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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
Primary Credit Analyst: Scott Bugie, Paris (33)1-4420-6680; scott_bugie@standardandpoors.com Secondary Credit Analyst: Nick Hill, London (44) 20-7176-7216; nick_hill@standardandpoors.com
Table Of Contents
Write-Down Estimates Have Increased Unwinding Lehman's Trades Will Further Depress The Market Values Of MBS Losses Have Spread Beyond Subprime A Rising Tide Of Write-Downs Alt-A Segment Risk Is Increasing Negative Home Equity Leads To Second-Lien RMBS Defaults CMBS Remains Resilient ABS CDOs Are Likely To Rack Up Heavy Losses EOD Clauses Force Sales At Depressed Values A Hold-To-Maturity Estimate Assesses Economic Value The Industry Moves From Write-Downs To Loan Losses
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
The pain of the global financial industry remains largely linked to the declining fortunes of the U.S. housing sector. Securities backed by U.S. mortgage loans have lost hundreds of billions of dollars in value since summer 2007. The losses have spread beyond subprime, which represents only 10%-15% of residential real estate borrowing in the U.S., to other pressured areas of U.S. housing finance. Three prominent players--Citigroup Inc. (AA-/Negative/A-1+), Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (A/Watch Dev/A-1), and UBS AG (AA-/Negative/A-1+)--account for 40% of the more than $300 billion in write-downs of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and leveraged loans taken through the first half of 2008. Beyond that concentration, the write-downs have been spread geographically and by institution. Intermediaries and investors across the globe took part in the financing of highly leveraged U.S. households during the boom years; they consequently are bearing their share of losses from the decline. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services believes that turbulent capital market conditions and continuing negative news from the U.S. mortgage market will lead to another large wave of write-downs in the second half of 2008. The rare true sales of nonprime MBS in 2008 have been at depressed prices. The stunning collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman; D/--/D) and the unwinding of the group's trades surely will place additional downward pressure on values of nonprime MBS via forced sales under unfavorable market conditions. While the global industry likely has passed the halfway mark for write-downs, a wider range of MBS segments are at risk and all segments of MBS have deteriorated in recent months. We expect financial institutions with material residual balances of nonprime MBS to take significant additional write-downs in the second half of 2008. In fact, this has already begun with the third-quarter earnings releases of the U.S. broker-dealers. The drop in value of several MBS segments is the result of accelerating rates of delinquency and default of U.S. mortgage borrowers as well as the complex financial engineering of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that has amplified the impact of the MBS decline. (See "The Credit Market Dislocation: Putting The Key Factors In Perspective," published Sept. 3, 2008, on RatingsDirect.) CDOs of asset-backed securities (ABS) represent the lion's share of losses at this stage in the cycle. Also representing significant risk concentrations are the Alternative-A, closed-end second mortgages (CES), and home equity line of credit (HELOC) segments of RMBS. The values of other bank assets that are marked to market--leveraged loans, commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and loans warehoused for inclusion in CMBS--have also eroded. When we analyze nonprime MBS from a "hold-to-maturity" perspective, the write-downs that financial institutions have already taken appear to cover the majority of projected losses on the wider group of MBS mentioned above. Focusing on the tiered structure of MBS shows that much greater amounts of estimated losses will penetrate the highly rated tranches of ABS CDOs and second-lien RMBS than the other segments of MBS, including subprime RMBS. But current market forces are such that an increasing proportion of nonprime MBS are being marked to prevailing low values. For example, half of the ABS CDOs issued from 2005 through 2007 have already reached event-of-default triggers that accelerate payments or lead to termination of the CDO and liquidation of the underlying securities. The financial industry raised a huge amount of capital over the past year to compensate for securities losses. The present market conditions are less favorable, and financial institutions face this next wave of write-downs with reduced opportunities to raise additional capital. The success in future capital raising, through issues or asset sales,
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
to compensate for additional securities write-downs, will be the key factor driving the credit ratings on many global financial institutions in the second half of 2008.
Unwinding Lehman's Trades Will Further Depress The Market Values Of MBS
Lehman Brothers' collapse will likely place further downward pressure on MBS values. While the Sept. 14, 2008, Chapter 11 filing only included the U.S. holding company Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI), the group's major international operating entities in the U.K., Japan, and Germany have been placed under various forms of administration by the financial authorities of their respective countries. We believe that many trades between Lehman's broker-dealer subsidiaries and their counterparties technically are in default due to the Chapter 11 filing--even if the operating subsidiaries remain solvent and functioning. This has or will lead to the unwinding of many trades. The acquisition of Lehman's U.S. trading operations by Barclays PLC (AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+) will limit only moderately the impact of this. The primary objective of financial authorities around the globe now in control of Lehman group's entities is for an orderly resolution and quick return of cash, stock, and other securities to Lehman customers. In the U.S., the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, a government regulatory organization that works closely with the SEC, made a statement to this effect on the day LBHI filed for bankruptcy protection.
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
The demise of Lehman means that the market loses a leading investor and trader of MBS and other structured securities. This troubling development comes when most banks and brokers are trying to shrink risk assets and reduce their MBS holdings. To the extent that Lehman is forced to sell securities in an unfavorable market environment when closing trades and paying maturing debts, downward pressure on the market values of MBS will increase. Lehman does not have material holdings of ABS CDOs, however, and the Lehman group had reduced materially its balances of other nonprime MBS since the summer of 2007. Approximately half of Lehman's MBS is European RMBS, which have not lost value to the same extent as U.S. RMBS. This is a factor that may limit the impact of the winding down of Lehman specifically on MBS prices. Lehman's $33 billion global commercial real estate portfolio, in contrast, is substantial, and is dominated by whole loans and equity positions. These will be difficult to sell. Lehman holds relatively little CMBS, and most is in Europe.
2005 2006 2007 Loss severity 10.5 23.0 27.0 50 N.A. N.A. N.A. 18.5 6.9 0.3 2.1 4.8 11.0 12.2 46.2 22.6 0.8 2.5 6.7 14.7 15.0 57.1 37.9 1.2 2.8 35 40 40 100 100 25-30 34
The broad European mortgage sector--both loans and MBS--to date has not experienced the same erosion in quality as the U.S. market. In Europe, mortgage loans have not deteriorated materially in performance, and MBS and covered bonds backed by mortgages have held their values better than U.S. MBS. Nonetheless, certain European markets--notably the U.K., Spain, and Ireland--are starting to weaken in our view, and the growing housing market
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
pressures in several European countries will be a negative credit factor for banks for the next two to three years.
On July 30, 2008, Standard & Poor's revised upward its expectations of default frequency and loss severity for the
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
recent vintages of subprime RMBS (see "Standard & Poor's Revises U.S. Subprime, Prime, And Alternative-A RMBS Loss Assumptions."). To update our estimate, we applied the revised estimates to the original issuance and outstanding balances of subprime RMBS (see table 2).
Table 2
Our estimate only covers securities that Standard & Poor's rates. Adding unrated securities could increase the total value of the amounts by up to 15% and would boost the projected lifetime loss by the same proportion. On the other hand, the estimate does not take into account in the positive offsetting factors of excess spread, which can be a material factor, and overcollateralization (OC) in the subprime RMBS themselves. Our calculation shows a lifetime loss of $230 billion, of which $182 billion is from the 2006 and 2007 vintages due to the projected greater deterioration of the subprime loans from those years. At origin, we rated 'AAA' approximately 80%, or $960 billion, of the $1.2 trillion in subprime RMBS issued 2005 through 2007, and 'AA+' and lower $240 billion in subordinated tranches. Without taking into account the OC and excess spread, the projected $230 billion in lifetime losses in the underlying pools would extinguish most of the $240 billion in original issuance of subordinated tranches but would not reach the 'AAA' subprime RMBS from a "whole-segment" perspective. From this big-picture perspective the 'AAA' tranches would not suffer any losses through to the maturity of the securities. But structured MBS are not identical. The performance of specific securities depends on portfolio composition (geography and loan type), the degree of subordination, and the existence and amount of OC and excess spread. The year and quarter of origination of the subprime loan collateral is the primary determining factor in the potential for loss. Depending on these security-specific factors, some 'BBB' rated subprime RMBS could pay full interest and principal through to maturity, and some 'AAA' rated RMBS could default.
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
adjustable-rate (negative amortization) mortgage subsegments of Alt-A RMBS are more than double the projected loss rate for fixed-rate Alt-A loans. Although transactions involving these riskier segments typically have higher credit enhancement than for other Alt-A RMBS, they have generally incurred much larger write-downs, which reflect lower coverage of projected/pipeline losses. We project a lifetime loss of $79 billion on the underlying Alt-A loans issued from 2005 through 2007, a total that slightly exceeds one-third of the dollar amount of subprime RMBS losses projected for the same three years (see table 3). As with the subprime RMBS, we exclude Alt-A loans in unrated transactions and the potential offset of OC and excess spread. While from our calculation Alt-A is a risky segment, we do not believe it poses the same magnitude of damage to the industry as does subprime RMBS.
Table 3
*Average loss assumption weighted by original issuance for the three subsegments: fixed-rate, option adjustable-rate, and short-reset hybrid. Source: Standard & Poor's.
The layer of subordinated Alt-A securities under the 'AAA' tranche is much thinner than that of subprime RMBS. We rated 'AAA' at origin approximately 94%, or $1.06 trillion, of Alt-A securities issued 2005 through 2007, and 'AA+' and lower $70 billion in subordinated tranches. Subordinated tranches rated 'AA+' and lower at origin are at risk of default, while securities that we rated 'AAA' at origin are largely protected by the subordination (and excess spread and OC) and should pay in full to maturity under the new loss assumptions. But as with subprime RMBS, the performance of specific securities will vary greatly depending on portfolio composition, excess spread, and OC.
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
Table 4
43 28 81
46.2 57.1 --
Table 5
Original issuance Loss assumption (% from table 1) Projected losses on original issuance 30 6.9 2.1 25 13 69 22.6 37.9 -5.7 5.1 12.9
Note that the HELOCs that served as collateral for RMBS issued in 2005-2007 represent a small proportion--less than 10%--of the total of HELOCs outstanding in the U.S. financial industry. Banks' on-balance-sheet HELOC loans represent a significantly larger concentration of risk from a systemwide perspective than do HELOC RMBS. The U.S. financial industry has already charged off a substantial amount of delinquent HELOCs, with more to come as the housing slump deepens.
Original issuance Loss assumption (% from table 1) Projected losses on original issuance 154 2.1 3.2 188 220 562 2.5 2.8 -4.8 6.0 14.2
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
High-grade 20 70 70
Mezzanine 30 85 85
CDO Squared 30 85 85
Applying these percentages yields an estimate of total write-downs of ABS CDOs of $309 billion (see table 8). The estimate for subprime RMBS plus ABS CDOs is $378 billion (see table 9). This estimate eliminates the double counting of risky mezzanine subprime RMBS purchased by ABS CDOs: approximately 70% of the subordinated tranches of subprime RMBS issued from 2005 through 2007 were purchased by ABS CDOs.
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
Table 8
*Commercial real estate (CRE) plus CUSIP CMBS. Issued through September 2007.
Table 9
69 309 378
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
Table 10
We projected ABS CDO losses by taking our assumptions for loss rates on subprime and Alt-A RMBS by vintage and tranche rating level and applying them to the specific securities that compose ABS CDOs. The result of this calculation is a cumulative loss of $264 billion with a higher loss rate on mezzanine CDOs and CDOs squared and a relatively lower rate on high-grade CDOs. To this we add a total of $173 billion in estimated losses on the other nonprime MBS segments. We eliminate double counting of the subprime and Alt-A RMBS purchased by ABS CDOs--this is why for subprime RMBS in particular the projected losses are only $69 billion. Most of the losses from subprime RMBS are borne by ABS CDOs. The fact that total write-downs through the first half of 2008 fall short of the hold-to-maturity estimate clearly points to heavy additional write-downs as the downturn deepens. We are making our estimates for securities write-downs and for projected losses from a hold-to-maturity perspective in the context of a slowing global economy, tighter credit market conditions, and widening spreads on all classes of debt--including for corporate and some government bonds. In particular, estimating the future market value of securities in such a turbulent and uncertain environment is subject to a wide margin of error. We believe that global systemwide write-downs of all debt securities to currently depressed and declining market values could easily double our $378 billion estimate for potential write-downs of subprime RMBS and ABS CDOs only. Market valuations may reflect significant risk premiums for illiquidity and uncertainties with respect to the assumptions of losses for different segments and vintages. We believe that the market is still searching for an equilibrium price on trillions of dollars of structured securities, in particular at the higher end of the ratings spectrum. The gap between projected securities losses on a hold-to-maturity and a market valuation approach is significant for many MBS that have retained their 'AAA' ratings.
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Global Financial Institutions Eye Another Wave Of Write-Downs As U.S. Housing Woes Spread
Perhaps the broadening of the subprime label to include most classes of bank assets in a wider range of countries is fitting--we just need a better name for this slump. The wider pool of affected assets reflects a second phase of the downturn in the credit cycle. In this "post-write-downs" phase, we expect that balance sheet loan losses and lower business volumes will dominate, as opposed to the market value write-downs of securities in the first phase. Right now, write-downs of MBS and other securities will remain significant, while on-balance-sheet loan losses will continue to climb. Unfortunately, the first stage is not over yet, and significant further write-downs are in store for global banks. The overlap of these two stages--additional securities write-downs and rising loan losses--in the second half of 2008 may prove to be the most difficult test yet for the battered global financial sector.
Additional Contact: Financial Institutions Ratings Europe; FIG_Europe@standardandpoors.com
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