Wealth, Debt, and Luck: Forms of Belief in Thailands Global Economy.

Mike Hayes Office of Human Rights Studies, Mahidol University In the long history of the research on the poor in Thailand and Asia in general, much work has been done on the curse of debt and the evils of rent seeking behavior by certain classes and organizations. Though much of the analysis is done through more mainstream economic theories which examine issues of rational choice, saving and consumer behavior, and the relationship between work, capital, and economic security, there is less interest in what has been called, in different ways, irrational economic choices, beliefs in economic luck, or to use a recently coined academic term occult economies. This paper seeks to contribute to these ideas though a general discussion of the belief structures and social structures around the relationship of luck to economic wealth in Thailand, and specifically looking at the underground lottery. As most Thais, and even most visitors to Thailand realize, it is a country extremely interested in the lottery. Similar to Burma, and to a lesser extent Cambodia, Thailands bi-monthly lottery is followed by a large (but uncountable) number of people. How the lottery is played in Thailand, Cambodia and Burma are simply matters of luck, picking the correct numbers.1 I will argue that the reason Thailand is a lottery country is multidimensional: the socio-economic system makes economic mobility difficult and winning money a logical alternative, a flexible religious belief allows for commercialization, a compliant (and at times complicit) political system allows for an underground lottery system. All these factors are invigorated by the impact of globalization, and in fact can be seen as products of a globalizing Thailand. One of the main assumptions of this paper is that there exists an increasing number of people bringing spiritual understandings to capitalism. Quite the opposite of what we assume is the dissemination of rationalism though global products, many people particularly on the fringes of capitalism are integrating into a system of rational capital, but are engaging in the new economy more profoundly in a way that is belief based. By spiritual capitalism here, I mean the use of belief, spirits, fatalism, Karma and so on, to understand, interact, and practice economic behaviors. A claim such as this can only ever be a qualitative guess, for there is no clear way to measure or rate the way people engage in economic behavior or understand their economic activity. However, I follow the work of anthropologists such as John and Jean Comoroff (1999; 2000), who in their work on occult economies and millennial capitalism highlight an increasing fascination with these economies. Similarly, the work of Alan Klima (2006), argues that a result of the 1997 global financial crisis was the refiguring of local outside the system economies not to eradicate but to incorporate activities such as supernatural forecasting. The resulting development was the emergence of a sense of a continuation between global speculative capital and local level prophecy of the lottery number. Most mainstream globalization theory assumes that the spread of global capital, with its rationalist systems most clearly highlighted in the global production of McDonalds
1

Burma does not have an official lottery system. However, Burmese migrants regularly play the Thai lottery, and within the country there are underground lotteries based on the Thai lottery. Further, there is also a lottery which gambles on the last two digits of the Stock market daily index. The numbers, after the decimal point can almost be considered random. Further, these numbers are issued twice a day meaning there is a lot more opportunity for gambling than the bi-monthly lottery.

(and George Ritzers work is most relevant here (Ritzer 1993, Ritzer 1998). In contrast the recent work Pradip Thomas is relevant. His paper, which is more about products than practices, makes two valid points. Firstly, there is little research which serious looks at how religion is figured in the global economy: he argues there is an equally compelling need for explorations of the political economy of religious products and production, the circulation and distribution of religious products, [and] the religious commodity market, (Thomas 60). It seems that religion, spirituality and belief in luck are too quickly deemed traditional or parochial, and therefore are not allowed to function rationally in the global system. Secondly, the increasingly close relationship between mediated Christianity and the commodity form facilitates the extension of specific, conservative, forms of values-based capitalism (Thomas 60). That is, in relationship to this paper, forms of belief and luck around the lottery is not an escape for capitalism, but an extension, or a form of alternative understanding of capitalism for those who cannot operate rationally in the legitimate State-based system. While Pradit argues the spiritual economy fits more closely into conservative Christian values, within the religious beliefs Thailand and its region, there acceptance is more mainstream. We can understand the commoditization of belief, with many Christian, Buddhist, and other religious becoming increasingly commercialized;2 but as yet there is little understanding on how spiritual systems of belief, operating outside their regular religious frameworks, as practiced in society. Undoubtedly the global production networks which lead to Toyotaism structures of manufacturing, or the control of the international financial institutions which unifies state economies into broadly neo-liberal, export orientated, and privatized systems has had a massive social impact and does spell the emergence of a new period of economic, social, and cultural practice. 3 Yet, these views are more about what is happening at the centre of global capital, and not its fringes. In city centres, and perhaps Bangkok is a better example than most cities, McDonalds, Starbucks, Korean hair styles, huge shopping malls, and conspicuous wealth are a clear testament to the impact of global capital. But one does not have to scratch far below this surface to see that not all global capital is so rationalist in its ideology, or that capital is so free flowing in its transitions. The most obvious question is, why do people resort to the spiritual when engaging in what is supposed to be a rational system? Should not the developing economy lift them up, like boats on the water as the tide comes in? (to use a frequently quoted metaphor from neo-liberal economists). From within the economy itself it would seem that embracing rationalism would give the best benefit to those on the fringes. I would like to explore these issues by using as an illustrative example the land rights battles
There has been much work on this, but for Thailand in particular see Jackson (1999a, 1999b, 2003), Pattana (2005a, 2005b) 3 Here I mean the out sourced, and dispersed production of components for a product, so that the modern Toyota is manufactured in perhaps 40 countries, or the Nike shoe is not made by Nike company. This form of manufacturing is written at length by Manuel Castells who talks of Toyotaism in his first volume The information age (Castells 1996). For a more economic viewpoint see Gereffi 2005.
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in northern Thailand. Currently there are a number of civil society groups and NGOs working for farmers groups to repossess land that has been taken by banks and other finance organizations.4 This is a frequent occurrence because farmers take out a loan by using their land as collateral, and then fall into debt. The land can then be taken by the Bank or money lender, and frequently then left unused, much to the disappointment of any farmers who do not have enough land themselves for raising crops. It is an irrational system for which the farmers wish to insert a more rational and efficient system of use. Farming can be a high risk business with much of the income depending on weather and crop prices; two rather uncontrollable variables. Further, events such as ill health, bad decisions, and family troubles can quite easily place a farmer or market vendor in debt very quickly. However, when visiting and talking to these groups about their need to reclaim the land, we are not talking about people who are attempting to lift themselves out of poverty. As one commentator has noted, the land movements demonstrates a battle to enter the middle class, not to escape poverty or ensure basic livelihood.5 The farmers wanted to use the land to increase their earning so they could exchange their motorbike for a car; or to ensure their kids which are currently in high school will finish and may go to technical colleges or university; or to extend their house with an extra floor or outbuilding. We are not talking about a poverty movement here, but a class mobility one. A couple of points should be made about this understanding. Firstly, that these movements are using the discourse of rational capital to explain their actions to take over and use the unused land. The battle is not about rationalizing a traditional rural people, but of economic structures which will not allow people access to a rational economic system. It would seem quite logical and economically beneficial for all parties for these people to use the land. But the Banks are concerned that land use will transfer into land ownership; they also dont have procedures to rent land (Banks are not real estate agents); and further, as we can see in Bangkok on nearly every city block, the mentality of land owners is more why develop a piece of land when you can sit on its value without any cost (given that there is no land tax) and wait until the prices are much higher and selling is going to make more money. Simply, the rules favour the landowning rich. A rational economic system does not mean a social system which allows class mobility. The second point about battles to enter the middle class is that we are not talking only about an unsympathetic economic system. We are also talking about other global discourses like democracy and human rights being unusable in these situations. I want to briefly address some human rights issues here because this does demonstrate that spiritual economies are resorted to not because people only believe in spiritualism alone, but rather there is sometimes little other choice for economic mobility. From a human rights perspective, peoples economic rights are covered primarily in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Without going into detail about specific economic rights, one question is if economic rights ensures that someone will be able to send their children to university or trade up from a motorbike to a car? Simply, this cannot be assured through human rights. Rather human rights
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Examples of these organizations include the Northern Farmers Network. Pers. Comm. Shihab Abid. 2006.This conversation I had with a Bangladeshi development worker has stayed with me for some time because it clearly shows that many development battles within Thailand are an entirely distinct form of development from those occurring in Bangladesh. However, these comments may not relate to movements such as the assembly of the poor, because these organizations are very much grounded in livelihood rights

tends to look the other way, rights are meant to stop people from falling too far by making State obligated to ensure social security and government services are available and delivered in a non discriminatory way. Further, in terms of peoples livelihood, it is only ones basic necessities which are guaranteed; the governments duty is to ensure non-regression - that is, people should not lose their rights or access to something if they already have it. So demands for economic development strictly cannot be campaigned though claims to ones human rights,6 but rather must be done through engaging in economic and social discourses of national development. The claims made so far in this paper may be overly broad. Arguing a social system is unsympathetic to mobility and this causes peoples interest in alternative discourses of wealth and development is difficult to prove and perhaps too much of a generalization. However, there can be no denying that socially and economically Thailand is a deeply divided country. Its GINI co-efficient of 42, which is standard from the region (Singapore is also 42, and Malaysia is 49 for example), but this is higher than USA and nearly all western European States.7 In terms of economic development, the fact that Thailand has around 1.8 million SMEs, and this makes up somewhere between 96-99% of all enterprises, does say something about the inability to convert these SMEs into something bigger.8 It also says that the economic structure supports enterprises but not development or transition. Finally, the class positions are perhaps most clearly displayed in the yellow and red shirt movements which, though it is a simplification to call this a class battle it is not inaccurate. While there are many societies like this where class division are the norm and not the exception, the focus on this paper is not on justifying or critiquing this division. What I want to argue is that the division itself invigorates a spiritualism of capitalism. The chance of people increasing their wealth and social standing through hard work and economic development are difficult at best, and impossible for most. What easier way to increase wealth than spiritually, through picking the correct numbers in the lottery, or having a gambling win. Before I discuss how the lottery works, and the belief systems around this, I want to sketch the life of the urban working class and propose some reasons why, for them, economic development through a rational economy is impossible. One of the signs of Thailands globalization and developments in the post 1997 crisis era is the sprouting of the Big C, Tesco, and Carre Fore supercentres. These supercentres number in the hundreds in Bangkok (and are less prevalent in rural Thailand), are very much a product of the 97 crisis. Part of the IMF structural adjustment rescue package with Thailand was to open up the markets to transnational companies in a range of areas including supermarkets. The debates on these supercentres has been heated. There are claims that they cause the disappearance of the family corner shop, and that they threaten culture.9 Yet, they are also a significant employers of semi-skilled workers as
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There is a much larger argument here about the right to development, and rights in development which I will not enter. My basic point here is that for farmers or workers who want to guarantee a better standard of living, this will be difficult, and more likely impossible, to ensure through standards from Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 7 The GINI figures are taken from the 2007-8 Human Development Report, UNDP, 2008. 8 See Department of Industrial Promotion of Thailand (n.d.). Also Nattapon (2006). 9 This debate displays an underlying politics. It is very strange why 7-11s, which clearly directly compete with the family shops, are not criticized. The 7-11s are Thai owned, and supercentres are mainly foreign owned. Further, the fact that most family corner shops buy their supplies from the supercentres shows that rather than competing, the supercentres are assisting the family corner shops.

well. Most supermarkets will employ people who have finished year 10 high school, and more commonly only people who have completed their 12 year education. An average worker in one of these supermarkets, such as a cash register or aisle packer, would be getting paid about 6,000 baht a month for a 54 hour week.10 After 3-4 years their salary would raise to about 8-10,000 baht. The highest level for the average high school trained worker would be as a section manager, who could get as high as 15,000 (a manager would be between 30-40,000, but a degree would be needed for this). For someone who has not worked at the supermarket for long, given their rent costs in Bangkok (lets say about 2,000 baht/month), they are looking at surviving on about 130 baht a day for all other costs. It does not take much to see how someone in this position of 130 baht a day can get into financial trouble easily. A motorbike crash, and expensive phone bill, a sickness or pregnancy can easily leave someone with a debt. While smaller debts of 1-3,000 Baht are more likely to be carried by friend and family, if a worker needs to find an extra 5,000-10,000 they commonly need to seek finance elsewhere. This is where the real financial trouble can begin not with the initial problem, but with the lack of access to credit. The credit market has expanded dramatically in Thailand in the past decade, with banks being able to give credit cards based on money saved in a bank account (and not wages), or with credit agencies like Aoen who can offer small loans to people who cannot get bank loans. Even though Aoen interest rates are high at around 20-30%, these rates are small compared to the rates charged by money lenders. A person who borrows 5,000 baht from a money lender, the rate is generally charged by the month. A low rate is about 10% a month (normally expressed as 10 baht per 100 borrowed), and this is the minimum payment. An average rate would be about 15%, and rates can get as high as 30 baht per hundred for people who are seen as a risk, or if there are no other lenders available. However, the most likely rate for a Big C worker would be about 15 Bath per hundred. If a worker needed take out a 5,000 Baht loan, they would be paying in interest alone 750 baht a month, and this would mean a drop in monthly earning of the worker, after taking out fixed costs, of about 20%. More critically, this cost never reduces because the principle is not paid off. What can happen is that after a set period (normally six months or a year) when the principle is due, the person would then have to transfer the debt to another lender, likely at higher rates, unless they can pay off the debt. This cycle would continue because the higher the interest rate, the less likely one is able to pay the debt until they are forced to flee from the lenders, or talk a friend or family member into covering their debts. It is easy to see how, in these situations, a small 5,000 baht debt can blow out into a 20,000 Baht or larger debt in a year, and people may pay five to ten times their original loan back. This practice of money lending is widespread. Again, looking at a supercentre, it would not be unusual to have 3-4 staff who lend to other staff. There are guarantees or deposits, normally at ATM cards and PIN numbers so the lender can take out their money first when the monthly salary arrives, but it can also be motorbikes, watches, or phones, depending on the loan size. At the shop floor level the money lending is imperfect, but enables these people to meet their basic financial commitments. Some of these lenders may get rich and be able to leave their job and start their own small business, but also an equal number of the lenders would find
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These are general figures given to me from interviews with people who work at Big C. Starting salaries vary, but around 5,700 Baht a month is average. There are more details to the pay including overtime, which most people get, but this does not increase monthly salaries by much more than 1,500 month.

themselves in debt as they would get bad loans from people fleeing their debt or simply unable to pay. Where this economy gets dark, is in the more aggressive and commercial areas of loans. These loans are normally for small or semi legal businesses for people who cannot get access to other loans. The loans may be charged at a rate of 5% a day (and think this means an annual rate of around 1,800%), or more commonly 40-60% but still paid back daily. The loans are enforced through threats and violence. It is generally seen that these loans come from people of influence (ittipon), as the financial structure can lead up like a pyramid payment to a senior figure, who likely has the silent complicit support of the authorities, and is most likely permitted through corruption. These loans, whether the small scale shop floor lending at a supercentre, or the more dark finance from the loan sharks, they represent a large part of Thailands rent seeking economy. Many areas, from real estate to small businesses rent seeking is a fact of the economy, and is part of the larger States predatory behavior. The wage and lending system in Big C is prevalent socio-economic environment for many through Bangkok, with many lower level clerks, shop assistants, food sellers living like this. It is clear that economic development through the global economy is limited. Yet large sections of the society do not live like this. The middle class civil servants and people in the business district would work under better conditions and higher pay, and would not be prey to this kind of economy, but much of the rural working class in Bangkok and high school leavers who cannot get entrance into university would face this kind of economic constraint. It is not surprising that a reliance on luck for wealth is strongest in this class.11 If one faces economic hardship at work, with little chance of a promotion or change of job offering better conditions, people would need to look for finance elsewhere. While some social commentators choose to focus on crime and prostitution, which undoubtedly is an avenue, by far the more common avenue is through the lottery and other forms of gambling. This paper does not discuss organized illegal gambling, because the shop floor workers at Big C are unlikely to visit an illegal casino, and certainly could not have a gambling habit at one of these places simply because they do not have the money to gamble.12 They most definitely engage in gambling, but normally it is with co workers or other people in their socio-economic bracket. Usually it is through card games, like a gambling version of Gin Rummy, or a version of Black Jack. These games are played at someones house while drinking and socializing, and the average wager is somewhere around 5-20 baht. A big win or loss would likely be around 1,000 Baht, but one would expect on average they would not win or lose more than a couple of hundred baht. The games are illegal and if the police raid they would most likely take any money on the table for themselves instead of arresting anyone.13 The more popular form of gambling is the lottery. The Official government lottery is drawn twice a month, on the 1st and 16th of the month. The legal way of playing is
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It should be noted that luck and lottery is also ethnic as well, with the Chinese Thais participating more in the spiritual economy, and having more complex beliefs on lucky numbers, Karma, and so on. 12 For a more detailed discussion of this gambling a good start is Pasuk et al 2008. 13 For this information Id like to thanks again the workers at Big C for their informal interviews.

purchasing a 40 Baht ticket which has a six digit number on it. If this number comes up the first prize is 4 million baht. There are also sub prizes worth 100,00 Baht, 40,000 Baht, and 10,00 Baht. Further, there are also prizes for the last two and three numbers of the six digit number (worth 2,000 and 4,000 baht). It is difficult to assess how big is lottery; each draw the Lottery office issues 14 million tickets, but not all of these are sold. In 1998, researchers claimed that there were 38 million tickets sold a year. The Thai Lottery Office raises 4 Billion in revenues for the Government, and this does not include all its charities and funds.14 While the official lottery does raise substantial revenues, the underground lottery is much larger than this legitimate form. Pasuk claims the illegal lottery has been estimated at 9 times as large as the legitimate lottery and somewhere around 8% of Thailand GDP (Pasuk et al 1998). This could mean in todays figures the lottery turns over 490 Billion baht.15 The size of the underground lottery has repercussions through the political economy as it raises funds for money politics, is a source of funds for rich and influential figures in Thailand, and creates a whole industry of thousands of workers throughout the country. The underground lottery is played by picking two or three digit numbers. If a two digit number wins the payment is about 650 baht for a 10 baht wager. For a three digit number, there are two choices, the number as is (which pays 5,000 for a 10 baht wager) or the numbers in any order (which pays 1,000 Baht). The flexibility of this system greatly favours those on a lower income. They can bet as low as they want, betting one baht on a three digit number (for a prize of 500 Baht), or betting a couple of hundred baht on 20 or so numbers. For the official lottery each ticket is 40 baht, and it is more difficult to pick number directly as it depends on the availability from the lottery sellers. A winning two digit ticket is worth 2,000 baht (but generally they winner gets 1,950 because they sell it to a trader who takes it into the office for them), or 4,000 baht for a three digit number. The payment in the illegal lottery are much better (paying 600 baht more for a two digit and 15,000 for a three digit than the official lottery). Further, other incentives making the underground lottery more appealing is that people may not need to pay up front (though this can lead to debt problems), and there is a free choice of numbers and wagers. Of course there is a risk that the underground vender will not pay the money back, and this does occasionally happen with smaller lottery venders, but given that the organized network for the lottery is big they generally do pay up. The odds, obviously, are stacked towards the venders, with people given a 1-65 payment on a 1-100 bet, or a 1-500 payment on a 11000 bet. Indeed, this form of the lottery is so popular that there were attempts to legalize it during the Thaksin period. For about two years the two and three number lottery was legal, with about the same odds as the underground lottery. This was a benefit to the lottery sellers who would get a commission on these numbers, and the government could earn taxes from the revenues, Thaksin claimed it earned 70 Billion a year (AFR 2005). The lottery, however, was stopped and those who proposed it have been undergoing a court case about the legality of running two and three digit lotteries. It is clear that those who controlled the underground lottery would be extremely pleased

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See Thailand Lottery. (2009) This of course is pure speculation that the lottery is still worth around 8% o GDP. While there is no doubt this figure is flawed, it should be emphasized that the lottery is a very substantial part of the illegal economy.

with this move by the government to turn the lottery back over to the illegal organizations which control it.16 There are some other cultural differences with the Thai form of lottery compared to western lotteries. The numbers someone picks are not just picked at random, which tends to be how western lottery players play. This is a very important distinction to make. Western lottery players believe in the luck of the draw itself. However, for Thai (and also Burmese and Cambodian gamblers), there is a reason for a number, and a likely way to find out that number. While we may claim that this is the residue of a traditional society that has not fully modernized, this answer too easily jumps to the conclusion of traditional peasant culture. It does not explain the widespread belief, across classes, of an ordained number. It does not explain the perseverance, or even arguably the increase, of these beliefs during economic development. More fundamentally, this response does not attempt to understand the practice itself, for here we cannot simply dismiss lottery practices as irrational. There are a few statements we can make about the numbers in the lottery. Firstly, the number must have a meaning. While how someone decides their number, and the meaning of the number, vary greatly, there is always a reason for the number. Sometimes it is cultural. Chinese players consider any bad luck must be balanced by good, so the license plate of a car in a car crash could be a lucky number, the bad luck of the crash must be compensated some how with good luck. For most people birthdates, telephone numbers, car license plates, room numbers, and so on can be sources of numbers. However one cannot just guess a number at random like in the west, the selection of numbers must be deliberate. Secondly, there are systems and structures to the number. For example there are books available for interpreting ones dreams into numbers, (for instance a dream of an elephant gives the numbers 19, 39, 119, 139, 309, and to dream of fishing gives the numbers 18, 68, 168, 178, 708, 66817). There is an aesthetics: one can say numbers are beautiful or ugly - more beautiful ones generally have different numbers evenly spread like 496; and ugly number would be one that would appear unlikely like 111. There has been little cultural or anthropological study of this number phenomena because too quickly it is assumed as a spiritualism or an occult economy, when, as I will soon argue, this system could be just as rational as any other in producing wealth. Thirdly, there are some people or things which have a greater ability to pick the number. There are numerous temples which are used to find numbers. The more famous include Wat Mahabut made famous for the Nang Nark story, which has a tree stump on which numbers apparently appear if you rub it enough.18 There is also Wat Pailom with the mummified body of monk in a glass coffin, and similarly on Soi Thakarm Wat Hua Krabua the mummified remains of an still born child also can be used for people to predict numbers (Vanchai 2006). Sometimes the numbers come
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There is a much larger political story here about Thaksin trying to reduce the strength of the rural political clans and their sources of illegal money, which is told in much better detail in McCargo (2005) and Pasuk and Baker (2004). 17 Yarnthep. Predictions dreams: Lucky numbers from Dreams. Simwit Bundakarn Publications. n.d. 18 The story of Nang Nark, which is a traditional ghost story, is of a wife who died during childbirth while her husband was fighting a war against the Burmese. Her ghost comes back to look after her husband once he returns, without him knowing that his wife is a ghost. This has been made into movies and series a number of times.

from staring into floating candle wax, from shaking number sticks from a canister, or from rubbing oil or powder into a tree stump or other object. These are but a few of the may Wats which provide numbers, sometimes temporarily, to people for the lottery. Some of these Wats, like Mahabus, have had longevity as a source for lottery number for many years, others can come and go quite quickly. Another phenomenon which I wont go into is a medium, or monk, who gives the number. There has been research in this area with studies on mediums, such as the work of Alan Klima, or studies on monks who can bring luck, like the work of Pattana Kitiarsa (2005a, 2005b) and Peter Jackson (1999a, 1999b, 2003). As Klima (2006) details, the economy is simple. The more people come, which means the more number that can be given out, which means the more chance of a correct number, which means that more people come. At many of the Wats which people come to pick money there may be a resident monk who will take alms, offer prayers, and give predictions. Less common is the medium, the person possessed by a spirit who gives advice, prophecies, and predictions.19 From this very brief outline it can be seen that there is a popular culture of lottery numbers. There may have been attempts to stop gambling on the lottery, but never on picking the numbers. Rather, there is a high level of social acceptance and relatively little criticism or distain towards peoples activities to predict the lottery numbers. As far as I know there have never been any activities by the Government to attempt to eliminate these practices. Instead, communities are much involved in the discussing, deciding and justifying numbers, for picking numbers is a community response. Winning the lottery, unlike getting a raise at work or winning a promotion, is noncompetitive. Further, the pervasiveness of number picking strategies suggest that if you win the lottery, it is not because of your luck, but because you deserved it. Either your numbers were fated to come, or you were dedicated enough to see the numbers in the tree stump or candle wax, or that you picked the right monk or medium to bring you the numbers. Winning the lottery is not about luck, but getting what one deserves, in a sense it is Karma. There appears a contradiction: most of society will happily participate in selecting numbers, yet moral and political support for the lottery is at best ambivalent. The culture of finding numbers is supported, the investment in the lottery is not. This disjunction between the moral and political contest over the lottery and the social acceptance towards predicting numbers can be understood in two ways: that of failed development theories, or of the myth of economic rationalism. Firstly, to turn to the previous failures of development theory; at the heart of Modernization theory is replacing traditional, superstitious societies with modern rational ones. While much modernization theory has been widely criticized, it still has a strong legacy particularly around the idea that tradition and superstition occur as a binary opposite to scientific development. We can see evidence of this in some critical responses to the lottery. A academic study from 2004-5 in response to Thaksins legalization of the gambling industry clearly frames its logic in this way. In 2004 academics from Durakit Pandit university released a study which claims Thailand's state-run lottery has "intoxicated" the public and caused billions of dollars in lost productivity by people hoping to strike it rich.20 The study further claimed there was lost productivity on the days of the draw, amounting to a loss of 4.4 Billion dollars a year, because of
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For more details on spirit mediums see Morris (2000). AFP (2005)

people watching the draw; people were hooked on the lottery; the lottery causes more social problems than corruption, and half a million students were gambling which leads to increasing debts, murders, and prostitution. Daniel Lerner, one of the founding thinkers of Modernization, described this action as instability arising out of frustration from rising expectations (Lerner 1976). Lerner writes that once a national economy starts making some people wealthy, the have not will expect that they too can live like the rich. Unless a State carefully manages the expectations of the poor, this will lead to social unrest and more. This is a viewpoint which is very common in communication development, and it assumes quite questionably that when a person sees wealth, they immediate want it. As a myth about class in Thailand, the response lays out some common values: the poor are intoxicated and hooked on wealth, as if an addiction or unnatural desire, which appears as desires for the latest brand mobile phone or expensive designer clothes, and they get into debt by gambling to gain this wealth or overspending. They will go to any length to get wealth (including murder and prostitution), and this is a problem bigger than corruption. Hence any activities around the lottery are considered part of a frustrated desire which must be managed in order to ensure social and political stability. Bringing this back the issues of the spiritual economy, the response attempts to clearly demarcate a rational and legal economy that is unfettered by intoxication or addiction. Yet, how does one distinguish intoxication for wealth, and normalized consumer behavior? How these two registers are distinguished is predominantly moral: the illegal economy is as immoral as prostitution or murder; the legal economy is wealth gained by work. Hence, a logical response by those who consider the lottery as a means to wealth, could be to instill a sense of spiritual order to justify the search for wealth. One gains wealth because it has been fated; this is not to question a social order, but bringing social order back to its spiritual or predetermined origins.21 A second way to understand this is through globalization theorys simplification of economic theory. Particularly during the earlier period of hyper-globalization theory,22 it was too simply assumed that global capital and the scientific bureaucracy were the latest evolution of a science of civilization. Yet, it is useful to consider Foucaults concept of governmentality here for this both shows that States continue to play an important role, and that the legitimate view of what is rational in the economy is a discursive construct. Foucault, in his original conceptualization was arguing that Governmentality was more a function of population and health control for a productive workforce and a strong Nation State, done through disciplinary measures like the policing of sexuality (bio-politics), the discursive production of the good citizen, the control of knowledge and so on. Similarly, the production of a workforce, buying global products at a supermarket was not simply about increasing wealth, but also producing a discourse of truth, that of rationalism. Much like Modernization theory, this rational truth quickly labeled any other economic responses as irrational
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Within the claim of frustration of rising expectations there is a contradiction in the myth of wealth and the practice of getting it. Many societies have myths around a lucky person who found sudden wealth, whether this is the old television series The Beverly Hillbillies, the stories of marrying wealth (like Imelda Marcos or Anna Nicole Smith, or of a simple discovery or computer program which turns someone into a billionaire). However, watching any Thai soap opera people can quickly see the pervasiveness of the myth of wealth as an inherited right. In these shows people are wealthy because they are born that way. Occasionally poor people become wealthy, but mostly that is because they were cheated out of their wealth, which they eventually regain, much like Cinderella or Snow White being restored to their Royal status. 22 For an outline of hyper-globalization theorists see Held and McGrew (1999).

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or traditional. In relationship with economic theory, for instance the tendency to consider market mechanisms as rational, and to believe that peoples economic choices are made upon rational decisions, there has been a sustained attack from a number of angles such as the behavioral economists, and the pop economy writings such as Stephen Levitts Freakonomics. However, what is of concern here is how the lottery is labeled as irrational, as an underground economy. But can we say it is irrational? It is true that people only have a 1 in 1000 chance of winning, but does the market system give better odds? Clearly not for the average worker at Big C. The rational economic system, particularly in Thailand, can be classified as predatory: the rich feed off the poor. The lending practices with their complicit support by the State mean there is much more likelihood of large, debts which cannot be repaid, of a large quasi taxation in the form of interest rates, and a tolerance of rent seeking in most parts of the SME economic environment. Which is the more rational system: that of predicting numbers in a pre-determined response to an unfair social order, or to attempt to survive low wages and exorbitant interest rates to find economic security? Assuming a person uses belief as a method to make sense of the world and give guiding principles, are we talking about a replicated belief system in a purely material arena, or is religion being overrun and disappearing as people transform their belief to ensure their security? While it is too far to assume that lottery practices are replacing religious practices, the extension of beliefs into the economic field is certainly a mechanism social groups use for improving their lives. Perhaps religion was a better mechanism for this, but if religion does not address social inequalities, and if it offers little assurances for peoples welfare and livelihood, then it is more than likely that people will search elsewhere for mechanisms which offer more hope. Bibliography AFP. 2005. 'Intoxicated' Thailand losing billions to lottery Sept 5. Accessed at: http://www.responsiblegambling.org/articles/Intoxicated_thailand_losing_billions_to_ lottery_study.pdf Castells, Manuel. The Rise of Network Society. Vol 1 of The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. ---. 2001 The Global Economy. David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds. The Global Transformations Reader. London: Polity,. 259-73. ---. 1998 Information Technology, Globalization and Social Development. Paper prepared for the UNRISD Conference on Information Technologies and Social Development, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 22-24 June Comaroff, Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony, American Ethnologist 26(2): 279303. Comaroff, Jean and John L. Comaroff (2000) Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming, Public Culture 12(2): 291343.

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Department of Industrial Promotion of Thailand. SME Is Main Mechanism in Boosting Economy (Thailand) Available on line at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/ groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN012162.pdf Foucault, Michel. 1991. Governmentality. In Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Trans. Rosi Braidotti. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1991: 87104. Gereffi, Gary. 2005. "The global economy: organization, governance, and development." In Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds.), Handbook of Economic Sociology , 2 nd ed. Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation. Held, David and Anthony McGrew. Introduction. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Cambridge: Polity, 1999. 1-16, 27-8. Jackson, Peter, 2003. Buddhadasa: Theravda Buddhism and Modernist Reform in Thailand, Silkworm Books, Thailand. Jackson, Peter A. 1999a The enchanting spirit of Thai capitalism: the cult of Luang Phor Khoon and the post-modernization of Thai Buddhism, South East Asia Research 7(1): 560. Jackson, Peter A. 1999b Royal spirits, Chinese gods, and magic monks: Thailands boom-time religions of prosperity, South East Asia Research 7(3): 245320. Klima Alan. 2006. Spirits of Dark Finance in Thailand: A Local Hazard for the International Moral Fund Cultural Dynamics 18: 33-59
Lerner, Daneil. 1976 Technology, Communication, and Change. Communication and Change: The last ten years, the next ten. Wilbur Schram and Daneil Lerner, eds. Honolulu: East West Centre Press.

McCargo, Duncan and Ukrist Pathmanand. 2005. The Thaksinization Of Thailand. Hawaii: U of Hawaii Press. Morris, Rosalind. In the Place of Origins: Modernity and its Mediums in Northern Thailand. Durham: Duke, 2000 Nattapon Dejvitak. 2006. The Role of SME Bank in Thailand. Bangkok: SME Development Bank of Thailand. http://www.gmsbizforum.com/ dmdocuments/SME%20Finance%20-%20SME%20Bank%20Role.pdf Pattana Kitiarsa. 2005a. Beyond Syncretism: Hybridization of Popular Religion in Contemporary Thailand. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36:3: 461-487 Pattana Kitiarsa . 2005b. Magic monks and spirit mediums in the politics of Thai popular religion. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6.2:

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Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker. 2004. Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand. Chiang Mai: Silkworm. Pasuk Pongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyaransan and Nualnoi Treerat. 2008. Guns, Girls, Gambling and Ganja: Thailands Illegal Economy and Public Policy. Chiang Mai: Silkwork. Ritzer, George. 1993. The McDonaldization of Society, Pine Forge Press. ---. 2001. Globalization Theory: Lessons from the Exploration of McDonaldization and the New Means of Consumption. Explorations in the Sociology of Consumption: Fast Food, Credit Cards, and Casinos. London: Sage. ---. 1998 The McDonaldization Thesis: Explorations and Extensions. London: Sage. Thailand Lottery. 2009. Thailandlottery.com http://www.thailandlottery.com/thailand_lottery.htm Thomas, Pradip. 2009. Selling God/saving souls: Religious commodities, spiritual markets and the media. Global Media and Communication (2009): 57-76 Vanchai Ariyabuddhiphongs and Nathanat Chanchalermporn. 2007. A Test of Social Cognitive Theory Reciprocal and Sequential Effects: Hope, Superstitious Belief and Environmental Factors among Lottery Gamblers in Thailand. Journal of Gambling Studies 23: 201214 Watson, James. Introduction: Transnationalism, Localization, and Fast Foods in East Asia. Golden Arches East: McDonalds in East Asia. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997. 138.

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