Mamerto R. Egargo Jr.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND CORAZON NAGUIT.

FACTS

Naguit filed with MCTC a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application seeks judicial
confirmation of Naguit’s imperfect title over the land. Te MCTC granted the registration however the
Republic thru the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the land
applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15 1980.

ISSUE

Whether or not under the Property Registration Decree that the subject land first be classified as
alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start?

HELD

The phrase ‘since Jun 12, 1945’ qualifies its antecedent phrase ‘under a bone fide claim of ownership.
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Hence, what the law merely
requires is that the property sought to be registered is ‘already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed’. In other words it is not necessary that the land be first
classified as alienable and disposable le before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could start.

REPUBLIC VS. HERBIETO

FACTS

Respondents are Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC a single application for
registration of two parcels of land. They claimed to be owners by virtue of its purchase from their
parents Republic filed an opposition arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of
adverse possession required by law; (2) Respondents’ muniments of title were not genuine and did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fideacquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The
Subject Lots were part of the public domainMTC granted the application for registration of the parcels of
land of Jeremias and David.CA affirmed the decision of MTC holding that the subject property, being
alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of
prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership.

ISSUE

WON the Subject Lots are part of the public domain and thus cannot be subject to private appropriation.

HELD
Yes. Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the
judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. Respondents application filed with
the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots A. They only alleged therein
that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, Respondent Jeremias, in his
testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an
owner since 1950. Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, the Subject Lots are within Alienable
and Disposable, The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963. Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may
only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse
possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the
Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless
the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
shall not apply thereto. Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have
complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.

REPUBLIC VS. MALABANAN

FACTS

Mario Malabanan filed an application for registration of his land situated in Silang, Cavite, with the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, on February 20, 1998, which he purchased from Eduardo Velasco. He
assailed that his predecessors-in-interests were in an open, notorious, continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than 30 years. Malabanan alleged that the subject property is an
alienable and disposable patrimonial property of the State, as evidenced by the certificate issued by
CENRO-DENR, hence the Regional Trial Court granted the petition. The OSG appealed with the CA,
alleging that the RTC erred in granting the petition filed by Malabanan because the petitioner failed to
prove that the subject land is a patrimonial property of the State. During the pendency of the case with
the CA, Malabanan died hence his interest is represented by his heirs.

ISSUE

In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the
land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification
occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
 HELD

In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945”have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act. The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

IGNACIO GRANDE, v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO L-17652

FACTS

Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 3.5 hectares in Magsaysay, Isabela. When
it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its north-eastern boundary was the
Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the north-eastern side
took place, by action of the current of the river, so much so, that by 1958, a 19,964 sq. m. had been
added to the registered area Respondents in this case claim ownership in themselves, asserting that
they have been in OCENCO of said portion of land since 1933. Petitioners moved for an action to quiet
title to the land. The trial court adjudged the ownership of the land to petitioners

ISSUE

WON the alluvial property belong to petitioners and if it is whether such becomes automatically
registered land.

HELD

NO. There can be no dispute that petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are
the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. It does not however, become a registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. Ownership of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system is quite
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining the river is governed by the civil
code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and
thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration Laws. The fact remains that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property.
Republic of the Philippines vs Santos

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

FACTS

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paranaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, B located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque River,
in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio
Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr.
as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had
been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and
adverse possession for more than 30 years.

ISSUE

Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.

HELD

No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil,
to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. The RTC and the CA
grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents property
pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying
up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the
dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on
the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was
more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil
Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law. The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may
not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and
their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot
4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law
that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person. The principle that the
riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of
possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that
pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the
current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B
was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by
respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to
acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B. Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that
respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not
thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land
was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land
still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion. Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation
of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares
river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the
adjoining lots the right to acquire.

CELSO R. HALILI AND ARTHUR R. HALILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 113539

FACTS

Simeon de Guzman, American citizen, died in 1968. his forced heirs were Helen Meyers Guzman (his
widow) and David Rey Guzman (his son) who are also American citizens. On Aug. 9, 1989, Helen
executed a deed of quitclaim transferring and conveying to David all her rights, title and interests in and
over 6 parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. On Feb. 5, 1991, David sold a
parcel of land to Emiliano Cataniag. Owners of the adjoining lots filed a complaint with the RTC
questioning the validity of the 2 conveyances – between Helen and Dabid and between David and
Emiliano. RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, affirmed. Hence, this petition for review of certiorari.

ISSUE

WON the sale is valid?

HELD

Petition denied. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of public domain,
except only by way of legal succession. If land is validly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid. Since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid
transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective if the constitutional provision – to keep our land in
Filipino hands – has been served.
Borromeo v. Descallar

FACTS

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met Antonietta Descallar (respondent), a Filipina, while the former was
working in the Philippines sometime in 1983. The two became sweetheart, and later cohabited as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, the two acquired some
real properties in the Philippines composed of several houses and lots which they bought from Agro-
Macro Development Corporation. The deed of sale of said real properties were placed in the name of
both Jambrich and Descallar as buyers, but were registered under the Torrens system in the name of
Descallar alone as Jambrich is disqualified to own real properties in the country. It is sufficiently
established though that the funds used to buy said properties came solely from Jambrich, as Descallar
has no sufficient source of income. After their relationship has turned sour and the two went their
separate ways, Jambrich sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Camilo Borromeo
(the petitioner), a Filipino, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. When Borromeo, the
buyer, tried to register the properties in his name, he discovered that it is registered in the name of
Descallar, and that it has already been mortgaged. Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of real
property against Descallar.

ISSUES

Having established that the true buyer of the disputed properties was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich,
what is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent Descallar?

HELD

The registration of the properties in question in the name of Descallar does not make her the owner of
the said properties. “It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a
means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not
a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property.
Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATON VS. LUI SHE

G.R. L-17587

FACTS

Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land in
Manila. This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into
Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential houses
with entranced on Florentino Torres Street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue.
The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the
restaurant. Wong had been long-time lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of
2,620. On September 22, 1957, Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister
died with noother heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind,
crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her otherwise dreary existence
was brightened now and then by the visits

of Wong’s four children who had become the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to
whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rental from her property at the corner
of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal
Avenue property. Wong also took care of the payment, in her behalf, of taxes, lawyer’s fees, funeral
expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her household expenses. “In grateful
acknowledgement of the personal services of the lessee to her”, Justine Santos executed on November
15, 1957 a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and
another portion fronting Florention Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was
given the right to withdraw at any time from the arrangement. On December 21, she executed another
contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises. The option was conditioned on his
obtaining Philippine citizenship. It appears however that the application for naturalization was
withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lease contract and the option to buy the land executed in favor of Wong who is an
alien is valid.

HELD

The contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an
insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to
an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien a right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As ruled in Krivenko vs Register of Deeds, ‘aliens are
not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their
residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option
to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property,
this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership
whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right
to dispose of it – rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is
transferred tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition and so on, until ultimately all the rights of
which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in
this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos’ ownership of her property
was reduced to a hallow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien
landholding in the Philippines is indeed in grave peril.

SUPREMA T. DUMO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 218269, June 06, 2018

FACTS

Petitioner Suprema T. Dumo filed an application for registration of two parcels of land, covered by
Advance Plan of Lot Nos. 400398 and 400399 with a total area of 1,273 square meters (LRC Case No.
270-Bg). Dumo alleged that the lots belonged to her mother Bernarda M. Trinidad, andthat she and her
siblings inherited them upon their mother's death. She further alleged that through a Deed of Partition
with Absolute Sale dated 6 February 1987, she acquired the subject lots from her siblings. Dumo traces
her title from her mother, Trinidad, who purchased the lots from Florencio Mabalay in August 1951.
Mabalay was Dumo's maternal grandfather. Mabalay, on the other hand, purchased the properties from
Carlos Calica. The heirs of Marcelino Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the
ground that the properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the accion reivindicatoria
case. Thus, the RTC consolidated the land registration case with the Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership, Possession and Damages. On 2 July 2010, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that
the subject property was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The RTC ordered the dismissal of Dumo's land
registration application on the ground of lack of registerable title, and ordered Dumo to restore
ownership and possession of the lots to the heirs of Espinas. The CA rendered its Decision dated 28
January 2014, affirming the RTC's decision dismissing the application for land registration of Dumo, and
finding that she failed to demonstrate that she and her predecessors-in¬ interest possessed the
property in the manner required by law to merit the grant of her application for land registration. The
CA, however, modified the decision of the RTC insofar as it found that the Subject Property belonged to
the heirs of Espinas. The CA found that since the property still belonged to the public domain, and the
heirs of Espinas were not able to establish their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, it was
erroneous for the RTC to declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of the Subject Property; hence, this
petition.

ISSUES

Whether Dumo is able to prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable
land of public domain.

RULING

NO, Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove that the land she seeks to register is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The applicant bears the burden of proving the status
of the land. In this connection, the Court held that there are two (2) documents which must be
presented: first, a copy of the original classification approved by the Secretary of the DENR and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, and second, a certificate of land classification
status issued by the CENRO or the PENRO based on the land classification approved by the DENR
Secretary.

In this case, none of the documents submitted by respondent to the trial court indicated that the subject
property was agricultural or part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. At most,
the CENRO Report and Certification stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public land
application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of the land.Unfortunately for
respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration in
order to show the alienable character of the lands subject herein

Heirs of Narvasa vs. Victoriano

FACTS

Basilia Imbornal had four children, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo, and from those arose the
following heirs: Heirs of the Francisco Narvasa—descendants of the Alejandra and Balbina Imbornal.
Heirs of Pablo Imbornal—descendants of Pablo Imbornal [Sabangan Property] During her lifetime,
Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan
with an area of 4,144 sq. m.), more or less (Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3)
daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.n[Motherland] On the
other hand, the husband of Catalina Imbornal, namely Ciriaco Abrio, was granted a homestead patent
over a 31, 367 sq. meter riparian land adjacent to the Cayanga River, Pangasinan. Consequently, the
heirs of Ciriaco Abrio occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, On the other hand, the heirs of
Pablo Imbornal occupied the southern portion of the land. There were two accretions that occurred
through the course of time: 1st Accretion—occurred during 1949 and the southern portion of the
Motherland. A TCT was issued Victoriano, who is one of the heirs of Pablo Imbornal; 2nd Accretion—
occurred during 1971 and abutted the First accretion on the southern portion of the Motherland. The
TCT was issued in the name of all the heirs of Pablo Imbornal. The heirs of Francisco Narvasa filed an
Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition and/or damages against the heirs of Pablo Imbornal.
The heirs of Francisco Narvasa anchored their claim on the following allegations: Ciriaco, with the help
of his wife, was able to convince the Imbornal sisters to sell the Sabangan property; Ciriaco used the
proceeds from the sale of the Sabangan property to fund his homestead patent on the Motherland;
Once the patent on the Motherland is approved, Ciriaco Imbornal is deemed to be holding such
property in trust for the Imbornal sisters. Also, the heirs of Francisco Narvasa further alleged that
through deceit, fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, the heirs of Pablo Imbornal had illegally
registered the said accretions in their names—notwithstanding that they were not riparian owners.

ISSUE

W/N THE HEIRS OF FRANCISCO NARVASA OWN THE MOTHERLAND (RIPARIAN LAND) ALONG WITH THE
SUBSEQUENT ACCRETIONS?

HELD

The Court first ruled over the existence of a valid implied trust between Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters.
Implied Trust: There is no implied Trust Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that "[i]f property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."In this case, it cannot be
said that, through oral evidence that Ciricao was merely a trustee of an implied trust holding the
Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.Weighed against the presumed
regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the
same was acquired and registered by mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of the heirs of
Francisco Narvasa would not effectively establish their claims of ownership.