G.R. No. 111141.
 March 6, 1998.* Same; Same; Same; Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division),
VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Quieting of Title; The ground or reason for filing a complaint for
quieting of title must be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”— At the
outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court
should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting
of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code: “ART. 476.
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of  any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding  which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein.” Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground
or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio
alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these
reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.
Same; Same; Same; The acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for
forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.— He prayed that, aside from issuing
a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from
intruding into the land, the court should declare him “the true and absolute owner” thereof.
Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents’ alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported
property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry
but definitely not one for quieting of title.
Same; Same; Prescription; A prescription title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).—
Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for
more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code
provides that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,” this provision of law must be read in
conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that “x x x (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.” Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe  (with color of title and good faith). The
good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
faith and just title.— Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith
and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting
the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof
were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore “tantamount to bad
faith.” To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim  ex
dolo malo non oritur actio  (no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the
property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that “(o)wnership and other real
rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s alleged possession in 1962 up
to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned
twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated
by Art. 1137.
Same; Same; Same; A survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.—A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and
also a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land. A survey
under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of
a partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part
of the common estate. Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan
reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer
only to a delineation of possession.
Same; Same; Same; A survey plan not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands
is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be
proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.— Furthermore, the plan
was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28,
paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711.
Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports,
surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification
and approval. A survey plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than
a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted
in evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify
that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it
subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of
the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties.
Same; Same; Ownership; A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive
evidence of ownership.—Similarly, petitioner’s tax declaration issued under his name is not
even persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax
declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an
indicium of a claim of ownership. Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in
proving one’s ownership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      Rodolfo A. Manlapaz for petitioner.
     Regino B. Tambago for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this
20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by
two contestants in this petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the
property can be vested in only one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong.
The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 441 ruled in favor of private
respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true and lawful
owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to
us for a favorable reversal. Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel
of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and
declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in
September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of
the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing the same
under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the
disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased
from their predecessor-in-interest,2 Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner,3 asserting that no
controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479
to private respondent Victorico Laurio.4 This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had
worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the
land sold to Espinosa and what remained of petitioner’s property was the old Bugsayon
river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to
change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the
southern portion of petitioner’s property, thus converting the old river into a riceland.5
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts: He denied
petitioner’s claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed land
remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands.
According to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2916,6 which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was
bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership
of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by
property owned by Agapito de la Cruz.7 Private Respondent then alleges that, on December
21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax
Declaration No. 53398 was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement
to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale9 on August 24,
1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No.
5720.10 However, the property remained in petitioner’s hands for only four (4) days
because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa11 who then declared it in his name
under Tax Declaration No. 12311.12 Consequently, the property became a part of the estate
of Pablo Espinosa’s wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs
executed an instrument denominated as “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Simultaneous Sale” whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was
sold to private respondent13 in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax
Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these
conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those
appearing in Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioner’s name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of
the disputed property. The first survey14 was made for petitioner, while the second was the
relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between
the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s allegation in his complaint that he is
the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas
of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa,
was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner
to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent filed a protest15 before the Bureau
of Lands against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the
municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended because of the
instant case.16
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida
Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida
Zaragoza,17 the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6hectare property of the deceased.
The property involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 330118 and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by
Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On
September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding
share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial
settlement19 petitioner’s share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private
respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurio’s) property and declared it a part of
his inheritance.20 The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North
by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property owner Espinosa,
and on the West by property owner Adolfo Titong.21 Private respondent accordingly denied
that petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the
land from Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug22 because the land was immediately sold to
Espinosa shortly thereafter.23
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the
true and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect private
respondents’ title and ownership over the property and to pay attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, costs and moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for
reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the
lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy
of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
“ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding  which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.”
Titong vs. Court of Appeals (4th Division)
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property.24 The ground or reason for filing a
complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius,  these grounds are
exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be
considered valid for the same action.25
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no
other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an
“instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding” beclouded the plaintiff’s title over
the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein),
together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the
southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney’s fees. He prayed that, aside from
issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers
from intruding into the land, the court should declare him “the true and absolute owner”
thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title
to the property were private respondents’ alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for
forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have
become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged,
among other matters, that petitioner, “in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and
fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land which extends to the
south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common
boundary between the properties.”26 Moreover, during the hearing of the case, petitioner
proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing what he considered as
the boundary of his property which private respondents perceived as actually encroaching
on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
“x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting
of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be
tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action
where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’ interest or title in and to said
property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where
possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other
than the ‘instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding’ itself, may be introduced.
An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for
recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the
petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.”27
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting
of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are
palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.28 Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident
reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner “sold, ceded, transferred and
conveyed” the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and
possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same
manner, Espinosa’s rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to private
respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as follows:
“ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.”
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing
sold.29 In the case at bar, petitioner’s claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he
has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession
for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code
provides that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,” this provision of law must be read in
conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that “x x x (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.” Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe  (with color of title and good
faith).30 The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.31 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.32
 Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As
aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting the boundary line
(Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts
constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore “tantamount to bad
faith.”33 To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the
maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the
property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that “(o)wnership and other real
rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s alleged possession in 1962 up
to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned
twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated
by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon
his request,34 the tax declaration in his name,35 the commissioner’s report on the relocation
survey,36 and the survey plan.37 Respondent court correctly held that these documents do
not conclusively demonstrate petitioner’s title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a
paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land.38 A survey under
a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a
partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of
the common estate.39 Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan
reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer
only to a delineation of possession.40
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in
accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by
Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field
notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the
Bureau of Lands for verification and approval.41 A survey plan not verified and approved by
said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of
which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due
execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value
therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each
other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility
accorded to evidence presented by the parties.42
Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the
5.2433hectare property as shown by the commissioner’s report.
There is also nothing in the commissioner’s report that substantiates petitioner’s claim
that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower court’s
statement in its decision46 that “as reflected in the commissioner’s report dated May 23,
1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)”47 or
the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show that this statement is
found in the summary of defendants’ (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to
Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even
continues to state the defendants’ assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their
5.5hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner
misapprehended the lower court’s decision or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or
worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney’s fees of
P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete
with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of
moral damages is in order.48 This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil
Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same
Code. This article states that “(a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.” The moral damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We agree with
the respondent court in holding that the award of attorney’s fees is justified because
petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil action.49
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned Decision of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Similarly, petitioner’s tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive
evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not
considered conclusive evidence of ownership.43 It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership.44 Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one’s
ownership.45 Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioner’s tax declaration and the
commissioner’s report as regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be
ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner’s property has an area of 3.2800
hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer’s
survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585
square meters. On the other hand, private respondent’s claimed property, as borne out by
 G.R. No. 92161. March 18, 1991.*
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES,
GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG,
PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners, vs. GUILLERMO MANALO and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Property; Ownership; Respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the
bed of the eastern branch of the river even if the same was included in the deeds of sale
executed in his favor, because it constituted property of public dominion .—Now, then,
pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private
ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds
of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These
vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. x x x
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, “rivers” is a composite term which
includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.
Same; Same; Same; Accretion; Accretion, as a mode of acquiring ownership, requires the
concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil be gradual and
imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (c) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers .—We turn next to the
issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there
was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern
branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers (or the sea coast). The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by
respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion
formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or
attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not
adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not
the alluvial process contemplated under Art. 457 of the Civil Code .—Assuming
(arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring
ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court
of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land
purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and
gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several
floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and
forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article
457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that
the law grants to the riparian owner.
Same; Same; Quieting of Title; Under Art. 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an
action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action .—If respondent Manalo had proved prior
possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the eastern
river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not
indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry
lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and
the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax
declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article
477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled
to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither
petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
PETITION to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having
an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on
the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on
the national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the
waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The
submerged portion, however, would reappear during the dry season from January to
August. It would remain under water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to
December during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9
May 1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina
Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of
Absolute Sale1 as follows:
“x x x a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500
hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto; on the East by National
Road; on South by Julian Tumolva; and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation
under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P750.00.
x x x”
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba
who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought
the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property
was more particularly described as follows:
“x x x a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of
18,000 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by
Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the
West, by Cagayan River assessed at P440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. x x x”2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the
two (2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into
one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares
includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489
hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was
conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under
water was left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by
respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a
certain point to form two (2) branches—the western and the eastern branches—and then
unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of
the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only
during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed
portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year
when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth,
river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern
bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when
the cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and
the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land
was surveyed on 12 December 1969.4 It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares
and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while
Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is
separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy
season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the
land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to
him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own
Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile
portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the
western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer.5 This situation compelled
respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The
case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to
appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry
against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the
Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaint6 before the then Court of First
Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against
petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from
Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered
ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent
Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on
which he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case
was then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter
into a stipulation of facts.7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with
the following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against
the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
. 1.That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
. 2.That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
. 3.That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land
in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and
. 4.That there is no pronouncement as to attorney’s fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.”8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the
trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2)
branches of the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals
concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and
distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for
the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by
land) connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in
effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the depression on the earth’s surface which
separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great
respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 This
is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to
observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise
settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact.10 But whether a
conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by
this Court.11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with
their findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows
through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:
“The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion
(Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the
same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the
plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy
land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the
northern tip (Exhs. ‘W’, ‘W-1’, ‘W-2’, ‘W-3’ and ‘W-4’). It has been held by our Supreme
Court that ‘the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion,
does not have to make an express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the
deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest’ (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil.
408).”12
The Court of Apppeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court,
thus:
“As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the
word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the
Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which
comes during rainy season especially from September to November which increases the
water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower
portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated with
water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the
water level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.”
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that—
‘According to the foregoing definition of the words “ordinary” and “extra-ordinary,” the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and
the highest depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is
the one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during
the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and
goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article
74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground
covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the
dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.’
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level
of the waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined
only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself.
Thesmall residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in
existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad’s property was still susceptible to
cultivation and uneroded.”13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved
Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions
governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine
the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the
definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3
August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of
the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law
applicable to the case at bar:
“Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters
during the highest floods”. (Italics supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground
covered by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their
onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially
dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the
periodical swelling of the waters (i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern
bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon
evidence of record. Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he
bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased
from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the
western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to
respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the
dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy
months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from
the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot
821 but also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination
depict the depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits “W” to “W-4”,
were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit
“W-2” which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit “W-3”
which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly
lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it
to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic
feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the eastern
bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified
that one had to go down what he called a “cliff” from the surveyed portion of the land of
respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban,
has a height of eight (8) meters.17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on
the surface of the earth. However, Exhibit “E”18 for the prosecution which was the
Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the
eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words “old bed”
enclosed in parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership
over the submerged portion—is an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In
the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion
assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side
of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire
private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the
deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These
vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article
420 of the Civil Code states:
“The following things are property of public dominion:
. (1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
. (2)Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.” (Italics
supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, “rivers” is a composite term which
includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting
upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine
Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:
“La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario
considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto,  en todo
rio es preciso distinguir:  1. esta agua corriente;  2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora
bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?
“Realmente, no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera;  de suerte que al decir el
Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio
publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio . Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos
o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num. 1, donde dice: son de dominio publico ...
los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que
con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominio
publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos  que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y
2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios  en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las
mayores crecidas ordinarias.”20 (Italics supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis
even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his
property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the
Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private
ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
into his landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common
occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced
by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of
accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code.21 It so happened that instead of
increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a
channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the
Court considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307
and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property
under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).22 The Court notes that the
parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim
must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on
the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale
transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision
of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that
the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a
slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of
several floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A
sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated
under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil
deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the
northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult
to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of
almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares
(8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and
1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion.
The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in
1969. If respondent Manalo’s contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of
only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals
and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-
like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This
topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821
is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the
waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo’s claim over Lot
821 rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of
land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned
by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad’s) tenants.
When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the
property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly
entered into his property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal
Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo’s allegation of prior possession,
petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed
lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307
and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who
was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In
fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini,
Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821.
In the same manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of
respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting
of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory
and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of
Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
04892 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot
307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby
DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined
in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 No. L-17652. June 30, 1962.
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs.  HON.COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG,
and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Property; Accretion; Alluvial deposits on registered land; Increment not automatically
registered.—An accretion does not automatically become registered land, just because the
lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a
river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest
or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws,
wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
     Gonzales & Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA,.J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande,
from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against
respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a
parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a
parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of
Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased
mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in
whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982,
issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it
was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was
the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current
of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance
of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters
(1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters)
formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they
and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the
land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958),
respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous,
open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the
present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision
adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents
to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter
P250.-00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
"It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual
deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We
are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Titie No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in
1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed
by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact
that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman,
defendants' witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in
1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion
since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectares,
more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year
for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') when they
entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec.
No. 257 (Exh. '2') cancelled Tax Dec. No. 28226 (Exh. '1'), because Exh. '2' says that 'tax
under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the
land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the
land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a
piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion
belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming
arguendo,that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is
of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the
owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v.
Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation
on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
'This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they
have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by
prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that
the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the
land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary
prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law,
part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person."
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September
14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
"That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which
started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both
parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly
belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in
Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that 'to the owner of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.' The defendants, however, contend that they have
acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case.
The Court a quo,has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by
accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the
original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section
46 of Act No. 496, which states that 'no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession'; and, second, the
adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less
than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
"As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct.
An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to
belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become
entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land
Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in
the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually
deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of
conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme
Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by the Land Registration Act, in
so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by
said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession; and these provisions do not
preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. This
Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-
R, July 17, 1959.
"We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding
the length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified
that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by
the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946,
he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declara- tion was
superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is
located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was
Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his
own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the
peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect,
although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The
area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
"We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez.
The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he
called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn,
claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958,
because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation
purposes or paid the taxes hereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said
land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the
accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the
property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who,
accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of
some 458 square meters.
"The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession—from
1933 to 1958—is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact
that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by
the additional circumstance that if the plaintiffs had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same.
The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the
surveyor Domingo Parian, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of
the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate.
Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to
recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had
been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the
evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process
of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received
their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in
favor of the defendants."
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the
alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article
366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion
becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a
Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of
the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of
a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. lmprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration
law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title
to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection,
the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the
time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The
increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject
to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens
system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession
and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the
evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933
or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of
the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of
Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to
them and can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent
articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil
Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired
alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioners. So ordered.

     Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon,

JJ.,  concur.

     Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,  took no part.

 G.R. No. 199537. February 10, 2016.*
 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ANDREA TAN, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Agricultural Lands; Regalian Doctrine; All lands of the public
domain belong to the State; Under the present Constitution, lands of the public domain are
not alienable except for agricultural lands.—All lands of the public domain belong to the
State. It is the fountain from which springs any asserted right of ownership over land.
Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private ownership. This is
the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our Constitutions and repeatedly
embraced in jurisprudence. Under the present Constitution, lands of the public domain are
not alienable except for agricultural lands.
Civil Law; Property; Acquisitive Prescription; Only private property can be acquired by
prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man.—Only private
property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be the object of prescription because prescription does not run
against the State in its sovereign capacity. However, when property of public dominion is no
longer intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial
property of the State. When this happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion
and becomes property of private ownership, albeit still owned by the State. The property is
now brought within the commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal
possession and prescription.
Same; Same; Same; While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable
and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PRD), it does not suffice for the purpose of
prescription under the Civil Code.—While a prior declaration that the property has become
alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under
Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil
Code. Before prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following conditions
must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property: 1. The subject lot must have
been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the
Constitution; 2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable; 3. There
must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended
for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property. Only when these conditions are
met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of an owner.
 
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
 
Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Property; Regalian Doctrine; View that the Regalian
Doctrine has not been incorporated in our Constitution; Thus, there is no basis for the
presumption that all lands belong to the state.—Respectfully, I disagree with the ponencia’s
statement that “the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private ownership.” This
statement is an offshoot of the idea that our Constitution embraces the Regalian Doctrine as
the most basic principle in our policies involving lands. The Regalian Doctrine has not been
incorporated in our Constitution. Pertinent portion of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State[.] Thus, there is no basis for the presumption that
all lands belong to the state. The Constitution limits state ownership of lands to “lands of the
public domain[.]” Lands that are in private possession in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial are considered never to have been public. They were never owned by the state.
Civil Law; Land Registration; View that the state cannot, on the sole basis of the land’s
“unclear” private character, always successfully oppose applications for registration of titles,
especially when the land involved has long been privately held and historically regarded by
private persons as their own.—The state cannot, on the sole basis of the land’s “unclear”
private character, always successfully oppose applications for registration of titles, especially
when the land involved has long been privately held and historically regarded by private
persons as their own. This case can be resolved without resort to the fiction of the Regalian
Doctrine. Respondent Andrea Tan’s application for registration was granted by the land
registration court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the land registration court’s Decision based
on the certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) that the land was already classified as alienable and disposable. By submitting the
CENRO’s certification, therefore, respondent applicant admitted that prior to her possession,
the land was part of the public domain. However, she failed to clearly show that the land
was classified as alienable and disposable public land.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Florido and Largo Law Office for respondent.
BRION, J.:
 
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) from the May 29, 2009 decision 1 and October 18, 2011 resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CEB CV No. 00702. The CA denied the Republic’s appeal
from LRC Case No. N-1443 wherein the Municipal Trial Court in Consolacion, Cebu,
granted respondent Andrea Tan’s application for land title registration.
Antecedents
  
On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080,
Cad. 545-D (new) situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject lot). She alleged that
she is the absolute owner in fee simple of the said 7,807-square-meter parcel of residential
land she purchased from a certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her application
was docketed as LRC Case No. N-144.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an
order of general default, excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor
General.
During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:
1. The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion,
Cebu;
2. The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965,
pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063;
3. Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in 1965 and 02983 in
1972 initially possessed the subject lot;
4. After Luciano’s death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;
5. Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992;
6. She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30)
years.
On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan’s application. The court
confirmed her title over the subject lot and ordered its registration.
 The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of her application. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R.
CEB CV No. 00702.
On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that under the Public Land
Act, there are two kinds of applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed
the land since June 12, 1945; and (2) those who already acquired the property through
prescription. The respondent’s application fell under the second category.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it
must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to the
certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
as evidence that the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on September 1,
1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded that Tan had already
acquired the subject lot by prescription.
On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing Republic v. Herbieto,4 it
argued that an applicant for judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land has
been likewise already declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 5
On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration citing the then
recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines6 which abandoned the
ruling in Herbieto. Malabanan declared that our law does not require that the property
should have been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, as long as the
declaration was made before the application for registration is filed. 7
On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Malabanan; and (2) that
the CENRO certification and tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that the
subject lot was no longer intended for public use.
Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title over the subject
lot. She maintains that the classification of the subject lot as alienable and disposable public
land by the DENR on September 1, 1965, per Land Classification Project No. 28, converted it
into patrimonial property of the State.
From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that Government-owned
land has become alienable and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of
the State, making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
 
Our Ruling
 We find the petition meritorious.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain from which springs
any asserted right of ownership over land. Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not
clearly within private ownership. This is the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated
in all of our Constitutions and repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence. 8 Under the present
Constitution, lands of the public domain are not alienable except for agricultural lands.9
The Public Land Act10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. It is the primary substantive law on this matter.
Section 11 thereof recognizes judicial confirmation of imperfect titles as a mode of
disposition of alienable public lands.11 Relative thereto, Section 48(b) of the PLA identifies
who are entitled to judicial confirmation of their title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by PD 1073)
 
The Property Registration Decree 12 (PRD) complements the PLA by prescribing how
registrable lands, including alienable public lands, are brought within the coverage of the
Torrens system. Section 14 of the PRD enumerates the qualified applicants for original
registration of title:
 
Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws;
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds
by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws;
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for
by law.13
The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.14 Nevertheless, prescription under Section 14(2) must not be confused with judicial
confirmation of title under Section 14(1). Judicial confirmation of title requires:
1. That the applicant is a Filipino citizen; 15
2. That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since
June 12, 1945;16
3. That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the
application. 17
 
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is
outside the commerce of man.18 It cannot be the object of prescription 19 because
prescription does not run against the State in its sovereign capacity. 20 However, when
property of public dominion is no longer intended for public use or for public service, it
becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State. 21 When this happens, the property is
withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of private ownership, albeit still
owned by the State.22 The property is now brought within the commerce of man and
becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription.
In the present case, respondent Tan’s application is not anchored on judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title because she does not claim to have possessed the subject
lot since June 12, 1945. Her application is based on acquisitive pre-scription on the claim
that: (1) the property was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2)
she had been in open continuous, public, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the
concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution 23 in Malabanan, we already held En Banc that a
declaration that property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does
not ipso facto convert it into patrimonial property. We said:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.  Without
such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
 disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer  
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where CONCURRING OPINION
the President is duly authorized by law.24

LEONEN, J.:

While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is  
sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it
does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code. 25 Before prescription I concur in the result.
can even begin to run against
Respectfully, I disagree with the ponencia’s statement that “the State owns all lands that
the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial are not clearly within private ownership.” 1 This statement is an offshoot of the idea that our
property: Constitution embraces the Regalian Doctrine as the most basic principle in our policies
involving lands.
1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution; The Regalian Doctrine has not been incorporated in our Constitution. Pertinent portion of
the Constitution provides:
2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable; 26

3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no
longer intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner.
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State[.] 2

In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared Thus, there is no basis for the presumption that all lands belong to the state. The
alienable and disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public Constitution limits state ownership of lands to “lands of the public domain[.]” 3 Lands that are
service. Without this, prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet in private possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial are considered
been converted into patrimonial property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of never to have been public.4 They were never owned by the state.
man and the respondent’s physical possession and occupation thereof do not produce any
legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal possession of
the property and her physical possession thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into
ownership.
In Cariño v. Insular Government: 5

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009 decision and October
18, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB CV No.
00702 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent’s application for Land Registration
is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
The [Organic Act of July 1, 1902] made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of
the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It
provides that “no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws.” §5. In the light of the declaration that we have
quoted from §12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in
the next breath that. . . it meant by “property” only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and
that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
 association — one of the profoundest factors in human thought — regarded as their
own.

. . . It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. 6

Hence, documents of title issued for such lands are not to be considered as a state grant
of ownership. They serve as confirmation of property rights already held by persons. They
are mere evidence of ownership. 7 The recognition of private rights over properties that have
long been held as private is consistent with our constitutional duty to uphold due process. 8

The state cannot, on the sole basis of the land’s “unclear” private character, always
successfully oppose applications for registration of titles, especially when the land involved
has long been privately held and historically regarded by private persons as their own. 9

This case can be resolved without resort to the fiction of the Regalian Doctrine.

Respondent Andrea Tan’s application for registration was granted by the land
registration court.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed the land registration court’s Decision
based on the certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) that the land was already classified as alienable and disposable. 11

By submitting the CENRO’s certification, therefore, respondent applicant admitted that

prior to her possession, the land was part of the public domain. However, she failed to
clearly show that the land was classified as alienable and disposable public land.

In several cases, we have clearly ruled that the CENRO’s certificate is not sufficient.

ACCORDINGLY, I concur that the Petition should be GRANTED.