Titong v.

CA

Doctrine: Physical intrusion is not a ground warranting a petition for queting of ti-
tle; Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith with just
title for the time fixed by law (10 years); A mere survey is not a conveyance or
mode of acquiring the common estate as it refers only to a delineation of pos-
session.

Facts:

Petitioner Titong filed an action for queting of title against respondent Vic-
torico Lurio and Angeles Laurio before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Masbate alleging therein that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 3918, declared for taxation purposes in his name, and that
respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land and
began plowing the same under the pretext of ownership.

Respondent avers that they purchased the disputed property from the heirs of
the late Segundina Espinosa who acquired said property by inheritance from de-
ceased spouse Pablo Espinosa to whom petitioner had sold the disputed prop-
erty. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition where it is argued by the petitioner that
the latter had acquired the disputed property by ordinary acquisitive prescription
because petitioner had been in possession of the disputed property for more
than twenty (20) years. Petitioner also used as the basis of his claim, a survey
plan upon the disputed property prepared upon his request.

Issue:

1. WON the petition for quieting of title was proper.

2. WON petitioner acquired the disputed property by ordinary acquisitive
prescription.
3. WON the survey plan is sufficient basis for petitioner’s claim

Ruling:

1. No. Art. 476 of the New Civil Code provides that whenever there is a
cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is appar-
 ently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, void-
able, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument,

record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in
real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of
title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding." In this case, the complaint failed to allege that an "instru-
ment, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the peti-
tioner’s title over the property involved.

Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), to-

gether with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly
entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the
same. Thus, the petition was improper.

2. No. Ordinary acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code requires pos-
session in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. The
good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership.

For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse

claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
In this case, petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of
good faith and just title.

As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of con-
verting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter
claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the
rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith." 33 To allow pe-
titioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim
ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim
upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which
requires a period of possession of 30 years regardless of good faith
 and just title cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon pe-
titioner because the latter occupied the disputed property for a period of
only 21 years.

3. No. A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instru-

ment sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a
proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate.
Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan
reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to owner-
ship as it may refer only to a delineation of possession.
Binalay vs Manalo

Facts:

• The original owner of the 20 hectares of land was Judge Taccad. Its western
portion is the border of the Cagayan River while the eastern portion is the border
of the national road. The western portion throughout the years is slowly being
submerged by the waters coming from the river but that ortion reappears during
dry seasons while submerged during rainy season.

• Herein respondent acquired 8.65 hectares of the land from the Taccads and
1.80 hectares from Taguba who acquired the same previously from the Taccads,
ammounting to a total of 10.45 hectares. The land acquired from Taguba is
bounded on the North by Balug Creek.

• The 2 parcel of lands were then surveyed on a rainy day in 1961 wherein a
portion of the land was underwater, therefore left unsurveyed. As a result, the
sketch plan submitted during the trial was incomplete and make it seem that the
land formed was an island and because the cagayan river forks at a certain
point which creates 2 branches designated as the east and west branches, the
eastern branch cuts through the land of herein respondent during rainy season .

• The resulting island like land was designated as Lot 821 and due to natural ac-
cretion of the submerged portion of the property adjacent to it, respondent
claims ownership. Herein Petitioner however, who is already in possession of
the lot, contends that they are the owners as have been already plant tobacco
and cultivates it during summer.

• A case of forcible entry was then filed by the respondent against the petitioner.
The trial court however dismissed the case as both parties failed to appear dur-
ing the trial. Another case of forcible entry was filed but it was also dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.

• This then made Manalo to file with Cfi a petition for the quieting of title, posses -
sion and damages against the petitioners. The trial court then rendered a deci-
sion in favor of Manalo, declaring him the owner and ordering Binalay to vacate
the premises.

• The case was appealed by Binalay to CA however CA only affirmed the lower
court's decision stating that during dry season, the lot becomes physically con-
nected with the dried up bed that is owned by respondent Manalo.
 • Aggrieved, the matter was raised to SC.

Issue:

Whether Lot 821 is owned by Manalo by way of natural accretion

Ruling:

No as the submerged lands is a property of public dominion.

Article 70 of the Law of the Waters states that The natural bed or channel of a
creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.

The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the
annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the
entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the
most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the period-
ical swelling of the waters (i.e., from September to December) causing the east-
ern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code re-
quires the concurrence of three (3) requisites:
(a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers
(or the sea coast).

Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may
claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307 however, the claimed accre-
tion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly op-
posite Lot 307 across the river.

Even if the case was that of the western branch, Manalo still did not acquire
ownership through alluvium as flooding was the reason which caused the land
to reappear, making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action
like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457
of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil de-
posits that the law grants to the riparian owner.
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO
CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG

An accretion does not automatically become registered land, just because the
lot that receive such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a
piece of land is one thing; registration under Torrens System of that ownership
is another.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032

hectares, located at barrio Ragan, Magsaysay Isabela, by inheritance from their
deceased mother Patricia Angui, who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui
and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown an OCT,
issued on June 9, 1934. When it was surveyed on 1930, its northeastern bound-
ary was the Cagayan River. Many years passed and a gradual accretion on the
northeastern side took place, by the action of the current of Cagayan River. Due
to the accretion, more or less 19,994 square meters has been added to the reg-
istered area.

On January 1958, petitioners instituted an action to quiet the title of the re-
spondents regarding the portion formed by accretion before CFI Isabela. They
alleged that that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peace-
ful and continuous possession thereof, until September 1948, when respondents
entered upon the land under claim of ownership. CFI Isabela rendered a deci-
sion adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners and or-
dered respondents to vacate the premises.

It ruled that although the respondents declared the land for taxation pur-
poses since 1948, it does not mean that they become the owner of the land by
mere occupancy for under Art. 714 NCC, ownership of a piece of land cannot be
acquired by occupation. Assuming that respondents occupied the land in Sep-
tember 19, 1948, CFI ruled that they are still not entitled for ordinary prescription
because they have not been in possession of the land for 10 years when the ac -
tion was commence in January 1958.

Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed. CA ruled that
if the petitioners had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof
in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. How-
ever, prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents have acquired the alluvial property in ques-

tion through prescription.

RULING:

Art. 457 of the New Civil Code states that alluvium deposits on land belong
to the owners of the adjacent land. However, an accretion does not automati-
cally become registered land, just because the lot that receive such accretion is
covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration
under Torrens System of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accre-
tion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code while,
imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.

Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest
or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title al-
ready possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third
parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the opera -
tion of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been pro-
vided.

Petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property up to the time

they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in
1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is
not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.

The Supreme Court then ruled that finding of the existence of these facts,
arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence pre-
sented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and cannot be reviewed by SC.
The law on prescription applicable in the case at bar is that provided in Act 190
and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or
1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and be-
fore the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquis-
itive prescription is in accordance with law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ANDREA TAN, respondent.

Civil Law; Property; Acquisitive Prescription; While a prior declaration that

the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application
for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree (PRD), it does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil
Code.

Facts:

In 2002, Andrea Tan applied for the original registration for a 7,807-square-meter
parcel of residential land in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu. During the trial, Tan
proved the following facts:

• The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on Sep-

tember 1, 1965, pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1063;
• Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in
1965 and 02983 in 1972 initially possessed the subject lot;
• After Luciano’s death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;
• Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on Sep-
tember 17, 1992;
• She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continu-
ous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the
concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years

The land registration court granted Tan’s application and confirmed her title over
the subject lot and ordered its registration.

The Republic appealed the case to the CA contending that Tan failed to prove
that she is a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an
owner, since June 12, 1945. The CA denied the appeal on the ground that the
1965 CENRO Certification is evidence that the subject was classified as alien-
able and disposable.

The Republic moved for reconsideration: citing Republic v. Herbieto, it argued

that an applicant for judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession
and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. CA denied
the motion, citing Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines which
abandoned the ruling in Herbieto. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not a declaration that Government-owned land has become alien-

able and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of the State,
making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:

NEGATIVE. SC HELD: While a prior declaration that the property has become
alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of
title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose of pre-
scription under the Civil Code. Before prescription can even begin to run against
the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patri-
monial property:

• The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compli-
ance with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution;
• The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;
• There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject
lot is no longer intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimo-
nial property. Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin
their public and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of
an owner

In the case at bar, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been de-
clared alienable and disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from pub-
lic use or public service. Without this, prescription cannot begin to run because
the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial property of the State. It
remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent’s physical posses-
sion and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the
law, the respondent has never acquired legal possession of the property and her
physical possession thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership