SET 3 NUMBERS 1-3

Esguerra vs. Gonzales-Asdala,

GR. No. 168906, December 4, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Esguerra filed an Amended Complaintfor Damages with Prayer for Preliminary

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against JWT and AGL because of the
airing of the advertisement of Ovaltine where she was part of the cast.

She then filed a complaint in the RTC where the respondent is the presiding judge.
Esguerra claimed to have made several inquiries on the status of her application for
preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with the RTC Branch
Clerk of Court.  She was assured that her application would be set for hearing.  After
almost three weeks of waiting without her application for injunctive relief being set for
hearing, Esguerra filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibition of RTC Judge Asdala, asserting
therein that "by failing to act swiftly on her application for TRO as mandated under the
law, RTC Judge Asdala has already displayed partiality and bias against her and in
favor of the private respondents, whether or not for 'valuable' consideration." Esguerra
wants the Court not only to reverse and set aside the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, but also to hold Judge Asdala answerable for damages in the
amount of P2.2 million, plus costs of suit and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge is liable of damages?

RULING:
No. The Court explained that it is settled doctrine that judges are not liable to respond
in a civil action for damages, and are not otherwise administratively responsible for what
they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal
powers and jurisdiction.  Certain it is that a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders.  To hold otherwise would
be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

It is indubitable that Judge Asdala's Order dated 28 August 2003 denying Esguerra's
application for a preliminary injunction/TRO was rendered in the exercise of her official
function as the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 87 which had jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. Q-03-50206 and all its incidents, including the said application

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is denied for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 March 2005 and its Resolution dated 12 July
2005 CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 are Affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Dyogi v Yatco. Decision

G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957
Bengzon, J.

FACTS:

This is a petition to compel the respondent judge to hear Civil Case No, 2239 of his
Quezon City court independently of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4367 of the
Rizal court of first instance. Plaintiffs prayed in a written motion that the case be heard
"without, awaiting 'the criminal, action". Acting on such petition, the respondent judge
issued his order denying the petition of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in his decision of denying the petition due to a
pending criminal case?

RULING:

Yes. The trial, court followed the Rule that after a criminal action has been commenced
a civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered, (107 Rules of Court sec. 1 par. c). This
Rule however, has been partially amended by article 33 of the New Civil Code providing
that a civil action for damages brought by the injured party in cases of defamation, fraud
and physical injuries shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

In the Carandang case, supra, the trial judge refused, to hear the civil suit for damages
for physical injuries before the termination of the criminal, proceeding arising from the
same wrong. Upon petition of the interested partly we directed said judge to proceed
with such civil case[3]. There is no reason to adjudge differently now. The order of
August 22 is Leoncio Dyogi, et al. v. Nicasio Yatco, et al., revoked, and the writ of
mandamus will be issued as prayed for. So ordered.

.
MARCIA vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Relova, J.:

FACTS

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile
petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for
damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.

While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal
Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged.
However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision
promulgated and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this
case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as
appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."

As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of

the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking
the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section I (d),
Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section 3 (c), Rule I I I of the New Rules of Court), 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof,
should apply in the case at bar?

RULING:

No. Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action
without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only
preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as
required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that
the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil
action if it is based on the crime.

The Court held that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not
necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the
evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for
which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the
exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.