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From The Ashes of Unjustifiability
From The Ashes of Unjustifiability
FROM
THE
ASHES
OF
UNJUSTIFIABILITY
On
the
inadequacy
of
the
answers
to
the
epistemic
regress
argument
PATRICK
SHANNON
PHIL
215
DR.
JENNA
WOODROW
OCTOBER
20,
2008
FROM
THE
ASHES
OF
UNJUSTIFIABILITY
1
While the student of epistemology is presented with a veritable wilderness of
unanswered philosophical questions, perhaps the most tantalizing challenge is the
search for knowledge liberated from the jaws of doubt. For this reason, the
traditionally accepted definition of knowledge requires the indubitable justification
of a true belief. This understanding of knowledge, and the subsequent inquiry into
what constitutes incontrovertible justification, has given rise to a vicious epistemic
regress. While a number of theories have presented convincing arguments for the
existence of conclusively justified belief, a closer examination will reveal that none
provides an adequate solution to the regress problem. As a result, the
understanding of knowledge long touted as both necessary and sufficient must be
rejected, and alternatives must be considered.
account of the epistemic regress argument. The justification of an empirical belief
requires that it be inferred from justified premises. If these justificatory beliefs must
appeal to further premises for justification, then it follows that any attempt to justify
a knowledge claim results in an “infinite and apparently vicious regress of
justification”(184). Bonjour suggests four prima facie outcomes of this regress:
Infinite regression, the appeal to ultimately unjustifiable beliefs, the discovery of
non‐inferentially justified beliefs, or the adoption of a non‐linear system of
coherently justified belief. The first two outcomes generate scepticism. The latter
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two, Foundationalism and Coherentism, respectively, present possible solutions to
the regress problem. 1
traditionally accepted linear order of justification, it is ostensibly the most viable
solution. The Foundationalist argues that a basic belief, or a coherent system of
be…indubitable”(Bonjour 185). Bonjour criticises this position by pointing out that
the philosopher, as a lover of wisdom, has a responsibility to accept only those
propositions that are highly likely to be true. Excepting the possibility of innate
knowledge, “no account seems to be available of how an empirical belief can be
genuinely justified in an epistemic sense” without referencing further premises
(193). To accept any such belief, particularly a foundational belief, for the sake of
comfort and convenience neglects the pursuit of wisdom. Knowledge built upon
poorly laid foundations will undoubtedly crumble beneath its own weight, no
matter how ornate and appealing its construction. It follows that while
Foundationalism presents a tempting escape from the maw of epistemic regress, it
does not constitute an acceptable solution.2
In light of Foundationalism’s inadequacy, Bonjour suggests that “the natural
direction to look for an answer is to the coherence theory”(193). The Coherentist
abandons a linear order of reasoning, and replaces it with a “holistic conception of
justification” characterised by a system of beliefs that mutually justify each other
1 I first discuss the regress problem in my Reading Summary of Bonjour’s essay.
2 Once again, I refer the reader to my reading summary of Bonjour’s critique for a
more detailed account of foundationalism’s failure to solve the epistemic regress.
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through their coherence to one another (Fumerton 216). In his “Critique of
Coherent theory of justification, and points out its fundamental flaws. The most
evident difficulty is that “no concept of coherence so far has ruled out the possibility
flaw in coherentism leads to a subjective understanding of justification and
relativism about truth. For example, those who advance the creationist view of
humankind’s origins support their argument by means of an internally coherent set
of beliefs drawn from a literal interpretation of the book of Genesis. When the
conclusions of scientific research are inconsistent with these beliefs, creationists
have rejected them outright. If the traditional definition of knowledge is to be
upheld, it must be justified according to a correspondence theory of truth;
Coherentism seems ill suited to this pursuit.
Furthermore, Coherentism is still subject to epistemic regress. According to
internalism, “It is not enough that…beliefs actually do cohere…[we] must be aware
of that coherence”(217). This awareness would require a metabelief justifying the
coherence of each individual belief within its system. This metabelief, however,
would have to appeal to its own coherent system, whose justifiedness would then be
called into question. While Bonjour suggests a “doxastic presumption” that “[our]
beliefs about what [we] believe are correct”, this presumption constitutes an
unjustified belief (218). Consequently, the Coherent theory of justification cannot
defend the traditional understanding of knowledge from epistemic regress.
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While I have shown that both Foundationalism and Coherentism are wholly
inadequate in the face of epistemic regress, there exists an alternative that offers a
powerful argument for traditional knowledge: Externalism. As I mention in my
reading summary, the externalist argues that the justification of our beliefs does not
have to fall within our reflective purview. A knowledge claim is justified if it is true
and “the natural relation…between the believer and the world” makes the belief
highly likely to be true (Bonjour 187). The crudest variants of externalism apply
themselves to Foundationalism by waiving the need to justify basic beliefs, and to
Coherentism by waiving the need to justify coherence. Both of these theories simply
remove the requirement for justification when convenient, and do not constitute
epistemically responsible solutions to regress. There exist, however, two promising
forms of externalism, Givenness and Reliabilism, which merit closer examination.
The Givennist asserts that certain beliefs are “immediately apprehended” by
the subject, and do not appeal to further premises. While this solution may succeed
in abandoning the need for inferential justification, its inability to justify the
Givenness from acting as an epistemic foundation for further knowledge. No matter
how immediate an apprehension, Cogito Ergo Sum is an impoverished island of
knowledge in a trackless ocean of scepticism.
Reliabilism, an externalist theory advanced by Alvin Goldman, maintains that
a belief is justified if it is caused by “a reliable cognitive process” that “generally
produces beliefs that are true”(267‐268). According to Goldman, we needn’t have
access to the causal mechanism itself, as long as we are able to determine that it
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produces true beliefs. While Goldman’s reliabilism is likely to generate well‐
founded beliefs, it simply cannot conform to the standards of the traditional
definition of knowledge. As Keith Lehrer puts it in his “Critique of Externalism”,
Reliabilism can only “provide accounts of the possession of information rather than
of the attainment of knowledge”(279). If we lack access to our justificatory
mechanisms, we cannot really know that they produce veridical beliefs. It follows
that we will never know if reliabilism halts epistemic regress, or which beliefs it
saves from scepticism. Since the original definition of knowledge seeks to guide the
subject to indubitable knowledge, externalism can provide little comfort.
Thus far, I have shown that none of the numerous theories that have
proposed methods of justification have adequately defended knowledge from the
scepticism of the epistemic regress problem. While the human imagination could
certainly generate innumerable further attempts at justification, perhaps it must be
accepted that knowledge as we understand it cannot be justified beyond doubt. Otto
Von Neurath approached the idea of knowledge through the following analogy: “We
are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being
able to dismantle it in dry dock and reconstruct it from the best
components”(Cartwright 89). In other words, there is no viewpoint external to the
human mind. If we are to understand the vast ocean of sense data presented to us at
each moment, we must do so from within the limitations of human perception, with
the tools available to us. While we may certainly doubt the veridicality of our mind’s
instruments, their justification lies outside the parameters of our understanding.
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Consequently, we must construct a definition of knowledge that respects the
limitations of the human consciousness.
A number of alternative theories of knowledge have presented themselves as
possible candidates. For example, in his essay, “Why Not Skepticism”, Lehrer
defends scepticism as a viable outcome of epistemic regress. He states that the
numerous theories of justification produced by the current theory of knowledge are
nothing more than dogma, and holds that the proponents of those theories have
maltreated scepticism. Lehrer argues that “the sceptic is not deprived of those
practical beliefs necessary to carrying on the business of practical affairs”, but
merely operates with an awareness that his or her beliefs are ultimately
unjustifiable (62). This view is, however, extremely radical. A more comfortable
alternative might be to relax the requirements for justification. While Externalist
theories, particularly Goldman’s Reliabilism, do not conform to the traditional
theory of knowledge, the reality they describe is not unlike Neurath’s analogy. If our
belief forming mechanisms are our “ship”, then their justification is external to our
consciousness. If this is the case, it is possible that an externalist theory of
knowledge may be inescapable. Lastly, the philosopher may adopt a naturalized
theory of epistemology, settling for a scientific study of the causal nature of our
belief forming mechanisms and abandoning altogether the pursuit of justification.
Willard Van Orman Quine asserts that epistemology, if it is to continue in an age of
scientific inquiry, must borrow heavily from the work of “cognitive scientists,
environment” (O’Brien 127).
It is clear that numerous alternatives may be called upon to replace the
antiquated and regress‐plagued understanding of knowledge long held by classical
epistemology. Despite their diversity, these theories share an acceptance of the
parameters of human consciousness, a willingness to adapt to the discoveries of
scientific research, and, most importantly, a similarity to one of the first works of
western philosophy. According to Plato’s “Apology”, Socrates affirms, “he, O men, is
the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing”(18).
Perhaps surrender to our limitations is not a defeat, but a return to the wisdom of
philosophy’s father.
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Works
Cited
Bonjour, Laurence. “A Critique of Foundationalism.” The Theory of Knowledge:
Classical and Contemporary Readings 3rd Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003.
Cartwright, Nancy, et al. Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Fumerton, Richard. “A Critique of Coherentism.” The Theory of Knowledge: Classical
and Contemporary Readings 3rd Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2003.
Goldman, Alvin. “Reliabilism: What Is Justified Belief?” The Theory of Knowledge:
Classical and Contemporary Readings 3rd Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003.
Lehrer, Keith. “Critique of Externalism.” The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and
Contemporary Readings 3rd Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2003.
Lehrer, Keith. “Why Not Skepticism?” The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and
Contemporary Readings 3rd Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2003.
O’Brien, Dan. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Polity Press,
2006.
Plato. “Apology.” Ten Great Works of Philosophy. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. New York:
New American Library, 1969.
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Shannon, Patrick. Reading Response: Laurence Bonjour’s “Critique of
Edmonton.