HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 1.
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang
Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But
by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death
of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering
the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which
stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3
December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that
he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of
Malabanan.
ISSUES:
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable
and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur
at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of
its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of
the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can
date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there
is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for
the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the
Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic
August 6, 2017Light
G.R. No. 179987
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application
for original registration of title covering a parcel of land in
Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and
that he and his predecessors in interest had been in open,
notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the said
land for more than 30 years.
2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally
owned by his great-grandfather which passed down to his
four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator
of the properties which the son of the latter succeeded his
parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by
the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence on the
classification of land to be alienable and
disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing
the case of Republic v Hebierto.
Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to
dissect them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and
(2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section
48 (b) vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its
prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such
rights. One did not repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable
and disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the
lands to be registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA
141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not
Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC did not
acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945
is satisfied when at the time of the application, the land is
already classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the
presumption of the right nugatory and the provision
inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the
Philippine is still not an independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time
the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the
commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the State
can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public
dominion when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial
property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of
Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the
executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there
is a positive act, regardless if the land was classified as
alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be
registered, can be acquired through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations
presented was 1948. No other substantive evidence was
presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Petition Denied.
Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991 (197
SCRA)
“failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking possession
from predecessor-in –interest to meet requirements provided by law”
Facts:
Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor
which was opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her
predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for
acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the
filing of application and the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic
of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon
appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive
evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony
as to the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming
that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and
Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano
Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration,
the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack
her possession on the said land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in
possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of
ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of
title.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial

evidence as complying with the requirement of law for confirmation of her
ownership of the land in dispute?

Ruling:

In is held that it is incumbent upon the respondent to prove that her predecessor-
in-interest is the persons of Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan have been in
adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful possession in the concept of an owner
for 20 years which she failed to provide a clear and convincing evidence to prove.
Her bare allegations do not constitute substantial proof. Respondent failed to
comply with the requirements of the law to confirm her title on the land applied
for registration. Lower court decision was set aside.

Underlying Principle: All lands not acquired from the government belong to the
state as part of public domain.