LTD CASES

CRUZ v SEC OF ENVI AND NATRES (INDIGENOUS PEOPLE)

FACTS:
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers assailing the constitutionality of certain provision of RA 8371
(Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) and its implementing Rules and
Regulations.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors filed their motions for leave to
intervene, they joined in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition. CHR also asserts that IPEA is an expression of the
principles of parens patriae and that the state has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous
people.

Petitioners assails the constitutionality of the provisions of the IPRA and its
implementing rules on the ground that THEY AMOUNT TO AN UNLAWFUL
DEPRIVATION OF THE STATEʼS OWNERSHIP OVER LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN AS WELL AS MINERALS AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES therein,
in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in SEC 2 ART XII of the
Constitution.

They also contend that by providing for an all encompassing definition of

“ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands
found w/in said areas, assailed provisions violate the rights of private land owners.

ISSUE:
Whether provisions of RA 8371 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
7 voted to DISMISS the petition.
● J. KAPUNAN - filed an opinion w/c the CJ and K Bellosillo, Quisumbing and
Santiago join, sustaining the VALIDITY of the challenged provision of RA 8371.
● J. PUNO - filed separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of SEC 1 PART II, RILE III of NCIP A.O 1 series of 1998
● J. Mendoza - voted to dismiss solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy

7 voted to GRANT the petition.

 ● J. PANGANIBAN - filed a separate opinion that related provisions of RA 8371
are unconstitutional.
● J. VITUG - same, unconstitutional daw
● J. Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga and De Leon join J. Panganiban and Vitug.

As votes were EQUALLY divided (7 : 7) the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was re deliberated upon, however, decision/votes remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, SEC 7 of the Rules of CivPro, the petition is
dismissed but the IPRA is held Constitutional.

Why? Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/
IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same. 

_______

SEC OF DENR v. YAP (BORACAY ISSUE)

** It defines RD as the one that dictates all lands of the public domain belongs to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
and charged with the CONSERVATION of such patrimony.

FACTS:
** In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants
in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to
secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to
their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as
amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

November 10, 1978, former Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay
Island, among other islands, caves, and administration of the PH tourist zones and
marine reserves. Pres. Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circ 3-82 to
implement Proc. No. 1801.

Pursuant to the said Proclamation, respondent-claimants Boracay Mayor Jose Yap

filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes for the land they have been occupying in
Boracay. Respondents alleged that said Proclamation raised doubts on their right
to secure titles over their occupied lands. They further alleged that they, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time of immemorial.

The Republic, through the OSG opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain.  It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of  the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
 Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, RTC rendered a decision in favour of the respondent-claimants.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA but was also denied. Hence, OSG sought reconsideration for
certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over occupied portions in
Boracay.

RULING:
The Court denied the petition. The ruling of CA is hereby reversed.

PD No 705 issued by then Press Marcos categorised all unclassified lands of the
public domain as PUBLIC FOREST. SEC 3(a) of PD 705 defines public forest as “a
mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not.”
Applying said PD, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are
ipso facto considered public forests.  PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. At the case at
bar, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions.  Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.  In

keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government. In the case at bar, no such
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court.  The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants
were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.

———

JUNIO v. DELOS SANTOS

FACTS:
Petitioner, Wenceslao Junio, is the registered owner of a park of land situated at
Bayambang, Pangasinan, with an area of about 7.65 hectares (more or less)
covered with a TCT of Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.

Respondent Delos Santos, executed an affidavit of adverse claim, claiming 1/3

undivided portion of Junioʼs property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
allegedly executed by Junio.

However, Junio denies having sold any portion of his property and filed a petition
for the cancellation of said adverse claim. Junio disputes the respondents claims
by alleging that under SEC 110 of Land Registry Act such inscription may be
resorted only when there is no other means or registering an interest, and SEC 57
of the same statute provides for the registration of a documented sale involving
alleged property.

Respondent countered that he had tried to avail himself of SEC 57 by requesting

Junio the duplicate of certificate title but the latter refused to. Thus, he was
compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant to SEC 110 of the LRA.

RULING:
The Court ruled that Respondent Delos Santos correctly resorted to the
annotation of an adverse claim considering Junioʼs refusal to surrender duplicate
of the title. Further, the court held that the genuineness and due execution of the
sale between the parties is in controversy.

The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court corresponding to
the former CFI of Pangasinan for hearing and for passing upon the controversy on
the merits between petitioner, as the registered owner, and private respondent,
who had filed the adverse claim, impleading for that purpose the alleged co-
vendees, Guillermo de la Cruz and Jose Junio. So ordered.