Municipality of Paranaque vs V.M. Realty Corp.

Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of

1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 134, on September 20, 1993 a complaint for
expropriation against private respondent over two parcels of land with a
combined area of about 10,000 square meters located at Wakas, San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila and covered by Torrens Certificate of
Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes
for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court authorized petitioner
to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of
court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based
on its current tax declaration. Private respondent filed its answer alleging
in the main that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by
the Local Government Code. The trial court then nullified its February 4,
1994 order and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's resolution. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WoN a resolution has a binding effect in contrast to an ordinance?
Held: The Supreme Court held that the petition is not meritorious. The
power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government which may delegate the exercise thereof to local
government units, other public entities and public utilities. A local
government unit may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's
control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations. AIDTHC
A local government unit, like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution
of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and
clearly requires an ordinance or a law for the purpose. A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. The fact that there is no cause of
action is evident from the face of the complaint for expropriation which
was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance

authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. On the

other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent
proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal
requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

Heirs of JBL Reyes vs CA

Facts: Before us are the following consolidated petitions filed by
petitioners Heirs of Jose B. L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes: (1) a petition
for review 1 of the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated January 27,
1998 which ordered the condemnation of petitioners' properties and
reversed the order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
9, dated October 3, 1995 dismissing the complaint of respondent City of
Manila (City) for expropriation, and (2) a petition for certiorari 4 alleging
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering a resolution 5 dated August 19, 1998 which issued a temporary
restraining order against the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila,
Branch 10, not to "(disturb) the occupancy of Dr. Rosario Abiog, one of
the members of SBMI, until the Supreme Court has decided the Petition
for Review on Certiorari" and a resolution 6 dated December 16, 1998
enjoining petitioners "from disturbing the physical possession of all the
properties subject of the expropriation proceedings."
Issue: whether the respondent City may legally expropriate the subject
properties, considering that a negative finding will necessarily moot the
issue of the propriety of the "protective orders" of the Court of Appeals?
Held: No, Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property
without due process of law depends on whether the City complied with
the legal requirements for expropriation. Before respondent City can
exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned and
must not violate any law. Being a mere creation of the legislature, a local
government unit can only exercise powers granted to it by the legislature.
Such is the nature of the constitutional power of control of Congress over
local government units, the latter being mere creations of the former. 31

When it expropriated the subject properties, respondent City relied on its

powers granted by Section 19 of the Local Government Code of

1991 32 and RA 409 (The Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The
latter specifically gives respondent City the power to expropriate private
property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing
program. 33 Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the
conditions
and
standards
prescribed by RA
7279 (the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992), the law governing the
expropriation of property for urban land reform and housing. Sections 9
and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands
for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies,
including
governmentowned or -controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority
Development, Zonal Improvement
sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which
have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and
Services or BLISS sites which have
not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable
and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities
mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to onsite development of government lands.

Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of

acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping,
land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation
to the Government, joint venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided,
however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only
when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation
is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property
owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act:
Provided, finally, that abandoned property, as herein
defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State
in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down
in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. [emphasis
supplied] ITSacC
In Filstream vs. Court of Appeals, 34 we held that the above-quoted
provisions are limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
specially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands
and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the
same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of
socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to
be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because
these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private
property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly
taken from them for public use.
We find that herein respondent City failed to prove strict compliance with
the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Respondent City
neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before
the trial court that it complied with said requirements. Even in the Court
of Appeals, respondent City in its pleadings failed to show its compliance
with the law. The Court of Appeals was likewise silent on this specific
jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of
the petitioners.
Republic vs Feliciano
Facts: On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with
the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of

the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of

ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots
with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of
Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that
he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a
Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute
Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by
purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said
property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria; that upon plaintiff's
purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same,
introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in
July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on
October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954, President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the
Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the
NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started subdividing
and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question,
while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No.
90, was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded
therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner
of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title
of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-ininterest be declared legal, valid and subsisting and that defendant be
ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But
before this motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a motion for execution,
dated November 18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this
time through Judge Miguel Navarro, issued an order denying the motion
for execution and setting aside the order denying intervenors' motion for
postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present
their evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of Judge Navarro's
order, the plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition
for certiorari. Said petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, and petitioners brought the matter to this Court in G.R.
No. 36163, which was denied on May 3, 1973 Consequently, the case
was remanded to the court a quofor further proceedings.

On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on

the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed
by the plaintiff.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued
the questioned order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto,
maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability
of the State and also on the ground that the existence and or authenticity
of the purported possessory information title of the respondents'
predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate,
the same is not evidence of title, or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by
prescription and laches.LexLib
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the
Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1985,
the respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order
of Judge Lising and remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings. Hence this petition.
Issue: WoN the doctrine of non-suability is applicable in this case?
Held: Yes We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability
of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the
State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a
piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in
rem, but an action in personam. 1 It is an action directed against a
specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party
or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein,
is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No.
3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit
against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too
plain to be misinterpreted. 2 There is no such showing in the instant

case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such
consent. This is a fatal defect, 3 and on this basis alone, the complaint
should have been dismissed.
City of Manila vs IAC
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside: (a) the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court now Court of
Appeals 1 promulgated on May 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 00613-R
entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al. v. City Court of Manila et al., modifying
the decision of the then Court of First Instance ofManila, Branch VIII 2 in
Civil Case No. 121921 ordering the defendants (herein petitioners) to
give plaintiffs (herein private respondents) the right to use a burial lot in
the North Cemetery corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid
lease sued upon, to search the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr. and to bury the same in a substitute lot to be chosen by the
plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 28,
1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
"On the basis of such certification, the authorities of
the North Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph
Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from
subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or
sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of
the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question
was rented out to another lessee so that when the
plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in
their shock, consternation and dismay, that the resting
place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the
stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb.
Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding,
Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in inquiring from the
officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery, defendant
Sergio Mallari, and was told that the remains of her
late husband had been taken from the burial lot in
question which was given to another lessee.
"Irene Sto. Domingo was also informed that she can look for the bones of
her deceased husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the
exhumed remains from the different burial lots of the North Cemetery are
being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties. But to the

bereaved widow, what she was advised to do was simply unacceptable.

According to her, it was just impossible to locate the remains of her late
husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of sacks
of human bones. She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the
wrong set of bones. She was even offered another lot but was never
appeased. She was too aggrieved that she came to court for relief even
before she could formally present her claims and demands to the city
government and to the other defendants named in the present
complaint."
Issue: whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery
are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City
of Manila. The resolution of this issue is essential to the determination of
the liability for damages of the petitioner city.
Held: Patrimonial
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law,
the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which
was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and
January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo pp. 20-21 Compilation of the Ordinances
of the City of Manila). The administration and government of the
cemetery are under the City Health Officer (Ibid., Sec. 3189), the order
and police of the cemetery (Ibid., Sec. 319), the opening of graves,
inches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the
same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore
prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of
burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative
Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of dominion, there is,
therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property
which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of
the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract
executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.
(Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1987]).
Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to
damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
(Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).
San Diego vs Municpality of Mindoro

Facts: a contract was entered into between the

said San Diego and the municipality, stipulating that for a
period of five (5) years, from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1952,
the former was to be the lessee of "the exclusive privilege of erecting
fish corrals along the Butas River beginning from its junction with
the San Agustin River up to the Naujan Lake itself," for an annual
rental of P26,300.00, or a total of P131,500.00 for five years. Upon
petition by the lessee, however, the said council reduced the annual
rental by 20% by virtue of Resolution 59, series of 1949.
On September 5, 1950, the lessee requested for a five year
extension of the original lease period. The request was, for some
time, left pending before the municipal council, but on December 1,
1951, after the lessee had reiterated his petition for extension, for the
reason that the typhoon "Wanda", which took place that month,
destroyed most of his fish corrals, the council adopted Resolution
222, series of 1951 extending the lease for another five (5) years
beginning January 1, 1952, with the express condition that the
plaintiff would waive the privilege to seek for reduction of the
amount of rent which was to be based on the original contract. After
the resolution had been approved by the Provincial
Board of Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the lessee, on December
23, 1951, contracted for the extensionof the period of the lease. The
contract was approved and confirmed on December 29, 1951 by
Resolution 229, series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan
whose term was then about to expire. Pursuant to the said contract,
the lessee filed a surety bond of P52,000.00 and then reconstructed
his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake with bagus fingerlings.
On January 2, 1952, the municipal council of Naujan, this
time composed of a new set of members, adopted Resolution 3,
series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series of 1951. On the
same date, the new council also passed Resolution 11, revoking
Resolution 229 of the old council which confirmed the
extension of the lease period. The lessee requested for
reconsideration and recall of Resolution 3, on the ground, among
others, that it violated the contract executed between him and
the municipality on December 23, 1951, and, therefore, contrary to
Article III, section 1, clause 10 of the Constitution. The request,
however, was not granted.
On September 4, 1952, the lessee instituted this
proceedings in the court below seeking to have Resolution 3,

series of 1952, of the municipal council ofNaujan, declared null and

void, for being unconstitutional, and praying for an order enjoining
the defendant municipality from conducting a public bidding for the
leasing of the Naujan fisheries to any person other than the plaintiff
during the period from January 1, 1953 to December 31, 1957.
Issue: whether or not Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking
Resolution 222, series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan is
valid.
Held: Yes
We agree with the defendant-appellant in that the questioned
Resolution 3 is not an impairment of the obligation of contract, because
the constitutional provision on impairment refers only to contract legally
executed. While, apparently, Resolution 3 tended to abrogate the
contract extending the lease, legally speaking, there was no contract
abrogated because, as we have said, the extension contract is void
and inexistent.
The lower court, in holding that the defendantappellant municipality has been estopped from assailing the
validity of the contract into which it entered on December 23, 1951,
seems to have overlooked the general rule that
". . . the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal
corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to make or
which it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within
prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although the
corporation has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has
fully performed his part of the agreement, or has expended large sums
in preparation for performance. A reason frequently assigned for this
rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a municipality in
such case would be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy,
the municipality executing it cannot be estopped to essert the invalidity
on this ground; nor can it be estopped to assert the invalidity of a
contract which has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its
legislative or government powers." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 202-204).
Fernando vs CA

Facts: "From the evidence presented we see the

following facts: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta,
market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the
City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic
tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to
Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon,
Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won the
bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and
he signed the purchase order. However, before suchd
date, specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder
Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernandoand Jose
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body,
that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but
he expired there. The City Engineer's office
investigated the case and learned that the five victims
entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor
with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty
and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did
the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health
Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the
cause of death of all five victims as `asphyxia' caused
by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working
below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims
burst, swelled in hemorrhagic areas and this was due
to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was
sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the
septic tank." (p. 177, Records).
Issue: Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the
case at bar?
Held: No
Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially
one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person
should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service,
who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore,

and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was
the proximate cause of the accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v.
Phil. Motors Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person
holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
do (emphasis Ours). The fatal accident in this case would not have
happened but for the victims' negligence.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE AND IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF DEATH
IN CASE AT BAR IS VICTIM'S NEGLIGENCE; NO DAMAGES CAN BE
DEMANDED. Considering that there was yet no award and order to
commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the market master or his
security guards to supervise the work could not have started. Also, the
victims could not have been seen working in the area because the septic
tank was hidden by a garbage storage which is more or less ten (10)
meters away from the comfort room itself. The surreptitious way in which
the victims did their job without clearance from the market master or
any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even their
relatives or family members did not know of their plan to clean the septic
tank. The herein circumstances lead Us to no other conclusion than that
the proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due
to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand
damages from the public respondent.
City of Manila vs Teotico
In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a
jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole.
This caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city
engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police.
CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City
of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the
decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it
shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city
officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall
prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident
happened in national highway.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a
general law; that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil
Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of
each law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it
from liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in
the sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in
general. There is no particular exemption but merely a general
exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a
particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and
municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the Citys motion for reconsideration in the
Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even
though it is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if
whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long
as it is under the Citys control and supervision, it shall be responsible for
damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at
bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road
where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant
and regular inspection of the citys roads, P. Burgos included.