Aristotles Conscious Evil Typology Manuel Oriol-Salgado

Abstract The phenomenon of akrasia or moral incontinence represents the point where the problem of evil turns into a specific and problematic human issue. The first is explained because it can only happen in reasonable beings, and the second because it happens in contradiction with reason. Thus, the study of akrasia, which Aristotle opens in his Nicomachean Ethics VII, is one of the first philosophical approaches to the problem of human wickedness. This paper begins with identifying the human type that akrasia reveals which matches neither the bad or vicious man, nor the enkrates or continent man (nor, of course, the good or virtuous man, nor any other non fully human behaviors). The Aristotelian akrasia has been widely discussed in philosophical literature, but most often only from the point of view of its essence and possibility, in contrast with Socrates moral intellectualism. Here, we will describe the different forms that the transgression of ones own convictions can assume. This question has not yet received the attention it requires from commentators, while Aristotle devotes to it a much longer treatment than to the Socratic discussion. The categorization of akrasia corresponds to three independent criteria. First, Aristotle regards the kind of pleasure that overcomes reason. A necessary pleasure or a non-necessary, a human or a non-human one will produce different kinds of akrasia. Second, the passion that efficiently causes the akrasic action can be positive or negative, i.e. seeking a pleasure or avoiding a pain. Third, deliberation can have taken place or not at the moment of the akratic action. Crossing these criteria, we find a rich and qualified typology of akrasia, as well as of enkrateia. The most interesting point, though, is the moral ascription of this typology. Each one of the akratic types deserves its own moral assessment. This evaluation, finally, sheds light on Aristotles own ethical and anthropological conception. Key Words: Akrasia, Aristotle, brutality, continence, enkrateia, evil, incontinence, pleasure, softness, wickedness. ***** 1. Akrasia as Conscious Evil Aristotle devotes the central part of his main ethical work, the Nicomachean Ethics, to the study of virtue.1 If we recall the analogy of the archer that Aristotle sketches at the beginning of this work,2 we can say that

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______________________________________________________________ while the goal of ethics is not knowing the good but being good,3 such knowledge is essential to achieving that purpose. For that reason, the primary intention of the book is to describe what the human good consists in, that is, virtue, both ethic and dianoethic. Given this description of the human good, the opposite disposition appears in contrast to it: vice. Vice is studied at the same time as its positive side: virtue. Precisely for this reason, vice is symmetric to virtue: if the virtuous has a good (true) moral knowledge, he desires and performs it; the vicious has a bad (false) moral knowledge, he desires and performs it. Paradoxically enough, therefore, virtue and vice, as conceived by Aristotle, have much in common: in both moral dispositions there is full consistency between knowledge, desire and action. Arriving at this point, however, Aristotle finds a problem: to be honest, it is rare among men to find such a consistency. Mans moral reality is much more complex, and both in the good and in the bad there is a mixture of virtue and vice, though in different proportions. His own realism makes the Philosophers face in Book VII the whole issue from a new beginning, 4 that is, he addresses the usual case in which the moral agent is not consistent, but instead reveals an internal division. When within such a division the rational part overcomes the irrational, such a phenomenon is called enkrateia (continence, in its Latin translation), whereas if the irrational (desire) overcomes the rational, we find the case of akrasia (incontinence or weakness of will), i.e. the case in which the agent has right moral knowledge, but the desire of the opposite action makes him not to follow it. Besides these two regular habits, Aristotle distinguishes two extreme ones: brutality and divine virtue, which are respectively infra- and supra-human. What is characteristic of the brute is that he does not even use reason, he is completely stripped of it (and therefore he would have an animal behavior, purely instinctive). In contrast to this, vice at least follows reason, albeit it is a wrong reason. For reasons of symmetry, we must assume that divine virtue, which is barely mentioned by Aristotle, is a habit in which there is not any irrational part, but that the agent (the god, the hero) is moved only by what its reason dictates. Not even his desire is in accordance with his reason (for that is virtue), but his desire, if any, is not a motor for his action. In short, moral dispositions (i.e. habits that are the object of moral evaluation in Aristotle, beyond actions and intentions) are more varied than the known pair virtue-vice. Sorted best to worst, these dispositions are: divine virtue, human virtue, enkrateia, akrasia, vice and brutality. The last three are wicked dispositions, for they lead to evil actions and they do not accomplish the goal of man. And of these, only akrasia and vice are conscious, because only in them there is no intervention of reason.5 But only in akrasia there is evil conscience, because only in the akrates the evil

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______________________________________________________________ that is performed is recognised as bad by the agent himself.6 This type of moral disposition, which in addition is the most widespread one, is what I call conscious evil. 2. Typology of Akrasia Although at the beginning of EN Book VII Aristotle presents six challenges that the opinions of the wise and the people about akrasia bring forward,7 commentators (specially contemporary ones) have focused almost exclusively on one of them, to which chapter 3 is devoted. This challenge is probably the most outstanding philosophical issue concerning akrasia: whether it is possible or not, and if so, how it is possible. Because of the separation that Aristotle made from Socrates on this point, Aristotles position is particularly interesting. But the essence and the possibility of akrasia is not the only issue of this matter which has philosophical relevance. From the challenges or difficulties posed by common opinions, the second difficulty that Aristotle faces, and to which he devotes more space,8 refers to the domain of akrasia: in what kind of actions does akrasia take place? Throughout the discussion, the main concern of the Philosopher seems to be to accommodate the common beliefs with the philosophical solution to the possibility of akrasia that he has set out before. But in doing this, he draws a much more nuanced and suggestive map of the different types of akrasia than the one he had traced so far, and to which present commentators normally devote little attention. A. Classification According to Pleasure or Pain One of the most indisputable results of the Aristotelian solution to the essence and possibility of akrasia is that desire is a key factor (though not the only one) to provide an account of human movement, and specifically of the akrates action. And desire is intimately associated with pleasure and pain. Thus, the dominion of akrasia is the same as the dominion of pleasures and pains, and an initial classification of akrasia (and enkrateia) species must be parallel to the classification of pleasures and pains. First of all, this classification must take into account precisely the distinction between pleasure and pain. If we limit ourselves to what we have called conscious evil, Aristotle distinguishes between acting evil consciously in order to pursue pleasure (akrasia in its proper sense) and acting evil consciously in order to avoid pain (softness, malakia). It is not difficult to imagine some examples, i.e. someone who steals (knowing that it is wrong) because he desires what he steals (akrasia in narrow sense), in contrast to someone who steals because otherwise his kidnappers will torment him (softness). Aristotle puts forward some more extreme examples of softness, as, for instance, of one who pulls his robe along the ground instead of making the effort to lift it.

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______________________________________________________________ These two types have much in common. Both are species of akrasia (in a broad sense), and therefore the solutions and distinctions that Aristotle has made so far apply to both of them. In both, the desire to pursue pleasure or to avoid pain is strong, for it fights and overcomes what the very reason of the agent indicates, and therefore they are morally less reprehensible than vice, in which the pleasure or pain accompanying the actions are weaker, since they do not need to overcome reason.9 But they also differ, not only in the kind of desire, but also in their moral evaluation. We will try to deepen this point later. B. Classification According to the Kind of Desire Aristotle, as is well known, distinguishes three kinds of desire in correlation with the different parts of the human soul: desires of the sensitive part (appetites), of the spirited part (impulses), and of the rational part (volitions). The second classification (the first in the order of the Nicomachean Ethics), related to the previous one, divides akrasia between the one produced by appetite and the one produced by impulse. Obviously, there can be no akrasia caused by volition, because by definition this kind of desire is rational and subject to reason, and in akrasia desire opposes reason. Actually, Aristotle draws his classification from the kinds of pleasure (and, we can extend his criterion, from the kinds of pain) that he distinguishes in NE VII, 4: necessary pleasures, and desirable pleasures in themselves but subject to excess. The first ones are the pleasures of the body (sex, food, drink, etc.), while the latter are the pleasures associated with practical life and reason (victory, fame, wealth, friendship, etc.). Purely intellectual pleasures (those associated with theoretical or contemplative life) do not fall in this latter group, because they are not capable of excess. Neither do some other pathological pleasures to which we shall refer later. Moreover, this classification of pleasures coincides with that of the kinds of desire, which is divided by the pleasures they seek. Surely the primary meaning of akrasia is related to the appetites. This akrasia is called akrasia haplos (without further specification) or absolute by Aristotle. The prevalence of this type of desire in the explanation of akrasia has led interpreters to consider that it is the only possible akrasia. However, though in a secondary or metaphorical sense, Aristotle treats impulse akrasia at length. Not only is it possible doing evil consciously following a brute or instinctive desire. Also those that consciously pursue with disorder (with excess) other kind of pleasures not so low (such as the pleasures associated with friendship or honour) do evil. Finally, Aristotle speaks about another type of metaphorical akrasia, related to a third type of pleasure (and, it is understood, with a third type of associated desire, although not as developed as the previous ones in the Aristotelian works): the bestial akrasia. Indeed, there are pleasures that are neither necessary nor rational in any sense. These pleasures are unnatural,

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______________________________________________________________ pathological, such as the cannibals pleasure, or the incestuous one, and so on. Aristotle seems to include not only unnatural pleasures of the body but also impulse unnatural pleasures (excessive cowardice, for example). But we should not confuse this type of akrasia with brutality as a moral disposition. For in bestial akrasia, we must assume some degree (albeit minimal) of using the reason, of being conscious of evil: the bestial akrates is overcome by those pathological pleasures, but he is conscious that it is evil. There is brutality because of the act committed, but not because of the consciousness (repentance, according to other Aristotelian passages) of what is being done. C. Other Classifications and Global View A third classification of akrasia is far less developed than the ones before, and does not follow the same classification criteria (related to the kind of desire or the object of desire), but it depends on the rational part, the part betrayed by desire. Indeed, some act against a deliberate moral knowledge, while others act without such a deliberation having taken place. Deliberation is the process of seeking the best means to achieve the end of action, and results in a decision to act. If the akrasia takes place after deliberation, it seems that the decision taken is not strong, for the agent cannot be loyal to his own decisions. If it takes place before deliberation, the akrates does not think about his own actions, but he is led by his first reactions. For these reasons, Aristotle referred to the first ones as weak, and to the latter as impetuous. Finally, Aristotle mentions, but does not develop, a fourth classification: habit akrasia versus natural akrasia. But we do not have enough elements to interpret what Aristotle meant by this. Not taking into account this fourth classification, we would have twelve possibilities of conscious evil, if we cross all the distinctions just made. But not all these types of conscious evil are really possible for Aristotle. For example, it is doubtful that there can be a weak bestial akrasia, as it requires deliberation without the use of reason (which is a contradiction). But the Philosopher does not develop his classifications. 3. Moral Evaluation of the Different Dispositions So far we have made a classification of the types of conscious evil that Aristotle distinguishes, without going deep into the moral evaluation that they deserve according to the Philosopher. The main criterion used by Aristotle in this evaluation is the extent to which the rational part is used, whether the agent is more or less rational in his actions. Related to this criterion, he also ranks the moral dispositions in accordance with their extension: the most common, natural and widespread bad dispositions, are less condemnable than the most exclusive, just like the exclusive good dispositions are more praiseworthy than the common ones

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______________________________________________________________ (for example, virtue is more exclusive than enkrateia). A third criterion or evidence of more or less accountability is the openness with which actions are performed: when we perform an action in secret it is a sign of greater shame, and therefore of less moral value. Regarding the distinction between appetite akrasia (haplos) and impulse akrasia, Aristotle is clear: it is preferable impulse akrasia, because this kind of desire is more rational than the other. The first is a vice (in the improper sense), while the latter is not censored (or it is censored just as a lapse). The third criterion also rows in the same direction: the appetite akrates performs its actions more secretly than the impulse akrates. The second criterion, however, is unclear at this point: it seems that appetite akrasia is more widespread, and yet it is more reprehensible. As for the beastly akrasia, it is clear that, according to every criterion, it is worse than appetite akrasia. Aristotle makes no distinction between the moral value of akrasia for pleasure and akrasia for pain, but we can assume, applying the third criteria mentioned, that akrasia for pleasure is worse than softness. Indeed, Aristotle suggests that the akrates strictly speaking is worse than the soft,10 although his reasons are not clear. Regarding the classification of weakness and impetuosity, obviously weakness (which includes deliberation) is more reprehensible than impetuosity (which excludes deliberation), because it is more contrary to reason. It is also more hidden and more exclusive. However, how are these moral judgments to be crossed with each other? As we just said, impulse akrasia is better than appetite akrasia, and appetite akrasia better than bestial akrasia. It is also clear that impulse akrasia is better than weakness akrasia. It is not so clear, but we can deduce it, that akrasia for pain (softness) is better than akrasia for pleasure. But is weak impulse akrasia better than impetuous appetite akrasia (just to give an example)? Aristotle gives us no clues about this. 4. Conclusions Aristotles is the first philosophical approach not only to how is it possible that we act wickedly fully consciously of our wrongdoing, but also of the classification of the different kinds of such behaviour. His classification relies on two criteria: the kind of desire from which the akrates moves, and the kind of reasoning which is betrayed by this desire. Although Aristotles moral evaluation of each kind of akrasia is not fully clear, he gives us some clues that allow us to complete to some degree his view. This classification and evaluation sheds some light on other aspects of Aristotles philosophy and has influenced more than usually is admitted. On the one hand, it confirms both the rationalism and the aristocratism of his

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______________________________________________________________ ethics. On the other hand, it anticipates the concept of legal extenuating or aggravating circumstances.

Notes
1 2

NE II-VI. NE I, 1094a22-24. 3 NE II, 2, 1103b26-29. 4 NE VII, 1, 1145a15. 5 NE VII, 6, 1150a1-3. 6 NE VII, 9, 1152a5-8. 7 The opinions are in NE VII, 1, 1145b8-21; the difficulties raised by them in NE VII, 2, 1145b22-1146b7. 8 NE VII, 4-7. 9 Cf. NE VII, 7, 1150a27-31. 10 NE VII, 7, 1150a35-b15. What Aristotle says explicitly is that the enkrates is better than the firm, and by the symmetry of their exposure we conclude that the soft is better than the akrates.

Bibliography
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Book VII, C. Natali. (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. Bobonich, C., Nicomachean Ethics. VII: Akrasia and Self-Control. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Book VII, C. Natali (ed). Manuel Oriol-Salgado is professor at CEU San Pablo University in Madrid. His main philosophical interests are ancient ethics, logic and philosophy of action.