NINO JAKE L.
BARRANTES, JD2A
LALOGOV
Title: Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, Sept 11, 1991).
Facts:
On September 27, 1988, the Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60, which
ratified a Burial Assistance Program initiated by Mayor Jejomar Binay. This program
provided ₱500.00 in financial assistance to bereaved families residing in Makati whose
gross monthly income did not exceed ₱2,000.00. The Metro Manila Commission
approved the resolution, and the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of
₱400,000.00 for its [Link], the Commission on Audit (COA)
disapproved the resolution, stating that:
[Link] was no substantial connection between the resolution's objective and the public
safety or general welfare of Makati's inhabitants.
[Link] funds must be used for public purposes benefiting the majority, not just a
few individuals.
[Link] program potentially violated the equal protection clause by favoring a specific
group.
Despite the COA's disapproval, the Municipality reaffirmed the program through
Resolution No. 243. Nevertheless, the COA maintained its position, leading Mayor
Binay to file a special civil action for certiorari, seeking to nullify COA Decision No. 115
Issues:
[Link] Resolution No. 60 (and its re-enactment under Resolution No. 243)
constitutes a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
[Link] the classification of beneficiaries under the program violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, granting the petition and setting
aside COA Decision No. 1159:
On Police Power: The Court held that police power is broad and encompasses
regulations promoting the health, safety, comfort, and general welfare of the community.
The Burial Assistance Program, aimed at aiding indigent families during bereavement,
falls within this scope as it addresses social welfare concerns and promotes human
dignity.
On Public Purpose: The Court emphasized that a public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. Supporting the poor
has long been recognized as a legitimate exercise of police power in promoting the
common good.
On Equal Protection: The classification of beneficiaries based on income does not
violate the equal protection clause. The Court recognized that paupers can be
reasonably classified for different treatment, especially when the objective is to provide
social assistance to the underprivileged.
Doctrine:
Police Power and General Welfare: Municipalities have the authority to enact
ordinances and implement programs under the general welfare clause, provided these
measures are reasonably related to the public good.
Public Purpose: Government expenditures must serve a public purpose. A program
does not lose its public character merely because it benefits a specific group, especially
if that group represents a vulnerable sector of society.
Equal Protection: Classifications in social welfare programs are permissible if they are
reasonable and serve a legitimate public interest, such as assisting the poor.
Title: Tatel vs Mun. of Virac 207 SCRA 157 (1992)
Facts:
Celestino Tatel owned a warehouse in Barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac,
Catanduanes, where he operated an abaca bailing machine. Residents complained
about disturbances caused by the machine, including smoke, obnoxious odors, and
dust, which they claimed affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood. A
municipal committee investigated and found that the warehouse's operations posed a
significant fire hazard due to the storage of flammable materials like abaca and copra,
especially given its proximity to residential houses and the area's crowded nature.
On April 22, 1966, the Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 29, declaring Tatel's
warehouse a public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing its
removal within two months. The Council cited Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, which
prohibited the construction of warehouses storing inflammable materials within 200
meters of residential blocks.
Tatel contested the resolution, arguing that his warehouse was legally constructed
under a valid permit and that Ordinance No. 13 was unconstitutional, violating due
process and equal protection clauses.
Issues:
[Link] Tatel's warehouse constituted a public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil
Code.
[Link] Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, was unconstitutional and void.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 13 and affirmed that Tatel's
warehouse, due to the storage of flammable materials, constituted a public nuisance.
Doctrine:
Police Power: Municipalities possess the authority to enact ordinances under their
police power to promote public health, safety, and welfare. Such ordinances are
presumed valid unless proven otherwise.
Public Nuisance: An establishment that poses a danger to public safety, such as a fire
hazard due to the storage of inflammable materials near residential areas, can be
declared a public nuisance and abated accordingly.
Title: Moday et al v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916 (Feb. 20, 1997
Facts:
The Municipality of Bunawan passed a resolution to expropriate a portion of land owned
by Moday for a government center. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved the
resolution, citing that other lots were available. Despite this, the municipality proceeded
with expropriation. The RTC and Court of Appeals upheld the expropriation.
Issues:
Is a municipal resolution for expropriation valid despite disapproval by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan?
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that the disapproval was invalid because the resolution was
within the municipality’s legal powers. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan can only
disapprove measures that are ultra vires (beyond authority), not those it merely
disagrees with on policy.
Doctrine:
LGUs have delegated power of eminent domain.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may only nullify municipal resolutions if they exceed
legal authority—not based on policy disagreement.
Title: Prov. Of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125 (May 17, 1993).
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129
authorizing the provincial governor to expropriate land adjacent to the provincial capitol
for a pilot farm and housing project for government employees. The province filed
expropriation cases against the San Joaquins. The Court of Appeals suspended the
proceedings, requiring prior approval from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
land conversion.
Issues:
Does a local government unit (LGU) need prior DAR approval to expropriate agricultural
land for public use?
Court’s Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that LGUs, when exercising delegated eminent domain
powers, are not required to obtain prior DAR approval for expropriation. The DAR's
authority over land conversion applies to applications by landowners or beneficiaries,
not to LGU-initiated expropriations.
Doctrine:
Eminent Domain by LGUs: LGUs can exercise eminent domain without prior DAR
approval when acting within their delegated authority for public purposes.
Public Purpose: The concept of "public use" includes projects that offer public
advantage or benefit, such as agricultural development centers and housing for
government employees.
Title: Barangay San Roque vs. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 138896 (June 20, 2000)
Facts:
Barangay San Roque of Talisay, Cebu, filed a complaint for expropriation before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to acquire land owned by the heirs of Francisco Pastor. The
MTC dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction, as expropriation suits fall under the
Regional Trial Court's (RTC) exclusive original jurisdiction. When refiled with the RTC,
the case was again dismissed on the ground that the assessed value of the land
(₱1,740) placed it within the MTC's jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 7691. Barangay
San Roque appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Does jurisdiction over an expropriation case depend on the assessed value of the
property involved?
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court held that expropriation suits are actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The primary issue in such cases is the government's authority to take private
property for public use, not the property's monetary value. Therefore, jurisdiction lies
with the RTC, regardless of the property's assessed value.
Doctrine:
Expropriation proceedings are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts, as they involve matters incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Title: Mun. of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp, 292 SCRA 678
Facts:
The Municipality of Parañaque sought to expropriate two parcels of land owned by V.M.
Realty Corporation for a socialized housing project. The expropriation was initiated
through Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993. V.M. Realty
contested the action, arguing that under the Local Government Code (RA 7160),
expropriation requires an ordinance, not merely a resolution. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
Issues:
Can a local government unit (LGU) validly initiate expropriation proceedings through a
resolution instead of an ordinance?
Does the principle of res judicata bar the LGU from filing another expropriation case
over the same property?
Court’s Decision:
On the Requirement of an Ordinance: No. The Supreme Court held that under Section
19 of RA 7160, an LGU must enact an ordinance—not merely a resolution—to validly
exercise the power of eminent domain. An ordinance has the force of law, whereas a
resolution merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the legislative body. Therefore,
the municipality's reliance on a resolution rendered the expropriation complaint invalid.
On Res Judicata: No. The Court ruled that while res judicata generally applies to
prevent the re-litigation of cases, it does not bar the State or its agents from exercising
the power of eminent domain. However, any subsequent expropriation must comply with
all legal requirements, including the enactment of a proper ordinance
Doctrine:
Ordinance Requirement: LGUs must enact an ordinance to validly exercise the power of
eminent domain; a mere resolution is insufficient.
Eminent Domain and Res Judicata: The inherent power of eminent domain is not barred
by res judicata, but its exercise must conform to legal prerequisites.
Title: City of Cebu vs. CA, G.R. No. 109173 (July 5, 1996)
Facts:
The City of Cebu, through Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418 dated February
17, 1992, authorized the expropriation of a 2,019-square-meter parcel of land owned by
Merlita Cardeno in Sitio Sto. Niño, Alaska-Mambaling, for a socialized housing project.
On February 25, 1992, the city filed a complaint for eminent domain against Cardeno.
Cardeno moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the city failed to make a valid and
definite offer to purchase the property, as required under Section 19 of Republic Act No.
7160 (Local Government Code). The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the
complaint, and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal.
Issues:
Whether the City of Cebu's complaint for expropriation was sufficient despite the alleged
failure to make a valid and definite offer to purchase the property prior to filing the
complaint.
Court’s Decision:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the city's complaint sufficiently alleged compliance
with the requirements of Section 19 of RA 7160. The Court emphasized that procedural
rules should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice. It ruled that the RTC
erred in dismissing the complaint without a full trial, as the city's allegations, if proven,
could establish a valid cause of action for expropriation. The case was remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings.
Doctrine:
Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules: Courts should avoid dismissing cases on
technicalities when the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action.
Expropriation Requirements: Under Section 19 of RA 7160, an LGU must make a valid
and definite offer to purchase the property before initiating expropriation proceedings.
Title: Francia vs. Mun. of Meycauyan, GR No. 170432 (2008)
Facts:
The Municipality of Meycauayan filed an expropriation complaint to acquire a 16,256 sq.
m. property owned by the Francia family, intending to construct a public terminal for
utility vehicles. The Francias contested, asserting the land was developed and the
compensation offered was inadequate. The RTC ruled in favor of the municipality,
allowing immediate possession upon depositing 15% of the property's fair market value.
The Francias appealed, arguing that the RTC erred by not determining the existence of
public purpose before issuing the writ of possession.
Issues:
Is a prior determination of public purpose necessary before issuing a writ of possession
in expropriation proceedings?
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by issuing the writ without such
determination?
Court’s Decision:
No to both. The Supreme Court held that under Section 19 of the Local Government
Code (RA 7160), a local government unit may take immediate possession of property
upon filing an expropriation case and depositing at least 15% of its fair market value,
without the need for a prior determination of public purpose. Thus, the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
Doctrine:
In expropriation cases under RA 7160, a prior determination of public purpose is not a
prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Immediate possession is authorized upon filing a sufficient complaint and depositing
15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
Title:Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)
Facts:
The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) filed four expropriation cases in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City to acquire approximately 282 hectares of land in Barangays
Malubog and Babag for a tourism development project. The project aimed to establish a
sports complex, clubhouse, golf course, and other recreational facilities accessible to
the public. The petitioners, including the heirs of Juancho Ardona, contested the
expropriation, arguing that the Constitution does not expressly authorize the taking of
private property for tourism purposes and that the land was covered by the agrarian
reform program.
Issues:
Whether the expropriation of private land for tourism development purposes is
constitutionally valid, given that tourism is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution as
a valid public use.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the expropriation. It ruled that the
power of eminent domain extends to the taking of private property for public purposes,
including tourism development, even if tourism is not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution. The Court emphasized that the Constitution's general provisions on public
welfare and the general welfare clause provide sufficient basis for such expropriations.
Additionally, the Court noted that the land was not entirely covered by the agrarian
reform program, and the PTA had complied with the procedural requirements for
expropriation.
Doctrine:
The power of eminent domain encompasses the authority to expropriate private
property for public purposes, including tourism development, even if such purposes are
not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution.
Title:Filstream International Inc. vs. CA, 284 SCRA 716 (1998)
Facts:
Filstream International Incorporated owned six parcels of land in Tondo II, Manila. In
January 1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit against occupants for non-payment of
rent and termination of lease contracts. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of
Filstream, ordering the occupants to vacate and pay back rentals. This decision was
affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, becoming final and
executory.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings, the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 7813 on November 5, 1993, authorizing the mayor to acquire lands,
including by expropriation. Subsequently, the City filed a complaint for eminent domain
to expropriate Filstream's properties. The Regional Trial Court issued a writ of
possession in favor of the City.
Filstream filed motions to dismiss the expropriation complaint and to quash the writ of
possession, arguing lack of valid cause of action, violation of constitutional guarantees,
and inadequate compensation. The Regional Trial Court denied these motions, leading
Filstream to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed.
Issues:
[Link] the City of Manila can exercise its power of eminent domain despite a final
and executory judgment in favor of Filstream in the ejectment case.
[Link] the City complied with the procedural requirements for expropriation under
Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).
Court’s Decision:
[Link] the Exercise of Eminent Domain: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the City of
Manila has the authority to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction,
even if a final and executory judgment in favor of Filstream exists.
[Link] Compliance with Procedural Requirements: No. The Court found that the City did
not comply with the procedural requirements for expropriation under Republic Act No.
7279, which mandates that expropriation proceedings should only be resorted to after
other modes of land acquisition have been exhausted.
Doctrine:
Local government units have the authority to exercise eminent domain within their
jurisdiction. However, they must comply with the procedural requirements set forth in
Republic Act No. 7279, which prioritizes other modes of land acquisition before resorting
to expropriation.
Title:Hagonoy Market Vendors Assn. Vs. Mun. of Hagonoy, Bulacan GR No. 137621
(Feb 6,2002)
Facts:
On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy enacted Ordinance No. 28,
increasing stall rentals in the public market. The ordinance was posted publicly from
November 4 to 25, 1996. In late November 1997, vendors received copies of the
ordinance and were informed of its enforcement starting January 1998. On December 8,
1997, the Hagonoy Market Vendor Association appealed to the Secretary of Justice,
challenging the ordinance's constitutionality and claiming lack of notice. The Secretary
dismissed the appeal as time-barred, citing the 30-day appeal period under Section 187
of the Local Government Code. The Court of Appeals upheld this dismissal, noting
procedural deficiencies in the association's petition.
Issues:
[Link] the appeal to the Secretary of Justice timely filed?
[Link] the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition due to procedural lapses?
Court’s Decision:
Timeliness of Appeal: No. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was filed beyond the
30-day period mandated by Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Court
found that the ordinance was properly posted and that the vendors had participated in
public hearings, indicating awareness of the ordinance.
Procedural Lapses: No. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal,
emphasizing that procedural rules must be followed to ensure orderly administration of
justice.
Doctrine:
Strict Compliance with Appeal Periods: Appeals questioning the constitutionality of tax
ordinances must be filed within the 30-day period specified by law; failure to do so
renders the appeal time-barred.
Title:Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, GR 146587 (July 2, 2002)
Facts:
In 1969, the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) initiated expropriation proceedings to
acquire approximately 544,980 square meters of land in Malolos, Bulacan, for the
"Voice of the Philippines" radio transmitter project. A deposit of ₱517,558.80 was made
as provisional compensation.
On February 26, 1979, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered the condemnation of the
property and directed the government to pay just compensation at ₱6.00 per square
meter, with legal interest from September 19, 1969. However, the full payment was not
made.
In 1984, the heirs of Luis Santos, the original owner, sought enforcement of the
judgment. The RTC issued a writ of execution and ordered the release of ₱72,683.55 to
the heirs.
In 1999, the government attempted to deposit ₱4,664,000.00 as compensation. The
heirs countered, requesting an updated compensation based on current zonal values or
the return of the property.
In 1999, the government attempted to deposit ₱4,664,000.00 as compensation. The
heirs countered, requesting an updated compensation based on current zonal values or
the return of the property.
Issues:
Whether the 1979 judgment had prescribed, rendering it unenforceable.
Whether the heirs are entitled to the return of the expropriated property due to non-
payment.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals:
On Prescription: The Court held that the five-year period for executing a judgment was
interrupted by the government's partial payment and the heirs' motions, thus the 1979
decision remained enforceable.
On Return of Property: The Court ruled that the expropriated property could not be
returned, as it had been devoted to public use, including allocations to the Bulacan
State University and the Philippine Carabao Center. The heirs are entitled to just
compensation with legal interest from the date of taking.
Doctrine:
The exercise of eminent domain requires just compensation, and delays in payment do
not nullify the expropriation if the property has been devoted to public use.
The five-year period for executing a judgment can be interrupted by actions such as
partial payments or motions filed by the parties.
Title:Fortich vs. Corona, 312 SCRA 751 (1999)
Facts:
A 144-hectare agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSR Management
and Development Corporation, was approved for conversion to agro-industrial use by
the Office of the President (OP) on March 29, 1996. This decision became final and
executory. Subsequently, farmer-beneficiaries protested, leading to a hunger strike. In
response, the OP issued a "Win-Win Resolution" on November 7, 1997, modifying its
earlier decision by allowing only 44 hectares for agro-industrial use and allocating the
remaining 100 hectares for distribution to farmers. Petitioners challenged this
modification.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the President can modify its final and executory decision through
the "Win-Win Resolution."
Court’s Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that once a decision becomes final and executory, it can
no longer be altered or modified. The OP's issuance of the "Win-Win Resolution"
constituted grave abuse of discretion, as it effectively reopened and modified a final
judgment without legal basis.
Doctrine:
Finality of Administrative Decisions: Once an administrative decision attains finality, the
issuing body loses jurisdiction to amend or modify it. Any subsequent alteration is void
for lack of jurisdiction.
Distinction Between "Cases" and "Matters": Under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the
Constitution, only "cases" (not "matters" like motions for reconsideration) require referral
to the Supreme Court en banc when a division fails to reach the required majority.
Title:Roxas & Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals, GR 1287876 (Dec 17, 1999).
Facts:
Roxas & Co., Inc. owned three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas: Hacienda Palico
(1,024 hectares), Hacienda Banilad (1,050 hectares), and Hacienda Caylaway (867
hectares). In 1988, the company voluntarily offered Hacienda Caylaway for sale under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Subsequently, the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings for Haciendas
Palico and Banilad. Roxas & Co. contested the acquisitions, citing due process
violations and arguing that the lands had been reclassified as non-agricultural under
local zoning ordinances and Presidential Proclamation No. 1520..
Issues:
[Link] Roxas & Co.'s failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred judicial
review.
[Link] the DAR's acquisition proceedings complied with due process requirements.
[Link] the DAR could proceed with land acquisition without considering the lands'
reclassification as non-agricultural.
[Link] the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) without full
payment of just compensation was valid.
Court’s Decision:
[Link] of Administrative Remedies: The Supreme Court held that the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies did not bar judicial review, as the case involved
violations of due process.
[Link] Process: The Court found that the DAR failed to observe due process,
particularly in providing proper notice and conducting necessary conferences before
land acquisition.
[Link] Reclassification: The Court emphasized that lands reclassified as non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of CARP should not be subject to agrarian reform.
[Link] Compensation: The issuance of CLOAs without full payment of just
compensation was deemed invalid.
Doctrine:
Due Process in Land Acquisition: The DAR must strictly comply with due process
requirements, including proper notice and consultation, in land acquisition proceedings
under CARP.
Respect for Land Reclassification: Lands reclassified as non-agricultural before the
effectivity of CARP are exempt from agrarian reform coverage.
Just Compensation Requirement: Full payment of just compensation is a prerequisite
for the valid transfer of land ownership under agrarian reform programs.
Title: Cabrera vs. CA, 195 SCRA 314 (1991)
Facts:
In 1969, the Provincial Board of Catanduanes enacted Resolution No. 158, closing an
old road leading to the new Capitol Building and exchanging it with private land to
construct a new road. Deeds of exchange were executed, and a new concrete road was
built. In 1977–1978, portions of the old road were repurposed for private use. Bruno S.
Cabrera, whose house faced the old road, filed a complaint seeking restoration of the
public road, annulment of the resolution and deeds, and damages, alleging the closure
was invalid and caused him injury.
Issues:
[Link] the closure and exchange of the public road by the Provincial Board valid?
[Link] the Provincial Board have the authority to close the road without Congressional
approval?
[Link] Cabrera entitled to damages for the inconvenience caused by the road closure?
Court’s Decision:
[Link] of Closure and Exchange: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial
Board had the authority under Republic Act No. 5185 and Section 2246 of the Revised
Administrative Code to close the road and exchange it for private land, provided that
those prejudiced were indemnified.
[Link] of the Provincial Board: Yes. The Court affirmed that local government units,
through their legislative bodies, have the power to close public roads within their
jurisdiction, especially when it serves the public welfare.
[Link] to Damages: No. The Court ruled that Cabrera was not entitled to
damages as he failed to prove that he suffered special damages distinct from those
experienced by the general public.
Doctrine:
Closure of Public Roads: Local government units have the authority to close public
roads under their jurisdiction for public welfare, subject to indemnification of those
prejudiced.
Damages for Road Closure: To claim damages due to road closure, a person must
demonstrate special injury different from that suffered by the general public.
Title: MMDA vs. Bel Air Village Assn. Inc., 328 SCRA 836 (2000)
Facts:
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) issued a notice to Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), requesting the opening of Neptune Street—a private
road within Bel-Air Village—for public vehicular traffic. MMDA also indicated plans to
demolish the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue. BAVA
opposed the move, asserting that MMDA lacked authority over private subdivision
roads. The Regional Trial Court denied BAVA's request for a preliminary injunction, but
the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, prompting MMDA to elevate the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
Does the MMDA have the authority to open a private subdivision road to public traffic
and demolish its perimeter wall without an ordinance from the local government unit?
Court’s Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that the MMDA does not possess police power or
legislative authority to unilaterally open private roads to public traffic or demolish
perimeter walls. Such powers are vested in the local government units (LGUs) and must
be exercised through proper ordinances. The MMDA's functions are limited to planning,
coordination, regulation, and implementation of services within Metro Manila, as
outlined in Republic Act No. 7924. Therefore, any action affecting private property rights
must be sanctioned by the appropriate LGU through legislative measures.
Doctrine:
Limitation of MMDA's Powers: The MMDA, being a development authority and not a
political subdivision, lacks police power and cannot enact ordinances or enforce
regulations that infringe upon private property rights without proper delegation from the
legislature or local government units.
Authority of Local Government Units: LGUs possess the power to enact ordinances
affecting roads within their jurisdiction, including private subdivision roads, and any
action to open such roads to public use must be authorized through proper legislative
channels.
Title: Sangalang vs. IAC, 168 SCRA 634 (1988)
Facts:
Bel-Air Village in Makati was developed in the 1950s as a residential subdivision with
deed restrictions limiting lots to residential use. In the 1970s, the adjacent commercial
block was developed, and Jupiter Street, which bordered the village, was opened to
public traffic. The municipal authorities of Makati removed gates and fences along
Jupiter Street, facilitating public access. Homeowners, including the Sangalangs, filed
actions against Ayala Corporation and municipal authorities, alleging breach of deed
restrictions and seeking damages.
Issues:
Whether the opening of Jupiter Street to public traffic and the commercialization of
adjacent areas violated the deed restrictions, thereby entitling the homeowners to
damages.
Court’s Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that while deed restrictions are generally enforceable, they
cannot prevail over the State's exercise of police power aimed at promoting public
welfare. The opening of Jupiter Street was a valid exercise of police power to alleviate
traffic congestion and enhance public convenience. Furthermore, the Court found no
contractual obligation on Ayala Corporation's part to maintain the exclusivity of the
residential area, and thus, it was not liable for damages.
Doctrine:
Police Power vs. Contractual Obligations: The State's police power to promote public
welfare can override private contractual agreements, such as deed restrictions,
especially when such agreements hinder public interests like traffic management.
Non-Impairment Clause: The constitutional guarantee against impairment of contracts is
not absolute and must yield to the legitimate exercise of police power.
Title: Macasiano vs. Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)
Facts:
On June 13, 1990, the Municipality of Parañaque enacted Ordinance No. 86, Series of
1990, authorizing the closure of certain public streets in Baclaran—specifically J.
Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension, and Opena Streets—to establish a
flea market. The ordinance was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA)
on July 20, 1990, subject to specific conditions, including ensuring that the streets would
not be used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of residents did not oppose the flea
market. Subsequently, the municipality entered into an agreement with Palanyag
Kilusang Bayan for Service, a service cooperative, granting it the right to manage and
operate the flea market, with the obligation to remit dues to the municipal treasury.
Market stalls were then erected along the affected streets.
Brigadier General Levy D. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command, ordered the demolition and confiscation of the stalls on September 13, 1990,
citing obstruction of public thoroughfares. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag.
On October 16, 1990, Macasiano issued a final notice to Palanyag to cease the flea
market within ten days, threatening dismantlement of the stalls in case of non-
compliance. In response, on October 23, 1990, the Municipality and Palanyag filed a
joint petition for prohibition, mandamus, and damages with a request for a preliminary
injunction. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on October 24, 1990, and
subsequently validated Ordinance No. 86, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against
Macasiano.
Issues:
Whether the Municipality of Parañaque had the authority to enact an ordinance
authorizing the closure and lease of public streets for use as a flea market.
Court’s Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that the municipality exceeded its authority. Properties
devoted to public use, such as streets, are beyond the commerce of man and cannot be
leased or repurposed for private use without explicit legislative authority. The Court
emphasized that:
Under Article 424 of the Civil Code, properties of public dominion, like public streets, are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be the object of lease or other commercial
transactions.
The municipality failed to comply with the conditions set by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority for the approval of Ordinance No. 86.
The establishment of a flea market on public streets would exacerbate traffic congestion
and impair public health and safety.
Therefore, the ordinance was declared null and void for lack of authority and failure to
comply with statutory requirements.
Doctrine:
Public Property and Commerce: Properties of public dominion, such as public streets,
are outside the commerce of man and cannot be leased or repurposed for private use
without explicit legislative authority.
Limitations on Local Government Powers: Local government units must adhere strictly
to legislative authority when enacting ordinances affecting public properties.
Compliance with Regulatory Conditions: Failure to comply with conditions set by higher
authorities, such as the Metropolitan Manila Authority, renders municipal ordinances
invalid.
