Tatel v.

Municipality of Virac Lastly, it cannot be said to be discriminatory even if only the

G.R. No. 40243|March 11, 1992|Ponente: J. Nocon petitioner's warehouse was declared as a nuisance and not
Doctrine: For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be the other warehouses in the area. A distinction must be made
within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but between the law itself and the manner in which said law is
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration
law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to
and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas
require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance
the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or and that the complaints have been lodged against the
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing
not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and anything about it.
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in
the import and export of abaca and other products, owned a Tan v. Pereña
warehouse in Barrio Sta. Elena, Virac, Catanduanes. The G.R. No. 149743|February 18, 2005|Ponente: J. Tinga
municipal council of Virac issued Resolution No. 29, which Doctrine:
declared the said warehouse a public nuisance within the
purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code. This was based on the Facts: In 1974, PD 449 mandated that only one cockpit shall
complaints received by the council from the residents of the be allowed in each city or municipality, except if the
barrio against the disturbance caused by the operation of the population exceeds 100,000, where two cockpits may be
abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse. Moreover, the established, maintained and operated. With the enactment of
smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine RA 7160 in 1991, however, the Sangguniang Bayan of
engulfed the community. municipalities were empowered "any law to the contrary
notwithstanding" to authorize and license the establishment,
Further, the investigating committee noted that an accidental operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate
fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks, as
continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the stated in its Section 447(3)(V).
storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives
and properties of the people within the neighborhood, Pursuant to the said provision, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
considering the crowded nature of the neighborhood. municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu Province, enacted
Petitioner Tatel then filed a petition for prohibition with Municipal Ordinance No. 6, s. 1993, which prescribed and
preliminary injunction in the CFI, which was dismissed by the promulgated the rules and regulations governing cockpit
trial court. operations in Daanbantayan. Under Section 5 of the
ordinance, the number of cockpits shall be that prescribed by
Before the SC, respondent municipal officials contend that PD 449, but may be amended for purposes of establishing
petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of additional cockpits, if the municipal population so warrants.
Ordinance No. 13, s. 1952, which prohibited the construction Subsequently, the Sanggunian passed Ordinance No. 7, an
of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion amendatory ordinance, which provided that not more than
or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 three cockpits shall be allowed in the municipality.
meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and
properties by accidental fire. For his part, petitioner argues Petitioner Leonardo Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl
that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish
process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Daanbantayan. As
null and void for not having been passed in accordance with such, the Commission recommended to the mayor of
law. Daanbantayan, Lamberto Te, that a permit be issued to Tan.
Te issued the corresponding permit. Respondent Socorro
Pertinent provision/s: Pereña, the owner and operator of the other cockpit in
Daanbantayan, filed a complaint for damages with prayer for
Issue: Whether the ordinance in question is valid? injunctive reliefs, alleging that there was no lawful basis for
the establishment of a second cockpit. He claimed that Tan
Ruling: YES. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado, but in Malingin,
within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but at a site less than five kilometers away from her own cockpit.
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, and must be in consonance with certain well established The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles complaint of respondent, which was reversed by the CA. The
require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene appellate court declared the amendatory ordinance in
the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or question invalid. Before the SC, petitioner contends that the
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must CA erred in declaring the ordinance invalid since Pereña’s
not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and complaint, which was for damages with preliminary injunction,
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be did not pray for the nullity of Ordinance No. 7. The
unreasonable. The subject ordinance meets all these. Municipality of Daanbantayan as a local government unit was
not made a party to the case, nor did any legal counsel on its
Further, in spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is behalf enter any appearance. Neither was the Office of the
regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses Solicitor General given any notice of the case.
wherein inflammable materials are stored where such
warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a Pertinent provision/s:
block of houses and not the construction per se of a
warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and Issue/s: (1) Whether the validity of the amendatory
property in case of fire which is one of the primordial ordinance was collaterally attacked?
obligations of the government.
(2) Whether the ordinance in question is invalid, in view of the aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective
conflict between Section 447(3)(V) of the LGC and Section 5 jurisdiction. This could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights
(b) of PD 449? in municipalities, a certain distraction in the daily routine of
life in a municipality. Further the national government would
Ruling: (1) NO. The initiatory complaint filed by Pereña is not be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory
only an action for damages, but also one for injunction. An enactments pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it
action for injunction will require judicial determination were to repeal Section 447(a)(3)(v).
whether there exists a right in esse which is to be protected,
and if there is an act constituting a violation of such right Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs
against which injunction is sought. Moreover, to warrant the against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for
a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage Malonzo v. Zamora
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Thus, the determination of G.R. No. 137718|January 28, 2000|Ponente: J. De Leon,
whether injunction or damages avail in this case requires the Jr.
ascertainment of whether a second cockpit may be legally Doctrine: The law (Section 50, LGC) does not require the
allowed in Daanbantayan. completion of the updating or adoption of the internal rules of
procedure before the Sanggunian could act on any other
Further, a perusal of the allegations of the complaint reveals matter like the enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires
that Pereña therein puts into question the legal basis for that the matter of adopting or updating the internal rules of
allowing Tan to operate another cockpit in Daanbantayan. She procedure be taken up during the first day of session.
asserted that "there is no lawful basis for the establishment of
a second cockpit considering the small population of Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Caloocan City
[Daanbantayan]," a claim which alludes to Section 5(b) of PD passed Ordinance No. 0168, s. 1994, which authorized the
449. Even the affirmative defenses of petitioner raised the city mayor to initiate proceedings for the expropriation of Lot
validity of the ordinance. The trial court also declared in its 26 of the Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT Realty
decision that the ordinance in question is valid, as justified Development Corporation. The lot was intended for low-cost
under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC. housing and the construction of an integrated bus terminal,
parks and playgrounds, and related support facilities.
Since the question on the validity of Ordinance No. 7 in view
of the continuing efficacy of Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting It, however, turned out that the subject lot was located
Law is one that has been fully litigated in the courts below, between the City of Caloocan and the then Municipality of
the Court would thus proceed in reviewing such issue. Malabon. This prompted CLT to file an SCA for interpleader
with prayer for injunctive reliefs sought to restrain the LGUs
(2) YES. Historical legislation suggests that the regulation of from assessing and collecting real property taxes from CLT
cockpits was vested in the municipal councils but is subject to and to interplead and litigate among themselves their
the guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl conflicting rights to claim such taxes.
Commission. This was the reason why Section 447 (a) (3) (V)
of the LGC stated the phrase "any law to the contrary Meanwhile, Vice Mayor Oscar Malapitan requested to recently
notwithstanding." As such, the power of the Sanggunian re-elected Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo an immediate repair and
concerned is no longer subject to the supervision of the renovation of the offices of the incoming councilors. This was
Gamefowl Commission. approved by Malonzo, and endorsed to the City Treasurer. The
treasurer then recommended that the funds for the supposed
However, while the sanggunian retains the power to authorize expropriation be used to accommodate the request of the
and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of mayor, since the expropriation proceedings earlier filed were
cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize halted due to the pendency of the SCA for interpleader, which
more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such was a prejudicial question.
cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred
thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established. The recommendation of the treasurer was endorsed by the
Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the mayor to the city council. As such, the city council passed the
identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision ordinance in question, Ordinance No. 0254, s. 1998, which
over cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with previous appropriated the fund intended for the expropriation to the
enactments that impose restrictions on how such power may renovation of the city offices. Eduardo Tibor then filed an
be exercised. administrative complaint against the city officials, alleging
that they wilfully violated certain provisions of the LGC. The
Further, the national government has the ability to implement OP then rendered a decision declaring the city officials guilty
police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal of misconduct, but was reversed by the SC.
government, especially if the subject of regulation is a
condition of universal character irrespective of territorial On MR, the OSG contends that Ordinance No. 0254, s. 1998,
jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one such condition. It is a was also enacted without sufficient compliance with Section
traditionally regulated activity, due to the attendant gambling 50 of the LGC, requiring that house rules be adopted or
involved or maybe even the fact that it essentially consists of updated.
two birds killing each other for public amusement.
Pertinent provision/s: Section 50, Local Government Code
Cockfighting is a valid matter of police power regulation, as it
is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of Issue: Whether the ordinance in question violates Section 50
enhancing national productivity and self-reliance. Limitation of the LGC, and is thus void?
on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a
reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the Ruling: NO. The law (Section 50, LGC) does not require the
purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits completion of the updating or adoption of the internal rules of
equals more cockfights. procedure before the Sanggunian could act on any other
matter like the enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires
To read Section 447 (a) (3) (v) in petitioner's perspective is to that the matter of adopting or updating the internal rules of
vest an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all procedure be taken up during the first day of session.
 Issue: Whether the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the
Here, the Sanggunian took up the matter of adopting a set of Sangguniang Panlungsod, should be counted in determining
house rules in its general meeting entitled, "Katitikan ng whether a quorum exists?
Karaniwang Pulong ng Sangguniang Panlungsod na ginanap
noong ika-2 ng Hulyo 1998 sa Bagong Gusali ng Pamahalaang Ruling: YES. RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang
Lungsod ng Caloocan." During said meeting, the Sanggunian Panlungsod shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as
created an Ad Hoc Committee composed of seven (7) presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the
members to study the existing house rules. Thereafter, it president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the
enacted Ordinance No. 0254, s. 1998. president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as
It would be inequitable to read something more into the members. "[C]omposed of" means "formed of" or "consisting
requirement of the law and use it as a basis for finding of."
petitioners guilty of misconduct, especially when the charge is
serious enough to warrant a penalty of suspension from office Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a "member" of
for three (3) months without pay. the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated
under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the respondents' motion for construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd
reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED. situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie
during a Sanggunian session is not considered a "member" of
La Carlota City, Negros Occidental v. Rojo the Sanggunian.
G.R. No. 181367|April 24, 2012|Ponente: J. Carpio
Doctrine: The entire membership must be taken into account "Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means the
in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, number greater than half or more than half of any total. The
for while the constitution merely states that "majority of each entire membership must be taken into account in computing
House shall constitute a quorum," Section 53 of the LGC is the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the
more exacting as it requires that the "majority of all members constitution merely states that "majority of each House shall
of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a constitute a quorum," Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting
quorum. as it requires that the "majority of all members of the
sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a
Facts: Former Vice-Mayor Rex Jalandoon of La Carlota, quorum.
Negros Occidental appointed Atty. Rex Rojo as the
Sangguniang Panglungsod secretary after the latter resigned Here, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros
as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Jalandoon Occidental is composed of the presiding officer, ten (10)
then submitted Rojo's appointment papers to the CSC Negros regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of
Occidental Field Office for attestation. However, the CSCFO thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13 "members" of the
informed Jalandoon of the infirmities the CSCFO found on the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7) members, is
appointment documents, such as the lack of signature of the needed to constitute a quorum to transact official business.
HR Management Officer and the Chairman of the Personnel Since seven (7) members (including the presiding officer)
Selection Board in the certifications. As such, it deemed the were present on the 17 March 2004 regular session of the
appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or withdrawn. Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such
that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly
Jalandoon appealed the recall to the CSC Regional Office in accepted.
Iloilo. However, Jeffrey Ferrer, the newly-elected mayor and
Demie Honrado, the newly-elected vice-mayor, intervened. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
Representing petitioner La Carlota City, they claim, inter alia, the 14 September 2007 Decision and the 18 January 2008
that the resignation of Rojo as member of the Sangguniang Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
Panlungsod is ineffective having not complied with the 01377. SO ORDERED.
provision on quorum under Section 82(d) of RA 7160. The
Regional Office ruled in favor of Jalandoon, which was affirmed Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on
by the CSC and the CA. Elections
G.R. No. 125416|September 26, 1996|Ponente: J.
Before the SC, petitioners allege that respondent’s Panganiban
appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary is void Doctrine:
since respondent’s irrevocable resignation as a Sangguniang
Panlungsod member was not deemed accepted when it was Facts: Congress enacted RA 7227, which provided for the
presented on 17 March 2004 during the scheduled regular creation of the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise
session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, created petitioner SBMA to implement the declared national
Negros Occidental for lack of quorum. policy of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses. When the American navy turned
Specifically, petitioners insist that the vice-mayor, as over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, should not government, petitioner commenced the implementation of its
be counted in determining whether a quorum exists. task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport,
Excluding the vice-mayor, there were only six (6) out of the buildings, houses and other installations left by the American
twelve (12) members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod who navy.
were present on 17 March 2004. Since the required majority
of seven (7) was not reached to constitute a quorum, then no In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
business could have validly been transacted on that day Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing
including the acceptance of respondent’s irrevocable therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Section
resignation. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone.
Private respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions
Pertinent provision/s: Section 53, Local Government Code filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul the said issuance of the Sanggunian. Respondents
demand that only when certain conditions are met, such as
the surrender of the "Virgin Forests" to Bataan, can there be
concurrence in joining the SSEZ. Resorted to (or initiated) by Law-making body submits to
the people directly either the registered voters of its
Despite the Sanggunian acting on their petition, private because the law-making territorial jurisdiction, for
respondents resorted to their power of initiative under Section body fails or refuses to approval or rejection, any
122 (b) of the LGC. Respondent COMELEC, however, denied enact the law, ordinance, ordinance or resolution
the petition for local initiative by private respondents on the resolution or act that they which is duly enacted or
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution desire or because they want approved by such law-
(pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. This was to amend or modify one making authority
later reversed via a resolution by the COMELEC, which already existing
scheduled a local referendum on the questioned issuance of
the Sanggunian. It further promulgated the assailed A process of law-making by Consists merely of the
Resolution No. 2848, which provided for the rules and the people themselves electorate approving or
guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing without the participation rejecting what has been
to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the and against the wishes of drawn up or enacted by a
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan. their elected legislative body
representatives
Pertinent provision/s:
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not
yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there
Issue: Whether Resolution No. 2848, which was issued by the
would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when
COMELEC, is valid?
the people have voted for it and it has become an approved
ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
Ruling: NO. The process started by private respondents was
enforced or implemented thereunder. Hence, there is nothing
an initiative but respondent COMELEC made preparations for
for the COMELEC to supervise, since in initiative and
a referendum only. In fact, in the body of Resolution No. 2848,
referendum, the COMELEC exercises administration and
the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
"initiative" is not mentioned at all.
conduct of elections.
Initiative Referendum
Dispositive: WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED.
Power of the people to Power of the electorate to Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
propose amendments to the approve or reject a initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is
Constitution or to propose legislation through an REMANDED to the Commission on Elections for further
and enact legislations election called for the proceeding consistent with the foregoing discussion. No costs.
through an election called purpose IT IS SO ORDERED.
for the purpose
Marmento v. Commission on Elections
"Indirect initiative" is G.R. No. 213953|September 26, 2017|Ponente: J. Del
exercise of initiative by the Castillo
people through a Doctrine: The COMELEC cannot defeat the exercise of the
proposition sent to Congress people's original legislative power (initiative and referendum)
or the local legislative body for lack of budgetary allocation for its conduct.
for action
Facts: On behalf of Muntinlupa People Power, petitioner Engr.
Oscar Marmeto filed a proposed ordinance with the
Three systems of initiative: Two classes of referendum:
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa. It sought the creation
of a sectoral council and the appropriation of the amount of
(a) Initiative on the (a) Referendum on statutes
₱200 million for the livelihood programs and projects that
Constitution, which refers to which refers to a petition to
would benefit the people of Muntinlupa City. When the
a petition proposing approve or reject an act or
Sanggunian failed to act on the proposition within 30 days
amendments to the law, or part thereof, passed
from its filing, Marmeto filed a petition for initiative with the
Constitution; by Congress; and
same body to invoke the power of initiative under the LGC.
(b) Initiative on statutes, (b) Referendum on local law
The Sanggunian informed COMELEC that the proposal could
which refers to a petition which refers to a petition to
not be acted upon because the City's budget for FY 2013 had
proposing to enact a approve or reject a law,
already been enacted. Thus, a new appropriation ordinance
national legislation; and resolution or ordinance
was needed to provide funds for the conduct of the initiative.
enacted by regional
Via a resolution, the COMELEC set aside Marmeto's initiative
(c) Initiative on local assemblies and local
petition. When Marmeto a second proposed ordinance with
legislation, which refers to a legislative bodies
the Sanggunian, this was again dismissed by the COMELEC for
petition proposing to enact a
lack of budgetary allocation.
regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law,
Through an SCA for certiorari under Rule 65, Marmeto assails
resolution or ordinance.
the dismissal of his petition by the COMELEC, arguing that
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to conduct the initiative
Local initiative is the legal Local referendum is the proceedings under pertinent laws upon compliance with the
process whereby the legal process whereby the legal requirements for the exercise of the right. He asserts
registered voters of local registered voters of the local that the COMELEC evaded its mandated duty by citing
government unit may government units may unavailability of funds as ground to frustrate the conduct of
directly propose, enact, or approve, amend or reject local initiative.
amend any ordinance any ordinance enacted by
the sanggunian In answer, COMELEC contends that the propositions in
Marmeto's petition were beyond the legal powers of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact since the proposed sectoral
council will act as a legislative body that will directly propose, Facts: In 1965, a collision occurred in San Fernando, La Union
enact, approve, or reject any ordinance through the power of between a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand truck and a
initiative and referendum. dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney, including Laureano
Pertinent provision/s: Baniña Sr., died. Private respondents Juana Baniña, et. al.,
who were the heirs of the deceased, filed a complaint for
Issue/s: (1) Whether the COMELEC may prevent the conduct damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo
of an initiative proceedings for lack of specific budgetary Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
allocation? jeepney. For their part, the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot
filed a third party complaint against petitioner municipality
(2) Whether Marmeto’s propositions are within the power of and the driver of the dump truck.
the Sanggunian to enact?
In answer, petitioner municipality raised affirmative defenses
Ruling: NO. When the COMELEC receives a budgetary such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
appropriation for its 'Current Operating Expenditures,' such prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the
appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate
constitutional functions. The COMELEC is mandated to enforce cause of the collision. Public respondent Judge Romeo Firme
and administer the pertinent laws on local initiative and rendered a decision in favor of the Heirs of Baniña and against
referendum, under Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the the municipality.
Constitution.
In rendering the assailed decision, Judge Firme deferred the
Here, the COMELEC was provided with budgetary allocation resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State
for the conduct of initiative elections. The COMELEC, amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said
therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded
Marmeto' s second initiative petition on the ground that there with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
were no funds allocated for the purpose. municipality and its driver.

(2) NO. Under the LGC, local legislative power within the city Pertinent provision/s:
is to be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which
shall be comprised of elected district and sectoral Issue: Whether petitioner municipality may be held liable for
representatives. Nothing in the LGC allows the creation of the death of the passenger of the jeepney involved in the
another local legislative body that will enact, approve, or mishap?
reject local laws either through the regular legislative process
or through initiative or referendum. Ruling: NO. The general rule is that the State may not be
sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes
Even Marmeto's claim that the sectoral council will not the form of express or implied consent. Express consent may
legislate but will merely "facilitate" the people's exercise of be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is
the power of initiative and referendum is rendered implied when the government enters into business contracts,
unnecessary by the task the COMELEC must assume under thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party,
the LGC. Section 122(c) of the LGC provides that the and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself
COMELEC (or its designated representative) shall extend to a counterclaim.
assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they
What is most disturbing, however, is the authority of the are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
proposed sectoral council to utilize, manage, and administer enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they
public funds as it sees fit. While the rule is that no money are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions
shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
an appropriations ordinance or law, and that local government The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes, mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
the utilization of the ₱200 million is subject to the guidelines liable if it does not first consent to be sued. When the state
to be later implemented by Marmeto's MPP. does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
That these guidelines will be drafted and implemented liable.
subsequent to the initiative elections denies the Muntinlupa
residents of the opportunity to assess and scrutinize the Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
utilization of local funds, and gives Marmeto and his that he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of
organization an almost complete discretion in determining the sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
allocation and disbursement of the funds. streets. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari and
mandamus is DISMISSED. The Resolution No. 14-0509 of the Since the construction or maintenance of roads in which the
Commission on Elections dated July 22, 2014 is AFFIRMED. SO truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are
ORDERED. admittedly governmental activities, the municipality cannot
be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee,
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Hon. Firme who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
G.R. No. L-52179|April 8, 1991|Ponente: J. Medialdea functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and
Doctrine: Municipal corporations are suable because their deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental Dispositive: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving
that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private
respondents. SO ORDERED.
 Ramos v. Court of Appeals Here, none of the foregoing exceptions are present in this
G.R. No. 99425|March 3, 1997|Ponente: J. Panganiban case. While it may be said that Atty. Romanillos appeared for
Doctrine: Private lawyers may not represent municipalities respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel
on their own. Neither may they do so even in collaboration of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent
with authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on the municipality in this same case, his collaboration with the
principle that only accountable public officers may act for and provincial attorney (Regalado) and the provincial fiscal is
on behalf of public entities and that public funds should not contrary to law and hence should not have been recognized
be expanded to hire private lawyers. as legal. The fact that the provincial attorney and the fiscal
are supposed to collaborate with a private lawyer does not
Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to legalize the latter's representation of the municipality.
represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice
however, a municipality may adopt the work already Further, petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning
performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is the legality of the appearance of Atty. Romanillos,
beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice is thereby notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of
heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to
compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said dissolve the preliminary injunction. The legality of the
municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at
adopted, the private lawyers work cannot bind the any stage of the proceedings.
municipality.
Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to
Facts: Petitioners Ramos, Perez, together with the Baliuag represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice
Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition for the however, a municipality may adopt the work already
declaration of nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91, s. 1976, performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is
No. 7, s. 1990 and the contract of lease over a commercial beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice is thereby heaped
arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no
Bulacan. The provincial fiscal and the provincial attorney, compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said
Oliviano Regalado, filed an answer on behalf of respondent municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly
municipality. However, during the pre-trial conference, Atty. adopted, the private lawyers work cannot bind the
Roberto Romanillos appeared and manifested that he was municipality.
counsel for respondent municipality. Subsequently, Regalado
appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
During the hearing, petitioners questioned the personality of AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel for the respondent
municipality and moved to declare null and void the Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga
proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. G.R. No. L-24440|March 28, 1968|Ponente: J. JP
Romanillos. Subsequently, Romanillos and Regalado filed a Bengzon
joint motion stating that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as Doctrine: If the property is owned by the municipality in its
counsel for respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, public and governmental capacity, the property is public and
as his collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is
adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
Atty. Romanillos. patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and
The trial court then issued an order denying petitioners' payment of just compensation.
motion and granting the joint motion of Romanillos and
Regalado. It reasoned that their request to disqualify Municipal properties held and devoted to public service are
Romanillos, the counsel on record of Kristi Corporation, the not in the same category as ordinary private property. As
private respondent in the civil case, was already moot since ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and
Regalado had already taken over the case, and that the fact attached. They can even be acquired through adverse
that petitioner's counsel has never questioned his appearance possession — all these to the detriment of the local
until after he made a formal offer of evidence for the community. Hence, the classification of municipal property
respondents was an acquiescence on the part of the devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should
petitioners. The trial court's decision was affirmed by the CA. prevail over the Civil Code classification.

Pertinent provision/s: Facts: When the Municipality of Zamboanga, the former

capital of the Zamboanga province, was converted to a
Issue: Whether a private lawyer, such as Romanillos, may chartered city under CA 39, the said law provided that the
represent the Municipality of Baliuag? buildings and properties which the Province of Zamboanga
shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another
Ruling: NO. Under Section 1683 of the Revised place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga
Administrative Code, only the provincial fiscal and the at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties
municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some
their lawsuits. The municipality's authority to employ a private buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the Zamboanga and covered individually by TCTs in the name of
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it, such as when Zamboanga Province.
the following circumstances are present: (1) if and when
original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is Pursuant to CA 39, the Auditor General fixed the value of the
vested in the Supreme Court; (2) when the municipality is a properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244. Subsequently, RA
municipality in the same province; and (3) when, in a case 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into
involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Section 6
pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise. of RA 711 provided that the funds, assets and other properties
and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be Doctrine:
divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del
Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the Facts: A Tri-Partite MOA was drawn between petitioner City of
President, upon recommendation of the Auditor General. Quezon, represented by Mayor Simon, respondent Lexber, Inc.
and the then Municipality of Antipolo, whereby a 26,010
However, the Executive Secretary issued a ruling holding that square meter parcel of land located in Antipolo was to be used
Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner of the as a garbage dumping site by petitioner and other Metro
properties mentioned in CA 39. Accordingly, the Manila cities or municipalities authorized by the latter, for a 5-
Commissioner of Internal Revenue then deducted an amount year period. Part of the agreement was that the landowner,
equal to 25% of the regular IRA for the City of Zamboanga. represented by respondent Lexber, shall be hired as the
The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to exclusive supplier of manpower, heavy equipment and
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of engineering services for the dumpsite and shall also have the
the P764,220.05 due it. right of first refusal for contracting such services.

Subsequently, RA 3039 was enacted, which amended CA 39. As such, a first negotiated contract was drawn between
It now mandated that the buildings, properties and assets petitioner City and respondent Lexber, whereby the latter was
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located engaged to construct the necessary infrastructure at the
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of dumpsite, designated as the Quezon City Sanitary Landfill, for
charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. Petitioner the contract price of P4,381,069. A second negotiated
province then filed a complaint for declaratory relief with an contract was drawn. This time, it was agreed that respondent
injunctive prayer. The complaint prayed for RA 3039 to be shall provide maintenance services in the form of manpower,
declared unconstitutional for depriving the province of equipment and engineering operations for the dumpsite for
property without due process and just compensation. The RTC the contract price of P1,536,796 monthly. Moreover, petitioner
ruled in favor of petitioner. shall pay respondent a reduced fee of 50% of the monthly
contract price in the event petitioner fails to dump the agreed
Pertinent provision/s: volume of 54,000 cubic meters of garbage for any given
month.
Issue: Whether petitioner Province of Zamboanga is entitled
to the payment for the properties in question? At first, petitioner dumped its garbage on the landfill site
continuously. However, petitioner ceased to dump garbage on
Ruling: YES, but only for the 26 unused lots. If the the said site for reasons not made known to respondent
property is owned by the municipality in its public and Lexber. Consequently, even while the dumpsite remained
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress unused, respondent Lexber claimed it was entitled to
has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its payment for its services as stipulated in the second
private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and negotiated contract. Mayor Mathay, the new city mayor,
Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be denied any liability. He argued that the contract was invalid
deprived of it without due process and payment of just and unenforceable, since it was signed only by Mayor Simon
compensation. and had neither the approval nor ratification of the City
Council, and it lacked the required budget appropriation.
Here, all the 50 properties in question which are devoted to
public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. A complaint for breach of contract, specific performance and
To be considered public, it is enough that the property be held damages was filed by Lexber against petitioner, where it
and devoted for governmental purposes like local argued that because petitioner stopped dumping garbage on
administration, public education, public health, etc. As such, the dumpsite, Lexber's equipment and personnel were idle, to
RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol its damage and prejudice. The RTC ruled in favor of Lexber,
site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium which was affirmed by the CA. Before the SC, petitioner
sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots argues that the contract is void for being violative of Sections
— since these were held by the former Zamboanga province 85 and 86 of the Auditing Code, which mandates that
in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the contracts involving expenditure of public funds shall have an
absolute control of Congress. appropriation for such purpose.

However, RA 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga Pertinent provision/s:

del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26
remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are Issue: Whether a contract entered into by the city mayor
not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. involving the expenditure of public funds by the local
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered government without prior appropriation by the city council is
strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in valid and binding on the part of the city?
nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for
governmental purposes are also registered is of no Ruling: YES. Then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. did not enter into
significance since registration cannot convert public property the subject contract without legal authority. The LGC of 1983,
to private. which was then in force, specifically and exclusively
empowered the city mayor to "represent the city in its
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is business transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the city
hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as treasury and all bonds, contracts and obligations of the city."
follows: (1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to While the LGC of 1991, which took effect after the execution
return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the of the subject contracts, provides that the mayor's
amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the representation must be "upon authority of the sangguniang
latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance," there was no
latter. No costs. So ordered. such qualification under the old code.

City of Quezon v. Lexber Incorporated Even Sections 9(f), 12(a) and 12(m) of the Charter of Quezon
G.R. No. 141616|March 15, 2001|Ponente: J. Ynares- City simply provide that the mayor shall exercise general
Santiago powers and duties, such as signing "all warrants drawn on the
city treasurer and all bonds, contracts, and obligations of the the appropriation ordinance. To require the local chief
city," even as it grants the City Council the power, by executive to secure another authorization for a project that
ordinance or resolution, "to make all appropriations for the has been specifically identified and approved by the
expenses of the government of the city," as well as "to sanggunian is antithetical to a responsive local government
prohibit the throwing or depositing of garbage, refuse, or envisioned in the Constitution and in the LGC. On the other
other offensive matter in the same, and to provide for its hand, the need for a covering contract arises when the project
collection and disposition x x x." is identified in generic terms. The covering contract must also
be approved by the sanggunian.
While the powers and duties of the Mayor and the City Council
are clearly delineated, there is nothing in the cited provisions, Here, Section 4 of the appropriation ordinance allocated
nor even in the statute itself, that requires prior authorization P40,609,457.62 to the "Mayor's Office." The subject line-item
by the city council by proper enactment of an ordinance "Consultancy Services" is found in the Maintenance and Other
before the City Mayor can enter into contracts. Operating Expenses under the Object of Expenditures for the
Office of the Mayor, along with other line-items such as
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the travelling expenses, training expenses, representation
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59541 expenses, and intelligence expenses. In effect, therefore, the
affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon subject line-item in this case, like the other line-items in the
City, Branch 220 in Civil Case No. Q-94-19405 is hereby appropriations ordinance, is a specific allocation to a specific
AFFIRMED in toto. The instant petition for review is DENIED for purpose for the specific maintenance and operating expense
lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. of a specific office.

Germar v. Legaspi Further, the contract for professional services entered into by
G.R. No. 232532|October 1, 2018|Ponente: J. A Reyes, Germar, has been properly and dearly identified in the
Jr. appropriations ordinance. It is not a case where there was no
Doctrine: If the project is already provided for in the mention of any detail of the project to which the fund shall be
appropriation ordinance in sufficient detail, then no separate utilized, since the line-item subject of the present case has
authorization is necessary. On the other hand, if the project is been identified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
couched in general terms, then a separate approval by the appropriations ordinance. To require a further elaboration of
Sangguniang Bayan is required. what type of consulting agreement should be entered into is
akin to requiring what type of calamity there should be before
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Germar won in the Mayor 2013 the calamity fund should be used.
elections, replacing former mayor, respondent Feliciano
Legaspi. During Germar's term, he entered into contracts for As such, an authorization from the Sangguniang Bayan, which
professional service with six consultants: Manahan, Leonardo, is separate from the appropriations ordinance for the fiscal
Guballa, Santos, Payumo and Boticario. Respectively, they year 2013, is not warranted. Germar's action of entering into
were to advice the office of the mayor on municipal contracts of professional service with the six (6) consultants
administration and governance, barangay affairs, business could not be considered as a transgression of an established
investment and trade, calamity and disaster, and the last two and definite rule of action, nor could it be considered a
consultants, on security relations. forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or an unlawful behavior.
Neither is there any willful intent to violate the law or any
The budget for the salary of the consultants is found in the willful intent to disregard established rules for clearly,
appropriation ordinance of the municipality for the year 2013. Germar's action is within the parameters of the law.
Particularly, it is a line-item called "Consultancy Services"
found under the category "Maintenance and Other Operating Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
Expenses" of the Office of the Mayor. for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 5, 2016
A year after, Legaspi filed a complaint against Germar before and June 30, 2017, respectively, in CA G.R. SP No. 145277 and
the Ombudsman. They charged Germar of Grave Misconduct, the Consolidated Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
Gross Dishonesty, Grave Abuse of Authority, Malversation and in OMB-L-A-15-0054 and OMB-L-A-15-0055 are hereby
Violation of RAs 7160, 6713, 3019 and 9184. Legaspi averred REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
that Germar entered into these contracts of professional
service without the prior authorization of the Sangguniang City of Bacolod v. Phuture Visions Co., Inc.
Bayan, which violated Section 444 of the LGC. G.R. No. 190289|January 17, 2018|Ponente: J. Velasco,
Jr.
The Ombudsman held Germar liable for Grave Misconduct but Doctrine: The power to issue or grant licenses and business
dismissed the case against the six consultants and the HR permits is not an exercise of the government's proprietary
Officer. Germar's petition for review was denied by the CA. function. Instead, it is an exercise of the police power of the
Before the SC, petitioner claims that the item of "Consultancy State, ergo a governmental act, since it is essentially
Services" in the appropriation ordinance of the Municipality of regulatory in nature.
Norzagaray is sufficient authorization for the petitioner to sign
the contracts of professional service. Facts: Respondent Phuture Visions Co. operated lotto betting
stations and /or other gaming outlets. It then applied with the
Pertinent provision/s: PAGCOR for an authority to operate bingo games at SM
Bacolod, as well as with SM Prime for the lease of a space in
Issue: Whether petitioner is still required to secure an the said building. Prior to the issuance of the actual hard copy
authorization from the Sanggunian before entering into such of the mayor's permit, Phuture commenced bingo operations
consultancy contracts? at SM Bacolod.

Ruling: NO. If the project or program is identified in the However, it learned that its bingo outlet was padlocked by
appropriation ordinance in sufficient detail, then there is no agents of the Office of the City Legal Officer and that a copy
more need to obtain a separate or additional authority from of a Closure Order was posted at the entrance of the bingo
the sanggunian. In such case, the project and the cost are outlet. Respondent Phuture alleged that petitioners are guilty
already identified and approved by the sanggunian through of surreptitiously padlocking its SM bingo outlet in a "patently
arbitrary, whimsical, capricious, oppressive, irregular, immoral No. 03322 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
and shamelessly politically motivated" manner and with clear dated March 20, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
discrimination since the majority owners of the company are City, Branch 49 is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
the sons of petitioner Mayor Leonardia's political rival, then
Congressman Monico Puentevella. Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Court of
Appeals
In answer, petitioner City claimed that Phuture failed to pay G.R. No. 121920|August 9, 2005|Ponente: J. Garcia
the necessary fees in their application for the Mayor's Permit, Doctrine: For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil
and that there were discrepancies in the documents it Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public
submitted. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner City and buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it
dismissed Phuture's petition, which was affirmed by the CA. being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has
The appellate court, however, reversed the dismissal of the control or supervision thereof.
suit for damages and remanded the same to the trial court. It
held that the manner by which the closure of the bingo The municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to
operations was effected was tantamount to a denial of its regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the
proprietary right without due process of law. laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches
regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a
Before the SC, petitioner argues that hearing the action for national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within
damages effectively violates the City's immunity from suit its territorial jurisdiction.
since respondent had not yet obtained the consent of the City
Government of Bacolod to be included in the claim for Facts: A contract was entered into by MWSS and Kwok
damages. They also argue that the other petitioners, the City Cheung, the sole proprietor of KC Waterworks System
Mayor and other officials impleaded, are similarly immune Construction, where MWSS engaged the services of KC to
from suit since the acts they performed were within their install water service connections. KC was given a job order by
lawful duty and functions. MWSS to conduct excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and
Santolan Road, a national road in San Juan, Metro Manila, for
Pertinent provision/s: the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires.
Issue: Whether petitioner City of Bacolod can be made liable
to pay respondent damages? Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car at a speed of
30km/h along the vicinity where the said excavations were
Ruling: NO. The purpose behind the principle of immunity being made. With her on board the car and seated on the
from suit by the State is to prevent the loss of governmental right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-
efficiency as a result of the time and energy it would require awa. Since the road was flooded due to the heavy rain, the
to defend itself against lawsuits. The State and its political left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers
subdivisions are open to suit only when they consent to it. of KC had earlier made excavations. This resulted in
Consent may be express or implied, such as when the Prosecutor Biglang-awa's right arm being fractured.
government exercises its proprietary functions, or where such
is embodied in a general or special law. Biglang-awa then filed before the RTC a complaint for
damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and KC.
The power to issue or grant licenses and business permits is The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa,
not an exercise of the government's proprietary function. which was affirmed by the CA. Before the SC, petitioner
Instead, it is an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo contends that under Section 149 [1][z] of the LGC, it is obliged
a governmental act, since it is essentially regulatory in nature. to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and
No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus be maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys,
implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the power sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places. Since
to issue business permits and licences Santolan Road is a national and not a municipal road, it
cannot be held liable for the injuries suffered by Biglang-awa
Here, respondent had no clear and unmistakable legal right to on account of the accident that occurred on said road.
operate its bingo operations at the onset. Respondent failed
to establish that it had duly applied for the proper permit for Further, only KC may be held liable since Section 8 of
bingo operations with the Office of the Mayor and, instead, Ordinance No. 82-01 states that only the permittee/excavator
merely relied on the questionable claim stub to support its shall assume fully all liabilities for the death, injury or damage
claim. Further, the application form submitted by respondent arising from the non-completion of such works and/or failure
pertained to a renewal of respondent's business for of one undertaking the work to adopt the required
"Professional Services, Band/Entertainment Services" located precautionary measures for the protection of the general
at "RH Bldg., 26th Lacson St." and not at SM Bacolod. These public.
factual findings belie respondent's claim that it had the right
to operate its bingo operations at SM Bacolod. Pertinent provision/s: Article 2189, New Civil Code

In addition, respondent admitted in its petition that the Issue: Whether petitioner municipality may be held liable for
primary purpose in its AOI was only amended to reflect bingo damages?
operations on February 14, 2007 or more than a month after
it had supposedly applied for a license for bingo operations Ruling: YES. For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the
with the Office of the Mayor. In sum, petitioners, in ordering Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public
the closure of respondent's bingo operations, were exercising buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it
their duty to implement laws and ordinances which include being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has
the local government's authority to issue licenses and permits control or supervision thereof. Section 149 of the LGC
for business operations in the city. provides that the Sangguniang Bayan shall regulate the
drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. water, sewer, and other pipes, adopt measures to ensure
The Decision dated February 27, 2009 and the Resolution public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and
dated October 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
other similar hazards to life and property, and provide just
compensation or relief for persons suffering from them. Before the SC, petitioners contend, inter alia, that vicarious
liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. He was not a mere
However, petitioner’s power of regulation vis-à-vis the passenger, but instead one who had direct control and
activities aforementioned applies not only in cases where supervision over Lozano during the time of the accident. The
such activities are to be performed in municipal roads. The element of direct control is not negated by the fact that
municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to Lozano's employer was the Municipality of Koronadal. Mayor
regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the Miguel, being Lozano's superior, still had control over the
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches manner the vehicle was operated.
regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a
national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within Pertinent provision/s: Article 2180, New Civil Code
its territorial jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the municipal mayor be held solidarily liable
Neither is the petitioner relieved of liability based on its for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him?
purported lack of knowledge of the excavation and the
condition of the road when the accident occurred. The Ruling: NO. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, a person is
obligation of the petitioner to maintain the safe condition of not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual acts, but also for
the road within its territory is a continuing one which is not those persons for whom one is responsible for. To sustain
suspended while a street is being repaired. Knowledge of the claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
condition of the road and the defects and/or obstructions on following requisites must be established: (1) that the
the road may be actual or constructive. It is enough that the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through
authorities should have known of the aforesaid circumstances another; (2) that the service to be rendered in accordance
in the exercise of ordinary care. with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all
times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the
Here, Santolan Road and the Greenhills area coming from occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
Ortigas Avenue going to Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila
is a busy thoroughfare. The gaping hole in the middle of the Here, it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the
road of Santolan Road could not have been missed by the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is
authorities concerned. Further, nowhere can it be found in uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the
said Ordinance any provision exempting municipalities in municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor
Metro Manila from liabilities caused by their own negligent Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. An
acts. employer-employee relationship still exists even if the
employee was loaned by the employer to another person or
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and entity because control over the employee subsists.
the assailed decision of the appellate court AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Further, mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Sps. Jayme v. Apostol Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
G.R. No. 163609|November 27, 2008|Ponente: J. RT Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
Reyes driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the
Doctrine: doctrine of vicarious liability. Here, Mayor Miguel was neither
Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered owner. There
Facts: Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the
was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin's
an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. Lozano death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
borrowed the pick-up truck from Ernesto Simbulan, who had accident.
the same in his possession. The pick-up truck was however in
the name of respondent Rodrigo Apostol. Lozano brought The true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of
Miguel to the Buayan Airport in General Santos City to catch Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality
his Manila flight. may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged
in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.
En route to their destination, the pick-up truck accidentally hit Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent
Marvin Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National driver and his direct employer.
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. Marvin was
sent 50 meters away from the point of impact, which resulted Note: Four-fold test in determining the existence of
in severe head injuries and ultimately, his death. The parents employer-employee relationship: (1) the employer's power of
of Marvin, petitioners Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, filed a selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3)
complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents. In the employer's right to control the method of doing the work;
their complaint, they prayed that all respondents be held and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
solidarily liable for their loss. They claimed that the proximate
cause of Marvin's death was Lozano's negligent and reckless Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
operation of the vehicle. appealed Decision AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

For their part, Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections
the pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and G.R. No. 125646|September 10, 1999|Ponente: J.
Lozano pointed out that Marvin's sudden sprint across the Ynares-Santiago
highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel Doctrine: A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The RTC territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and
ruled in favor of petitioners. This was reversed by the CA, bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.
where it held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in
damages since Miguel was not the employer of Lozano but the the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
Municipality. Moreover, Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the
in the Isuzu pick-up at the time of the accident. proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility.
 1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is
Facts: The City Council of Pasig passed Ordinance No. 21, s. DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
1996, which created Barangay Karangalan. This was based on 2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663
the petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March
Paz, and to be converted and separated into a distinct 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City
barangay. Subsequently, the City of Pasig issued Ordinance of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is
No. 52, s. 1996, which created Barangay Napico. ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with
finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and
The Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.
respective plebiscites for the said barangays and filed a No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
petition in the COMELEC, which called the attention of the
Commission to a pending case before the RTC for settlement Municipality of Pateros v. Court of Appeals
of boundary dispute. The Municipality alleges that the G.R. No. 157714|June 16, 2009|Ponente: J. Nachura
proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary Doctrine: In the event that no amicable settlement is
dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled reached, as envisioned under Section 118(e) of the LGC, a
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the certification shall be issued to that effect, and the dispute
said case shall have been finally decided by the court. shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned within
sixty (60) days from the date of the aforementioned
The COMELEC suspended the plebiscite for Barangay certification. Only upon failure of these intermediary steps will
Karangalan but upheld the plebiscite held for Barangay resort to the RTC follow, as specifically provided in Section
Napico for being moot in view of the fact that the plebiscite 119 of the LGC.
was already conducted. Before the SC, the City of Pasig
argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same Facts: Proclamation No. 2475, issued by Marcos, and
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come Proclamation No. 518, which was subsequently issued by
into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. President Corazon Aquino, declared that Fort Bonifacio was in
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Makati. The
Pertinent provision/s: Municipality of Pateros then filed an action for judicial
declaration of the territorial boundaries of Pateros against
Issue: Whether the civil case before the RTC involving the Makati before the RTC. Pateros claimed that, based on
boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the historical and official records, it had an original area of 1,038
City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first hectares, more or less. However, when a cadastral mapping
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1978, Pateros
barangays may be held? learned that its territorial boundaries had been substantially
reduced to merely 166 hectares. Pateros opined that this
Ruling: YES. In the interest of good order, the court may disparity was brought about by the issuance of Proclamation
suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of Nos. 2475 and 518.
another case closely interrelated or linked to the first. Here,
while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas The RTC dismissed the petition, which was affirmed by the CA.
covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico The trial court held that they had no jurisdiction to try and
are within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of the hear the case since Proclamation No. 2475 specifically
same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending declared that the subject property is within the territorial
before the RTC. jurisdiction of Makati and, inasmuch as the Proclamation was
not declared unconstitutional, the same is a valid and
Whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within subsisting law.
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the
City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the Before the SC, Pateros argues that Proclamation Nos. 2475
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. A requisite for and 518 suffer from Constitutional infirmity since the
the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be alteration or modification of the boundaries of municipalities
properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less or cities can only be made by a law enacted by Congress and
permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial approved by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until the political units directly affected. The said proclamations,
and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the although issued by then President Marcos during the Marcos
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only era, was not a legislative enactment.
be an exercise in futility.
Pertinent provision/s: Section 118 (d), Local Government
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of Code
plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the
conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to try and hear
or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly the case for settlement of boundary dispute?
within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Ruling: YES, but only upon compliance with the
Neither is it correct to say that because a plebiscite had procedure laid down in Section 118 of the LGC. When
already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Pateros filed its complaint with the RTC of Makati, Makati was
Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already still a municipality. Hence, there was no Sangguniang
been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Panlalawigan that could take cognizance of the boundary
Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC dispute, as provided in Section 118(b) of the LGC. Further, the
against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of former MMA did not also have the authority to take the place
Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because the MMA's power
RTC Antipolo. was limited to the delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
Now that Makati is already a highly urbanized city, the parties become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos
should follow Section 118(d) of the LGC and should opt to should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.
amicably settle this dispute by joint referral to the respective
sanggunians of the parties. This has become imperative The SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era, which was
because, after all, no attempt had been made earlier to settle affirmed by the RTC. This was partly reversed by the CA.
the dispute amicably under the aegis of the LGC. Before the SC, Nueva Era questions the remedy used by
Marcos, contending that resort to the CA was unnecessary
In the event that no amicable settlement is reached, as since Section 119 of the LGC states that an appeal to the
envisioned under Section 118(e) of the LGC, a certification decision of the SP is exclusively vested to the RTC, without
shall be issued to that effect, and the dispute shall be formally further appeal to the CA.
tried by the Sanggunian concerned within sixty (60) days from
the date of the aforementioned certification. Only upon failure Pertinent provision/s: Section 119, Local Government Code
of these intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as
specifically provided in Section 119 of the LGC. Issue: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the petition for
review filed by the Municipality of Marcos?
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED,
having been mooted by the conversion of respondent Ruling: YES. Appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot
Municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. The parties be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law.
are hereby DIRECTED to comply with Section 118(d) and (e) of Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review
the Local Government Code, and Rule III of the Rules and precisely because the law allows it. BP 129, as amended by
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of RA 7902 vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final
1991 without prejudice to judicial recourse, as provided in the judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the RTC
Local Government Code. No costs. SO ORDERED. and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, among others.
Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte BP 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of
G.R. No. 169435|February 27, 2008|Ponente: J. RT Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy
Reyes of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in
Doctrine: While Section 119 of the LGC states that an appeal cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
to the decision of the SP is exclusively vested to the RTC, jurisdiction. Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via
without further appeal to the CA, the appellate court the CA petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for certiorari
can pass upon the petition for review of the same since BP to be able to pass upon the same.
129, as amended by RA 7902 vests in the CA the appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, Note: Section 1 of RA 3753, which created the Municipality of
orders or awards of the RTC and quasi-judicial agencies, Marcos, lists down the barangays that constitute the
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others. municipality. Since only the barangays of Dingras are
enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's
Facts: By virtue of EO 66, Governor General Francis Burton territory is, therefore, excluded, following the maxim,
Harrison created the township of Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte, by expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
uniting several rancherias or rural settlements. The
Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
pursuant to RA 3753. Section 1 of the said law provides that Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The
the Municipality of Marcos shall be bounded on the east by Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. The term "Mt. Reinstated. SO ORDERED.
Province" refers to the present adjoining provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, SN Aboitiz Power-Magat, Inc. v. Municipality of Alfonso
which were then a single province. Lista, Ifugao
G.R. No. 198647|November 20, 2017|Ponente: J. Tijam
However, Mt. Province was divided into four provinces, Doctrine: Issues involving boundary disputes between LGUs
including Kalinga and Apayao. This was subsequently divided cannot be resolved through an action for nullification of title
again by RA 7878, which created the regular provinces of but only by following the procedure laid down in Section 118
Kalinga and Apayao. The part of then Mt. Province which was of the LGC.
at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao. Thus, the
eastern boundary of Marcos is the present Ilocos Norte- Facts: Respondent Municipality of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao filed a
Apayao boundary. complaint, alleging that the NPC fraudulently secured a patent
by making it appear in the survey plans that certain parcels of
30 years later, the Sangguniang Bayan of Marcos passed land were located in Barangay General Aguinaldo, Ramon,
Resolution No. 93-015, which claimed that the middle portion Isabela when these parcels of land were actually located in
of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its Barangay Sto. Domingo in Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. As such, OCTs
territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva were issued to the NPC because of such survey plans.
Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east Later on, NPC alienated such parcels of land in favor of
by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would PSALM, a GOCC, which in turn transferred the same to·
consequently be obtained by it. petitioner SN Aboitiz Power Magat (SNAP). Respondent thus
prayed for the declaration of nullity of the patent and the OCT
In answer, Nueva Era alleged that since time immemorial, its in question because the same were void for failure to reflect
entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," the true location of the subject parcels of land.
an indigenous cultural community. It argued that since the
land being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the SNAP then filed an MTD on the grounds of prescription and
tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era. Further, failure to state a cause of action. This was denied by the RTC.
Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. Since The CA dismissed SNAP's SCA for certiorari.
RA 3753 specifically mentioned 7 barrios of Dingras to
Pertinent provision/s: Section 118, Local Government Code
Issue: Whether an action for the nullification of title is the
proper remedy for cases involving boundary disputes?

Ruling: NO. In an action for nullification of title or declaration

of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following
allegations for the sufficiency of cause of action: (1) that the
claimant is the owner of the subject land prior to the issuance
of the title to the defendant; and (2) that fraud or mistake was
perpetrated in obtaining said title over the subject land.

Here, respondent municipality does not claim ownership over

the property. The main thrust of respondent municipality's
claim rests on its allegations that fraud attended the securing
of the subject patents and certificates of title and that such
fraud had the effect of depriving it of its territorial jurisdiction.
Without the claim of ownership, there was no supposed right
upon which respondent municipality may anchor its claim and
which SNAP may violate. Verily, it is clear that the amended
complaint was insufficient for lack of cause of action.

Despite this, respondent municipality is not without remedy. If

at all, any issue as to boundary dispute may be resolved by
referring the same to the provinces' respective Sangguniang
Panlalawigan following Section 118 (c) of the LGC which
provides for the remedy in case of a boundary dispute
involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces.

Evidently, the boundary dispute is between the Municipality of

Alfonso Lista in the Province of Ifugao and the Municipality of
Ramon in the Province of Isabela. Such issue and its corollary
incidents cannot be resolved in the complaint and the
subsequent amended complaint filed by the respondent
municipality. In other words, respondent municipality's
territorial claim can neither be resolved in an action for
nullification of title.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

The Decision dated April 6, 2011 and Resolution dated
September 15, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No.
113111 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.