G.R. No.

179987               September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the
decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on
the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with
either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On
February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented
during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for
Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown
and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation
of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in
Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land
as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for
purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of
February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings
therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than
30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private
property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to
be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the
rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue
that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the
Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit
title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application
of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its
view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private

ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to
the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West
by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public
lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of
public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were
classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all
other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the
lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are
not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be
classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land
from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to
that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for
the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

 (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945,
or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or
timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and
disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set
forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land
Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the
public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural
land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to
such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945
could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and
insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and
occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of
the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative
intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should
interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12,
1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands
of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law,
as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason
that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that
the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription
may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title
be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered
lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number
of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still
prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act
No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public
land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or
private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong
to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
 the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June
12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the
land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be
part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property
even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the
land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic

August 6, 2017Light

G.R. No. 179987

Facts:

1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title covering a
parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his
predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the said
land for more than 30 years.
2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather which passed
down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator of the properties which the son
of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and disposable by the
DENR on March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v Hebierto.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed

Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect them. The case settles down
the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141

1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to those
who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the
other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable” from “agricultural” by PD
1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only
an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:

1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at the time of the
application, the land is already classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the right nugatory and the
provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an independent
state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and
Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.

1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the patrimonial
property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in use, is converted
into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there
is a positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless if the land was
classified as alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through
prescription.

Applying to the case at bar:

1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other substantive
evidence was presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of
the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

Petition Denied.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129682. March 21, 2002.]

NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAÑAGAS PAGKATIPUNAN, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals nullifying the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Gumaca, Quezon 2 which confirmed petitioners’ title over the lots subject of the instant petition.
Petitioners further seek to annul and set aside the resolutions 3 of the Court of Appeals denying their urgent
motion to recall the judgment entered 4 in the land registration case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sometime in November 1960, petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia
Esquires, filed with the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon an application for judicial confirmation and
registration of their title to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located in
San Narciso, Quezon. 5

On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order of default against the whole world, except spouses
Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo Medenilla who were given ten (10) days to file their written opposition as
regards Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406. Upon motion of petitioner’s predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406
was removed from the coverage of the application. The remaining parcel of land covered by Lot No. 1 has an
area of 3,804.261 square meters.

On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming petitioners’ title to the property.
On October 23, 1967, OCT No. O-12665 was issued in the name of petitioners.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the
Intermediate Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-
19930 before the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon null and void, and to cancel Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of deeds to annul said
certificates of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. 6

The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land registration case and of rendition of the decision on
June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified as timberland under LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as
shown in BF Map No. LC-1180; hence inalienable and not subject to registration. Moreover, petitioners’ title
thereto can not be confirmed for lack of showing of possession and occupation of the land in the manner and for
the length of time required by Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Neither did petitioners
have any fee simple title which may be registered under Act No. 496, as amended. Consequently, the Court of
First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction over the res and any proceedings had therein were null and void. 7

On the other hand, petitioners raised the special defenses of indefeasibility of title and res judicata. They argued
that due to the lapse of a considerable length of time, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in the
land registration case has become final and conclusive against the Republic. Moreover, the action for reversion
of the land to the public domain is barred by prior judgment. 8

In a decision promulgated on June 27, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court held that the land in question was
forestral land; hence not registrable. There was no evidence on record to show that the land was actually and
officially delimited and classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. Therefore, the Court of
First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for registration and to decide the
same. Consequently, the action to declare null and void the June 15, 1967 decision for lack of jurisdiction did not
prescribe. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondents, and as prayed
for:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) The Decision dated June 15, 1967 in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 is hereby declared null and
void, and accordingly set aside;

(b) Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12665, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-84439, T-93857 and T-
117618 deriving therefrom, as well as any other derivative titles, are declared null and void;

(c) The respondent Register of Deeds for Quezon Province is ordered to cancel said titles; and

(d) The parcels of land covered thereby are ordered reverted to the State.

Without pronouncement as to costs." 9

On July 16, 1986, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the afore-cited decision 10 reiterating that the
land in question was agricultural because it was possessed and cultivated as such long before its classification as
timberland by the Bureau of Forestry, in 1955. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of said land for agricultural and cattle raising
purposes as far back as the Spanish regime. Following the doctrine in Oracoy v. Director of Lands, 11 private
interest had intervened and petitioners acquired vested rights which can no longer be impaired by the
subsequent classification of the land as timberland by the Director of Forestry.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On August 20, 1986, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 12 On December
12, 1986, the decision of June 27, 1986 attained finality and judgment was entered in the book of entries of
judgments. 13

On April 2, 1987, petitioners filed an urgent motion to set aside entry of judgment on the ground that Atty. Cirilo
E. Doronila, petitioners’ counsel of record, was not furnished a copy of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. 14 In the absence of such notice, the decision of the appellate court did not become final and
executory.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On October 22, 1987, the Court of` Appeals set aside and lifted the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 07115
and directed the clerk of court to furnish petitioners’ counsel a copy of the August 20, 1986 resolution. 15

For petitioners’ inaction despite service of the August 20, 1986 resolution, the June 27, 1986 decision became
final and executory. On March 2, 1988, entry of judgment was again made in the land registration case.

On September 4, 1995, Atty. Doronila withdrew his appearance as counsel for petitioners. 16

On April 1, 1996, Petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. George I. Howard, filed with the Court of Appeals
an urgent motion to recall the entry of judgment, 17 which was denied by the appellate court on December 16,
1996. 18

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that it raised arguments already discussed
and resolved in the urgent motion to recall entry of judgment. 19

Hence, the instant petition for review. 20

Petitioners claim that their title to the land became incontrovertible and indefeasible one (1) year after issuance
of the decree of registration. Hence, the Republic’s cause of action was barred by prescription and res judicata,
proceedings having been initiated only after about 18 years from the time the decree of registration was made.
Contrary to the appellate court’s findings, the land is agricultural and the inclusion and classification thereof by
the Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as timberland can not impair the vested rights acquired by petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession of the land in
question since time immemorial and for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application for
registration in 1960. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside
entry of judgment in the land registration case.

The petition lacks merit.

Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 21

Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the application for land registration and issuance
of the certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same was timberland and formed
part of the public domain, as per certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development on April 1, 1985,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Vigo Cantidang, San Narciso, Quezon, containing an area of 3,
804.261 square meters as described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-117618 . . . registered in the name of
Spouses Nestor E. Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Mañ gas is verified to be within the Timberland Block-B, Project
No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, certified and declared as such on August 25, 1955 per BFD Map LC-1880. The
land is, therefore, within the administrative jurisdiction and control of the Bureau of Forest Development, and
not subject to disposition under the Public Land Law.

[Sgd.] ARMANDO CRUZ

Supervising Cartographer 22
This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the proceedings before the court a quo on March 10, 1986,
when they confirmed that the land has been classified as forming part of forest land, albeit only on August 25,
1955. 23 Since no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable, the
title issued to herein petitioners is considered void ab initio. 24

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine
also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. 25 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 26

In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as disposable or alienable.
Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation
of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 27
Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. 28 It cannot be presumed. Neither
should it be ignored nor deemed waived. 29 It calls for proof. 30

The court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Republic’s failure to show that the
land is more valuable as forest land than for agricultural purposes, a finding which is based on a wrong concept
of what is forest land.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of land of the public domain in the Constitution. One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or
vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of trees and underbrush. However, the cutting down of trees and
the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the land of the public domain from forest or
timber land to alienable agricultural land. 31

The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. 32 A person cannot enter into forest land and by
the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before
the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect
title. 33

As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry: 34

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, which took effect on December
1, 1936, expressly provided that only agricultural land of the public domain are subject to acquisitive
prescription, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 48. . . .

(a) . . .

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-six, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed therein, but most
importantly, he must prove that the land is alienable public land. 35 In the case at bar, petitioners failed to do so.

Petitioners’ contention that the Republic is now barred from questioning the validity of the certificate of title
issued to them considering that it took the government almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same is
erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription does not run against the State. 36 The lengthy occupation of the
disputed land by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of
the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable. 37

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it set aside the June 15, 1967 decision of the court
a quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the public domain. Since the land in question is
unregistrable, the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or
judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners’ motion to set aside the judgment rendered on
December 12, 1986, in the land registration case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No.
07115, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-52518               August 13, 1991

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968 in a special
civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against the respondents:

(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the Philippines, in lieu of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the
petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges
prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and

(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.

respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.

After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) promulgated on 28
December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and
construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and
therefore, is a legal question.1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June 1966.2 Petitioner seeks
therein a declaration that respondent University of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have
the right to supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner
and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License
Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990;
asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that respondents be
required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.

Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted upon, and pursuant to the
order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987,3 wherein they
interpose the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition states no cause of
action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest
products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and
interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.

Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim.4

On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for
Judgment,5 which reads as follows:

COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit the
following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT,
without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood and was,
for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on
February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan,
Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment)
issued and promulgated by the Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on January 11, 1960. ... ;

3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1,
1963. ... ;

4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful possession of said
timber concession and had been felling cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the
aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;

5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government on June 4,1953
(License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960,
has constructed roads and other improvements and installations of the aforementioned area subject to
the grant and purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned
License Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;

6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment)
of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads
as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS

EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND
FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
 PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the
authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from
sale or settlement and reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment
station for the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of
the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of Laguna, and partly
in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there
be, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found therein shall be
subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as
follows, to wit:

x x x           x x x          x x x

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.

(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA

President of the Philippines

x x x           x x x          x x x

7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-
A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines
and approved by the President of the Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE

PHILIPPINES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use of the University
of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the
College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.

SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three thousand hectares,
more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of
which are stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in
full ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.

SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt
from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the
Philippines.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 18, 1964.

8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the institution of the
present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in writing to plaintiff-.

(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License Agreement 27-A
(Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines,
instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
 (b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of the Central
Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the
University of the Philippines.

9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully discussed in the letter
dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the President of the University of the Philippines,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.

10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused to allow entry to
personnel of the University of the Philippines to the Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for
the purpose of supervising the felling cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber
cut and felled prior to removal

11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the implemetation of Republic Act No.
3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue:

x x x           x x x          x x x

February 8, 1966

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Manila

Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant

Dear Sir:

Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land approximately 3,500
hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the government to the University of the
Philippines. This area is known as Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the
name of the University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the University of
the Philippines gives the university full rights of dominion and ownership, subject to the existing
concession of International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of
this law all forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the University of the
Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the University is to enable us to generate
income out of the land grant and establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of
Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.

I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following matters:

1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna from June, 1964
up to the present should be remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines pines;

2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the University
of the Philippines and lastly

3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest charges and royalties
due from any logging concession at the land grant.

May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester of Laguna about this
matter. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR.

Business Executive

12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February 8, 1966, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

March 11, 1966

U.P. Paete Land Grant

University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City

Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Business Executive

Gentlemen:

This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of Revenue
Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products, cut, gathered and removed
from registered private woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must be invoiced
when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by
the regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and
as the grant is manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges purportedly to be paid by
any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are,
therefore, to be considered not as the charges contemplated by the National Internal Revenue
Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber
resources of the land grant.

Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:

1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges payable by
concessionaires of the land grant.

2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal claim for the refund thereof is made
within two years from the date of payment. The proper claimant shall be International
Hardwood and not the University.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the District Forester
of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966:

April 18, 1966

The District Forester

Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the right of the
University of the Philippines to collect forest charges from the existing logging concessionaire at
the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing some
 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No.
3990, approved in June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its
authority over said land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest charges directly to the
University instead of to the national government.

Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the
official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the following points raised by the University:

1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect forest charges from
INTERWOOD, the existing logging concessionaire.

2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of Forestry from June, 1964 up to
April, 1966 shall be refunded to the University of the Philippines. In this manner,
INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore paid by it
to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.

On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is understood that forest
charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as scaled by scalers of the University of the
Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is
exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Business Executive

14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18, 1966 was duly endorsed
by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the Director of Forestry.

15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to plaintiff the letter
dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:

Sirs:

This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your reply to the letter of Mr.
Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the Philippines.

In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of the Philippines is
claiming the right:

(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the area covered by the U.P. Land Grant
at Paete, Laguna;

(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;

(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and

(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the Bureau of Forestry in the
cutting, removal and disposition of the timber from said area, and the authority of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the measurement and scaling of the logs and the
collection of the corresponding forest charges and other fees in connection therewith.

This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the University of the
Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by
virtue of number License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the timber inside subject
area is still binding and should therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment
that we sent your client our letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment on the
application of the State University for a Special Timber License over the said area.
 16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of Bureau of Forestry issued
the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966:

x x x           x x x          x x x

June 30, 1966

District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna

(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)

Sir:

This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated April 26, 1966,
designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the scaling work for logs cut from
the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines in the Pacto Land
Grant to Scalers of the University of the Philippines.

In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete Land Grant, which
embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines, is
considered a registered private woodland of the University of the Philippines and therefore no
forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view
further of the ruling of said Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any
concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be
considered not as the charged contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of
the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the
land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.

However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered or to be entered
into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products from the neighboring public forests.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA

x x x           x x x          x x x

On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the case, and whatever additional
evidence may be presented by the parties, the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this
Honorable Court that judgment be rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the following issues:

1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due and payable
under its timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof', to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and

2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the
University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise,
through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, telling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and
cut.

Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.

Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case
against UP, it held:

... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In the first place, the
cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any
 existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber
concession over the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the
University of the Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property to the University of the
Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full
ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what the
donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the property donated. In the second place, the respondents'
demand cannot be valid unless the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code
regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of the prescribed forest charges
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the
respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include
therein such amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised
Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not only because of the first reason above
stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is not intended in Republic Act No. 3990,
which does not contain even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at
the end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the Philippines cannot legally
use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the
use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions,
particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of the petitioner's timber concession, the University of the
Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of land or over
portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from them
the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code.

Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:

... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE
OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.

II

... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT
OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES
PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.

1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move and pray
that the trial court render judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on the following issues:

1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due and
payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2
hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and

2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be paid to
the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within
the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber
thus felled

These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al.6 that
declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and purposes,
abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to both
pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said
section pertinently provides:
 SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.— When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the
result of the trial by these issues. ...

The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites for declaratory
relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the
issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination.7

There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one
exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will
help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of
right which is actually contested.8

2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of the Philippines
may effect collection of forest charges through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement
does not expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in the
absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest charges owing to
it, the Republic may effect such collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative
jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of
the timber and other resources within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the
concession of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded
property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties) may
be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license. To deny it such charges would render its "full
ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to
it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:

All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt from
taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
(emphasis supplied for emphasis).

(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment station;
since this law does not provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the
establishment and maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area, which can
only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the
general principle that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection
with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of
petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No.
3990 have issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and to supervise
petitioner's logging operations.

Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has not been granted by
R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner
of the timber concession affected by said Act.

The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly
against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear
implication. Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of forest
products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under
the regulations of the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of
Forestry.9 The supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and removal of forest
products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry.10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the
UP any authority to collect from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due and
payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest
products or to supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders thereof; (b) The cession in full
ownership of the land in question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's
concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive
jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that
of a donee of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the
power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested
right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.

There is merit in the second assigned error.

Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public domain described therein,
with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from
sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production studies of said college, subject
however to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products
found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations.

The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.

Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of the UP in
connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of
Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in
full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."

When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from
the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner,
removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished
and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of
the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any
essential quality.11 The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that
it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or
diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as
grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above
transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that
"any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the
Philippines. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and,
in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the
effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No.
3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by
law.12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the
jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use.13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the
owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this
rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits.14 In the
instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been
given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I February
1985.1âwphi1 However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the
new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore
to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the
transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and
jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due
thereon.

The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP the authority to
collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it
is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the supervision and
control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means
bound under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that
legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against the grantee. The
grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict
interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party pursuant
to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the
contrary, be bound by the rule.

It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging,
felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the trial court
in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by
petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the area ceded and
transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the
Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No.
3990.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47178  November 25, 1940

THE INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.

THE PAÑGIL FEDERATION OF LABOR, respondent.

 

FACTS:
An industrial dispute existed between the petitioner company and certain of its employees who are members of
the respondent union.  The Court of Industrial Relations tried and heard the dispute as it was considered as
“public interest” under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The industrial dispute referred to certain
demand by the union to the company which includes particularly:

2.) Setting of minimum daily wages of common laborers at one peso

3.) Devising a proper schedule of rate wages for all laborers

4.) Setting of the rate of wages for the mountain camps which should be higher by 20% over those given in town.
One of the Judges of CIR then rendered a decision in favor of the union’s demand. Petitioner company the filed a
motion for reconsideration and while such was pending, it also filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of the
CIR over said industrial dispute. It claimed that the provision of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and denies the petitioner the equal protection of laws, thus
rendering said section unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in connection
with an industrial dispute under provisions of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and if it has, whether or
not such grant of power is unconstitutional and void.

HELD:
Petitioner’s view was without merit. Petitioner gave only a narrow construction under Section 5 of CA No. 103.
The Court of Industrial Relations was granted the plenary powers to “settle all questions, matters, controversies,
or disputes arising between, and /or affecting employees and employers.” Petitioner’s contention that CIR must
first be directed by the President of the Philippines to investigate such dispute before it can acquire jurisdiction
is NOT mandatory. The Commonwealth Act should receive a construction that will lead to its very objective
namely, which is to create an instrumentality through which intervention of the government could be made
effective in order to prevent non-pacific methods in the determinations of industrial or agricultural disputes.
The National Assembly, under Sec. 20 of the CA No. 103 has also furnished a sufficient standard by which the
court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before
it.  The requisites for such delegation therefore were complied with, namely:
a.) The completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
b.) The presence of sufficient standards
Such discretionary power which is in judicial character being conferred to the CIR does not infringe upon the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers. It is recognized in administrative law that such doctrine does not preclude a
certain degree of admixture of the three powers of the government to administrative agency. The non-
delegation of powers is not absolute. Exceptions are circumstances which are brought by the complexities in our
government. Example is that there are matters which really requires specialized knowledge and expertise which
is possessed by administrative agencies.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2746. December 6, 1906. ]
MATEO CARIÑO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-Appellee.
Coudert Brothers, for Appellant.
Attorney-General Wilfley, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC LANDS; PRESCRIPTION; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — The statute of limitations did not run against
the Crown of Spain as to its public agricultural lands in these Islands. (Following Valenton Et. Al. v. Murciano,
and other cases.)
2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF GRANT. — There is in these Islands no conclusive presumption of a grant from the
Government founded merely upon long possession.
3. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT. — Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6, is not applicable to this case.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :

The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in fact, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a petition in the Court of
Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract of land in the municipality of Baguio, in the
province of Benguet, containing 146 hectares. The Government of the Philippine Islands, appeared in the Court
of Land Registration and opposed the petition. The Government of the United States that the land was part of the
military reservation of Baguio. Judgment was entered in the Court of Land Registration in favor of the petitioner,
from which judgment the respondents appealed in accordance with the law then in force to the Court of First
Instance of the province of Benguet. The case was therein tried de novo, and judgment was entered dismissing
the petition. The petitioner has brought the case here by bill of exceptions.

The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory information obtained in 1901.
By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this possessory information was obtained (art. 394), it
produced only those effects which the laws give to mere possession.

The petitioner not having shown any title from the Government, and the land being agricultural, the case is
governed by the decisions of this court in the cases of Valenton Et. Al. v. Murciano 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 434); Cansino Et.
Al. v. Valdez Et. Al. 2 (4 Off. Gaz., 488); and Tiglao v. The Insular Government 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 747). In these cases it
was held that the mere possession of land such as that in controversy in this case would give the possessor and
title thereto as against the Government; in other words, that the statute of limitations did not run against the
State in reference to its agricultural lands.

The petitioner, however, insists that although the statute of limitations as such did not run against the
Government of Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to be conclusively presumed from immemorial use
and occupation. To say that the presumption of a grant is presumption of law is, in our opinion, simply to say
that it amounts to a statute of limitations; and for a court to hold that the statute of limitations does not run
against the Government as to its public agricultural lands, and at the same time to hold that if a person has been
in possession of such lands for thirty years it is conclusively presumed that the Government has given him a
deed therefor, would be to make two rulings directly inconsistent with each other.

Considered as a presumption of fact, the contention could not be sustained in this particular case. Here the
surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant, It is known that for nearly three
hundred years all attempts to convert the Igorots of the Province of Benguet to the Christian religion completely
failed, and that during that time they remained practically in the same condition as they were when the Islands
were first occupied by the Spaniards. To presume as a matter of fact that during that time, and down to at least
1880, the provisions of the laws relating to the grant, adjustment, and sale of public were taken advantage of by
these deeds from the Government for these lands would be to presume something which did not exist. The
appellant says in his brief (p.10):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Igorot, no less than the American Indian, is an aborigine, and is equally ignorant of the forms of law and
procedure necessary to protect his interests."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is, moreover, in the case evidence that in 1894 the petitioner sought to obtain title from the Government
in accordance with the laws then in force. In 1901 he made a contract with Metalcalf A. Clarke, by the terms of
which he agreed to sell the land to Clarke for 6,000 pesos when he obtained title thereto from the Government,
and this contract he does not say that he is the owner, but simply that he is in possession thereof. The court
below found that the land is now worth upwards of P50,000.

The possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has
lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant
portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for
any purpose.

The petitioner relies upon the case of the United States v. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) and the case of The United
States v. Chaves (175 U.S., 509). In the case of Hays v. The United States (175 U.S. 248) the court said at page
261;

"But this presumption is subject to the limitation that where title is claimed from a deed which is shown to be
void, it will not be presumed that there was an independent grant (Smith v. Highbee, 12 Vermont,. 113), or
where surrounding circumstances are inconsistent with the theory of a grant. (Townsend v. Downer, 32
Vermont, 183).

"The substance of this doctrine is that lapse of time any be treated as helping out the presumption of a grant, but
where a void grant is shown, it affords no presumption that another valid grant was made. Nor does such
presumption arise if the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant. In this case
under consideration we can not find any evidence which justifies us in believing that a legal grant can have been
made, and under those circumstances we can not consider possession since the date of the treaty as dispensing
with the requirement that the title, if not perfect at that time, was one which the claimant would have a lawful
right to make perfect had the territory not been acquired by the United States."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of Chaves v. The United States (175 U.S., 552) the court made the following statement at page
562:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length of time to prove a valid
title. In United States v. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) the possession was under the claim of a grant made by the
governor of New Mexico to the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been seen and read by
witnesses, and its existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as we stated in the opinion (p. 460), to
warrant ’the finding of the court below that the complainant’s title was derived from the Republic of Mexico, and
was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the territory of New
Mexico, within which the land was situated. We do not question the correctness to the remarks made by Mr.
Justice Shiras in regard to evidence of possession and the presumptions which may under certain circumstances
drawn as to the existence of a grant.

"We do not deny the right of the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper case, in order to quiet a title
and to give to long continued possession the quality of a rightful possession under a legal right. We recognized
and enforced such a rule in the case of United States v. Chaves decided at this term. in which the question is
involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not a duration long enough to justify any such
inference.

"There is no proof of any valid grant, but on the contrary the evidence offered by the plaintiff himself and upon
which the bases the title that he asks the court to confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a body which had
no legal power to make it, and which, therefore, conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as
given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that possession of the lands was taken. We can
not presume (within the time involved in this case) that any other and valid grant was ever made. The
possession of the plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not
been long enough to presume a grant. (Crispin v. United States, 168 U.S., 208; Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S.,
637, 649, 653; Hays v. The United States, ante 248.) The possession subsequently existing, we can not notice.
Same authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

As we understand it, it is well settled in the United States that prescription does not run against the Government
as to its public lands — in other words, that if a person desires to obtain title to the public lands of the United
States situated within the boundaries of the States, he must do so in the way pointed out by the law. We do not
understand that a person in possession of unsurveyed public lands in the State of Minnesota, for example, whose
ancestors had occupied that the land for forty years, could maintain in court a claim that he was the legal owner
of the lands by reason of the presumption that the United States had granted the land to his ancestors, a
presumption founded not upon any proceedings taken in the General Land Office to acquire a patent thereto, but
upon the mere possession for that length of time.

The same is true of the public lands of Spain in the Philippine Islands. In the case of Valenton Et. Al. v. Marciano it
was said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner."cralaw
virtua1aw library

But in any event, and whatever the law may be elsewhere, it seems clear that this doctrine of presumptive grant
can not apply to the Philippines in view of the Spanish legislation for the Indies. From time to time there were
promulgated laws which required the person in possession of public lands to exhibit their titles or grants
thereto. If these titles or grants were found to be good, they were confirmed, but if they were not, or if the
persons had no grants or titles at all, they were evicted from the land. For example, in Law 14, title 12, 4,
Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, it is stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretrial courts designate, at such times as
shall to them most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and
estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose their title deeds
thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts or by virtue of just prescriptive
rights shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will.

In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, it was provided —

"that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of promulgation and publication of said
order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same shall be cultivated or tenanted, may, either in
person or through their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and
patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period within which
documents must be presented a term sufficient in length and proportionate to the distance the interested party
may have to travel for the purpose of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the
parties interested that in case of the failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just
and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to
others."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the regulations of June 25, 1880, it was provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose possession they are unlawfully
enjoining within the time of one year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to
fulfill their obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the treasury, the latter
will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the ownership of the Stated over the lands, and will, after
fixing the whole thereof, proceed to sell at public auction that part of the same which, either because it may have
been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone, is not deemed advisable to preserve as State
forest reservations." 1

In the royal decree of the 13th of February, 1894, published in the Official Gazzette of Manila of the 17th of April,
01894, it is provided in article 4 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 4. The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment (composicion) under the royal
decree of the 25th of June, 1880, but the adjustments of which decree in the Gaceta de Manila, will revert to the
State. Any claim to such lands by those who might have applied for the adjustment of the same, but who have not
done so as the above mentioned date, will not avail them in any way or at any time."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the public agricultural lands in
the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse of thirty or any other number of years that
the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof a legal title thereto.

The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, the Public Land Act, for the
reason that act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the Appellant.

After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered accordingly and ten days thereafter the case be
returned to the court below for execution. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Mapa, J., concurs in the result.

CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariň o went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the
owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented
possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is
part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo
averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case
Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a
character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used
for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against
Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for
a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

G.R. No. L-26100             February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G.

JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for petitioners.
Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral proceedings under
Republic Act 931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no
personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening
petition was filed outside the 40-year period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition
was not published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in question, have court standing
under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:

On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record
No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is
not disputed that the land here involved (described in Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public
lands by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.

On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case
No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon the grounds
that: (1) he and his predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and
cultivation of the land since Spanish times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots without personal notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were
not able to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.

On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J.
Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed
by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square
meters on July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.

On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.

On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right to intervene in the
case because of a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946,
Court of First Instance of Baguio] which declared that such tree farm leases were null and void.

On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory relief judgment
did not bind them, for they were not parties to that action.

On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-
examine the witnesses of respondent Lutes.

On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to his reopening
petition. On October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.

On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the reopening. A motion to
reconsider was rejected by the court on November 5, 1963.

On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This
motion was adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration. They maintained the position that the
declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed
on February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964, private petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds.

On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion
to dismiss made by private petitioners.

On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with preliminary injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the
petition to reopen and the latter's order of August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners' opposition. The
appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P500-bond.

Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that petitioners were not
bound by the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees,
private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider.
It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.

Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the petition before
us. On August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.
1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?

First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.

The title of the Act reads —

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN
CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

Section 1 thereof provides —

SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings,
who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had
been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such
parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of
the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years 2 after the date on which this Act shall
take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered
Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of
by the Government, and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify
the Government through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find that all
conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof
have been paid from the time when land tax should have been collected until the day when the motion is
presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such
parcels. 3

We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case where oppositors were
"foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that although Section 34, Land Registration
Act, 4 "apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for
registration, ... nevertheless ... the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right
independent of, and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government."5 The opposition, according to
the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public
domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the
Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it."

But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. The case at bar,
however, stands on a different footing. It involves a special statute R.A. 931, which allows a petition for
reopening on lands "about to be declared" or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial
proceedings. Such right, however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed
of by the Government." 6 The lessee's right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers
the present case clear from the impact of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a petition
to reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longer prosper.

This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening petition there filed
was opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land holding revocable permits issued by
the government. We struck down the petition in that Case because the public land, subject-matter of the
suit, had already been leased by the government to private persons.

Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but through the Director of
Lands. But we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that
only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly oppose the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do
so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes
to the fact of lease that may be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening
petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should happen. The point is that, with the fact of
lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees have
sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent when we take
stock of their averment that they have introduced improvements on the land affected. It would seem to us that
lessees insofar as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the purview of those who, according to the Rules of
Court, 8 may intervene in an action. For, they are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties." 9 In the event herein private petitioners are able to show that they are
legitimate lessees, then their lease will continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be proven that the land is
leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a petition for
reopening. 10

In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral court
should have ruled on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases — on the merits. Because there is need
for Lutes' right to reopen and petitioners' right to continue as lessees to be threshed out in that court.

We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the necessary personality to
intervene in and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.

2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have been published
in accordance with the Cadastral Act.

To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos,
supra, involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question. We there held, after a discussion of law
and jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening — a parcel of land claimed by
respondent Akia — was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands.
Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition,
therefore, need not be published." We find no reason to break away from such conclusion.

Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio
Townsite Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here involved was part of that case.
Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this point of fact.

We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below over petitions to
reopen, as in this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.

3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral
proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes?

The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision
was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961.

It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under
certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the
statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of
the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval
of this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.

It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No charge has been
made hero or in the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional injunction that the subject of
legislation must be expressed in the title thereof. Well-entrenched in constitutional law is the precept that
constitutional questions will not be entertained by courts unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued." 11 At any rate it cannot be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its
title.

This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.

Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray away from the true
path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The office of statutory interpretation,
let us not for a moment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he
true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it
may be enforced." 12 In varying language, "the, purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover
the true intention of the law." 13 They "are only valuable when they subserve this purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit
or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not "correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent. 17

It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the law 18 or
where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be
resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may properly
be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction.
For the reason that by specific constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such case, courts "are compelled by
the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at the legislative intention." 22

With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We take another look at
the title of R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC
LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords. 23 It
expresses in language clear the very substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress intended
to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.

To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid — from which surfaces
a seeming inconsistency between the title and the body — attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present
statute's predecessor. That prior law used the very same language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach
meaning to this circumstance. Had the legislature meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute
might have, it had a chance to do so in the reenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility
the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than
the act itself, and in many states is the subject of constitutional regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction
that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because
"the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill." 25 Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in
some sort a part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These considerations are all the more valid here
because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional debate in the House from which it originated as
House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28

The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court
proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." That title is written "in capital letters" — by Congress itself;
such kind of a title then "is not to be classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the
legislature speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A.
931 — "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" — was but inadvertently omitted from the body. Parting from
this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In line with views herein stated, the
title belongs to that type of titles which; should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressed in the
body. 30 At the very least, the words "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal
importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."

Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must give to the statute
does not need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of the principle long accepted
that remedial legislation should receive the blessings of liberal construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling
as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to
landowners who, before the Act, had no legal means of perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the
explanatory note thereof, which reads:

This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any interest in any parcel
of land which has been declared as public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said person or
claimant to present his claim within the time prescribed by law.
 There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not had the
opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the corresponding
cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and circumstances which are
beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said persons or claimants have no more legal remedy as the
effectivity of said Act expired in 1940.

This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or claimants with
meritorious claims or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and protection. This bill proposes to
give said persons or claimants their day in court. Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring
judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the
beneficent effects intended by legislation.

The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder
embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within
the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of
respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of
Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year
period.lawphi1.nêt

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's orders of August 5,
1963, November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is
hereby directed to admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part..

City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969

Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral
proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite
which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the
following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land
since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the
contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds:
1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was
not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931,
which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of
Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions
RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case
such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the
public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of
this act.”  If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would
allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case
which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text
may be supplied or remedied by its title.
[G.R. No. L-32941. July 31, 1973.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First
Instance of Baguio, Branch I, ALSON CARANTES, BILL CARANTES and EDUARDO CARANTES, Respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Rosalio
A. de Leon for Petitioner.
Jesus M. Ponce for Private Respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:

A perusal, even the most cursory, of this petition for review on certiorari, would make evident its being
impressed with merit Respondent Judge, under color of a statutory provision 1 and at the instance of private
respondents, did reopen Civil Registration Case No. 1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio establishing the
Baguio Townsite Reservation, promulgated as far back as November 13, 1922, thus enabling private
respondents to apply for the registration of an area of 74,017 square meters inside the Camp John Hay Leave
and Recreation Center. In the decision now sought to be set aside in this suit dated November 9, 1968, its
registration therefor was ordered in favor of the aforesaid private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines thus has a legitimate grievance. Republic v. Marcos, 2 a 1969 decision, speaks authoritatively. It does
provide a firm, not to say rocklike foundation. Respondent Judge was without power to reopen the aforesaid
Civil Reservation Case No. 1 which was not a cadastral proceeding. What is more, it is undeniable that the land in
question, being a part of a duly established military camp or reservation, cannot be thus ordered registered in
favor of private respondents. We have to grant the petition.

It would appear from the facts that on November 12, 1966, Respondents, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 3 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the reopening of said
proceeding to have them declared owners, and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a total area of
74,017 square meters therein described. Then on December 14, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order land
that have been the object of cadastral proceedings who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit
established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years
next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within . . ., to petition for a reopening of the
judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two Hundred and Fifty-Nine, as amended,
only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, . . ." (1958) requiring the publication
and posting of notices thereof. The Director of Lands duly opposed, as a report of an investigator of his office
was that the area sought to be registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. This notwithstanding, on
November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:"
[Wherefore], this Court hereby orders the registration of this parcel of land, situated in Res. Sec.’J’, Baguio City,
identified as Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 as shown on survey plan PSU 223402, and described in its Technical Descriptions
and Surveyor’s Certificate, with a combined total area of 74,017 square meters, more or less, in the names of the
petitioners, pro-indiviso, namely, [Alson Carantes], married to Monica Pedro, [Eduardo Carantes], married to
Jesusa Rosal, and [Bill Carantes], married to Budaet Onias, all of legal ages, Filipino citizens, with residence and
postal addresses at Loakan, Baguio City, Philippines." 4 The efforts exerted by the Director of Lands and the City
of Baguio to appeal said decision, seasonably made, did not prosper, respondent Judge being of the belief that
"the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay." Unfortunately, with the Solicitor-General not having been
informed of what did transpire, such denial went unchallenged. 5 It was not until August 22, 1969 that the
Solicitor-General entered his appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is
part of a duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge on December 8,
1969. It must be noted that the location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently,
the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the private
respondents had been in possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came within the protection of the
words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights." 6

What is immediately apparent is that even if the above decision were not flawed by a grave infirmity, it could not
survive after the decision of this Court in Republic v. Marcos, 7 as noted in the brief for private respondents, an
action against the very same judge whose actuation over a matter not dissimilar was challenged and —
challenged sucessfully. For the absence of jurisdiction under such statutory provision from which he would
derive his competence as well as the location of the disputed area inside a military reservation deprived the
decision now sought to be nullified of the slightest claim to validity. Nor could private respondents derive
comfort from the doctrine of estoppel which as they should be the first to realize cannot operate against the
state. Accordingly, as noted at the outset, we grant the petition.
1. The question of jurisdiction was squarely raised and passed upon in the aforesaid Republic v. Marcos. Thus:
"Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is quite explicit and categorical. Only persons
‘claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings’ are granted the right to
petition for a reopening thereof if the other conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of
doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds
no application. Considering that as far back as October 10, 1910, the then President of the United States, William
H. Taft, issued an executive order reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could not have been
the object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsite reservation, decided only on November 13,
1922." 8 It was then stated in the opinion: "The Cadastral Act was enacted on February 11, 1913, taking effect on
its passage. As is made clear in the first section thereof, when public interest requires that titles to any land be
settled and adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the Governor General, he could order the Director
of Lands or a private surveyor named by the landowners, with the approval of the Director of Lands, to make a
survey and plan of such lands. Clearly, it does not include the survey of lands declared as reservations." 9

Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs
the subject matter of reservations. As provided therein: ‘All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the
Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military
reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said
lands, buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become registered land
in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated.’ The
validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process
clause, in a 1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." 10 Finally an earlier case of decisive
significance was referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the
private respondents to seek a reopening under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision. We there explicitly held: ‘The defendant’s contention that the
respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legally established
military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627
of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings, or any interest
therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and
declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration
Act. . . ." ‘" 11

This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic, respondent Judge in that case was
devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No.
931." 12 So it is in the present case. The absence of jurisdiction is equally clear.

2. That Republic v. Marcos is likewise an insuperable bar to the reopening sought by private respondents is
made clear by the latter portion of the opinion. Thus: "This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is
made more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person to seek reopening under this statute.
For the power of the Court to order such reopening is limited ‘to such of said parcels of land as have not been
alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government. .
. .’ Included in the petition is an executive order of then President Herbert Hoover of June 19, 1929, declaring to
be a naval reservation of the Government of the United States ‘that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence
Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved for naval purposes . . .’ If there were still any lingering
doubt, that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential determination, then binding and
conclusive as we were under American sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval reservation." 13

3. The state of the law could thus be summarized: "The private respondents are thus bereft of any right which
they could assert under Republic Act No. 931. Such an enactment is the basis of whatever standing that would
justify their reliance on the specific power granted courts of first instance to reopen cadastral proceedings. Such
jurisdiction is thus limited and specific. Unless a party can make it manifest by express language or a clear
implication from the wording of the statute too strong to be resisted, he may not set in motion the judicial
machinery under such specific grant of authority. This, private respondents have failed to do as the statute in
terms that are crystal clear and free from ambiguity denies them such a right. Petitioners have made out their
case for certiorari and prohibition." 14

Private respondents, however, would not give up without an attempt to escape from the operation of a decision
that is controlling. Not that it did them any good. Their counsel, with a show of diligence, would cite authorities
on estoppel. He ought to have known better. He should have realized that resort to them would be without avail.
For, as Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for this Court, in Luciano v. Estrella, 15 categorically declared, "it is a well
known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents." 1 6 In an earlier case, Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc., 17 there was an enunciation of such a principle in this wise: "Thus did the lower court, as pointed out
by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at
by the national treasurer and the auditor general. It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law.
Estoppel does not lie. Such a principle dates back to Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands, a 1919 decision."
18

Nor is this all. An indication that one’s appreciation of controlling doctrine leaves something to be desired is bad
enough. What is worse is the impression yielded of a failure to discern the thought that lies behind the 1969
decision of Republic v. Marcos. 19 It is this: the state as a persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as
well as the present charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. 20 There is need
therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded
recognition, especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such
primordial consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescence of public officials, is the
controlling norm. Nor is there anything unjust in such an approach as the alleged deprivation of a private right
without justification by the government is not remediless, where there is persuasive proof that such is the case.
The point of this decision as well as the earlier Republic v. Marcos is that the procedure followed by private
respondents is not the road to such an objective even on the assumption, purely hypothetical, that there is basis
in law for what is hoped for and aimed at.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the decision of respondent Judge,
dated November 9, 1968, which is declared to be without any force or effect as having been issued without
jurisdiction. Costs against private respondents.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., did not take part.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PIO R. MARCOS

FACTS:
On November 12, 1966, respondents, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil Reservation Case No. 1 of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared
owners, and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a total area of 74,017 square meters. Then on
December 14, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices thereof.
The Director of Lands duly opposed, as a report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be
registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. This notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent
Judge rendered his decision ordering the registration of this parcel of land in the names of the petitioners, pro
-indiviso, namely, [Alson Carantes], married to Monica Pedro, [Eduardo Carantes], married to Jesusa Rosal, and
[Bill Carantes], married to Budaet Onias, all of legal ages, Filipino citizens, with residence and postal
addresses at Loakan, Baguio City, Philippines. The efforts exerted by the Director of Lands and the City of Baguio
to appeal said decision, seasonably made, did not prosper, respondent Judge being of the belief that "the proper
party to appeal should be Camp John Hay." Unfortunately, with the Solicitor-General not having been informed
of what did transpire, such denial went unchallenged. It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General
entered his appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a duly
established military reservation. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. The
location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing
to set aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in possession "since
the Spanish regime," and thus came within the protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp
John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Marcos lack jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is quite explicit and categorical. Only
persons "claiming to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings' are granted the right to
petition for a re-opening thereof if the other conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of
doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of cadastral proceedings, then this statute
finds no application. Considering that as far back as October 10, 1910, the then President of the United
States, William H. Taft, issued an executive order reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they
could not have been the object of the cadastral proceedings involving the Baguio townsite reservation,
decided only on November 13, 1922." It was then stated in the opinion: "The Cadastral Act was enacted on
February 11, 1913, taking effect on its passage. As is made clear in the first section thereof, when public
interest requires that titles to any land be settled and adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the
Governor General, he could order the Director of Lands,to make a survey and plan of such lands. Clearly, it does
not include the survey of lands declared as reservations."An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, specifically
governs the subject matter of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interests therein,
within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to
be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, and
such of said lands, buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become
registered land in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances
hereinafter stated.In Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision, the court rules that:
"The defendant's contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the
registration portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of
military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides
that "All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of
the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under
the operations of the Land Registration Act.This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner
Republic, respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private
respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931." So it is in the present case. The absence of
jurisdiction is equally clear.That Republic v. Marcos is likewise an insuperable bar to the re-opening sought by
private respondents is made clear by the latter portion of the opinion. Thus: "This lack of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent Judge is made more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person to seek re-
opening under this statute. For the power of the Court to order such re-opening is limited 'to such of said parcels
of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently
disposed of by the Government. ... .' Included in the petition is an executive order of then President Herbert
Hoover of June 19, 1929 declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government of the United States 'that tract of
land known as lot no. 141, residence Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved for naval
purposes... .' If there were still any lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a
presidential determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under American sovereignty, that
the lot in question should be a naval reservation

G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ
T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN
PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI
TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE
CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN,
LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,
RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO,
WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY,
ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM
MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID,
MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN,
DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID,
MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by
her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION,
INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA,
Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112
groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that
the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage
like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for
the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-
in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and
pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of
land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of
the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and
desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of
R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.