Smart Healthcare Security Survey
Smart Healthcare Security Survey
net/publication/323576672
Article in International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering · October 2017
DOI: 10.23956/ijarcsse.v7i10.423
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Abstract—The Internet of things (IoT) is one of the emerging technologies that brought revolution in many
application domains such as smart cities, smart retails, healthcare monitoring and so on. As the physical objects are
connected via internet, security risk may arise. This paper analyses the existing technologies and protocols that are
designed by different authors to ensure the secure communication over internet. It additionally focuses on the
advancement in healthcare systems while deploying IoT services.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), Body sensor network (BSN), healthcare, security, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a concept of reflecting a conglomeration of devices that are connected to the
internet. It is a next generation technology which will impact the whole world. Introducing automation allows people to
live a sophisticated life style. IoT plays an important role in wide range of applications such as smart cities, structural
health, emergency services, smart healthcare etc. In the last few years, this field has drawn huge attention from
researchers to address the potential of the IoT in the healthcare field by considering various practical challenges. Wireless
Sensor Network technology has its potential usage in wide range of applications. This technology is integrated with IoT
to achieve huge changes to the future society. Health care is one of the most attractive applications of IoT which helps
elder people to live independently. Apart from the advantages of IoT, there are several security and privacy issues to be
considered when automating the healthcare system. This paper surveys about several security scheme that exist in health
care and other applications of IoT.
In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey on various approaches in securing the healthcare system. The
section II of this paper briefly describes the introduction of IoT and WBSN to give the right background for
understanding the system. In this paper, section III lists out several security requirements that are required to resist
various attacks to the healthcare system. Section IV describes various attacks that are more challenging to the healthcare
environment. Section V presents the survey of various healthcare models and the comparison table in terms of protocol
and the security services they provide. Finally, conclusion of the review paper is given in section VI.
B. Data Integrity
Data Integrity ensures that the data transmitted via network is not tampered, delayed or replayed by an adversary
for malicious activity. Ensuring data integrity is essential to resist against modification, repudiation and replaying attacks.
Data integrity maintains the correctness and consistency of the data during the entire life cycle of the data.
C. User anonymity
To protect the user’s privacy, the protocol must be able to provide user anonymity. This requirement guarantees
that the attacker could never access the information of a legal party. This keeps the identity of the patient secretive. The
anonymity preservation is a very important requirement to be considered in maintaining the security of the system.
D. Availability
This requirement ensures that the server must be continuously available to the user to access information or send
commands when required. Sensory data and wearable medical services must be available at all times. More significantly,
data should be correct always and should be able to dynamically adapt to event, time and location and the data.
E. Non-traceability
An authentication protocol should be able to provide non-traceability; i.e., the adversary should not be able to
trace the action of the valid user. The patient’s location information is transmitted via communication channel. As this
information is highly confidential, this must be done in a secured way so that an attacker can never trace out the exact
position of the patient.
G. Data confidentiality
This requirement ensures that the information is transmitted securely during all communications between the
communicating parties. Since the medical data are highly sensitive, it must be encrypted both at storage and during
transmission, so that users without the correct keys cannot access the data. Therefore, the privacy of the wireless
communication channels must be considered to prevent the data from eavesdropping.
H. Access control
The security mechanism must be able to properly enforce different access rights for different users. The access
control mechanism must be resilient to attacks from colluding adversaries and from cloned devices. The system should
be able to verify the user and give permission to access service. For each access request, the system must verify the
validity of the user. If the user is invalid, user request will not be proceed and he will not be allowed to access the
services. On successful verification, the access is granted to the requester.
A. Eavesdropping attack
It refers to the process of listening to an on-going communication, which is an initial step for launching other
attacks. Such attacks are easier to perform on unprotected wireless channels, because the communication takes place in
an open insecure wireless channel. To prevent this attack, the data transmission between two parties is protected using
B. Impersonation attack
This attack occurs when an illegal user pretends to be a legal entity by replaying a genuine message intercepted
from a previous successful communication. An adversary may attempt to launch an impersonation attack by replaying
the intercepted messages or modifying the intercepted message parameters
C. Replay attack
In replay attack, an attacker usually traps and transmits the prior executed messages to the recipient entities to
prove that the message has been sent from the legal sender entity .i.e., an adversary would like to cheat the protocol
entities by replaying previous used messages. The random number and timestamps are two mainly used mechanisms to
resist replay attack. Using these two parameter verification, the replay message will be rejected.
D. Man-in-the-middle attack
This attack occurs when the adversary silently listens to the communication of two legal parties with the intent
to delay, alter or delete messages exchanged during communication. When a patient is in urgent need of medication, an
attacker in extreme conditions may prescribe worst kind of medication procedures which may lead to the loss of valuable
life. Resistance to man-in-the-middle attack is one of the most important security considerations after authentication. An
efficient solution for resisting man-in-the-middle attacks is to embed the identities of all communicating entities into the
protocol message for entity authentication.
G. Spoofing attack
Spoofing or Masquerading is a type of attack that causes threat to data integrity. In this attack scenario, a false
user pretends to be a doctor or the medical database of a recognized hospital to give false medication to a genuine patient.
Therefore, it is important to protect the system against spoofing attack.
In 2006, Wood A [Link] [3] developed ALARM-NET, an Assisted-Living And Residential Monitoring NETwork
that combines different devices in a simple architecture, connecting wearable body networks, wireless sensors, and IP-
network elements. Real-time data queries are a significant process in ALARM-NET. It permits users to interact with the
running system and allows automatic data collection. Queries are determined by <source, ID> tuples, and request a
certain type of sensor data about a subject. If the subject is a user, the AlarmGate translates it to a particular sensor, by
consulting static sensor configuration or the current location of the subject. Authorization policies are used to control the
access to the sensor data. For each and every query, the sensor samples the requested data and completes the transaction
by returning a single report to the originator. Periodic queries are distributed with a given sample period and the reports
are streamed back to the requester until a stop command is received. The reissue command can be used to restart the
query [Link] crucial part of ALARM-NET is to secure the medical records and data. To protect the data against
unauthorized disclosure, access to an AlarmGate is restricted by authentication process using Secure Remote Password
(SRP) Protocol. After successful authentication, the session key is used with AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
modes for encryption. Messages sent and received from/to the client by the AlarmGate are encrypted when needed. The
communication between the WSN and the AlarmGate should also be secured using Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) and encryption. The power consumption and overhead is reduced by the Lightweight protocols with hardware
accelerated cryptography.
Next in 2009, Huang Y.M [Link] [4] presented a study that focuses on developing a healthcare monitoring
architecture, structured by three network tiers that provide pervasive and secure access to wearable sensor systems. The
security services for an appropriate and constant healthcare monitoring are promoted by combining various wireless
techniques and adaptive encryption cryptography. The Wireless Sensor Motes (WSM) design includes Bluetooth chip and
a fabric belt. This belt combines two types of sensors to monitor the healthcare and the chip is built with enhanced
security schemes to provide secure transmission and low-power consumption. The Wearable Sensor System (WSS)
enhances the Bluetooth security authentication and encryption with AES-based encryption schemes. The point-to-point
communication between two WSM is secured using a polynomial-based encryption scheme. The symmetrical key
cryptosystem is used in securing data transmission.
Finger is an efficient policy system developed by Yanmin [Link] [5] in 2009. It runs on sensors and supports
interpretation and enforcement of obligation policies. The obligation policies includes both event-condition-action and
authorization policies. The event-condition-action rules carry out an action in response to an event and the authorization
policies define the access control imposed on subject to access the resources and services. Each sensor manages its own
policies and implements both Policy Decision Point (PDP) which makes policy decisions and a Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) to invoke the action specified by the policy. Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol is used for an efficient
A novel Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) authentication protocol using Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
(ECC) is developed by Chunhua Jin [Link] [10]. To guarantee secure communication in RFID based healthcare systems,
various security protocols have been suggested for different applications. The RFID authentication protocol is the one of
the most important protocol among them. Through this protocol, the tag and the reader can authenticate each other. This
protocol involves two phases. Phase I is termed as setup phase where the key is generated for both the server and the tag.
In phase II, the server and the tag authenticate each other using random number generation. So this phase is represented
as authentication phase.
In 2015, Gope P [Link] [11] proposed a distributed IoT system architecture. This system uses an anonymous
authentication scheme which ensures notable security properties like cloning attacks, resistance to replay attacks, sensor
anonymity etc. The authentication scheme consists of three phases. Phase I is called registration phase where a Home IoT
Server (HIoTS) issues security credentials to a sensor node over a secure channel. Phase II is designed for inter cluster
movement of the sensor node, where a sensor node may move from one cluster to another by preserving strong
anonymity. In Phase III, the anonymous authentication environment for inter-network movement of the sensor node is
presented. So this phase can be represented as inter-network movement phase. This authentication scheme can be used in
many applications such as radio-frequency identification-based IoT system, Biosensor-based IoT healthcare system etc.
In 2015, Lightweight Anonymous Authentication Protocol Using k-pseudonym Set is proposed by Xinghua Li
[Link] [12] to overcome the problem of serious resource consumption. This anonymous authentication protocol is used
based on a shared secret key in wireless networks. In the authentication scheme, the user sends the k-pseudonym set
which contains the actual identity of the user and other k − 1 pseudonyms. The authentication server completes the
authentication process once it finds the real user. The real user can be determined only after it traversals the shared keys
of maximum k users in the set. The k-pseudonym set is constructed using enhanced Dolev-Yao model which allows the
Table I Comparative analysis on different Cryptographic Solutions, Security Services, Strength and limitations
Scheme Cryptographic Security Services Strengths Limitations
Solutions
Query Protection of data against Reduces radio Susceptible to
Protocol. unauthorized disclosure. traffic and saves adversarial
Wood A [Link] It provides IP network energy. confidentiality
[3], 2006. security and WSN Non-critical system attacks, which can
security. queries have low leak resident’s
End to End secure priority. location.
communication. It does not consider
the properties like
anonymity and
secure localization.
Huang Y.M AES Bluetooth authentication. Low overhead. It does not detect
[Link] [4], algorithm. Prevent replay attacks, This system is the location of
2009. SAFER+ impersonation attacks, flexible and chronic patients.
Yeh [Link] [15], SHA-3 Data Integrity, It achieves system The computation
2016. Authentication, efficiency and cost can be reduced
Anonymity,etc. robustness. further.
Practicability of
IoT-based
healthcare system is
guaranteed.
Gope P [Link] Lightweight Mutual Authentication It satisfies several The system is not
[16], 2016. mutual and Fair Key Agreement. security tested against
authentication Privacy Against requirements and several other
protocol. Eavesdropper (PAE) with resists known possible security
SHA-256. User Anonymity and attacks. attacks.
Untraceability.
The various cryptographic protocols used in different papers and the security services that are relevant to the
systems are summarized in table 1. The table gives a better understanding of security measures and protocols available in
the existing systems, along with a brief analysis of each security scheme's strength and weaknesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The IoT technology brought huge attention in everybody's life. This paper presents various aspects of IoT based
healthcare technologies. Since data protection and privacy of users are considered as the major challenges, researchers
across the world has provided various technological solutions to enhance privacy and security mechanisms in healthcare
applications. This paper surveys on well-planned security mechanisms in IoT based healthcare system. The basic security
requirements such as health data protection, data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication etc., are addressed by the
authors. In addition to these requirements, the protocols with light weight solution must also be considered to facilitate
the researchers to come up with the more robust security mechanisms.
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