Contents

1. DEFENDANT IS GUILTY UDER S. 364A UNDER IPC......................................................1

1.1 Defendant Abducted the Victim............................................................................................1

1.2 Defendant kept victim under detention..................................................................................2

1.3 Defendant threatened to hurt the victim................................................................................2

1.4 Defendant asked for Ransom from the family of the Victim................................................2

2. DEFENDANT IS GUILTY UNDER S. 388 OF IPC..................................................................3

3. DEFENDANT’S WIFE AND SON ARE GUILTY UNDER S.364A AND S. 388 BY
VIRTUE OF S. 34 OF IPC..............................................................................................................3
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. DEFENDANT IS GUILTY UDER S. 364A UNDER IPC

It is submitted before this Learned Court that before S. 364A is pressed in service, it is necessary
for the prosecution to prove that:
I. Accused Kidnapped, abducted or detained a person;
II. He kept such a person under custody or detention;
III. (a) Threatening to cause to death or hurt to that person, or
(b) Give rise to a reasonable apprehension that such a person may be put to death or hurt
or causes hurt to such person; and
IV. The kidnapping, abduction or detention has been for ransom.1
1.1 Defendant Abducted the Victim

It is submitted that if a person compels another person to go from one place, or induces some
person to go from one place, then the offence of abduction is committed. 2 Hence, Abduction is
an offence in which a person is moved from one place, against his/her will by forceful
compulsion or by use of deceitful means. Victim was moved from one place, against her will by
the use of deceitful means in our present case.3
For abduction to be completed, it is essential that the person is compelled to go from one place to
some other place.4 In the present case, the victim was moved to an old factory from the house of
defendant after consuming sweet Pan.5
Further, mere Abduction is not an offense at all. 6 The guilty and wrongful intention must be
present for the offence to be punishable. There was guilty and wrongful intention on the part of
defendant as he demanded ransom amounting to rupees 5 Lakhs.7

1
Malleshi v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 8 SCC 95; Vinod v. State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 1142.
2
S. 362, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
3
Moot Proposition.
4
Vishwanath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 67.
5
Moot Proposition.
6
Vishwanath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 67.
7
Moot Proposition.
 1.2 Defendant kept victim under detention

It is submitted that the victim was kept under detention by the defendant. The act of police
rescuing the victim from the captivity of the defendant shows that she was kept under the
detention.8
1.3 Defendant threatened to hurt the victim

It is submitted that the essence of this section is that there is reasonable apprehension that the
kidnapped person may be subject to death or hurt if the ransom money demanded is not paid. 9
The defendant demanded Rupees 5 lakhs for the life of the victim by calling Mr. Rizhvi in the
evening.10 He even sent a video through Mr. Jamil in which he threatened that the victim would
be raped by the defendant son, in case his demand was not fulfilled. Therefore, it is established
that there was reasonable apprehension that the kidnapped person might be subject to death or
hurt if the ransom money demanded had not been paid.
1.4 Defendant asked for Ransom from the family of the Victim

It is submitted that ‘Ransom’ is a sum of money demanded to be paid for releasing a captive,
prisoner or detenu.11 In the present case, the defendant demanded the ransom amounting to
Rupees 5 lakhs from the family of the victim in exchange for her release.12
It is submitted that it is not a straight jacket rule that the demand for abduction must always be
made to the person who is required to ultimately pay it. 13 Hence, the act of handing over the
video to Mr. Jamil14 (who further hand it over to the victim’s family) does not absolve the
defendant from liability under S. 364A of the IPC.
Therefore, the defendant is guilty under S. 364A of the IPC.

2. DEFENDANT IS GUILTY UNDER S. 388 OF IPC

Following are the necessary ingredients to constitute an Offense under S. 388 of IPC:

8
Moot Proposition.
9
Shyam Babu v. State of Haryana, AIR 2009 SC 577.
10
Ibid.
11
Sooman Sood @ Kamal Jeet Kaur v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2007 SC 2774.
12
Moot Proposition.
13
Malleshi v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 8 SCC 95; Netra Pal v. State, (2001) Cr LJ 1669 (Del).
14
Moot Proposition.
 1. The extortioner puts the complainant in the fear of accusation of an offense punishable
with death or imprisonment of life;
2. Such accusation was intentional;
3. The Extortioner induced the person threatened, to deliver some property or valuable
security;
4. The extortioner acted dishonestly in doing so in an aggravated form;
5. That an unnatural offense was committed by him.15
It is submitted that the defendant put fear in the mind of the victim’s family to commit an offence
of rape,16 an offence which is punishable with death or imprisonment of life.17 By proving that
the defendant is guilty under S. 364A of IPC it has been established that he acted dishonestly.
Hence, all the conditions under S. 388 are fulfilled.
Therefore, the defendant is guilty under S. 388 of the IPC.

3. DEFENDANT’S WIFE AND SON ARE GUILTY UNDER S.364A AND S. 388 BY
VIRTUE OF S. 34 OF IPC.

It is submitted before this Learned Court that if an act is done by several persons in furtherance
of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if
it were done by him alone.18 It means that if some act is done by the accused person in
furtherance of common intention of his co-accused, his equally liable like his co-accused. 19 It is
submitted that the wife and son of the Defendant are equally liable because the said act was done
in furtherance of common intention.
Further, Common intention means a pre-oriented plan and acting in pursuance to the plan, thus
common intention must exist prior to the commission of the act in a point of time. 20 Defendant
asked the victim to join for dinner 15 days earlier; 21 it shows that it was a pre-oriented plan. Also,
both defendant along with his wife together welcomed victim to their house and it was after the
consumption of sweet paan the victim found herself in an old factory. If the defendant’s wife had

15
S. 388, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
16
Moot Proposition.
17
S. 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
18
S. 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
19
State of Punjab v. Fauja Singh, (1997) 3 Crimes 170 (P&H).
20
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2012 SC 3539.
21
Moot Proposition.
been innocent she would have tried to stop the defendant from doing that act as any ordinary
prudent person might have done.
That in order to bring a case under S. 34 of IPC it is not necessary that there must be a prior
conspiracy or pre-mediation, the common intention can be formed in the course of occurrence. 22
Common intention requires a pre-arranged plan but it can be developed at the spur of the
moment.23 Even if the defendant’s wife was not a part of a prior conspiracy, she pursued the
common intention in the course of occurrence of offense.
That if common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused,
Section 34 will still be attracted as it involves vicarious liability. 24 By agreeing to carry out the
heinous crime of rape by the defendant’s son,25 it is clear that he had a common intention and
thus was the co-conspirator.
Also, In order to convict person vicariously liable under S. 34 of IPC, it is not necessary to prove
that each and every one of them had indulged in an overt act. 26 It means if common intention is
proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will still be attracted as
it involves vicarious liability.27 Hence, even if the defendant’s son did not participated in any
type of the overt act, he is still vicariously liable by the virtue of S. 34.
Mere distancing from the scene does not absolve accuse from common intention under S. 34 of
IPC.28 Even if the defendant’s wife or son were not found by the police 29 while rescuing the
victim, it does not absolve their liability under S. 34 of IPC.
Therefore, defendant’s wife and son are guilty under S.364A and S.388 by virtue of S. 34 of IPC.

22
Hari Om v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1993) 1 Crimes 294 (SC).
23
Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1999 (8) SCC 555.
24
Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1083; Sankharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (9) JT
116.
25
Moot Proposition.
26
Ram Bilas Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1593.
27
Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1083; Sankharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (9) JT
116.
28
Lallan Bhai v. State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 333.
29
Moot Proposition.