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David Chalmerss two dimensions of content

9.1 Two-dimensional account David Chalmers thinks that we should address the problem of the nature of mental content by recognising that it involves at least two principal dimensions.1 Henceforth, his position is also known as a two-dimensional account of content. Before illustrating the main theses of Chalmerss account of mental content, let us describe the central problems that he thinks any theory of content should solve. 9.2 Explanatory requirements David Chalmers argues that an account of mental content should answer to the following problems and puzzles. 1. Are the conditions that determine content internal or external to the subject? 2. What does ground the cognitive difference between the statement Superman is identical to Superman, that is not very informative, and the statement, that surely many evil characters would find informative, that Superman is identical to Clark Kent? 3. Consider a French speaker, Pierre, who comes to believe that a town called Londres is beautiful. Then, he moves to UK and goes to live in London and comes to believe that London is ugly. In addition, he fails to realise that the terms London and Londres refer to the same town. Now, it seems wrong to say that Pierre is irrational because he has two contradictory beliefs. Thus, what is the correct story about Pierre? 4. Consider that you suffer of amnesia and someone takes you to the doctor and leaves you there. There are there are many patients in the waiting room. You do not know who is going to be the next one to be visited. In fact, you are too shy to ask. In addition, there is a sign that says that the waiting room is both for patients who have to wait to see whether the injection given by nurse will have some bad effects and for those that are waiting to be visited by the doctor. Then the nurse just says next and, as a matter of fact, it is your turn. Give that you do not move, the nurse who knows you says the next one is D where D is a long description of you, including your name, facts of your past etc. However, suffering from amnesia, you are not capable to recognise that D concerns you. Only when you will recognise I am the person described by D you will enter the doctors room.
1

Chalmers 2002.

So, it seems that there are some special sentences, involving indexical expressions such as I, that have a special relation to behaviour and that cannot be captures in descriptive terms as those used in the long and detailed description D. Why is it so? In particular, what does happen when we recognise that I = the person who satisfies D? 5. Mode of presentation problem. While we can attribute truly to a person the belief that Superman is capable of flying, to the same person we might attribute falsely the belief that Clark Kent is flying. So, what does explain this fact? 6. Contingent a priori truth. We take by stipulation that a meter is a certain stick in Paris (a platinum bar). Thus, we can know a priori that the length of that stick is one meter. However, the fact that that stick is long a meter is contingent.We could have chosen another object, longer or shorter that the stick, as the reference of the length of a meter. Thus, how can we know a priori a contingent fact? 9.2.1 The source of the problems According to Chalmers, all these problems derive from assuming that the content of an expression consists exclusively of the things the expression or thought is about or refers to. Given this assumption, in relation to puzzle 1., we should endorse externalism, but this means sacrifice the internalists intuitions. 2. Informativeness could not depend on content, in fact the referents of Clark Kent and Superman are the same. 3. The explanation why Pierre is not irrational would not depend on content. Again, Londres and London are about the same town. 4. The special nature of indexical expressions could not be explained in terms of content. Although the nurse is referring to you when she says next and I refers to you, you will move into the doctors room only if you realise that I am the next patient. 5. Modes of presentation would be independent from content. In fact, again the referents are the same. 6. The a priori knowledge of contingent truth would not be related to content.

9.3 The basic ingredients of Chalmerss account Philosophers have argued that problems 1-6 should be addressed by offering a notion of narrow content.2 Chalmers thinks that they are right, and he wants to articulate a unified theory of narrow content. Chalmers maintains that the content of a though involves two components. The first one is epistemic content. The central claim of his proposal is that this the notion that captures the main features of a narrow content that have an explanatory role in phenomena 1-6. The other dimension of content is subjunctive content. This content is often wide. Chalmers introduce some technical notions and principles to articulate his distinction between epistemic content and subjunctive content. Let us consider them. 9.3.1 Truth values of thoughts and extensions of concepts Chalmers recapitulates the following; somehow, standard views on thought and concepts: 1) Thoughts have truth-values. Thus the thought that the lemon is in front of me might be true or false (or have some intermediate truth value if you admit this in your logic). 2) Thoughts are composed of concepts. Thus, the though that the lemon is yellow is composed by the concepts lemon and being yellow.3 3) Concepts have extensions that are the the classes of things to which the concepts apply. For instance, the extension of lemon is the class of all lemons. 4) The truth value of a thought depends on the extensions of the concepts that form the thought. For instance, the thought that the all lemons are yellow is true if the extension of the concept lemon, i.e. all lemons, have the property that is in the extension of the concept yellow, i.e. the property yellow. 9.3.2 Intensions Besides extensions, concepts are said to have intensions.4 The intuitive idea of an intension is that this notion captures the way in which the
Clearly, some of the argument offered in Segal 2007 concerns variations on these puzzles (see Lecture 5). 3 Certain philosophers would not endorse this strong constitutive claim. Instead, they would prefer to say that expressing or articulating the though involves concepts, while they think that the content is not made of concepts. But this point does not appear to affect Chalmers's proposal. 4 Chalmers account is surely in the tradition of the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. However, there are also many differences in their accounts. In particular, Chalmers develops his account in relation to modal notions of necessity and possibility, within the context of possible world semantics.
2

extension of a certain concept varies in accordance with the nature of the world. In terms of possible worlds intensions can be characterised as functions that associates to a concept its extension in a possible world.5 Let us consider the concept lemon, and our world and possible worlds w1, ... , wn, so its intention is a function, let us write it as Flemon, such that: Flemon (our world) = the class of all lemons in our world Flemon (w1) = the class of all lemons in w1. Flemon (wn ) = the class of all lemons in wn. So, for instance, while in our world Flemon has as a value the class of lemons, there might be possible worlds where there are no lemons, thus the Flemon would have as value the empty class. Also thoughts have intentions; these are functions that associate to a thought its truth value in every possible world. Thus, let us write this function Tp , where p indicates a specific though. For instance, let us consider the thought, lemons are yellow, we will have that that the intension Tlemons are yellow is the following function: Tlemons are yellow (our world) = true. Tlemons are world). Flemon are yellow (wn ) = .... As the truth value of a thought depends on the extensions of the concepts that occur in it, the intension of a thought depends on the intensions of the concepts that occur in it. In fact, the truth value a function Tp will assign to a though in a certain world depends on what are the extensions associated, by their intentions, to the concepts that enter in the though. For example, the intension T of the though lemons are yellow is the following function: Tlemons are yellow (w1) = true if and only if the value of Flemon in w1 , i.e. the class of lemons in w1, is included into the value of Fyellow in w1, i.e. the class of yellow things in w1.
yellow

(w1) = false. (For instance, w1 is the lemonless

It might seem that this notion of intention has similarities with the notion by Fodor to characterise narrow content, see Lecture 7. However, see Chalmers 2002 at pp. 625-626 .

Tlemons are yellow (w1) (lemons are yellow, w1) = is false if and only if the value of Flemon in w1 , i.e. the class of lemons in w1, is not included into the value of Fyellow in w1, i.e. the class of yellow things in w1.6 9.4 Two intentions: epistemic and subjunctive At the core of Chalmerss two-dimensional proposal is the thesis that both concepts and thoughts have two different types of intentions: epistemic intentions and subjunctive intensions. The subjunctive intension of a concept picks out the extension of the concept across possible worlds that are counterfactual to the actual world. The subjunctive intension of a thought picks out the truth value of a though in worlds that are counterfactual to the actual world, that is taken to be fixed. The subjunctive intention of a thought depends on the subjunctive intensions of the concepts occurring in it. On the other hand, the epistemic intension of a concept picks out the extension of a concept dependently on how the actual world turns out to be. Similarly, the epistemic intension of a though picks out its truth value in function of the epistemic intentions of the occurring concepts. Let us clarify these distinctions with reference to the concept water and by using figure 1.

This dependence could be characterised by saying that the intension TP of the thought that p can be defined as a certain function I, that is a function of functions. Function I has intensions of concepts entering in p as arguments. When the values of these functions, i.e. the extensions of these concepts, are in the appropriate relations of inclusion, I has value true otherwise it has value false: Thus, for example, Tlemons are yellow (w1) = I (Flemon (w1), Fyellow (w1)). and I is the function that has value true when the value Flemon (w1) are members of the value Fyellow (w1), otherwise, I has value false.

w2

XYZ

w3

ABC

w1

H2O

w3

ABC

SIwater (w2) = H2O

SIwater (w3)= H2O

SIwater (w1)= XYZ

SIwater (w3)= XYZ

Metaphysical possibilities: counterfactual worlds to the actual world. w1a Epistemic possibilities or scenarios: actual world. H2O w2a XYZ

SIwater (w1a ) = H2O EIwater (w1a ) = H2O

SIwater (w2a ) = XYZ EIwater (w2a ) = XYZ

Before knowing which is the actual world.

Figure 1

9.4.1 Epistemic intentions and epistemic possibilities7 In the Figure 1, the epistemic intension (EI) of the concept water picks out H2O in Earth, i.e. w1, if this is the actual world. It would pick out XYZ in Twin Earth, i.e. w2, if that world was the actual one (and it would pick out ABC if w3 it taken to be the actual world). Roughly, this intension assigns as extension to the concept water in a possible world whatever satisfies the superficial properties of water, such as colourless, drinkable, that fill the oceans and lakes, etc. etc., but excluding its chemical structure. Thus, these intensions reflect the possibilities that a subject can contemplate before it is established which substance satisfies those superficial features. Think about someone who used the concept water before the discoveries of chemistry. He would be able to contemplate the alternative scenarios w1 and w2 and take them to be the actual world and infer what would be the extension of water. The notion of epistemic intentions is related to that of epistemic possibility. The epistemic possibilities are available to a subject when he does not know, in relation to a specific topic she is contemplating, which is the actual world. Consider the case of someone who has the concept water, specifiable as a certain set of superficial properties. In addition, this person does not know the chemical composition of water. For this person will be
7

See Chalmers 2002, pp. 609-612.

epistemically possible that water is H2O or that it XYZ or ABC. In addition, no a priori reasoning will enable the subject to exclude one of these possibilities. These epistemic possibilities, being independent from knowing how the world turns out to be, i.e a H20- or a XYZ- or a ABCworld, can be grasped a priori. Chalmers calls scenarios maximally specific epistemic possibilities that are given by specifying all their details. Thus, scenarios are possible worlds that can be considered to be the actual world. If I consider a scenario as actual I can then, a priori, derive the conclusion that a certain thought is consistent or inconsistent with the scenario. Thus, we can say that the scenario verifies that thought, i.e. the thought is true in that scenario. This authorises to say that the epistemic intension of a though can be regarded as a function from scenarios, taken to be actual, to truth values. For instance, if I assume that the scenario where XYZ satisfies the superficial properties of water is the actual world, then it would verify the thought that water is XYZ. On the other hand, we can also say that the thought endorses certain scenarios and excludes other ones. While the thought that water is XYZ endorses the scenario where water is XYZ, it excludes the scenario where water is H2O. Scenarios thus define an epistemic space of epistemic possibilities that a certain subject has open in function of the extent of her empirical knowledge of how the world turn out to be. More empirical beliefs the subject has about the actual world, less extensive is her epistemic space. (see Figure 2).

Emprirical beliefs Epistemic space

Acquiring of emprical belief

Figure 2

According to Chalmers, the central feature of the epistemic intension of a concept is that it encapsulates an a priori accessible relation between how the world might turn out to be and the proper application of the concept.
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It is in virtue of the epistemic intension of the concept water that we can reason as follow: if the actual world is a H2O-world, where this substance satisfies the superficial properties of water, then the concept water applies to H2O. On the other hand, it is in virtue of the epistemic intensions of our thoughts that we can evaluate their truth value in relation to what is taken to be the actual world. Thus, we can know a priori that: If the actual world is H2O-world that includes wetness, then the thought water is wet is true. 9.4.2 Subjunctive intensions and metaphysical possibilities8 On the other hand, the subjunctive intension SI of the concept water picks out the extension of water in counterfactual possible worlds, once it is fixed which, amongst possible worlds, is the actual world. Chalmers assumes that Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke have given compelling reasons for thinking that that the term water (but Chalmers talks about the concept water expressed by it) is a rigid designator. This means that water refers in every possible world to the same entity to which it refers in the actual one. Thus, we see that in Figure 1the SI of the concept water in the counterfactual worlds to our world assigns always to water the extension H2O. If the actual world was Twin Earth, then SI of water would make it the case that it refers rigidly to XYZ. Metaphysical possibilities are associated to subjunctive intentions. These are possibilities that depend on how the world turned out to be in relation to the topic at issue. 9.4.3 Cases where subjunctive intension and epistemic intentions coincide In the case of the concept water that the epistemic and subjunctive intensions can differ when they have the same possible world as argument. In fact, see figure 1, it happens that the epistemic intension of water in w1, taken as the actual world, would deliver as result H2O, however the subjunctive intension of water in w1, if this is the counterfactual world to the actual XYZ-world, has as result XYZ. However, this result is not always to be expected. In fact, it depends on the fact that water is a rigid designator that has the same referent in all counterfactual possible worlds.
8

Chalmers 2002, p. 614-616.

However, in the cases of purely descriptive concepts epistemic and subjunctive intensions coincide. Purely descriptive concepts are concepts that refer not rigidly to whatever satisfies a certain description. For example, the concept the inventor of the zip refers to whoever invented the zip independently from who is the inventor in the actual world. Thus, this concept will have the same epistemic and subjective intensions. 9.5 Narrow and wide content According to Chalmers, epistemic intensions constitute narrow content. In fact, they do not depend on how the world is. The agent can a priori know the conditional sentences that describe the dependence between a concept and its referent depending in which scenario is taken to be actual. Thus, the epistemic intension of a concept is accessible a priori. These dependences are independent from how the world turns out to be. Similarly, thanks to the epistemic intensions of thoughts, the agent can grasp a priori the dependence between the scenario, taken to be actual, and the truth value of the thought. In particular, epistemic intensions reflect the rational connections between thoughts and thus should enter in the psychological explanation. On the other hand the subjunctive content of a concept and of a though is often wide. In fact, it often depends on which is the actual world. This is clearly the case when we consider water as a concept that refers rigidly to natural kinds. Its subjunctive intensions will deliver the extension of this concept in accordance with which possible world turned out to be the actual one. Similarly, such dependence with environmental factors would also characterise the subjunctive intensions of thoughts that involve the concept water. However, it is also true that in certain cases subjunctive content does not depends on the environment. This happens when the concepts involved are purely descriptive. 9.6 Explanations Chalmers thinks that he notion of narrow content spelled out in terms of epistemic intentions can explain the puzzles and problems considered at the beginning. (1) The debate between externalist and internalists is put to rest once we realise that there are two dimensions in content. Epistemic content is narrow, and satisfies the intuitions of internalists, and subjunctive content is wide exactly in those cases mentioned by the externalist to support the idea of wide content.

(2) Concepts with the same subjunctive intentions might have different epistemic intentions that explain cases of informative identities. (3) Pierre is not irrational, given that Londres and London have associated different epistemic intentions. (4) The essential indexicality of beliefs is explained by the fact that epistemic content is given by indexical and centred intensions. (5) Modes of presentations are epistemic intensions. (6) Contingent a priori thoughts have a necessary epistemic intension, but they have contingent subjunctive intentions. References Chalmers, David. 2002. "The components of content." In Chalmers, David, ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 608-633. Segal, Gabriel. 2007. "Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitudes Attributions." In McLaughlin, B. P. and Cohen, Jonathan, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 5-19.

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