CASE no, 1. Secretary of DENR vs. Mayor Yap G.R. No.

167707, October 8, 2008

FACTS:

 On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
 Respondents-claimants then filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo alleging that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 among others, raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial.
 Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.
Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
 The Republic, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available
for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as
amended. As such, since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
 The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants stating that Proclamation No. 1801 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay.
 The OSG moved for consideration but was subsequently denied. Thereafter, appealed to CA. However, CA only
affirmed the lower court’s decision holding that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: The main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in
G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right,
if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended.

HELD: NO!

 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
 All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.

 Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic
Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which now provides for possession and occupation of the land
applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
 Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable. Thus, It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.
926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
 Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island
has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
 Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither
do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law.

There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
 (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

 Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act
No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable
and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the
wording of the law itself. Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter
how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.

CASE no. 2: Cruz vs. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS:

 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa in their capacity as citizens and taxpayers assailed the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8371 which is also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) on the ground that it amounts
to the unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural resources
therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to
their ancestral domains and ancestral lands based on their native title. After the deep-seated deliberation, the members
of the court voted as follows: Seven Justices have voted to dismiss the petition while the other 7 Justices ruled in favor
of the petition. They failed to come up with the necessary majority instead the votes were equally divided. Both parties
initiated a redeliberation but nothing happened since the voting remained the same. As a result, in virtue of Section 7,
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, the petitioned was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the Regalian Doctrine negates native title

Held: NO!

 The Regalian Doctrine does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. The
Congress in its wisdom did not intend to have clashing of laws. In this case, it also resolved the question on whether the
existence of native title to land.is considered as an exception to the theory of Regalian. It has been clearly elucidated
by the Supreme Court that the Doctrine of native title is not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine.
 The Regalian Doctrine and the Doctrine of the Native Title can exist side by side. The possession per se since time
immemorial has ripened to ownership. By having this IPRA, it serves as a way that removed the barriers when it comes
to the idea of reconciling the Regalian Doctrine and Doctrine of Native Title such as for this instance wherein it is
impossible to own land in Baguio or in the whole Cordillera Administrative Region under PD 1529 since lands which
are beyond 18 % slope cannot be titled but this problem was cured. On the other hand, the NCIP does not give title but
it merely facilitates the recognition of ancestral lands. It is a recognition of something that is already present. Moreover,
registration may spawn if ownership of land is not acquired or proven by the seven modes of acquiring ownership.

CASE no. 3: Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009 & G.R. No. 179987,
September 3, 2013
Facts:

 On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite, covering a
parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 sq. meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather.
 Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.
After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including
Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under project no. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.”
  On December 3, 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.

Issues:

 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the
filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June12, 1945 or earlier?
 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, may a parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
 3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below
that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
 4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree or both?

Ruling:

 The Petition is denied. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
 (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree. In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
CASE no. 4: Grey Alba vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 5246, September 16, 1910
FACTS:

 The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners,
as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was
accompanied by a plan and technical description of the said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a
decree directing that described in the petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.
 On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a revision
of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in
said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree of
Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For
him, The petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so
as to be given notice of registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la
Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April 6,
1895.)
 He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land
described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence
presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from
the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.
 From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed.
 The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition,
as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud
within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the
estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.

ISSUE:

1. Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the
same year?

2. Whether or not,the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.

HELD: The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners
in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908.
1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of
any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud.

2. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized
in his behalf. It is to contain, among other things, the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if
known.

The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and this contract was duly executed in
writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the
petitioners’ land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts)

The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents and while he petitioners were
minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the
time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they
omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not
necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants.

Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail.
However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by
means of the publication “to all whom it may concern.” Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the [given] exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
“to all whom it may concern.”

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land
Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

NOTES:

The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.

The element of intention to deprive another of just rights constitutes the essential characteristics of actual – as distinguished from
legal-fraud

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a
tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name
to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

action in rem vs. action in personam:

If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory
at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the
object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established,
and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

5. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree.
Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved;
that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud

6. Advantages of the Torrens System:

1. It has substituted security for insecurity. law library

2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from months to days. law library

3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. law library
4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the “three R’s” can transact his own conveyancing. law library

5. It affords protection against fraud.

6. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or
technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)