Week 1. Economic Development: Technology or Institutions ? 1) William Easterly, 2001.

The Elusive Quest for Growth (Ch 3 & 4) 2) Douglass North, 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Ch 1-8)

Week 2. Political Institutions and Growth: The Problem of Building a State and Controlling It. 1) Mancur Olson, 2000. Power and Prosperity (Ch 1) 2) Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth- Century England 3) Bradford J. DeLong and Andrei Shleifer, 1993. Princes and Merchants: European City growth before the Industrial Revolution 4) Adam Przeworski, 2000. Democracy and Development (Ch 3)

Week 3. Social Norms, Political Culture and Growth 1) Robert Putnam, 1993. Making Democracy Work (entire book)

Week 4. One World or Many Worlds? Colonialism, Inequality and Economic Stagnation 1) Robert Wade, 1992. East Asia s Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence (p310-320 only)

-Specific factors that explain the success of Taiwan and Korea (p312-315): a) Private property rights were maintained, which forced government officials to consider the impact of their decisions in light of how they would affect profits. b) A highly disciplined, rapidly growing pool of technically educated manpower was available. These professionals allowed for the building of a competent civil service, as well as provided a check on government behavior through their critical commentary in the countries fairly independent presses.

c) Relative cultural homogeneity in both countries precluded the eruption of ethnic violence and facilitated the creation of a strong, unified nationstate. d) A culture of social responsibility was deeply engrained in Taiwan and Korean society, as moral development was elevated to the high level of significance that Western societies tend to reserve solely for intellectual development. This conscience meant that highly trained professionals would willingly take on low paying civil service jobs with the states best interests in mind. This same sense of social responsibility was used to shame and thwart minority or specific concerns, largely insulating the bureaucracy from pressure from interest groups. e) Weak middle-class organization in Taiwan and Korea meant that imported consumer goods composed a relatively small percentage of the total foreign exchange, which eased pressure on the balance of payments. f) The constant threat of invasion by their neighbors gave a sense of urgency to Taiwan and Korea s pursuit of economic goals. At the same time, the external threat allowed the bureaucracy to justify internal repression and promote discipline within the civil service. g) Geopolitics also played a role in these countries prioritization of economic goals, as it was in the influential United States interest for them to do so. Indeed the U.S. helped them along with massive aid and tolerance for their protectionist policies. Eventually rulers perceived their survival as hinging on the states economic success, which thus provoked them to invest in more economic technocrats would were able to successfully implement ambitious industrial policies which were earlier pioneered in Japan. Wade emphasizes the importance of a neighborhood growth effect , as the growth of the economies of Taiwan and Korea relied heavily on emulating models used in nearby Japan.

2) Sokoloff & Engelman, 2002. In economics a country's factor endowment is commonly understood as the amount of land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship that a country possesses and can exploit for manufacturing. Countries with a large endowment of resources tend to be more prosperous than those with a small endowment, all other things being equal. The development of sound institutions to access and equitably distribute these resources, however, is necessary in order for a country to obtain the greatest benefit from its factor endowment. Nonetheless, the New World economies inherited attractive endowments such as conducive soils, ideal weather conditions, and suitable size and sparse populations that eventually came under the control of institutionalizing European colonists who had a marginal economic interest to exploit and benefit from these new discoveries. Colonists were driven to yield high profits and power by reproducing such

economies vulnerable legal and political framework, which ultimately led them towards the paths of economic developments with various degrees of inequality in human capital, wealth, and political power. A classical example often cited to emphasize the importance of institutions in developing a country's factor endowment is that of North America (the United States and Canada) around the turn of the century. It is commonly argued that these countries benefited greatly by borrowing many of Britain's institutions and laws. While North America undoubtedly gained from this borrowing, this does not fully explain why the rest of the New World (which also enjoyed a large factor endowment and access to British institutions) did not develop in a similar way. In fact, data shows that connection between the prosperity of the colonizing and the wealth of the colony was weaker than many thought. The future United States and Canada surpassed several British established colonies in the Caribbean, such as Barbados, Jamaica, Belize, and Guyana. In fact, the United States converged on the world economic leader, measured in GDP/capita, the UK. In 1910, the United States overtook the UK and began to diverge from it until about the 1950s. This shows that there must have been another explanation as to why the future United States and Canada developed at a faster rate than other colonies in the region.[1] Kenneth Sokoloff and Stanley Engerman argue in their article "History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World"[2] that the difference between North America and the rest of the New World was not just in institutions but in the nature of their respective factor endowments. Countries like Brazil and Cuba had an extremely large yet concentrated factor endowment that tended toward exploitation, a hierarchical social system and exhibited economies of scale. Cuba and Brazil primarily grew lucrative products such as cotton, coffee, and sugar, which required hand picking and most efficiently picked when picked by hands in unison, whereas the United States was generally a wheat producer. The true advantage of the United States and Canada lay in a more equitable distribution of factors that could not be exploited on an extremely large scale. This distribution led to a more open and opportunistic economy, and eventually to long-term prosperity. For example, because wealth and power were distributed relatively equally in the United States and in Canada, these two countries led the rest of the Americas in providing education on a broader scale. Education is an important factor to improve technology in order to boost productivity, which is the reason that US and Canada surpassed the others. Greater access to education allowed for greater investment in human capital, which increases productivity and contributed to the United States and Canada's economic growth. According to Sokoloff and Engerman's article "History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," [3] not only the United States had relatively equal distribution of wealth, it had relatively homogeneous population, political power and human capital. United States and Canada's relatively equal distribution of wealth, amount of human capital and political power utimately affected development of institution, extent of franchise, and public education that

persist and influence growth of the country. The open franchise in the United States and Canada was possibe due to the large voting body of middle class and small elites. The open franchise brought elimination of wealth and literary requirement by 1940 in Canada and the United States (literacy requirement was still enforced in US southern regions only). Again, the open franchise was possible because the United States endowed a land suitable for wheat growing thus had a large body of middle class unlike Brazil and Cuba where they exhibited small elites, some overseers and large slave population. United States, then, outgrows other New World countries and eventually diverged from Cuba and Brazil in late eighteen and early nineteen century. Sokoloff and Engerman hypothesize that in societies founded with greater inequality, the elites gained more power to influence the choice of legal and economic institutions.[4] In those countries which are inequal, small elites restrict majority people's rights, such as education and votes, to perpetuate the social structures and continue to make themselves "elites." The U.S. began its economic growth largely through slave labor and trade of the output of that labor. As the elites enacted policy to generate more economic equality, for example by increasing literacy rates, the U.S. GDP per capita pulled ahead of other long-since established countries along with the literacy rates. It is essential to note that factor endowments played a crucial role in shaping the colonies institutions and economic growth; colonies with a richer quality of soil grew cash crops such as sugar, coffee, and cotton, which were most efficiently grown using plantation systems. As such, the demand for not only slave labor but also peonage within these colonies grew. Due to the vast inequality that the society developed due to a small elite population in comparison to the vast laborer population, they were able to maintain the wealth and power within the elite class via establishing a guarded franchise. The inequalities within the cash crop colonies resulted in their economy not being able to expand and grow as fast as the U.S and Canada, due to restrictive policies. Those policies in inequal countries curb the intellectual development of most people who are only required to do simple manual jobs; however, US and Canada encourage their people to take part in education. As a result, US and Canada excel with higher productivities, which are supported by advanced technology. Precept Notes on Week 4 readings (Wade, Engerman & Sokoloff, Bairoch) 1. Dependency Theory o Solow biggest shortcoming did not include institutions and culture o Looked at country as one domestic unit o Now we have to look at the country as it interacts with the international system o Dependency theory Core vs. Periphery  Developed countries in the world, US, European countries  Periphery are the less developed countries  Development of the periphery countries depend on the core countries  Two theories of development:

o o o o

 Pure dependency theorists: MNCs, export to third world countries etc.; doom the third world countries, collude with third world elites to keep them down so that developed countries can maintain their political and economic incentives political in nature  But does not explain Four Tigers: Developmental dependency Economic in nature o Supply and demand rise of countries that filled the need for basic raw materials o Division of labor 2. Bairoch Core countries not that dependent on third world countries Third world countries did not supply a large export market either Third world countries were still hurt very much  We see significant economic damage through institutions Development can happen in the third world 3. Engermann & Sokoloff Mechanisms through which we can see that growth Question of endogenous vs. exogenous institutions Endogenous internal, factor endowments, raw materials, comparative advantages (factor endowments institutions growth) Exogenous effect of colonization (factor endowment growth institutions) If you are North, you believe the endogenous theory, growth is dependent on the nature of institutions in place How do they explain this?  3 types of colonies: sugar colonies, Spanish colonies, North American colonies  What are the conditions that determine these types of colonies?  First two can support big plantations, high land high human capital; third is low land low human capital Then they have to show, how do these different types of colonies lead to modern institutions of varying levels of political equality? Colonies modern institutions  Immigration policies  Way that the immigrants were treated also differed  Suffrage  Land policy These policies then impact education Banking system savings rates, Solow model (Putnam, inequalities in societies; North/Wein more equal division can lead to more stable institutions) Stasavag not enough Legal institutions people have access to how decisions are made, economic policies 4. Wade

o o o o o o

o o

o o

o Neoliberal interpretation World Bank orthodoxy o Free market convergence o Capitalist forces will naturally make sure we converge to the right pries, keep hands off o Neoliberal theory focuses more on the role of the absence of the state o Neoclassical forces says that capitalist forces will predominate o Neoliberal, any kind of intervention will warp what growth should be o Applies more to domestic policy o Amsden s theory thinks they have valid points, but believes the progress they have made is not enough o Pages to know in the reading:  286 Amsden argues against neoliberal theory that free markets will take care of everything  Free market countries are suffering from late industrialization , need help in catching up  Believes that 2 things are happening entrepreneurial state and diversified business requires reciprocity (exports)  learning  They are late to the process of industrialization, historical evidence in the case of SK, state became a central part in helping the labor force to catch up, domestic subsidies for goods, teamed up in a way with business that you would not see in capitalist markets  Chaebols state provided subsidies, why East Asian society succeeded, because state gave them protection as long as they met a certain level of exports; force as much exports as possible, gave selective protection o Haggard pg 303  Compares East Asain countries to Latin American countries  Exports  Latin America  Import Substitution  Not going against neoliberal real question for growth is why did East Asia choose a policy that we knew would work in the neoliberal sense while why did Latin America choose a policy that would choose policy that would not lead to long-term economic growth  Four conditions: pg. 304  1. International factors  2. Domestic Coalitions  3. Political conditions  4. Ideas  Pg 310 Wade s idea, given his dissatifaction with the other 2 theorists  Shortcomings, agree with Amsden s idea, against the neoliberal approach, and I agree with Haggard s approach in bringing in the political/international stuff  Combines the two  Due attention to changes in the international system

y y y y y

o 1. Higher competition between developed countries  Rising costs, needed cheaper labor to cut their costs  More room back then because developing countries had not claimed yet  Want semi-skilled labor; more highly educated because of political institutions  Related in a sense to Engermann and Sokoloff o 2. Innovations in transport o 3. Lower tariffs o 4. Political conditions shore up expansion of Communists; geopolitics Why these big differences between the regions? Next he goes into domestic, asks how is this growth sustained? Talks about education, civil services You have highly educated people going into the government as opposed to working for corporations, this job culture sustains this economic growth Then, as an extension of the geopolitical argument; country experiences tremendous pressures from N Korea, US equate national security with economic growth, for political leaders becomes a central agenda

Week 5. Democracy as an Equilibrium. Democratic Transitions.

Boix, Carles. 2006. The Roots of Democracy Policy Review. Boix, Carles. 2011. Democracy, Development and the International System . Working paper. Anderson, Perry. 1974. Lineages of the Absolutist State. Verso. Conclusions. Pages 397-431.

Week 6: Political Power Within A Democracy

Dahl, Robert Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City ch. , 8, 12,21, and 23 (*) Bartels, Larry. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age chapters 9. Gilens, Martin. 2005. Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly 69(5):778- 896 Week 7. Parties and Elections

Lecture notes from Tuesday, 8 Nov 2011 Why parties? A) Normative Answer: Explains what role parties should play; it s good for democracies to have parties. -Collective responsibility -Accountability * Responsible parties: - political parties should make clear policy commitments at election time - when out of power, parties should develop policy alternatives -parties should differentiate their promises to provide voters with a choice .. if these conditions are met, and parties follow through, they ll get elected. ideally enforces accountability & representation B) Empirical Answer: Explains why politicians would work through parties; groups of ambitious politicians work together through an organization to solve certain collective action problems: -Among candidates -Within government .. how do different bodies/branches cooperate? -In the electorate .. facilitate mobilization/education of voters * Why parties what incentives for real world politicians? - Electoral coordination manifestation of game theory, mutual defection (both running on local issues) is bad for everyone. Parties try to force the factions to cooperate and try to give up their incentives and run on national issues -Parties as long coalitions on isues like tax cuts, defense, and social spending. Politicians will be willing to stay in parties as a form of insurance. - Mobilization R = P*B + D C R = rewards from participation P = probability that participation changes the outcome B = benefits from election preferred party D = selective benefits C = costs of participating

Dimensions of Electoral Systems - Nominations: fusion & joint lists - Ballot systems: How many votes do voters get? Vote for candidate or party? - District structure: How do votes translate to seats?

Readings 1) John Aldrich. Why Parties? (Ch 1 & 2) 2) Gary Cox. Making Votes Count (Ch 2-3) 3) Bernard Grofman. The Impact of Electoral Laws on Political Parties 4) Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Electoral System and Economic Policy 5) Larry Bartels. Unequal Democracy (Ch 2) 6) McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal. Polarized America (Ch 1-3)

Week 8. Legislatures Lecture notes from Tues 15 Nov 2011 Facts & Fiction about the Polarization of American Politics Facts or Fiction? 1) There is nothing enw about polarized politics 2) The parties are not actually that different - neither is really true .. have to go all the way back to the Civil War to find significant polarization between the two main parties; period in mid-20th century where polarization is quite low. Polarization in American politics primarily reflects differences on cultural/wedge issues like abortion, guns, and homosexuality ( .. but fo real how does this suggest that there was less polarization or that polarization was less strong or something?) One thing is certain in the search to unravel the mystery o the great divide: we know for sure the answer isn t class. We can rule that uncomfortable subject out from the start. Thomas Frank Polarization may increase income stratification. Facts or Fiction? 1) Red States are poor and Blue state are rich (NY, CT, CA). So low-income voters must vote Republican. -There is a logical fallacy. 2) Conservative Christian voters vote against their economic self-interest. (What s the matter with Kansas?) Tend to be poor, but vote Republican. * clearly things other than economic interests matter in determining how people vote

-Actually the rich people in Blue States are a few wealthy Republicans & vice versa? What s the impact of income on the conservative legislature? Born again vs Other whites gap between their republican identification is large at high income levels (trying to suggest that religiosity doesn't matter that much) Facts or Fiction? 1) Polarization is a consequence of realignment in the South in the mid-20th century 2) Race & ethnicity is an important factor in polarization R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (Chapters 1, 2, 4) Why do legislators do what they do? Why do they sometimes give general benefits over specific benefits though it seems like they d be more likely to give specific benefits to constituents that matter? Key assumption: Legislators primarily care about re-election. They have other goals such as making good policy and gaining power within the legislature, but they will not pursue these secondary goals if they get in the way of re-election. > Key contribution to theory of congressional politics: Legislators constrained by opinions of coalition bodies & citizens. Anticipation of opinion matters most concerns about challenger exposing what legislator did to the citizens through the media. Legislators develop techniques to hide traceability, pursue blame avoidance by implementing policies into bigger bills that are signed by lots of legislators. But when they re implementing a positive policy, they claim credit and use the media to portray an image of themselves as supporters of specific policies.

Kriehbel, Pivotal Politics (1998) -creates a political spectrum of policy -provides a theory of US lawmaking. makes assumptions about environment in which these laws are made stresses importance of super-majoritarian procedures including 1) filibuster stalling of discussion on a bill through extended debate subject to 3/5 override in Senate 2) executive veto President can veto legislation, subject to a 2/3 Congressional override. -so the 2 major conclusions about US lawmaking that he draws based on these elements is that gridlocks happen often but not always AND when legislation passes, it does so with more than simple majority. -assumptions of his model include: 1) a uni-dimensional policy space, ranging linearly from liberal to conservative policies

2) lawmakers (legislators & president) have single-peaked preferences, which means they have an ideal point on the continuum neutral on various policies that are the same distance from their ideal preference in either direction / goal is just to maximize utility 3) Complete information 4) No parties controversial assumption -key actors: 1) filibuster pivot (f) 2) veto pivot (v) 3) president (p) 4) median voter (m) + status quo (q). median voter may propose some policy (if not, status quo).. filibuster decides to block it or not, if he doesn't block then president has to decided to veto or not, if not new policy. if president vetos, Congress decides to override or not, if overrides, new policy. matters where status quo is positioned , determines who is pivotal actor. -Equilibrium regions: 1) full convergence 2) partial convergence 3) gridlock -Implications: 1) more extreme the status quo, you get more convergence 2) if preferences of president change, you may get rid of gridlock 3) if preferences of pivots become more spread, you get more gridlock * polarization of the parties tends toward more gridlock There is a correlation between gridlock & polarization. (kina McCarty) Potential explanations for this: 1) divided government under cohesive parties 2) pivot theory 3) citizens distrust 4) strategic disagreement

Michael Laver, Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context Compares capacity of a legislature in a parliamentary system vs. presidential/separation of powers system. Capacity is endogenous to political structure In parliamentary system, legislature is breeding ground for future executives (training camp) so there is a high level of party discipline. Has power to decide the executive government David Canon - Race Redistricting, and Representation McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal. Polarized America Ch 6 Week 9. Executives and Bureaucracies

1) Jose Cheibub. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (Ch 1 & 2) Cheibub in his keynote paper argued that there is no empirical support for the notion that it is harder for presidents to form coalitions when there is high party fragmentation, or that single party minority presidential governments are less effective than coalition governments thus proportional representation does not in itself undermine presidential systems. The design of presidential electoral systems needs to take account of the political, ethnic, geographic or religious cleavages to encourage the presidency to operate as a force towards unity and integration - for example, the provision in Nigeria that the election winner must have at least a quarter of the vote in at least two thirds of the states of the federation. The two round system commonly used in Latin America can play that sort of role as well. Concurrent presidential and legislative elections deprive voters of the opportunity to signal their disapproval in the middle of the presidential term. However, what matters is not so much how the president is elected, but the existence and effectiveness of mechanisms.

2) George Tsbelis. Veto Players: How Institutions Work (Ch 3) 3) Terry Moe. The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure in Can the Government Govern? (p 267-329) Main Point: "American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective." (267) Bureaucracies are defined by the political situation that determines their structural design. "Structural politics is interest group politics." (269) Part I: The Politics of Structural Choice (Who influences the bureaucracy's institutional design?) Interest Groups and Structural Choice "If one seeks to understand why structural choices turn out as they do . . . it does not make much sense to start with politicians. The more fundamental questions have to do with how interest groups decide what kinds of structures they want politicians to provide." (269) Technical Problems Faced by Interest Groups (during structural choice) An interest group, in a 'perfect' world, would "impose a set of rules to constrain bureaucratic behavior." (271) But, because of asymmetric information, control is imperfect. The solution is twofold: They seek the right 'kind' of bureaucrat. This is associated with professionalism,

which implies predictable behavior. They try to design "a structure that affords them reasonable autonomy." (273) Political Problems Faced by Interest Groups (during structural choice) Because interest groups are not politically all-powerful, they face two problems: Political uncertainty, which "is inherent in democratic government." (273) In order to protect their bureaucratic agents, they can employ the following structural means: "It can write detailed legislation that imposes rigid constraints on the agency's mandate and decision procedures." "It can place even greater emphasis on professionalism...since professionals will generally act to protect their own autonomy and resist political interference... And it can try to minimize the power and number of political appointees." "It can oppose formal provisions that enhance political oversight and involvement." "It can see that the agency is given a safe location in the scheme of government." "It can favor judicialization of agency decisionmaking as a way of insulating policy choices from outside interference." As a result, "the driving force of political uncertainty, then, cause the winning group to favor structural designs it would never favor on technical grounds alone." (275-276) Political compromise: because the opposition also participates in the decisionmaking, they too make demands on the structure. They favor: "Opponents want structures that work against effective performance." "They want structures that allow politicians to get at the agency." "They want appointment and personnel arrangements that allow for political direction of the agency." "The favor agency decisionmaking procedures that allow them to participate, to present evidence and arguments, to appeal adverse agency decisions, to delay, and, in general, to protect their own interests and inhibit effective agency action through formal, legally sanctioned rules." "They want agency decisions to be accompanied by, and partially justified in terms of, 'objective' assessments of their consequences." (276) Consequently, "opposition groups are dedicated to crippling the bureaucracy..." (276) The result is that these two groups force "the structure of public bureaucracy to depart from technical rationality." "Those currently in a position to exercise public authority will often face uncertainty about their own grip on political power in the years ahead, and this will prompt them to favor structures that insulate their achievements from politics." "Opponents will also tend to have a say in structural design, and, to the degree they do, they will impose structures that subvert effective performance and

politicize agency decisions." (277)

Legislators and Structural Choice The attractiveness of control is diluted by three factors: "The winning group ... will pressure to have its victories removed from political influence." "The capacity for control can be a curse for legislators in later conflict, since both sides will descend on them repeatedly." "Oversight for purposes of serious policy control is time-consuming, costly, and difficult to do well; legislators typically have much more productive ways to spend their scarce resources." (278) "The result is that legislators tend not to invest in general policy control... they value 'particularized control.'" (278) "Legislators... can be expected either to respond to group demands in structural politics or to take entrepreneurial action in trying to please them. They will not be given to flights of autonomous action or statesmanship." (279)

Presidents and Structural Choice The President is expected to govern effectively, and the President answers to history. (279) This poses two problems for interest groups: Presidents tend not to be "susceptible to the appeals of special interests." "Presidents want to control the bureaucracy." "Their ideal is a rational, coherent, centrally directed bureaucracy that strongly resembles popular textbook notions of what an effective bureaucracy, public or private, ought to look like." (280) Legislators, Presidents, and Interest Groups Groups and legislators want a 'congressional bureaucracy' that "is not supposed to function as a coherent whole... Only the pieces are important." Presidents want a "coherent, centrally controlled... 'presidential bureaucracy' that is fundamentally at odds with the congressional bureaucracy everyone else is busily trying to create." (281)

Bureaucracy "The result is that each agency cannot help but begin life as a unique structural reflection of its own politics... Agency bureaucrats are now political actors." (282)

Careerists are "pure bureaucrats" with unique interests. They too seek to reduce their political uncertainty: They will "nurture mutually beneficial relationships with groups and politicians whose political support the agency needs." "All agencies will have a tendency to move away from presidents." "Political appointees are also unattractive allies." Insulation "If they cannot control the environment, they can try to shut themselves off from it in various ways." (283-284)

Structural Choice as a Perpetual Process Three basic forces supply the dynamics of structural choice: "Group opponents will constantly be on the lookout for opportunities to impose structures of their own that will inhibit the agency's performance and open it up to external control." "The winning group must constantly be ready to defend its agency from attack." "The president will try to ensure that agency behavior is consistent with broader presidential priorities." (285) "However, the choices about structure that are made in the first period, when the agency is designed and empowered with a mandate, are normally far more enduring, and consequential than those that will be made later." (285)

Part II: Self-Interest and the New Social Regulation

"The 'innovative' bureaucratic designs of the new social regulation are due not to some abstract theory of good government, but to changes in the distribution of political power that have thrust new players and interests into prominent roles in the the [sic] politics of structural choice." (289) Three agencies that reflect the inherent inefficiency of American public bureaucracies: The CPSC, "at its birth and throughout its life... was a structural reflection of competitive politics. Structure was not a means to effective pursuit of the symbolic mandate. It was a means of political attack and defense." (297) The "OSHA was burdened at the outset with awkward agency-forcing mechanisms impose by labor in response to political uncertainty, as well as by an ingeniously fragmented set of bureaucratic arrangements imposed by business through political compromise." (305) "The EPA has grown into a confounding mixture of congressional and presidential bureaucracy... The resulting set of arrangements conforms to no one's idea of what an effective bureaucracy ought to look like... The EPA is a creature of politics and in politics, organizations are not designed to be effective." (322-323)

Conclusion Three major reasons "why public bureaucracy cannot be organized for effective performance": Because of political uncertainty, "even the group that successfully pressures for the creation of a public agency... will not demand an effectively designed organization." "The winning group must usually compromise with the losing group when structural choices are being made... the losing group is dedicated to crippling the agency in whatever ways it can." "Presidents have the power and incentive to impose their own layer of structure on top of the one that the legislative process has already provided." (325326) "The problem is inherent in our democratic system as a whole, and it is our basic framework of political institutions, not the bureaucracy, that must be reformed if solutions are ever to be found... The bureaucracy itself is not the problem." (329)

4) James Q. Wilson. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies do and Why They Do It (p315-378) Many, if not most, of the difficulties we experience in dealing with government agencies arise from the agencies being part of a fragmented and open political system The central feature of the American constitutional system the separation of powers exacerbates many of these problems. The governments of the US were not designed to be efficient or powerful, but to be tolerable and malleable. Those who designed these arrangements always assumed that the federal government would exercise few and limited powers. James Q. Wilson

In Brief As the title says, Wilson seeks to explain what government agencies (bureaucracies) do and why they do it. More specifically, he seeks to explain why bureaucracies are inefficient--that is, why there is always a long line at the Department of Motor Vehicles, but never at McDonald's. He attributes this inefficiency to bureaucratic rules and procedures, including norms, rules, incentives, goals, context, constraints, culture, and values.

Main Argument The popular complaint is that bureaucracies behave as they do because they are run by unqualified "bureaucrats" and are enmeshed in "rules" and "red tape", but the scientific answer involves more analysis. To explain why government agencies behave as they do, it is crucial to recognize that they are government bureaucracies, not independent businesses, which gives them a completely different set of incentives (p. 115). Three Main Constraints Bureaucracies are subject to three main constraints; these constraints are the independent variables explaining why bureaucracies are inefficient. In particular: Government agencies cannot lawfully retain and devote to the private benefit of their members the earnings of the organizations (so unlike McDonald's, there is no profit-maximization incentive); Government agencies cannot allocate the factors of production in accordance with the preferences of the organization's administrators (so unlike McDonald's, we cannot necessarily move people and equipment to where it is most needed); Government agencies must serve goals not of the organization's own choosing. Related to these constraints are a few other factors affecting bureaucratic behavior: Bureaucrats do not (legally) profit from their positions. Normal businesses try to limit expenditures and raise revenues to generate profits, but bureaucrats have no such incentive. Official routines are characterized by excessive complexity. The specific, clear and unquestionable goals imposed on bureaucrats create an aversion to take risks. After all, the cost to a bureaucrat of ignoring these goals could be very high. But normal businesses thrive by taking risks.

Effects of these Constraints Managers have a strong incentive to worry more about constraints than tasks, which means to worry more about processes than outcomes. The multiplicity of constraints on an agency enhances the power of potential intervenors in the agency. Equity is more important than efficiency in the management of many government agencies. The existence of many contextual goals, like the existence of constraints on the use of resources, tends to make managers more risk averse. Public agencies have more managers than private ones performing similar tasks. The more contextual goals and constraints that must be served the more discretionary authority in an agency is pushed upward to the top.

There has been much talk recently about the ineffectiveness of government in dealing with pressing social problems. The U.S. federal government currently employs over 3.1 million people-- The Executive branch with its 14 departments (State, Defense, Justice, etc.) and 16 Independent Agencies (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), National Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA), etc. employ over 3 million workers, alone. When combined with the 15.2 million people employed by state and local governments, the "public bureaucracy" comprises a significant proportion of America's 125 million person labor force. James Q. Wilson is one of this country's foremost scholars on the subject of U.S. government bureaucracy, having been Harvard's Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Government for 25 years before moving to UCLA as a professor of management. With nine books and numerous articles in academic journals, he has achieved a remarkable level of scholarship and knowledge. He shares much of that knowledge in his book, Bureaucracy. One of the things that I mentioned in class was that Wilson provided insight into how private, non-government "interest groups" exert influence over public (government) agencies. These interest groups can be anything from small citizens' organizations or large businesses and corporations. In his book he says that there are four "political environments" that determine the influence of outside interests on a government agency, (p. 76). I'll describe these shortly, but first I must mention that in some cases, a corporate industry may capture a federal agency which means that the corporation will exert tremendous control over it. (I must point out that Wilson has argued that the ability to capture a public agency has weakened because of 4 things: 1.) the appointment of single administrators 2.) the imposition of stricter campaign finance laws; 3.) the "decentralization" of congress; and 4.) broadened access to the courts-- private parties can sue the government of a broader list of issues and the government must foot the cost of the legal bill if the agency loses). Now, returning to the four political environments that determine how outside interests influence a public agency (You need only to concern yourself with the first, but read the others for a fuller understanding of what Wilson is saying: In the first environment a dominant interest group favors its respective agency's goals and practices what Wilson calls, "client politics." The government agency becomes a CLIENT AGENCY. The example that I gave in class involved the Civil Aeronautics Board. It needs the support of the industry to do its job, but must fend off the attempts by the single dominating industry to control it. Otherwise, it is "captured." (I also mentioned that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as another example, but this is a bit more complicated. The NHTSB must rely on the auto industry for support because it does not have sufficient resources of its own to do all that it must do, but there is an important difference as explained, below:

In the second political environment, we have a situation like this A powerful, grass-roots, social movement emerges in response to a social problem. An example would be auto safety. In the 1960s Ralph Nader led a consumer movement that demanded strong government standards for highway (and automobile) safety. As a result, politicians in Washington create a government agency whose responsibility is to solve the problem. Wilson calls such an agency an ENTREPRENEURIAL AGENCY and an example of such an agency is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The NHTSA exists in an environment where a dominant interest group (the automotive industry) may oppose the agency s goals. This agency, according to Wilson must practice "entrepreneurial politics" and hope that the social movement that founded it and supports it does not dissolve. Without social activists providing political support to the agency, the danger of being captured by the auto industry increases. For the record, here are the other two political environments: The third exists where two or more rival interest groups that conflict over a particular agency's goals. Wilson says that in this situation you will encounter "interest-group politics" and he calls such an agency an "INTEREST GROUP AGENCY" (An example would be the Occupational Health and Safety Administration). Agency directors are particularly challenged in this situation because must pick the right interest group to support at the right time The last political environment is where no important interest group exists in the operational area of an agency. Wilson calls this "majoritarian politics" and such an agency is a "MAJORITARIAN AGENCY" (Here, an example would be the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department). The big challenge here is to be careful to act in a way that doesn't create enemies. If you don t do this interest groups and social movements may form to capture your agency and direct its course of action.

Week 10 (Thursday lecture) -Americans views of bureaucracies are diametrically opposed: too arbitrary or too rule-bound not outcome driven; inefficient; poor incentive structures esp bc they have unclear and sometimes conflicting missions .. same incentives used in business firms tend not to be used in agencies (firing, merit pay, profit sharing, etc) Dilemma of bureaucracy: -bureaucrats should be accountable to democratically elected leaders -bureaucracies require autonomy to take advantage of expertise .. want people to specialize in particular policy areas to deal with them effectively, but it s difficult bc bureaucrats may not always be specialized in areas that are of primary concern to the voters. have to do things that are controversial/not understood by voters. how to balance these concerns? Principal-Agent Paradigm Principal: Hierarchical Superior

-elected officials president & Congress Agent: Subordinate of principal -bureaucrats How to get agents to perform well? 2 dimensions of performance 1) does agent do the things that the principal wants them to/are they insubordinate? 2) how effective are they at actually accomplishing their job well and at low cost The principal s problem is to design bureaucratic institutions/agencies/boards, etc in a way that makes the agents actions reflects the preferences of the principal Easiest way is to select good agents who are well-educated/skilled and tend to have the same views as principal. Also another way is to eliminate moral hazard by creating incentives for agent to act in principal s interests bc principal cant always observe what agents are doing to monitor them. Key Insights -poor selection mechanisms make the moral hazard problem worse -moral hazard problems are harder to solve when there is more than one principal [separation of power systems] as competing interests need to be balanced (President & Congress would both like to incentivize agent to pursue their preferred policies undermines their ability to control behavior of agents) -principal will delegate less authority to agents when the moral hazard problem is severe -principals will delegate more when agents perform specialized tasks that the principal cannot perform herself / may not understand very well (highly technological, require more expertise, etc) Civil Service -appointment by exam for some positions -protection against political removals & assessments -less accountable to elected politicians -more incentives for professionalism and expertise see Types of Agencies chart. (match colors to make sense of it) -weary about agencies being captured by interest groups Clientele Politics and Regulatory Capture -capture theory: interests of the regulated come to dominate regulatory agencies -iron triangles: stable long-term relationships btw agencies, oversight committees, etc. (agency committee interest group) Breaking the triangles : efforts by public interest groups to oppose them, media exposure to expose these political sub-systems which tend to be unresponsive, other political actors have also tried to prevent these relationships as presidents have increased control over them through increased White House Staff and Office of Management & Budget, also more access to courts by groups to prevent this. The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure

-Terry Moe: A bureaucracy that is structurally unsuited for effective action is precisely the kind of bureaucracy that interest groups and politicians routinely and deliberately create. (futile exercise to try to prevent it, bc politicians purposely create unresponsive/under-performing bureaucracies for their benefit .. only way to get effective / responsive bureaucracies is to do away with politics) -Political uncertainty proponents want to place additional admin burdens to guarantee that political opponents cannot undermine agency if they come to power agencies are purposely insulated from presidential management so that when presidents change, agency will continue to do what previous principle wanted it to do (deliberately make it unresponsive) -Political compromise opponents play an important role in agency design Privatization -Should the government contract its activities out to private firms? (Wilson reading) a) efficiency: does private provision cost less? in narrow economic sense, yes .. but most cost savings comes from lower labor costs, private sector workers less likely to unionize. services may be of lower quality. distinction btw economic efficiency and efficiency of pursuing other social/political goals b) equity: will private firm provide the service on an equal basis? Historically, private firms do have incentives to deal with all-paying customers and public sectors also discriminate. equity with respect to ability to pay may be jeopardized if privatization occurs. but there are ways to design schemes like vouchers to address this.. c) accountability: will the private firm be democratically accountable? controversial issues of imposing controls on how public funds are used d) authority: should some decisions be left to the direct representatives? (moral question)

Precept on 1 Dec 2011. Week 10 . Courts Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics Historical overview of how judicial review came about Is the court countermajoritarian? It has no popular mandate; Can overturn laws and policies implemented by the executives/legislators, who have been elected by the people directly.

Tuesday. 5 Dec 2011 What role should the courts play in policy making?

What role are the courts capable of playing? Constitutional Review Judicial review: power of the judiciary to render parliamentary and bureaucratic actions illegal or unconstitutional, can also be more positive in requiring state actors to take certain actors to uphold/fulfill a constitutional statute. Arguments for Judicial Review -constitutions contain limitations on govt. -those limitations must be interpreted and enforced -the courts, to the extent that they are politically insulated (and countermajoritarian) can provide such limitation -courts must ensure that the procedures of democracy are protected Arguments against Judicial Review -constitutions also place constraints on the courts . . who governs the government? -executives and legislatures may have legitimate claims to constitutional interpretation -judicial review is inherently counter-majoritarian, at best it is an exception to democratic majoritarian rule not an advancement of it

Marbury vs Madison -Following his defeat in the 1800 election, Jon Adams made a number of midnight appointments to federal office -Secretary of State Madison refused to deliver the commission to these officeholders -Marbury asked Supreme Court to use its power under Judiciary Act of 1789 to force Madison to deliver the commissions (issue writ of mandamus) -Court ruled that the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional

Positive Theories of Judicial Review -commitment model: dominant parties want to signal a commitment to limitations on their power. (stronger the party, the stronger judicial review will be actually) ExSouth Afrika, concessions made to blacks -insurance model: when power is diffuse and fragmented, the current coalition wants to insure itself of political rights and influence when it loses power (note similarity to Moe s arguments) both agree to have an independent body to protect minority rights Dimensions of Judicial Review -standing .. who can sue? -effect & timing of decision -abstract or concrete: can courts weigh in before law is even passed (abstract like in Germany gives court more power)

-repeal or non-enforcement -mechanisms of accountability -term length -size of court

Problem of Judicial Activism 1) The Dynamic Court idea that the court is politically insulated, free from electoral constraints decision making process is much more streamlined relative to Congress/House breaking gridlock if the court median is located in the gridlock interval, the court can set policy to its ideal point (M vs M) ; even if court is outside gridlock interval it can still make strategic decisions 2) The Constrained Court - bounded nature of constitutional rights prevents the courts from acting on many social reform claims - judiciary lacks sufficient independence from other branches to demand reform, no enforcement power.. rely on executive to enforce kivyao - court lacks tools to implement reforms .. no bureaucrats, cant hire policy analysts - more limitations on court authority: o overruling statutory interpretation by passing new statute o new constitutional amendments are rare o effects can be limited with legislation o over resistance to the court from executives/state govts. Rosenberg -Empirical analysis of when courts can produce social reform: - there is legal precedent for change - legislative and executive support for reform -Effect of Brown v Board of Education -percentage of southern black school children attending school with whites remained at zero until supportive administration came to power -Roe v Wade -abortion laws were liberalizing rapidly before Roe, but the Court was getting out in front of public opinion and there was a backlash.. points to fact that not much changes until public opinion changes (emphasizes minimal role of courts in changing that opinion) -tendency to overstate the importance of court cases More detailed notes on Gerald Rosenberg s The Hollow Hope Two views of the US Supreme Court: 1) Dynamic court: maintains that the US Supreme Court is capable of effecting

widespread change; Brown v Board & Roe v Wade often cited as examples. a. 3 reasons why the court is believed to be able to effect change: i. its members are free from the electoral connection and can thus "act in the face of public opposition" ii. litigants entering their doorsteps -- especially groups desiring social change, who are disadvantaged in the electoral and legislative process -- enjoy access that depends neither on "connections nor position" iii. the court s decisions have indirect ways of producing social change not necessarily enjoyed by those emanating from the other branches; for example, they can serve to set the agendas of the other branches and they iv. can "educate" Americans. 2) Constrained court: holds that because of the existing constraints imposed upon the Court by Congress and the constitution, the Court is unable to accomplish significant change a. First constraint i. the nature of constitutional rights precludes the Court from hearing or effectively acting on many significant social reform claims, and lessens the chances of popular mobilization ii. How to overcome? Can be overcome if there exists sufficient precedence for change b. Second constraint i. does not have sufficient independence from the legislative and executive branches to affect significant social reform ii. How to overcome? Secure support from substantial numbers in Congress and from the executive branch c. Third constraint: i. Court does not have the power to develop necessary policy and implement decisions that could affect significant reform (relies on cooperation from executive & judicial branches to enforce its decisions) ii. How to overcome? Secure support of citizens so that they can pressure the legislators, who care about getting re-elected (points back to Arnold) d. + at least one of the four following conditions is met in addition to all 3 of the above constraints being overcome i. Positive incentives are offered to induce compliance ii. Costs are imposed to induce compliance iii. Court decisions allow for market implementation (birth control for example)

iv. Administrators and officials crucial for implementation are willing to act and see court orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources for hiding behind Rosenberg sides with the Constrained Court view. He points to the procedural/technical obstacles to even bringing a case to court. He maintains that the efforts made by women's rights, pro-choice, and civil rights activists to use the courts to produce social change have not been very effective. To prove and support this claim, he examines a great deal of statistical information. In looking at the effects that Brown v. Board of Education had on desegregation, for example, Rosenberg looks at the percentage of black schoolchildren attending mixed schools in the South in the years preceding this landmark decision, and the years following it. He finds that almost no measurable change had occurred in the ten years following this decision. Indeed, it is not until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that the percentage begins to increase annually. Instead of having substantial positive direct or indirect effects, he argues that the Court s rulings mainly set back the cause of racial integration. Similarly, in looking at Roe v. Wade, he finds that the annual number of legal abortions did not seem to be greatly affected by the Court's decision. He suggests that this ruling similarly did more to harm than advance women s rights, and he gives more credit to extra-judicial developments, including the tide of history, for the progress made in this area as well. He actually develops an extraordinary battery of tests to discern any possible impact -- from the direct to the very indirect -- that the Court's rulings may have had on a diverse range of political actors and the public. To give but a taste, here are some of things he uses to assess whether the Court generated change on the abortion issue (pre/post Roe): the number of legal abortions, precedents, mass and elite attitudes, availability of abortion services, media coverage, and legislative activity. Rosenberg offers a bold conclusion: US courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform. At best, they can second the social reform acts of the other branches of government (p.338/422 (1st/2nd ed.)). At worst, courts serve as fly paper for social reformers who succumb to the lure of litigation (p.341/427). Court rulings divert scarce resources away from more productive uses while providing only an illusion of change (p.341/427). Critics maintain that Rosenberg's argument ignores the implications of court decisions on future actions that created more direct change. There are similar omissions in discussion of MLK Jr., who cited Brown v. Board as a reason for mobilizing his followers in a speech given on a night preceding a boycott. Offering a different perspective, McCann (1992; 1996; 1998) has emphasized ways that court decisions play constitutive roles which he regards as quite significant even though they are largely invisible to Rosenberg s model. More specifically, McCann has directed attention to ways that a variety of political actors, acting through multiple

governmental institutions and independently of them, have constructed legal norms from the bottom up, not only by complying (from the top down) with court decisions.

Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies Questions addressed in this book: a) Why adopt judicial review during periods of democratization? Where does judicial review come from? b) What explains variation in constitutional review powers? How does it develop? c) Once created, why are some constitutional courts more aggressive in utilizing their powers than others? What political conditions support its expansion? Methodology: Examines three constitutional courts in East Asia, where law is traditionally viewed as a tool of authoritarian rulers. New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Thesis: The establishment of constitutional review in new democracies is largely a function of politics and interests, not a reflection of macro-cultural or societal factors or adherence to democratic norms. Specifically, judicial review may provide "insurance" for self-interested, risk-averse politicians, negotiating the terms of new constitutional arrangements under conditions of political deadlock or systemic uncertainty. Moreover, the expansion of judicial power in new democracies is largely a function of courts' shrewdness in gradually expanding their legitimacy and ambit of influence, without antagonizing more powerful potential adversaries from the political environment within which they operate. In other words, judicial review powers (as evidenced by the creation of a constitution with rights and a court that can protect these rights) are so pervasive in new democracies because 1) the future is uncertain in these new political systems and 2) the institutional structure of that political and legal system is still in transition. Judicial review helps provide insurance to get through the transition. -subsumes the commitment model under his insurance model ( * links to Moe s argument about the design of bureaucracies resulting from politics) "Where constitutional designers believe that they may not control the political institutions of government, they are likely to set up a court to serve as an enforcement body protecting the constitutional bargain from encroachment. When designers believe that they will retain a dominant position in government, they seek stronger power for the political branches and will forge institutional constraint in favor of parliamentary sovereignty" (p 200-201). At times of political transition,

greater degrees of political deadlock and/or more diffused or decentralized political power, increases the probability that uncertainty will be embedded in its constitution-making process and subsequent electoral market. This in turn leads to a greater likelihood that a relatively powerful and independent constitutional court will emerge as insurance adopted by risk-averse participants in the constitutional negotiation game. Note: Possible other reasons why new democracies all seem to be choosing a very similar type of legal system and at the minimum have a constitution with rights and at least some court that is given the power to declare laws as unconstitutional? Possibly think about this from the citizen s point view and also the growing connection between new democracies and other countries/international organizations/international banks, etc Structure of judicial review: -how judges get appointed (overtly political apptmt undermines legitimacy and increases likelihood that judge will get kicked off court when you are voted out) -who has access to the courts -effect/timing of decisions -term limits: term vs. lifetime -size of the court (smaller it is, more opportunity executive has to influence it; larger it is, more diffuse but also more inefficient) --> these considerations are made based on why you think a judiciary is necessary to begin with which in turn depends on your party s position in society Precept 15 Dec 2011

Week 11. Democracies and Welfare States

Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaser 2004. Poverty In the US and Europe, Ch 2-7

I Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater & Timothy Sneeding 2006. A Re-examination of Welfare States and Inequality in Rich Nations p897-919