Apiado, Elyn D.

| JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

REPUBLIC vs FABIO
G.R. No. 159589; December 23, 2008
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents, the heirs of Juan Fabio, represented by Angelita F. Esteibar (Esteibar) as their Attorney-in-
Fact, filed with the RTC of Naic, Cavite, an application for registration of title to a lot under the provisions of Act
No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended by PD 1529. Respondents alleged that they are the owners of
the Lot, including all the improvements, having acquired the same through a bona fide claim of ownership. They
declared that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the Lot in the concept of an owner for more than 100 years. They have also submitted several documents to
support their claim of ownership. RTC rendered a decision ordering the registration of the lot in the name of Juan
Fabio.
Upon appeal to the CA, the Republic on its part, claimed that the trial court erred in ruling that
respondents have acquired a vested right over the lot. According to one of the witnesses in the trial, the survey plan
submitted by the respondents contained a notation which states that “this survey falls within the Calumpang Point
Naval Reservation and disposition hereof shall be subject to the final delimitation thereof as per Proc. No. 1582-A
dated September 6, 1976.”, however, the CA still affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondents have acquired a right over the Lot?

RULING:
No. The letter-certification submitted by the respondents stating that the subject land is alienable and
disposable is insufficient. Conlu is merely a land investigator of the DENR. It is not enough that he alone should
certify that the Lot is within the alienable and disposable zone.
Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public
domain belongs to the President. The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify
or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The DENR Secretary is the only other
public official empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and
subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents’
predecessors-in- interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its
declaration as a military reservation in 1904.
Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and
disposable.
In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable and
disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration
under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073.
Hence, there is no need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents’ occupation and possession
of the Lot in the concept of an owner.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

MALABANAN vs REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179987; April 29, 2009
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 sq. meters. Malabanan claimed that
he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather.
Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property
that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated June 11, 2001, issued by CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was “verified
to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under project no.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On December 3, 2002, the RTC approved the
application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the application of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the land should be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 In order that an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.
2. Whether a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code for purposes of Section 14(2) of the
Property registration Decree.

RULING:
1. No. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
2. No. In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. Only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs REPUBLIC

Resolution on MR
G.R. No. 179987; September 3, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property hepurchased
from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable anddisposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been inopen, continuous, uninterrupted, public
and adverse possession and occupation of the land formore than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealedthe judgment to
the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment. Due to Malabanan’s interveningdemise during the appeal in
the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision to this Court through apetition for review on certiorari. The
petition was denied. Petitioners and the Republic filedMotions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable anddisposable land of
the public domain.

RULING:
No. Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and theirpredecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Withoutsatisfying the requisite character
and period of possession – possession and occupation that isopen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot beconsidered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it asalienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remainedineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, theland continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamationdeclaring the land as no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

FORTUNA vs REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 173423; March 5, 2014
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a land identified as Lot No. 4457with the RTC.
They claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful,
adverse and uninterrupted possession of the lot for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey
plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment. In its Decision, the RTC granted the application for
registration in favor of thespouses Fortuna.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna
were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land, they failedt o show that they complied with
the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945.
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings. They contend that the
applicable law is Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), asamended by RA No. 1942
requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an
agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead
required that the possession shouldbe since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was
carried in Section 14(1)of the Property Registration Decree (PRD).
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 andpublished
on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of
the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., they alleged that PD No. 1073 and the PRD
should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 andJanuary 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to
have already satisfied the 30-yearrequirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s possession
dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amendedby RA No. 1942 is
applicable for registration of the land identified as Lot No. 4457 in favor ofthe spouses Fortuna.

RULING:
No. Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that “the Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation,”
the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that the publication of laws is an
indispensable requirement for its effectivity. “All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.”
Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that thedecree took effect
only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or atleast since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947. Even if
the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agriculturalland of the public domain, the
spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of title would stillnot prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that
they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

VALIAO vs REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 170757; November 28, 2011
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Valiao filed an application for registration of land in the RTC of Negros Occidental. Oppositors
filed a motion to dismiss because the land was allegedly not Alienable and Disposable, not open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, there’s res judicata and the tax declaration was not a sufficient
evidence. The motion was denied. Valiao presented tax declaration dated 1976 and claims that the predecessors-in-
interest purchased the land in 1916 through a deed of sale. Petition was granted.
Upon appeal to the CA, RTC decision was reversed. The court stated that classification oflands is and
executive prerogative and that unclassified lands are inalienable. Further, the priorcadastral case which ruled that
the land belongs to the State renders res judicata. Valiao also failed to prove hat there is an open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the land is Alienable and Disposable?

2. Whether or not there is Res Judicata?

RULING:
This is an exception the rule that “Court is not a trier of facts”. Hence, the court has reviewed
facts and evidence.

1. The requisites for judicial confirmation of title provided in Sec. 14 RA 7659 must be presentedby no
less clear, positive and convincing evidence. The Regalian Doctrine provides that there must be a positive
act by the government reclassifying the lands as A&D. Property of public domain is beyond the commerce
of men. Occupation in the concept of owner no matter how longcannot ripen into ownership and be registered as
title. Absence of evidence means land remainsland of public domain.

2. Judicial declaration that a land is public does not preclude application seeking judicialconfirmation of
title to the same land provided thereafter it is Alienable and Disposable and there is an open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupationsince June 12, 1945. Valiao failed to prove the same through
incontrovertible evidence. Tax declaration dated 1976 do not prove PO since 1916. Tax declaration are not
conclusive evidenceof ownership when not supported by other evidence. It is a mere indicia of claim of ownership.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

REPUBLIC vs SIOSON
G.R. No. L-13687; November 29, 1963
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
On November 6, 1951, in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the spouses Segundo Sioson and
Pascuala Bautista filed an application for registration of the four (4) parcels of landdelimited in plan Psu-12152,
attached to their application, of which they claimed to be the owners in fee simple.
On March 20, 1951, the Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of land the registration
which was applied for stating (a) that neither the applicants nor their predecessorsin interest had sufficient title
to the said parcel of land, the same not having been a acquired either by composicion title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; (b)
that neither the applicants nor theirpredecessors in interest have possesses the land openly, continuously,
publicly, adversely and under bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894; all (e) that the said parcel of land
sought to be registered is a part of the public domain and as such belong to the Republic of the
Philippines.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the petition at bar without affording anopportunity to
the Petitioner-Appellant to adduce in support of the same.

RULING:
Yes. The petition for review is predicated on actual and extrinsic fraud committed by the respondents, then
applicant, and was filed within a year from the entry of the decree. Without hearing the evidence in support of the
allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents the Court below denied
the petition. This is an error. There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court should have afforded
the petitioner an opportunity to prove it. Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of
a navigable stream, creek or river the decree and title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them
any right or title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the Land Registration
Act.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY vs REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-195026; February 22, 2016
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On January 16, 1958, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476 which reserved
certain portions of the public domain for Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) site purposes.
The said parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement andreserved for CMU's school site
purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."
On January 31, 1961, the Director of Lands, pursuant to the directive of the President,filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance for the settlement and adjudication of the title ofthe parcels of land reserved in favor of
CMU, and for the determination of the rights of adverse claimants in relation to the reservation of the land.
In its decision, the cadastral court declared that the subject parcels of land as public land included in the
reservation for CMU, and be registered in its name, except for specified portions adjudicated to other persons.
After several amendments of decision, the cadastral court issued theDecrees favor of CMU. Consequently, the
OCTs were registered in the name of CMU.
On December 15, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines filed before the CA a petition for annulment of
the decision of the cadastral court. Accordingly, the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. CMU alleges
that the specific and express authorization and the directive from the President authorizing the Director of Lands
to file the necessary petition in the CFI of Bukidnon for compulsory registration of the parcels of land reserved for
CMU's site purposes is equivalentto a declaration and certification by the Office of the President that the subject
parcels of land are alienable and disposable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the directive of the President authorizing the Director of Lands to file thenecessary
petition for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land so reserved is the equivalent of the
declaration and certification that the subject land is alienable and disposable

RULING:
No. CMU relies on the Court's ruling in the De la Rosa case that the directive from the President
authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land
so reserved is the equivalent of the declaration and certification that the subject land is alienable and disposable. As
such, CMU avows that thesubject lots, as declared alienable and disposable, are properly registered in its name.
This Court finds that the De la Rosa case does not apply in the instant petition. It was explicated in De la
Rosa that the authority of the President to issue such a directive finds supportin Section 7 of C.A. No. 141.
However, the said directive by the President is limited to those enumerated in Section 8 of C.A. No.141.
Based from the provision, the lands which can be declared open to disposition or concession are
those which have been officially delimited and classified, or when practicable surveyed; those not reserved
for public or quasi-public purpose; those not appropriated by the Government; those which have not become
private property in any manner; those which have no private right authorized and recognized by C.A. No. 141 or
any other valid law may be claimed;or those which have ceased to be reserved or appropriated.
Therefore, the said directive cannot be considered as a declaration that said land is alienable and
disposable. Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands, having been reserved for public purpose by virtue of
Proclamation No. 476, have not ceased to be so at the time the said directive was made. Hence, the lots did not
revert to and become public agricultural land for them to bethe subject of a declaration by the President that the
same are alienable and disposable.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

NAVY OFFICERS’ VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. vs REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 177168; August 3, 2015
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On 1965, a certain portion of land was declared for “AFP Officer’s Village” for disposal. A month later, a
part of the land was declared to be for the VFP as a site for rehabilitation, etc. On November 15, 1991, the
property was the subject of a Deed of Sale between the Republic ofthe Philippines, And petitioner Navy Officers’
Village Associaction, Inc. (NOVAI). The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-
15387 was issued in NOVAI’s name.
Republic wants the title cancelled on the ground that, among others, the land covered by NOVAI’s title is
part of a military reservation.
The RTC ruled in favor of NOVAI, contending that the land is already Alienable and Disposable
However, the CA reversed the RTC’s Decision as the petitioner failed to prove the positive act of the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is already A&D and hence, can be registered.

RULING:
No. It is settled that the land falls under those which are reserved for public use in CA 141. In a limited
sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public use sunder Section 9 (d) of C.A. No. 141
are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the general classification under Section 6,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific declaration under Section 88, in relation with
Section 8 and Section 83,these lands classified as reservations are non-alienable and non-disposable.
From the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which areintended for public
use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and
remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.
Applying to the case at bar, Proclamation No. 478 was issued after Proclamation No. 461.Hence, while
Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the Fort Andres Bonifacio Military
Reservation (FBMR) and made the covered area available for disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation
No. 478 subsequently withdrew the property from the total disposable portion and reserved it for theuse of the
Veterans Rehabilitation and Medical Training Center (VRMTC).
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

AMUNATEGUI vs DIR. OF FORESTRY

G.R. No. L-27873; Novemebr 29, 1983
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:
FACTS:
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration.
In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application
of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar
Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified
as forest land and part of the public domain.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No.885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a"mangrove swamp" is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third
groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp,
is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private
persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the namesof the private
applicants?

RULING:
Yes. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the wayplaces. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules onconfirmation of imperfect title do
not apply. The SC, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
domain, classified as public forest land.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

REPUBLIC vs CA AND DE LA ROSA

G.R. No. L-43938; April 15, 1980
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Jose dela Rosa sought to register a parcel of land. The land was divided into 9 lots. Lots 1-5 were
purchased from Balbalio while Lots 6-9 were purchased from Alberto. Both Balbalio and Alberto claim to have
acquired the lots by virtue of prescription.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Atok Big Wedge Corp. and
the Bureau of Forestry Development. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground of valid mining claims, while the
Bureau of Forestry objected because the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, hence, not subject to alienation.
The trial court denied the application. The CA reversed the traial court’s decision, affirming the surface
rights of dela Rosa over the land while reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their
mining claims. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property by virtue of theirrespective mining
claims?

RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the property was considered forest land, they were removed from the public
domain and had become private properties from the perfection of the mining claims of Benguet and Atok.
The evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by dela Rosa was insufficient to
support claim of ownership. Even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of dela Rosa had really been in
possession of the property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of
the property as agricultural land, which it was not.
The theory of the CA that the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface is
erroneous. It is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but
also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height (Art. 437, NCC).
The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
rule is, once minerals are discovered in the land,whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State (the Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in
public and even private land) to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private property,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be
undertaken therein.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

REPUBLIC vs CA AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION

G.R. No. 103882; November 25, 1998
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered
cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other
means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation
of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation (RREC) for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC
and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a
foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce ofman because RA
1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the
CA with modifications. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area?

RULING:
No. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to the strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-
water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upperlimit of wave wash at high tide
usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, its meaning cannot broaden;
much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the
term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No.
158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA
1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

CHAVEZ vs PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 133250; May 6, 2003
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created Public Estate Authority (PEA), which was
tasked with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then
president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project. Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then,
years later, PEA entered into a JVA with Amari for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered
into a joint venture in the absence ofany public bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was
conveying to Amari were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the Freedom Islands
were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality
of the JVA. Petitioner nowc omes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the
conveyance orsale of the reclaimed areas to Amari. He also asked for the full disclosure of
therenegotiations happening between the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to Amari of the lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution?

RULING:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public
service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

COLLADO vs CA
G.R. No. 1077764; October 4, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Edna T. Collado (Collado) filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of
land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares. The Lot is situated in Barangay
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal. Attached to the applicationwas the technical description of the Lotwhich stated that,
"[tJhis survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional
co-applicants and subsequently, more applicants joined.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through
its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to Collado, et al.'s application. In due
course, the land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception of
the oppositors.
During the hearing, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For
failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case
submitted for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court set aside the order and reset the hearing
for the presentation of the evidence. Counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice. Hence, the
court issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The RTC held that Collado, et al. had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over
the Lot. Accordingly, the RTC rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of Collado, et al. The CA
declared null and void the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

RULING:
Collado, et al. did not acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33
segregating the same as a watershed reservation.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of CA 141. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect
title. An imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a
concession especial or special gtant, a composition con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title
through purchase. Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his
application as provided by CA 14r. Clearly, Collado, et al. were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under CA 141 prior to the
issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073. There is no proof that prior to the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904, Collado, et al. had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any
other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva
had only been in possession for two years. Verily, Collado, et al. have not possessed the parcel of land in the
manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904,
EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became nondisposable and inalienable public land. At
the time Collado, et al. filed their application on April 25,1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under
EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners' application. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of
occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. Forestlands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of
forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
Third, Based on the facts on record that neither Collado, et al. nor their predecessors-ininterest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as all naturalresources belong to the
State. Watersheds are considered natural resources which are notsusceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. The statute of limitations withregard to public land does not operate against the State.
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

REPUBLIC vs SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 156951; September 22, 2006
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
Proclamation No 423 which established a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley –
later renamed Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, was issued by former President Carlos Garcia. Areas specified
in the Proclamation were withdrawn from sales and settlements and were reserved for military purposes. Several
presidential proclamations would later be issued excluding certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation
423.
What is mainly sought to be declared as a nullity in this petition is the title over the parcels of
land that are referred to as JUSMAG housing are in Fort Bonifacio being occupied by active and retired military
officers and their families. SHAI, a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers, was
able to secure title in its name over the bulk, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The TCT was issued by the Rizal Registry on the basis of a notarized deed of sale purportedly executed by
then Land Management Bureau Director Abelardo Palad, Jr.. The investigation conducted by the DOJ, however,
reported land scams at the FBMR and also finding that the signature of Palad was forged.
In 1993, then Pres. Ramos ordered the OSG toinstitute an action towards the cancellation of TCT No.
15084 in SHAI’s name as well as the title acquired by the Navy Officer’s Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger
parcel of land withint he reservation.
In a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Republic’s complaint
as it considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the
Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court. Hence, this petition of the
Republic
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land sold was alienable?

RULING:
No. The Court upheld the contention of the Republic that the JUSMAG area is inalienable, the
same having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and
disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the
Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved
shall be nonalienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable. Consistent
with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof
is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime
reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is released from
its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as
disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a
purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.
Until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone
and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military
reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense.
SHAI had not pointed to any proclamation or legislative act for that matter segregating the property from the
reservation and classifying the same as alienable lands of public domain. Furthermore, the Constitution also
Apiado, Elyn D. | JD-2-1 LTD Case Digests

forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable public land except through lease for a
limited period. The whole conveyance process was also suspicious since the whole process was accomplished
only in one day.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of
the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio. TCT No.
15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared void and cancelled