofthe Attorney General as a party because he isnot responsible for appointing counsel and beeause Plaintifs alleged harm was neither caused by the Attorey General nor isthe harm capable of being redressed by him As noted, a state officer acting in his oficial capacity may be subject o suit in an ation for prospective injunctive rele. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156-60; see also Wil, 491 US. at 71 5.10; Hyman, 625 A.24 at 310-11, Personal ation by a defendant individually is not = necessary contin of injunctive reli against state officers in heir official capacity. Luckey v. Harri, 860 F.24 1012, 10S (11th Cie. 1988), Rather, its suicient that he state office, “by ‘stu of is office, have] some connection” withthe allegedly unconstitutional conduct. ‘Be Parte Young, 209 US. st 137. “[W]hether [this connection) arses oxt of general law ois specially created by the act itself, snot material so long asi exists” Moreover, the Law Court has explained that a “proper party defendant i any office, office, department agency, authority, commission, bord, o institution against whom the plaintiff has alleged aright to final roliof" Me, Stote Emp Ass'n SEIU Local 1989 v. Dep't of Corr, 682 A.2d 686, 689 (Me. 1996), Forinstanc, a state entity of official is properly named as a defendant when the party “maybe charged with providing part ofthe relief sought... or with insuring [another actors) compliance with any judgment.” Under these standards, the Court will permit amendment of the Complaint to add the ‘Attomey General as «pany, subject ofcourse to any motion to dismiss thatthe Attomey General ‘may file trough separate counsel or otherwise. Plaintiffs inthis case seek an injunction requiring continuous representation of counsel to all members ofthe Subelass within 48 hours of initial appearance as well as other equitable reli, including release from custody andlor dismissal of charges. The Attorney General, by virtue oF his office, has some connection to the unconstitutional conduct complained of and the relief sought, See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. Indeed, the Law Court has desribed the Attomey General's role as follows: ‘The Attomey Genera, inthis State, i @ constitutional officer endowed with common law powers. See, Constitution of Maine, Article IX, Section 11. As the chief law officer of the State, he may, inthe absence of some express legislative restriction to the contrary, exercise all such power and authority as publi interests ‘ay, from time to time require, and may institute, conduct, and maintain all such actions and proceedings as he deems necessary forthe enforcement ofthe laws of the State, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights ‘Superintendent of Ins. . Attorney Gen, $58 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Me. 1989) (emphasis in original) Moreover, by statue, the “Attorney General may, in the Atorney General's disreton, actin place of or with he district attorneys o any of them, in instituting and conducting prosecutions for crime..." $ M.RS. § 199, He is also vested with “il esponsibility forthe direction and contol ofall investigation and prosecution oF homicides and such other major crimes a the Attomey General may deem necessary forthe peace and good order ofthe State of Maine.” $ M.R.S, § 200-A, Thus in light of the Attorney General's authority to control prosecutions and his “responsibilty to act inthe best iteress ofthe people of Maine,” see Opinion ofthe Justices, 2015 ME 27, §22, 112 A.34 926, the Court concludes—at least at this preliminary stage—that the Attorney General “may be charged with providing part of the relief Sought” or with insuring “compliance with any judgment.” SEIU Local 1989, 682 A.2 at 689, 4. MCRA (Count It) Defendant arpue that Plains’ claim under the MCRA would be subject to a motion to

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