DANS, JR V PEOPLE Petitioner: Jose Dans, Jr and Imelda Marcos Respondent: Hon.

Sandiganbayan, People of the Philippines Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court, Certiorari

FACTS: 1984: Imelda Marcos was both Chairwoman if the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). Jose Dans was the Vice-Chairman of the LRTA and Director of PGHI. By virtue of an Agreement for the Development of the Areas Adjacent to the Light Rail Transit System Stations and the Management and Operations of the Concession Areas Therein , two lease agreements of LRTA land were made to PGHI and PGHFI subsequently subleased the two at the following values: 1. June 8 lease of Pasay Lot, leased: Php 102,760; subleased: Php 734,000 2. June 18 lease of Sta. Cruz Lot, leased Php 92, 437; subleased: Php 199,710 January 12 1992: Marcos and Dans were charged with the following (a. Accused; b. Charge): 1. Criminal Case 17449 a. Marcos, Dans b. while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did the and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforementioned government corporation (LRTA) into an agreement for the development of the areas adjacent to the LRTA stations and the management and operation of the concession areas therein, with PGHFI, a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. c. Charged pursuant to RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 2. Criminal Case 17450 a. Marcos, Dans b. Lease on Pasay Lot was disadvantageous to the government 3. Criminal Case 17451 a. Marcos b. then Chairman of the LRTA, a government entity created under EO No 603 of the former President Ferdinand Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did the and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Chairman of the PGHFI, a private corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which

private enterprise has, at the time, pending business transactions with the accused, in her capacity as Chairman of the LRTA. 4. Criminal Case 17452 a. Dans b. Same as above except: Vice-Chairman of LRTA accepting the Director position of PGHFI 5. Criminal Case 17453 a. Marcos, Dans b. Lease of Sta. Cruz Lot was disadvantageous to government c. This charge would fail because prosecution couldn t submit an authenticated copy of the sublease agreement Both pleaded not guilty. Dans moved for the advance examination of the RAMON CUERVO, a real estate broker as an expert witness to inform the court that the agreed lease prices stated in agreements are based on fair standard industry valuation standards. Marcos would never question Cuervo and later expressed that she had no desire to further examine him. By the time the case was submitted for decision, Marcos neither submitted formal offer of evidence, despite notice from court to do so, not the required memorandum. September 24, 1993: Judgment from First Division Sandiganbayan: 1. ACQUITTING: cases 17449, 17451, 17452 2. CONVICTING: cases 17450, 17453 November 13, 1996: Court would deny motions for reconsideration and modify 1993 Decision by adding civil liability of petitioners: 1. 17450 Php 32, 172,000 2. 17453 Php 92,268,840 Both raise motions for reconsideration, cases are consolidated.

ISSUES: I.

Was respondent Court correct in denying the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Dans in 17453? YES DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If court denies motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution.

Dans had asked for a Dismissal in December 1992. It was denied. He argues that the testimony of Cuervo should not have been admitted because it was not submitted as evidence. Court ruled that there is nothing barring the court from taking cognizance of any matter taken up during the trial or which has become part of the records. It is erroneous to suppose that Cuervo s testimony was not formally offered because testimonial evidence is formally offered by the calling of the witness to the stand . Furthermore, even without Cuervo s testimony, there was enough evidence presented to show the discrepancy between the lease contract and the sublease contract to show that the government was disadvantaged. II. Were informations filed in 17450 and 17453 sufficient in form? YES Under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the elements of the crime are: 1. accused in public officer 2. entered in a contract or transaction on behalf of the government 3. such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government Information met the minimum requirements for them to upheld in the court Assuming arguendo, other courses of action could have been taken, such as filing for a motion for a BILL OF PARTICULARS - Bill of Particulars: Defendant may, at any time on or before arraignment, move for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. Marcos filed such motion. After prosecution had filed its answer, she did not reply, indicating she was satisfied. III. Constitutionality of Section 3(g), RA 3019 YES There is no vagueness about the statute. To ask of the how s and why s is evidentiary in nature and unique to each case. IV. Was Marcos deprived of her constitutional right to be heard or counsel? NO She was represented by: Atty. Coronel, Attys. Dilag, Sillano, Fernandez, Millora, David, Diego, Mendoza and the law firm of Lazaro and Associates.

V.

Was the evidence properly appreciated by Court? YES Were members of First Division Sandiganbayan bias, consequently, was their 1993 Decision valid? YES Justice GARCHITORENA was actively questioning Cuervo. This is immaterial because of the documentary evidence. Records show that the Justices could not reach a consensus, so a Special Division was constituted. The Justices had a change of heart after informal discussion and would reach a unanimous decision. Petitioners point out that once the Special Division was created, the First Division was thereby divested of jurisdiction. Court held that although they aver such behavior among judges, but the decision is in tune with the right of the accused to a speedy trial, which is more important than any consideration of technical impropriety in resolving a case.

VI.

VII.

Was guilt of petitioners proved beyond a reasonable doubt? YES Guilt was not solely based on the testimony of Cuervo, which at best was only an opinion and his figures estimates. The guilt was shown conclusively by the nexus of the documentary evidence.