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BP-HZN-MBI 00021 417
Confidential
Don Vidrine Interview- Tuesday 27th April
Don was working the night tour and had joined the DW Horizon team during January
this year (20 1 0). He said this was his 4th trip.
The hole had already been drilled when he arrived to start his trip.
There had been kicks and losses, the mud weight had been cut and they were close to
balance.
The logging program went ok, some tool problems, no hole problems.
On the wiper trip after logging pumped out, because they were close to balance, to the
top of the 11 7 /8" (later said the top of the 9 7 /8")
Gas reading was 1000 units at bottoms up, this is not uncommon, it stayed a little
longer but we had been out of the hole for a week.
Pumped out, took the correct fill up, to top of9 7/8" liner, good trip.
Ran the 9 7/8 x 7" casing, trip went well.
Cleared the pipe and circulated returns (100+ bbls) to the top of the liner.
Cement job went ok, complex job with different fluids, looked like it went fine,
bumped the plug and tested the seal assembly.
Pulled out of hole to pick up the cement stinger.
Ran in hole to the top of the BOPs and tested the casing, very good test based on the
chart he saw.
Carried on running in the hole to depth, rigged up and started the displacement. Had a
procedure, displaced the choke and kill lines, pumped the displacement pill followed
by water.
Conversation then went to Don's arrival at the rig floor to start his tour.
When he arrived there was 1400 psi on the DP. He said they shut the DP back in and
it had come back up. He questioned this and was told by the team in the drillers
doghouse that this was annular compression -he had heard about this but had not seen
it before.
He went to the kill line and there was no pressure.
They then pressured up on the kill line to check it was full - it was lined up to the
hydraulic choke.
Opened the kill line and it was static at 30 psi.
BP-HZN-MB 100021418
Confidential
Opened the choke to the mini trip tank and bled off 2/1 Os (two tenths) of a barrel. It
slowed to a drip then stopped. Watched for 30 minutes with no flow.
The 1400 psi remained on the drill pipe, it stayed at that pressure- there was no
indication that it was gas coming up.
Initially there was 2400 psi on the drill pipe- this was the differential on the u tube
and 60 barrels were bled off.
The 1400 psi was the difference between the mud in the riser. This was annular
compression- they (TP etc) said it does that all the time.
If we have 1400 psi on the drill pipe we should see it on the kill line? Let's bleed it
off and see - the kill line was bled then stopped.
1 then went to call Hafle
When I came back they were still watching the stripping tank and the dripping had
stopped. Everything looked fine.
We then closed it in and opened the bag (annular). Got the pumps lined up. Told
them to let me know when the pill comes up so that we could do a sheen test.
I then went to the office and checked what calls I had.
They called to say the pill was back so I went to the rig floor.
Everything was fine, checked for flow and it was ok.
Had taken some spacer it was 16ppg. Everything looked fine. With the spacer in
there, there was still an 8 - 900 psi underbalance.
The only other thing is that if they had already opened the dump line?? - I didn't go
down there.
The strokes on the panel looked about right - everything was fine when we were
doing the sheen test. The sheen test was passing.
Said to go ahead and start dumping, told them everybody get in place and start
dumping. The plan was to circulate then watch it for 30 minutes
Reverted back to negative test.
The Tourpusher and Senior Toolpusher told me it was this annular compression thing.
I wanted to do another test - I don't know why we didn't see pressure on the kill
line??
Asked about procedure for negative testing -There is no standard procedure it is left
for the rig to figure it out.
BP-HZN-MBI00021419
Confidential
Asked what a successful test looks like- did anyone say- No. Just do a negative test
for 30 minutes. I have never seen procedures for this.
The volume of the pill was 450 barrels.
Crews were always on the ball. The visitors did not take any focus away from the
well.
Steve asked for help to annotate the chart and Don agreed.
They shut in after the pill was above the stack. They were bleeding off to Haliburton.
They bled down and it came back up. 1400 psi was the difference between the mud
and the seawater.
1 talked to Hafle about the 1400- said that if there had been a kick in the well we
would have seen it.
When I first went to the rig floor we talked about the 1400 psi for a long time - they
(TO Toolpusher etc) found it kind of humorous that I talked about it for a long time.
Asked about the TP crews -They were experienced; competent hands.
Who was on the rig floor- Ranqy Ez, Jason Anderson, Bob Kaluza, Driller, Mud
Engineer, Leo and Gordon (they (mud Eng) were changing out. Charles wasn' t there.
I then went back to the office to look at some paperwork. I had been there around l 0
- 15 minutes when Jason called - he said we are getting mud back and we are
diverting to the gas buster.
I grabbed my hat and started for the floor it must have taken around 30 seconds to get
outside. I went through the short hall and upstairs there was ~ u d and seawater
blowing everywhere, there was a mud film on the deck. I decided not to continue and
carne back across. There was then an explosion I a blast, I hunkered down on the
deck. I was on the port side the blast was back .... ........ .
I then proceeded all the way to the pipe rack, got a life vest and went to the bridge to
see if they had hit the emergency disconnect.
I wanted to get the power shut off but it went off - I don't recall if the power went off
before or after the blast. I was glad it was off.
I went to the bridge - the subsea hand said we should disconnect - we went to the
panel and only the lower annular was closed. Chris then hit the button. It looked like
it hit correctly - it all lit up. Saw the gallon count. Chris said he saw the stab retract.
I was then talking to people and getting them into the capsule - there were some
injured people in the capsules.
1 stayed long enough to get everyone in the capsule, some guys jumped with a raft.
The last guy came in and we closed the door.
BP-HZN-MBI00021420
Confidenti al
I didn't see any flames when the explosion occurred.
The weather was calm.
We hadn't back loaded all the mud- I told the mud engineer to keep some.
I heard people say that the engi.ne room was gutted.
We then went to the Bankston.
Was asked if it had been mud or spacer that was being sprayed from the well - it
might have been spacer, my feeling is there was some mud.
Never indicated any increase in flow! 1 spoke to the mud logger- he didn' t see
anything unusual. The mud engineer was watching the returns.
Don was asked- what do you think happened- I have no idea!
Additional -
The crews were good.
The diverter can go overboard or to the poor boy de gasser.
When Jason called to say he was diverting flow to the poor boy degasser he also said
he either was closing or had closed the bag (annular)
Don thought the diverter was not closed - he said it appeared that fluid was coming
from the rig floor.
He estimated it took him 1 or 2 minutes to get outside when he got the call.
Don did not know of any issues with the BOP system.
Asked about being spaced out for the BOP- Don said that they were good about
spacing out but didn' t check. Asked about block height- didn' t know- said he would
expect them to be at the space out position.
Didn' t know if the shears would cut the tool joint.
Didn' t know ifthere was 1 or 2 overboard lines on the diverter.
Stated- L don' t know why that mud got so far up the riser.
Clarified- When the toolpusher called he didn' t say it was a blow out or kick, mud
was coming back and he was diverting to the gas buster.
On the boat the Senior Toolpusher said the AD had called to say they had a well
control problem.
When I went outside I was wondering why they had not sounded general quarters - I
realised later that the fire alarms were sounding.
BP-HZN-MBI00021421
Confidential
The crews responded well - you could tell they had been drilled.
Our relationships on the rig were good -they will call -we keep it open - we stop the
job.
The relationship with the onshore team is good - never had a problem calling in day or
night.
We mostly deal with Brian and Hafle- mostly Brian Morel.
Asked about the negative test program - Said it was a bullet program that came by
email - we (offshore I onshore team) talked about it, there was no formal approval - I
never had instructions that 1 didn't think that people knew about- they were copied on
the emails - there were no problems with communication.
There were no issues with TO people, no problem with them communicating with me.
When asked- Don replied that there were no fatigue issues with the crews.
END.
BP-HZN-MB 100021422
Confidential
Robinson, Martin, Cowie
Don Vidrine, BP
night tower
hole drilled before he .arrived
struggling with kicks and losses
cut mud wt and close to balance
logging went ok, some tool problems
wiper trip pumped out because they were close to bal. close to top
(9 7/8)
1000 units of gas bottoms up (not uncommon)
stayed longer because out of hole for a week during logging
(static)
hole took correct fillup
9 7/8 x 7 inch casing, trip went well
left stack open while running through riser
at TO with casing cleared the pipe, circulated 1 00+ barrels returns
(trouble getting, either plugged or losses)
cement job went ok, complex job w/diff fluids, looked like it went
fine
bumped plug, set seal assmby, tested, seemed to be good test
pump 1.5x drill pipe vol. to wipe drill pipe with nerf ball
run in hole to top of BOP's, closed shear rams, test casing, very
good test based on chart
went to depth, rigged up and started displacement procedure
displaced choke, kill, boost lines, pumped pill,
followed by sw
not on ri g floor at time of neg test
bled drill pipe to 0, built press., they said it was normal - Kaluza
told by Sr toolpusher and tourpusher- called it annular
compression - heard about this, but had not seen it before
decided to check kill line side, no pressure, pumped a few strokes
on kill line, pressured
bled off. shut in, built to 30 psi
bled .2bbl to trip tank
BP-HZN-MBI00021423
Confidential
went to a drip and stopped, watched for 30 mins with no flow
drill pipe had 1400psi steady
stayed at that pressure, no indication of gas coming up
at beg of test, 2400psi in drill pipe, differential on a U-tube, bled
60bbl to Opsi
1400psi differential between mud and riser
annular compression -they said it does that all the time
1400psi, it should be seen on kill line -lets bleed it off and see,
bled, it stopped
called Hafle to discuss surface plug, said still watching stripping
tank, dripping had stopped and everything looked fine
Closed it in, opened the bag, lined up pumps
guys let me know when pill comes up, do sheen test, went to
office to check calls
call to say pill was back, went to rig floor, everything fine
realized at that point to check flow - was not flowing as far as he
knows, shaker hand and mud eng monitoring
mud eng said it came back on right strokes, strokes looked ok to
Don on panel (didn't know exact#)
sheen test passed, expected 800-900psi underbalance to
reservoir
they were comfortaple with test, he told them to get everyone in
place to start dumping
tool pusher and Sr TP told them this was annular compression
asked about standard procedure for negative tests, none known
(comes from town in bullet form, procedure is left to rig to figure
out)
what does a successful test look like, check for flow or no-flow
hafle called office while displacing about 9pm, thought he was j ust
curious about how things were going
neg test - TO had dismissed drill pipe pressure as anything
serious
somewhat joked about my concern over drill pipe- they found it
humorous that I continued talking about
In doghouse - Ezell, jason anderson, bob Kaluza, dewey Sevette,
mud eng Leo and Gordon, maybe Charles Credeur
Sheen test- after, returned to ofc 10-15 mins, rec'd call from rig
floor- jason
Jason (TP) called and said getting mud back- diverting returns to
gas buster, closing (had closed) annular, hung up quickly
Started for floor, grabbed hat- down hall, upstairs toward rig-
mud and seawater blowing everywhere (about 30sec elapsed
time) positive it was mud
decided to not continue to rig floor, went back around corner,
heard explosion which caused him to hunker down- did not see
flames at that time
BP-HZN-MBI00021424
Confidential
Don heard only one explosion. Power went out, didn't know it was
before or after explosion
crossed pipe rack to get life vest, Proceeded to bridge to see if
EDS had been activated
Say many people on bridge, met Subsea hand in bridge (Chris) -
Chris asked about EDS
went to panel- only lower annular lights were lit at that point-
Chris hit EDS button
Looked like it actuated correctly because panel lit up, Chris said
he saw gallon count and stab retract
Left bridge to help people to capsules, helped injured
Some guys jumped overboard with life raft
Last guy came into the capsule, closed door- weather calm, went
to Bankston
Hadn't backloaded all the mud, told eng he had to keep some- my
feeling was there was some mud
Never indicated any increase in flow
Spoke to mud logger while on Bankston, he didn't see anything
unusual before event occurred -was watching returns
Specifically asked him what he thought happened - he said he had
no idea
started on Horizon in January, completed 14/14 rotation of 4
hitches
Crews were good
Diverter can go overboard or to poor boy degasser
Heard that AD called Sr TP that they had a well control problem
Appeared fluid coming from rig floor, didn't think diverter was
closed.
No issues known about BOP equipment
Didn't know if 1 or 2 overboard lines on diverter
If space out was standard, Don said yes, posted in doghouse,
crews were good about doing it, 5.5 across stack
Block position before explosion - too much spray to see top drive
(not visible, wall of mud)
asked - fire alarms working? Yes
Emergency drills - weekly, everyone responds accordingly
Brian and Mark Hafle usually communicates, Brian mostly
Negative test procedure came by email, people copied to make
aware
Communication with office, TO all good
Fatigue issues not a problem
937am next morning, called Brian Martin -this may mean nothing,
minor hydraulic leak on one of the pods, reported to him by
subsea
3rd party info from Bakston
6pm negative test
hadn't started neg test, discussing to use kill line
preferred method was BP kill line
BP-HZN-MB 100021425
Confidential
TransOcean already using drill line
Neg test performed using kill line
test took 20 mins
720-750 30 mins static,
test was good while he watched, but didn't watch whole test- went
back to office
1015 jason anderson toolpusher came in said mud back in
displacement test
Went outside (aft) mud blowing everywhere
couldn't get to rig floor, then heard first explosion
grabbed lifevest, to bridge
pushed ESD shut in button, didn't work, pushed again- everyone
evacuated
statement to CG
BP-HZN-MBI00021426
Confidential
7 May 2010- Guillot, Anderson, Wetherbee,
ON Horizon sinee Jan 2010
in oilfield since 1971 -office, field since 78
neg test- annular used to test- lower 1 think
call made to close BOP because of mud on floor, what were they closing -annular. either he did
or I did, not sure
in bridge, before evac, what light was lit on panel - lower annular, 'just about sure'
who hit EDS- night Subsea hand
where were you when hit- standing next to him
when hit, what did you all see -I don't remember, everything appeared to function, lights came
on, received responses we were supposed to
did not see all panel lit up
good gallon count seen
did he hit both buttons on panel - 'as I recall yes'
how long from time of call of closing BOPs to EDS- can't say, some minutes after, got call to go
to floor, came out to deck aft, mud blowing everywhere, couldn't get to floor, tried to go forward to
go up that way, moving to port, explosion - got life vest and went to bridge - not sure timeframe
how many blasts - first one heard - after heard a couple more
where did first blast occur- starboard, but didn't see anything to be sure, j ust feeling - l was on
port. wasn't over there
when did lights go out - making way towards forward - not sure if right before or after blast- I
think before but not certain
out when you got to bridge -I assume those on bridge were emergency, but deck was all out-
emergency gen on - don't know
when you walked to bridge, there was lights -yes
before explosion, one annular closed which one - lower
On the negative test, pressures being bled off by who- TO started bleeding from drill pi pe side -
not sure when Bob got on rig floor- but Bob then had them bleed from the kill line per APD
how lined up to bleed - trip tank off choke line
bled back to halliburton- 2 sets of lines rigged up, but not sure- feeling they were bleeding back
on that line to halliburton, not sure flow path though
crew change during neg test- yorrect
when on tower, any more bleeding to be done - no, all complete, shut down
8 P-HZN-MB 100021427
Confidential
BOP setup any leaks in system- small hydraulic leak on one of the pods, can't recall which one,
should be on morning report
not sure if it cleared up, or trash was causing - that is only thing I was aware of
EDS activation, when subsea hand pushed, where was gallon count coming from -don't know
where, assume on counter
when he pushed EDS buttons, were they blinking or solid - don't remember
were any lights green- think some might have been green- just got a response
while in drilling mode, EDS function set at 1 or 2 - no, don't know
mud back to surface, coming through rotary, any odors or smells- no, don't recall
where sound come from -no, on port, not near me -went down, mud on deck - don't know
anything other than explosion or blast
on bridge was HPU unit still intact, or damage to well bay area- no, did not know damage
anywhere
Subsea hand went through actions, all appeared correct
B P-HZN-MB 100021428
Confidential
12 May- Cowie, Guillot, Anderson
Kill line closed, rig pumps
monitoring and pumping with rig pumps, monitoring from drillers console- monitoring off of
pump pressure
screen on floor that has Halliburton readings
pressure on choke line side, choke valves -wasn't moitoring it
mud being bled back, how informed on volume -got on floor, went over to bleed back in bbls,
driller read off logs -said he bled back 67bbls but don't know where he bled it to
Where did fluid go- assuming it went to Halliburton- don't know if all went there though, that
was his understanding, wasn't up there when all that was going on
1400psi test, when did they say 67 - right before negative test on kill line, we went over what
they did
Anything else bled off after that other than what went to mini-trip - bled choke to 0, about 112
bbls volume at that time- wanted to make sure no pressure that would affect neg test
Choke line opened all the way to BOP - don't think valve was open, just bled line, making sure
no pressure on line -didn't want anything bleeding through valve
opened kill up to stripping tank for neg test, bled back 2/10 and stopped
Kaluza bled off 3-4bbls before stopped, driller had 67
end of neg test, everything holding, bled back, still pressure on DP against iBOP- yes, 1 think
so
how equalized to open up - not sure, wasn't talking to TP
who cal led to say they were closing in well - TP Jason Anderson
what did he say he was closing- annular
closing diverter or anything else- said he would divert returns to gas buster
closing annular- yes
TOI crew change towers- 0000 and 1200
no crew change during this process - TP changed at 1730-1800 timeframe- TP already up
there when I got there. Also mud engineer changed
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