Municipality of Cavite v.

Hilaria Rojas
G.R. No. 9069, March 31, 1915
Torres, J.
Facts:
The Municipality of Cavite has leased a portion of the Plaza Soledad to Hilaria Rojas. Rojas had been
obliged to pay a rental fee of P5.58 a quarter in advance for the property. The defendant has already
erected a house in the area which has been assessed to be worth P3,000.
The Municipality of Cavite wanted Rojas to vacate the area as the Act No. 1039 gives the municipal
mentioned the exclusive right, control and administration of the public places in the municipality.
Rojas would not vacate the property as she has been fulfilling the obligation of paying rent regularly for
the previous months.
Rojas also sought that the municipality would indemnify her for the expenses.
According to the lease by the two parties, the defendant could only be ordered to vacate the property
leased when the plaintiff municipality need it for decoration or public use.
Issue:
WON the lease be considered null and void.
WON the defendants be required to vacate the leased property.
WON the plaintiff be required to indemnify the defendant for her expenses in the leased property.
Held:
The lease is null and void. The defendant should vacate the leased property. The plaintiff is not entitled to
indemnify the defendant. The decision is on the grounds of the following provisions:
Article 1271 of the Civil Code states that communal things that cannot be sold by their very nature of
being outside of commerce include those that are for public use such as the plaza, street, common lands,
and etc.
Article 1303 of the Civil Code states that the defendant should restore the leased property by leaving it in
the same condition as it was before her occupation. The same provision also requires the municipality to
return the payment for rent that has been collected from the defendant since the beginning of the lease
agreement.
The Civil Code provides that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The plazas and streets are outside of this commerce of man, since they are properties intended
for public use. Thus, in leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendants for private use the
plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a
thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do. Further, the defendants must restore and
deliver possession of the land. On the other hand the plaintiff must reimburse to the defendants the rentals
they have paid as soon as they restore the land improperly leased.
Ratio Decidendi: The defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land for it is an integral part of the
plaza which is for public use and is reserved for the common benefit. Property for public use in provinces
and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,
the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907
withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. The plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by
executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do. The Civil
Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the
object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce. Therefore, it must be concluded
that the said lease is null and void.
VALIAO V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 170757, 28 November 2011
 Facts
On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following
grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in
to bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for registration.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property
in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao,
pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio
possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open,
continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's
death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and
violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion
and Qualified Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for registration of the
subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue
A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June
23, 2005.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition.
Issues
Whether Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Whether they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation under a claim of ownership.
Ruling
The petitioners’ application under PD 1529 should be denied.
The petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is
beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.  To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.
In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government.
The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. There is nothing in the records that would substantiate petitioners’ claim
that Basilio was in possession of the property during the period of possession required by law.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would actually exercise over his own property. As regards petitioners’ possession of the land in question
from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29,
1976.  At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
land when not supported for other evidence. It does not necessarily prove ownership.
Valiao vs Republic of the Philippines G.R, No. 170757. November 28, 2011.
Nature: Rule 45 - Petition for review on certiorari.
Facts: Valiao et al. filed with the RT of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration of
a parcel of in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of log, Negros Occidental. However it was opposed the
registration by the private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay and the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In support of their claim of
possession over the subect property, petitioners submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No. 9562 dated
September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez. TC Decision: Granted petitioners'
application for registration of the subject property. Thus private oppositors and the Republic appeal with
the CA CA Decision: Reversed the trial court's findings and DECLARE the subject parcel of land to be
inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the public domain. Accordingto CA, the classification of
lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative or the executive department of the government and
in the absence of such @assincation. the ands remain as unclassined untut is released thererrom and
rendered open to disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case Involving the same parties herein
and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that
such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action TOr land registration. It also ruled
that the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to prove
that they and their predecessors-In-Interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier
WON the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of public domain.
WON the claim of prescription by the applicant will lie on the subject lot.
WON the CA's decision constitutes res judicata as far as this application is concerned.
WON the alleged possession of the applicants through predecessors-in-interest is sufficient to sustain
their claim for prescription.
held
1. NO. The subject lot is not alienable and disposable land of public domain. Sec 14 (par 1) of PD
1529 requires the petitioners to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the petitioners
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable disposable. To prove that the
land subject of application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators: and a legislative act or a
statute, The applicant mav also secure a certincation rom the government that the land claimed to nave
been possessed for the reauired number of vears is alienable and disposable In the case at bar. no such
evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain the absence or incontrovertible evidence to prove that the
subject property Is alread) cassined as alenabe and asposabe., we must consider the same as sulalenabe
public domain
2. NO, The claim of prescription by the applicant will not lie on the subject lot. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land alienated to a private person by the State remain part or the
inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is bevond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept or owner no matter
now on cannot ripen Into ownersni and be registered as a title, The burden of proof in overcomina
the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying
for registration (or camina ownersnio). wno must prove that the land sublect or the applicaton is
 alenabe or disposable. TO overcome this presumouon -Incontvevaence must De established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
3. No. The judgment does not constitute res judicata that bars a subsequent action for land
registration. In this case, was cited the case or Director or Lands v. Court of Appeals, the court
held that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same
applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not
only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or since lune 12.
1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
4. 4. NO. The alleged possession of the applicants through predecessors-in- Interest IS not Sumcient
to sustain their claim Tor prescription, The petitioners' possession of the land in question from
1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29,
1976. At best pettioners can only bossession since sald date. What IS required is upen exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their predecessors-In- interest, under a
bona top caim ownership. 12, 1945 or parier Petitioners talled to explain why, despite their claim
that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an
owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. Moreover. tax declarations ano receipts are not conclusive evidence or
ownersnio or or the rant to bossess and when not suoportedov anv other evidence. he disputed
propertv mav nave been decared for taxation ourooses in the names of the applicants for
registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They
are merely Indicia or a claim or ownership Supreme Court Ruling: Denied the Petition

Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court GRL-66575 24May1988

FACTS Petitioners Adriano Maneclang et.al. filed with the CFI a complaint for quieting of title over a
certain fishpond located within the 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Bugallon, Pangasinan.
The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing their land is a
creek constituting a tributary to Agno River and hence public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. The Maneclangs appealed the decision to the lAC but the lAC attired the trial court
decision. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari. However, after having been asked by the
Court to comment to the case, Petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of the awardee in
the public bidding, Maza, they desire to amicably settle the case by submitting a Compromise Agreement
praying that judgment be rendered recognizing their ownership over the land and the body of water found
within their titled properties. Petitioners state that there would be no benefit on their part, but to the
advantage Of the municipality instead, since it IS Clear that after the National Irrigation Authority built
the dike over the land, no Waler gets in or out of the land
ISSUE Whether the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement adjudicating ownership over the
questioned fishpond in favor of the Maneclangs are valld
HELD/RATIO NO, the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement are null and void and have no legal
effect for being contrary to law and public policy. The stipulations partake of the nature of an
adjudication of ownership in favor of the Maneclangs of the questioned fishpond that was clearly found to
be originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River, which belongs to the public domain and is
thus not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. A creek, detined as a recess or
arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the
public domain WhICh IS not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a
public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual and
considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation
Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its
conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. The
finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual determination
binding upon the Supreme Court. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted
municipal council IS clothed with deprived of their right to due process as mere publication of the notice
of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world
G.R. No. L-3279 March 11. 1908 THE CITY OF MANILA vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT,
ET AL. (10 Phil., 327)
FACTS: The city of Manila filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of a
certain parcel or tract of land situated in Paco, a district of the said city. The said city alleged that it was
the absolute owner of the said land; that said land was assessed by the city of Manila in the sum of
$1,780; that there existed no liens of whatever character against said land; that the land was unoccupied;
that the said city obtained title to the said land by reason of being the successor to all the rights and
actions of the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de Manila), to which said property formerly belonged.
The Insular Government opposed the inscription of the said land to the petitioner's name upon the ground
that the land in question is the property of the Government of the United States under the control of the
Insular Government. One of the examiners of titles of the Court of Land Registration made an
examination of the title claimed by the petitioner and reported to the judge of the Court of Land
Registration the application filed by the city of Manila is not accompanied by any document relative to its
alleged ownership; that in the office of the register of deeds there is no record of any act or contract
opposing the claim of the applicant; nor does there appear, from the investigations held, any fact contrary
to those quoted in the application; and that the city of Manila, in order to acquire title TO the land above
mentioned, must show the ownership which the former ayuntamiento had over said land. Therefore, the
examiner was of the opinion that the title of the City of Manila is defective and cannot be registered. The
cause was duly brought on for trial and during the trial of said cause the petitioner attempted to establish
that the old city of Manila, its predecessor, had rented said land, had received rents therefor, and in a
general way had administered the same.
The respondent maintained that the land in question was public land, belonging to the Central
Government and the same had never been granted to any person or corporation or municipality by the
Spanish Government. The judge of the said court granted the registration of the rest of said described
property in favor of the city. Against this order the respondent gave notice of his intention to appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned property is owned by the city of Manila.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere renting of property and receiving the rent therefor
cannot, of themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of ownership of such property. One
of the earliest provisions of law relating to the rights of pueblos in the insular possessions of the Spanish
Government is that of settlements and pueblos of natives. Article 53 of the Ordinances of Good
Government indicates that 1) that the King continued to be the absolute owner of said lands; 2) that the
pueblos were only given the mere usufruct of the same; 3) that the King might at any time annul such
grant; and 4) that a designation, of the particular land so granted, was a necessary prerequisite for the
holding of the same for the purposes indicated, by the said pueblo. The municipalities of the Philippine
Islands are not entitled, by right, to any part of the public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish
law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the public domain adjoining municipal territory might be
granted by the Government for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights
therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign. The
petitioner herein not having presented proof showing that the land in question had been granted to it by
the former sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that it was entitled to said lands by virtue of
some law of the present sovereign of these Islands, the Court of Land Registration was not empowered to
grant the registration of said lands in favor of said petitioner. The judgment, therefore, of the lower court
is hereby reversed.

Moreno [G.R No L-15829 December 4, 1967.]

In document 2003hs108_property Law Digests (Page 187-193)
En Banc, Bengzon JP (J): 9 concur
Facts: The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned a vast track of marshland in Macabebe, Pampanga
called
Hacienda San Esteban, which was administered and managed by the Ayala y Cia. From 1860 to 1924
Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered
nipa sap or “tuba”. It operated a distillery plant in barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable
alcohol which was in turn manufactured into liquor. Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the
hacienda posed as a problem; thus Ayala y Cia dug canals leading towards the hacienda’s interior where
most of them interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding
and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called “arundines”. By the gradual process of erosion
these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It converted
Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. Sometime in 1925 or 1926
Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp
land into a fishpond. In
so doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan,
Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi. The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints
from residents of the surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods
during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their means of transportation and fishing grounds,
said residents demanded re-opening of those canals. Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe,
accompanied by policemen and some residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure
dikes at Sapang Malauling Maragul, Nigui and Quiñorang Silab. Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil
Case 4488 in the CFI Pampanga which preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from
demolishing the dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a
complaint (Civil Case 4527) in the same court. The CFI Pampanga rendered judgment in both cases
against Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
In the meantime, the Secretary of Commerce and Communications conducted his own investigation,
found and declared on 8 November 1930 that the streams closed by Roman Santos were natural, floatable
and navigable and were utilized by the public for transportation since time immemorial. However, on 8
May 1931 the said official revoked his decision and declared the streams in question privately owned
because they were artificially constructed. Subsequently, upon authority granted under Act 3982 the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications entered into a contract with Roman Santos whereby the
former recognized the private ownership of 6 streams and the latter turned over for public use 2 artificial
canals and bound himself to maintain them in navigable state. The Provincial Board of Pampanga and the
municipal councils of Macabebe and Masantol objected to the contract. However, the Secretary of Justice,
in his opinion dated 6 March 1934, upheld its legality. Roman Santos withdrew his appeals in the
Supreme Court.
On 25 February 1935 the municipality of Macabebe and the Zobel family executed an agreement whereby
they recognized the nature of the streams mentioned in Panopio’s report as public or private, depending
on the findings in said report. This agreement was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications on 27 February1935 and confirmed the next day by the municipal council of Macabebe
under Resolution 36. On 12 June 1935 however, the Secretary of Justice issued an opinion holding that
the contract executed by the Zobel family and the municipality of Macabebe has no validity. Still, despite
the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, the streams in question remained closed.
In 1939 administrative investigations were again conducted by various agencies of the Executive branch
of our government culminating in an order of President Manuel Quezon immediately before the national
elections in 1941 requiring the opening of Sapang Macanduling Maragul, Macabacle, Balbaro and
Cansusu. Said streams were again closed in 1942 allegedly upon order of President Quezon.
Roman Santos acquired in 1940 from the Zobel family a larger portion of Hacienda San Esteban wherein
are located 25 streams which were closed by Ayala y Cia. 18 years later or in 1950, Congress enacted RA
2056. Thereafter, on 15 August 1958, Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act No. 2056 against fishpond owners
in the province of Pampanga who have closed rivers and appropriated them as fishponds without color of
title. On the same day, Benigno Musni and other residents in the vicinity of Hacienda San Esteban
petitioned the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to open the following streams: Balbaro,
Batasan Matua, Bunga, Cansusu, Macabacle, Macanduling Maragul, Mariablus Malate, Matalabang
Maisac, Nigui, Quiñorang Silab, Sapang Maragul and Sepung Bato. On 20 October 1958 Musni and his
co-petitioners amended their petition to include other streams: Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Batasan Matua,
Bato, Bengco, Bunga, Butabuta, Camastiles, Cansusu, Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga, Mabutol,
Macabacle, Macabacle qng. Iba, Macanduling Maragul, Malauli, Magasawa, Mariablus Malate,
Masamaral, Matalabang Maisac, Mariablus, 3 Nigui, Pita, Quiñorang Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung
Bato, Sinag and Tumbong. On March 2, 4, 10, 30 and 31, and 1 April 1959, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications rendered his decisions ordering the opening and restoration of the channel of
all the streams except Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Nigui,
Pepangebonan, Nasi and Bulacus, within 30 days.
On 29 April 1959, after receipt of the Secretary’s decision, Roman Santos filed a petition with the CFI
Manila for injunction against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian C. Cargullo.
As prayed for, preliminary injunction was granted on 8 May 1959. On April 29 and 12 June 1959, Roman
Santos received the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications dated March 10 and
March 30, March 31, and 1 April 1959. Consequently, on June 24, 1959 he asked the court to cite in
contempt Secretary Florencio Moreno, Undersecretary M. D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo for issuing and
serving upon him the said decisions despite the existence of the preliminary injunction. The Cou rt
however ruled that Secretary Moreno, Undersecretary Bautista and Cargullo acted in good faith, and
hence were merely “admonished to desist from any and further action in this Court, with the stern
warning, however, that a repetition of the acts complained of shall be dealt with severely.” On 18 July
1959 the trial court declared all the streams under litigation private, and made the writ of preliminary
injunction permanent. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian Cargullo appealed
to the Supreme Couurt from the order of 17 July 1959 issued in connection with Roman Santos’ motion
for contempt and from the decision of the lower court on the merits of the case.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, except as to Sapang Cansusu which was
declared public and thus as to which the judgment of the lower court was reversed. No costs.
1. Motion for reconsideration not required as a condition precedent to judicial relief in RA
2056; Congress intend decision of Secretary of Public Works and Communication to be final and
executory subject to a timely review by the courts
RA 2056 does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent to judicial
relief. From the context of the law, the intention of the legislators to forego a motion for reconsideration
manifests itself clearly. RA 2056 underscores the urgency and summary nature of the proceedings
authorized thereunder. Thus in Section 2 thereof the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
under pain of criminal liability is duty bound to terminate the proceedings and render his decision within
a period not exceeding 90 days from the filing of the complaint. Under the same section, the party
respondent concerned is given not more than 30 days within which to comply with the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, otherwise the removal of the dams would be done by the
Government at the expense of said party. Congress has precisely provided for a speedy and a most
expeditious proceeding for the removal of illegal obstructions to rivers and on the basis of such a
provision it would be preposterous to conclude that it had in mind to require a party to file a motion for
reconsideration an additional proceeding which would certainly lengthen the time towards the final
settlement of existing controversies. The logical conclusion is that Congress intended the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to be final and executory subject to a timely review by
the courts without going through formal and time consuming preliminaries.
2. Question of Constitutionality rightly aired before a competent court; not within competence
of Secretary of Public Works and Communications
The petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 2056 and the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications to order the demolition of dams across rivers or streams. Those questions are
not within the competence of said Secretary to decide upon a motion for reconsideration. They are purely
legal questions, not administrative in nature, and should properly be aired before a competent court as
was rightly done by the petitioner.
3. Appeal of the decision of the Secretary to the President dispensed with as Secretary is alter-ego  of
the President
As to the failure of Roman Santos to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines, suffice it to state that such appeal could be dispensed
with because said Secretary is the alter ego of the President. The actions of the former are presumed to
have the implied sanction of the latter.
4. Action correctly filed with the CFI Manila; Purpose is to review the decision of the
Secretary, even if the resolution of controversy rests in the ownership of the streams; Section 1 of
Rule 5, not section 3, is controlling
The mere fact that the resolution of the controversy would wholly rest on the ownership of the streams
involved would not necessarily classify it as a real action. The purpose of the suit is to review the
decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to enjoin him from enforcing them and
to prevent him from making and issuing similar decisions concerning the streams in Hacienda San
Esteban. The acts of the Secretary of Public Works are Communications are the object of the litigation,
hence, the suit ought to be filed in the CFI whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the place where the
Secretary is found or is holding office. For the rule is that outside its territorial limits, the court has no
power to enforce its orders. Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court does not apply to determine venue
of this action, Section of the same rule applies. Section 1 provides that “civil actions in CFIs may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” Thus, in the present case, the
petition for injunction was correctly filed in the CFI Manila as the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and Julian Cargullo are found and hold office in the City of Manila.
5. Review of Secretary’s decision by the court; inquiry limited to evidence presented during
the administrative proceedings
Whether the action instituted in the CFI be for mandamus, injunction or certiorari is not very material. In
reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the CFI shall confine its
inquiry to the evidence presented during the administrative proceedings. Evidence not presented therein
shall not be admitted and considered by the trial court. As held previously by the Court, “the findings of
the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid before him, for that would be tantamount to
holding a new investigation, and to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the
discretion and judgment of the court, to whom the statute had not entrusted the case. It is immaterial that
the action should be one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari; in either event the case
must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive
decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are
not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they
find reasonable support in the evidence.” Thus, it was an error for the lower court to conduct a trial de
novo.
6. RA 2056 is not unconstitutional
The Court has held in Lovina v. Moreno that said law is constitutional. It cannot be held that the law is
constitutional but applied unconstitutionally as the petitioner’s dikes were demolished through an
administrative, not judicial, proceeding. Such conclusion amount in effect to declaring the law
unconstitutional, stated inversely. Note that the law provides for an expeditious administrative process to
determine whether or not a dam or dike should be declared a public nuisance and ordered demolished.
And to say that such an administrative process, when put to operation, is unconstitutional is tantamount to
saying that the law itself violates the Constitution.
7. RA 2056 applies to 2 types of bodies of water
RA 2056 applies to two types of bodies of water, namely, (1) public navigable rivers, streams, coastal
waters, waters or waterways and (b) areas declared as communal fishing grounds.
8. Building of dams, dikes or other works on navigable public waters a public nuisance
Section 1 of RA 2056 law provides that “the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works
which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public
waters or
waterways as well as the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared as
communal fishing grounds, shall be ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited constructions as
herein provided.”
9. Montano v. Insular Government (marchlands not susceptible to appropriation by
occupation) not applicable
The doctrine in Montano vs. Insular Government, that a marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides
belong to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the present
ccase inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled and precisely
Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years’ occupation pursuant to paragraph 6,
section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission. Whereas, Hacienda San Esteban is titled land and
private ownership thereof by Ayala y Cia, has been recognized by the King of Spain and later by the
Philippine Government when the same was registered under Act 496.
10. Injunction proper if person constructs a dam across a public canal, which is situated within
a public land
“No private person has a right to usurp possession of a watercourse, branch of a river, or lake of the
public domain and use, unless it shall have been proved that he constructed the same within property of
his exclusive ownership, and such usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal provisions which
explicitly exclude such waterways from the exclusive use or possession of a private party.” (Bautista v.
Alarcon, 23 Phil 631) Inversely, and as indicated in said case, a private person may take possession of a
watercourse if he constructed the same within his property.
11. Public and Private ownership under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889; Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866
As to Public Ownership; Articles 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 provides that property of public
ownership includes “that devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.” Article 407 of the
same Code provides that “(1) Rivers and their natural channels; (2) Continuous or intermittent waters
from springs or brooks running in then natural channels and the channels themselves; (3) Waters rising
continuously or intermittently on lands of public; (4) Lakes and ponds formed by nature on public lands,
and their beds; (5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, the channels of which are of public
ownership; (6) Subterranean waters on public lands; (7) Waters found within the zone of operation of
public works, even though constructed under contract; Waters which flow continuously or intermittently
from lands belonging to private persons, to the State, to provinces, or to towns from the moment they
leave such lands; and (9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers, and public institutions” are of public
ownership. Further, Article 72 of the Spanish Law of Waters (8 August 1866) provides that “the water-
beds on public land, of creeks through which spring waters run, are a part of the public domain. The
natural water-beds or channels of rivers are also part of the public domain.”
As to Private Ownership; Article 408 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 provides that “(1) Waters, either
continuous or intermittent rising on private estates, while they run through them; (2) Lakes and ponds and
their beds when formed by nature on such estates; (3) Subterranean waters found therein; (4) Rain waters
falling thereon as long as they remain within their boundaries; and (5) The channels of flowing streams,
continuous or intermittent formed by rain water, and those of brooks crossing estates which are not of
public ownership” are of private ownership. Further, Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters (8 August
1866) provides that “the water-beds of all creeks belong to the owners of the estates or lands over which
they flow.” Further, “the water, bed, banks, and floodgates of a ditch or aqueduct are deemed to be an
integral part of the estate or building for which the waters are intended. The owners of estates through or
along the boundaries of which the aqueduct passes can assert no ownership over it, nor any right to make
use of its beds or banks, unless they base their claim on title deed which specify the right or the ownership
claimed.”
12. Character of canals based on the estate over which they flow; Canals of private ownership
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3 August 1866, and Article 408(5) of the Spanish
Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates over which they flow. The
channels, therefore, of the streams in question which may be classified as creeks, belong to the owners of
Hacienda San Esteban. Further, the said streams, considered as canals, of which they originally were, are
of private ownership in contemplation of Article 339(1) of the Spanish Civil Code. Canals constructed by
private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership.
The streams, except for Sapang Cansusu, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the
hacienda
Facts:
The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and managed by the Ayala y Cia.
From the year 1860 to about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting and
cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in barrio
San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol, which was in turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y Cia., therefore
dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them interlinked with each other. The
canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards
called "arundines." By the gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and
dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It converted
Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. To do so, it cut down the nipa
palm, constructed dikes and closed the canals criss-crossing the hacienda.
Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who
also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang
Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.
The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from residents of the
surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods during the rainy season,
and that it deprived them of their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded
re-opening of those canals.
Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen and some residents went
to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and
Quiñorang Silab.
Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga which
preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the dikes across the canals. The
municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 4527) in the
same court. The Pampanga Court of First Instance rendered judgment in both cases against Roman Santos
who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban
according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of Public Works and Communications?
Ruling:
A private person may take possession of a watercourse if he constructed the same within his property.
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by Roman Santos in the administrative
proceedings supports the conclusion of the lower court that the streams involved in this case were
originally man-made canals constructed by the former owners of Hacienda San Esteban and that said
streams were not held open for public use. This same conclusion was reached 27 years earlier by an
investigator of the Bureau of Public Works whose report and recommendations were approved by the
Director of Public Works and submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications.
The streams in question were artificially made, hence of private ownership.
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5) of the Spanish
Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates over which they flow. The
channels, therefore, of the streams in question, which may be classified creeks, belong to the owners of
Hacienda San Esteban.
With the exception of Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River,
admittedly a public stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure therefore by the predecessors of
Roman Santos was illegal.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and his
personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across them should not he ordered
demolished as public nuisances.
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization
Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as
Executive Secretary, respondents.
Facts:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents
from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-
Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. The Supreme Court granted the prayer
for a temporary restraining order, in favor of the petitioner, effective February 20, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in
reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military
occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes
and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.

Issue:
Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?
Ruling:
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the
terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement, which bind both the
Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the
satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a
juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the
object of appropriation.
Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92013) Ojeda v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 92047) ROPPONGI
PROPERTY
FACTS: These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo,
Japan. The latter case also, prays for a writ of mandamus to fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property. The Roppongi case is one of the four
properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparation Agreement entered into
with Japan. The other three (3) properties include Nampeidai Property (present site of the Philippine
Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial Property (commercial lot being used as a warehouse and parking
lot for consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is now vacant). The Reparations
Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550M would be payable in twenty (20) years in
accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments. The procurements are to be divided into government sector and those for private parties in
projects, the latter shall be made available only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in
national development projects. The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading “Government
Sector” for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeida due to
the need for major repairs. However, the Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped since that
time. Although there was a proposal to lease the property with the provision to have buildings built at the
expense of the lessee, the same was not acted favorably upon by the government. Instead, President
Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods
and services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various
sectors, the Executive branch of the government pushed for the sale of reparation properties, starting with
the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The
first was a failure, while the second has been postponed and later restrained by the SC. Amongst the
arguments of the respondents is that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code, but rather by
the laws of Japan where the property is located. They relied upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.
ISSUES: 1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?
NO. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion and the respondents have failed to
show that it has become patrimonial. The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code
as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. The fact that it has not been used
for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion
happens only if property is withdrawn from public use, through an abandonment of the intention to use
the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a
certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. The EO does not declare that the properties lost
their public character, merely intending the properties to be made available to foreigners and not to
Filipinos alone, in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Furthermore, it is based on the wrong premise
that the Japan properties can be sold to end-users, when in fact it cannot. Neither does the CARP Law re-
classify the properties into patrimonial properties, merely stating that sources of funds for its
implementation be sourced from proceeds of the disposition of the Government in foreign countries, but
not that the Roppongi property be withdrawn from being classified as a property of public dominion.
CONFLICT OF LAW Furthermore, the respondents’ argument that the Japanese law and not our Civil
Code shall apply is incorrect. There is no conflict of law in this situation. A conflict of law arises only
when: a. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined. b. A foreign law on land ownership and
its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should apply. Both elements does not exist in the case. The issues are not concerned
with the validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines.
The issue is the authority of the government officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the state
and the validity of the procedures adopted to effect the sale, which should be governed by Philippine law
The rule of lex situs does not apply.
2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property? NO. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public
domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property is needed.
None has been enacted for this purpose.
3. W/N EO No. 296 is constitutional? The SC did not anymore pass upon its constitutionality.
PANG SEVEN NA CASE WALA
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Berciles (Digested Case)
Re: Closure and opening of roads thru an ordinance (Sec. 21)
FACTS: This is a petition for review of an order dismissing petitioner's application for registration of
title over a parcel of land. The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. The City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion
of said street abandoned road. Subsequently, the City Council of Cebu passed another resolution,
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was
awarded to the herein petitioner. The City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of
absolute sale to the herein petitioner. The petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of
Cebu to have its title to the land registered. However, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a
motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public
road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce
of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the City Charter of Cebu City (RA 3857) give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road
as abandoned.
(2) WON the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu
which may be the object of a common contract.
(3) WON the property in question is registrable by the petitioner.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides that the city council has the
authority "to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that
the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.
(2) Yes. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State." Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which
can be the object of an ordinary contract.
(3) Yes.  Since the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
Benjamin Rabuco, et. al. vs. Hon. Antonio Villegas G.R. No. L-24661. February 28, 1974.
Teehankee, J. Doctrine: When a property is owned by a political subdivision in its public and
governmental capacity, the Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property
owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process
and without just compensation.
Facts: In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area
including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then
took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At
petitioners' instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents city officials "from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein
petitioners' possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila" as
safeguarded them under the Court's subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965 pursuant to RA
3120.
Issue: Whether RA 3120 is unconstitutional as it infringes the right to due process.
Held: No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the
established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the
municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to
bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of
the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a
manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State property.
Levy D. Macasiano vs. Honorable Roberto C. Diokno G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992 Medialdea,
J.: Doctrine: Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress.
Facts: On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which
authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon, pursuant to
MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or
municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or
vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.. On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Parañaque
issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any
service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or
vending areas. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service
cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea
market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal
government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said
streets. On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the
Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J.
Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag.
Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque
authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
Held: No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as
sites for a flea market is invalid. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed
by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws. Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress. Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the
disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by
the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions
imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Further, it is of public notice that the streets
along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of
vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel,
G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the
problem of congestion. Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to
limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of
such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members
of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will
enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general
prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should
refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.

Republic vs. Aboitiz

August 8, 2017

G.R. No. 174626

Facts:

1. On September 11, 1998, respondent Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration
of Land Title of a parcel of land with an area of 1,254 square meters, located in
Talamban, Cebu City.
 2. That as per record of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region VII, the subject property had been classified as alienable and
disposable since 1957; that per certification of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, the subject property was not
covered by any subsisting public land application; and that the subject property
had been covered by tax declarations from 1963 to 1994 in Irenea’s name, and
from 1994 to present, in his name.
3. The Republic assails the CA’s decision on granting the said application.

Issue: Whether or not said property may be registered for having satisfied Sec. 14 (2) of PD 1529

Held: No.  In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property.

However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.

Petition Granted.