LTD

Case Digests
2015-2016
FEU JD Block JD4202
1 Cruz vs Sec of the DENR 347 SCRA 128 12/6/2000 Aguilar,
Charles Tito R.
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
Regalian Doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
RULING:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC)/Indigenous Peoples
(IP) ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the
IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them,
as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

2 Sec of DENR vs Yap 568 SCRA 164 10/8/2008 Aguilar, Charles

Tito R.
FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay
for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as
a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section
3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

RULING:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

3 Republic vs Lao 405 SCRA 291 Aguilar, Charles Tito R.

FACTS:
Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She
allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria
Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from
her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed
that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based
on her and her predecessor-in-interests’ open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious
and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty
(30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the
technical description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors’ names. The
court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the
decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review
before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the
issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts
of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent sufficiently complied with the required period and acts of possession?
Whether the respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was alienable
and disposable land of the public domain?
RULING:

The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register one’s title over
a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse
possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land subject of the application is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent
did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and
time required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest
started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous
owners was shown and she did not show any relationship between the parties where she
obtained her deed of sale. She further did not present any certification from appropriate
government agency to show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land
of the public domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these
incontrovertible evidences to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these
evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application was
denied.

4 La Bugal B'laan vs Ramos 127882 12/2/2006 Albay, Miami

Frianz F.
Facts:
Jul. 25, 1987: Pres. Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations for contracts involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals. The
President may execute with the foreign proponent, upon recommendation of the Secretary.
Mar. 3, 1995: Pres. Ramos approved RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act 1995) to govern the
exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mining resources. It took effect on
Apr. 9, 1995.
Mar. 30, 1995: Pres. Ramos entered into a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in S. Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and N. Cotabato.
WMCP sold all its shares to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under
Philippine Laws with at least 60% of its equity owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino owned
corporations.
By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR Secretary approved the transfer and registration
of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius.
Petitioners allege that RA 7942 allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop,
utilize and exploit mineral resources contrary to Sec. 2, Par. 4, Art. 12.
 It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or technical
assistance. It permits foreign owned companies to OPERATE AND MANAGE mining activities.
It allows foreign-owned companies to extend BOTH financial AND technical assistance
instead of financial OR technical assistance.
Issue:

W/N RA 7942, the Philippine Mining Act is constitutional.

Held:
NO. It is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs
the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it
actually treats these agreements as service contracts.

It follows that the WMCP FTAA entered into under such Act is also unconstitutional.

All provisions of the DENR AO 96-40 not in conformity with the Decision are also invalidated.
Following the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-owned
corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals
and mineral oils should be limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only. Contrary to this,
the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully-foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than
mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate
every aspect of the mining activity.
In Section 33, Chapter VI the underlying assumption is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
Chapter XII grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that it
grants contractors in mineral agreements.
An FTAA contractor “has or has access to all the financing, managing, and technical
expertise…”, suggesting that some management assistance is prescribed.
Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP “the exclusive right to explore, exploit,
utilize, process and dispose of all Minerals products and by-products thereof that may be
produced from the Contract Area.”
Under Section 1.2, WMCP shall provide all “financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations”.
All in all, WMCP is granted beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly
belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of the citizens.
Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. The phrase “management or other forms of
assistance” in the 1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only
“technical or financial assistance”. The omission was intentional and purposeful.

The phrase “service contracts” has likewise been deleted in the 1987 Constitution. This
omission is indicative of a difference in purpose. The concept of “technical or financial
assistance” agreements is not identical to that of “service contracts”. The drafters, as evidenced
from their deliberations, intended to do away with service contracts which were used to
circumvent the capitalization (60%-40%) requirement. It was intended to be a safeguard to
prevent abuses. Service contracts are not allowed.
The CONCOM took into consideration the “Draft of the 1986 UP Law Constitutional
Project” when it adopted the concept of “agreements…involving either technical or financial
assistance”.
The UP Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as
grants of beneficial ownership of the country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations.
While in theory, the State owns these natural resources – and Filipino citizens, their
beneficiaries – service contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for,
develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of
nationalization of natural resources, with the Regalian doctrine, and with Philippine sovereignty.
But the proponents still recognized the need for capital and technical know-how in the
large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources. Thus, they proposed a
compromise: “agreements…involving either technical or financial assistance”. This compromise
is deemed to be more consistent with the State’s ownership of and its “full control and
supervision” over such resources.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-
owned corporations is an exception to the general rule that participation in the nation’s natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Such provision must be construed strictly against
non-Filipinos.

5 Sotto vs Sotto 43 Phil. 688 9/1/2022 Albay, Miami Frianz

F.
Facts:
The petitioner alleges that he is the owner of said lot No. 7510; that in or about the year 1907 he
absented himself from the city of Cebu, leaving the respondent in charge of the lot; that on or
about the 16th of April, 1921, upon visiting the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu he discovered that the respondent had fraudulently obtained the registration of said lot in
his own name and that a certificate of title for said lot had been issued to said respondent. Due
to his long absence from Cebu, he was unable to appear in court in the land registration
proceedings and to defend his rights; and that this action is his only remedy to recover the
property in question.

Issue:
Whether the final decree of confirmation and registration be reopened and the term “judgment”
is within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held:
Yes, the final decree of confirmation and registration can be reopened. The final "decree of
confirmation and registration" cannot be reopened except for the reasons and in the manner
stated in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The final "decree of confirmation and
registration" provided for in the Land Registration Act is not a judgment within the meaning of
section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that section is not applicable to decisions
covered or confirmed by such final decrees. The remedy provided for in section 513 of the Code
of Civil Procedure may, in land registration matters, be applied to judgments not confirmed by
final decrees.

6 Legarda vs Saleeby 31 Phil. 590 10/2/1985 Albay, Miami

Frianz F.
Facts:
Legarda obtained a decree of registration of a parcel of land on the 25th of October,
1906. Saleeby, on the 25th of March, 1912, obtained a certificate of registration for his land
which joined the land theretofore registered by Legarda. The certificate of title issued to Saleeby
included a narrow strip of the land theretofore registered in the name of Legarda. On the 13th of
December, 1912, Legarda presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
adjustment and correction of the error committed in the certificate issued to Saleeby, which
included said narrow strip of land.
Issue:

Whether the petitioner has a better title over the wall and the land occupied by it.

Held:
Yes, the petitioner has a better title over the property. In a case where two certificates of
title include or cover the same land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original
parties, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in part comprised in
the earlier certificate. In successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to
the land as against the person who obtained the second certificate. The decree of registration is
conclusive upon and against all persons.
The real purpose of the torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted, at the
time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su
casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The proceeding for the registration of land under
the torrens system is a judicial proceeding, but it involves more in its consequences than does
an ordinary action.
The registration under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of title do not
give the owner any better title than he had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the certificate.
He secures his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. If he obtains a
certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he really and in fact owns, the certificate should
be corrected. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not secure his certificate. Having
a fee simple title, and presenting sufficient proof of that fact, he is entitled to a certificate of
registration. The certificate of registration simply accumulates, in one document, a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee simple title, which the owner, in fact, has. The
certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which the owner has. The certificate should
not be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except to correct errors, in some
direct proceedings permitted by law. The title represented by the certificate can not be changed,
altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.

7 Capitol Subdivision vs Province of Negros Occidental 7 SCRA 60

1963 Añonuevo, Jon-jon
FACTS:
Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan,
registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916. Sometime in
1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price
of P300,000, payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name
of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of
Title under his name.
Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot
378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co.
In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos
Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that
the title will remain with the Bank until full payment.The Bank executed the corresponding deed
of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued. It
should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did
not take possession of the property for Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an
alleged right of lease.
When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take
possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the
Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations
with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the
status of said occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it
brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year
1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began
the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason
beyond their comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its
name only for assessment purposes.
And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital
was situated there and that he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only until
1950.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned
expropriation proceedings.

HELD/RATIO:
The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired
the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been
consummated.
First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its
filing and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a
deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the
property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been
expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party
in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of
the Back, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the
mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the Bank’s knowledge and
participation.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda
Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been
expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary
implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.

8 Director of Lands vs Santiago 160 SCRA 186 4/15/1988

Añonuevo, Jon-jon
FACTS:

On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in
the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of
Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the
same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear
on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORP., with the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party
Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area
stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago.
A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with
the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in default. The same notice was
likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law.On Jan.
23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order
of general default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of
the evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the
questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent corporation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his
counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was contrary to
facts and to law. The motion was however denied.

ISSUE/S
WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in
favor of respondent corporation,
2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

HELD/RATIO:
The petition is Granted. The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the
respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through
its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years.
The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and answers within
the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be recorded …,” cannot be interpreted to mean that the
court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an
interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust.
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to
be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the
applicant’s evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor’s evidence. The
oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample
opportunity to establish the government’s claim. In view of the basic presumption that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate.
Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:…
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

9 Barroga vs Albano 157 SCRA 131 1/20/1986 Añonuevo, Jon-

jon
FACTS:
CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in favour of Delfina Aquino. One of the
oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the
decree of registration did not issue except until after lapse of 14 years or so (October 14, 1955).
It was only after 24 years (November 17, 1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquino’s name.
1970 after the decree of registration had been handed down but before the title issued in
Delfina Aquino’s favour, the children and heirs of Ruperto Pascual, appellants Eufemia Barroga
and Saturnina Padaca, brought suit against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino, appellees
Angel Albano et al.
Barroga had been in possession of the land since 1941 and real owners thereof prayed that
Aquino’s title be cancelled and new title be made out in their names. Aquino’s title encroached
upon a 4sqm portion of an adjoining lot belonging to Cesar Castro who filed a complaint in
intervention.
CFI dismissed Barroga’s and Padaca’s complaint and declared the intervenor Castro the
owner of 4sqm portion overlapped by Aquino.their action was barred by prior judgement. Res
adjudicata, the judgement of the cadastral court was one against a specific thing and therefore
conclusive upon the title of the thing. As possessor of the lot in question, they could not be
ejected therefrom by mere writ of possession.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not they can be ejected.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The Writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period
of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same
does not prescribe. The appellees must be declared to be entitled to the writ over the subject
lot, despite the lapse of many years, their rights thereto being imprescriptible, in enforcement of
the decree of registration and vindication of the title issued in favour of the predecessor-in-
interest. The writ may be correctly enforced against the appellants. The appellants, it must be
said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should not be allowed to
continue doing so.

10 Republic vs Malabanan 587 SCRA 172 4/29/2009 Batulan,

Kervin
Facts:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for registration of his land situated in Silang,
Cavite, with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, on February 20, 1998, which he purchased from
Eduardo Velasco. He assailed that his predecessors-in-interests were in an open, notorious,
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Malabanan
alleged that the subject property is an alienable and disposable patrimonial property of the
State, as evidenced by the certificate issued by CENRO-DENR, hence the Regional Trial Court
granted the petition. The OSG appealed with the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the
petition filed by Malabanan because the petitioner failed to prove that the subject land is a
patrimonial property of the State. During the pendency of the case with the CA, Malabanan died
hence his interest is represented by his heirs.

Issue:
 In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant
for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?

Ruling:
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.
The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

11 Averia vs Caguioa 146 SCRA 459 Batulan, Kervin

Facts:
The petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below,
claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the
said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." It is
argued that the lower court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the
absence of unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act.

Issue:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale
Ruling:
With reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529),
the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief
only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any
"adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to
hear and decide not only such noncontroversial cases but even the contentious and substantial
issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
12 Arceo vs CA 185 SCRA 489 5/8/1990 Batulan, Kervin
Facts:
Spouses Arceos owned unregistered parcels of land, they had a son named Esteban
who has five children. One of Esteban’s children named Jose who was then married to Virginia
Franco. Jose and Virginia had then six children. Before the spouses Arceo passed away, they
executed a deed of donation in favor of Jose covering the subject disputed land.
Sometime in 1972, Virgina together with her children filed an application for registration
of the subject land with the cadastral court. The same was contested by the other heirs, hence
the court denied the petition and distributed the land according to the law. Soon thereafter, the
decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Hence, the petitioners now argue with the Supreme Court that the cadastral court was bereft of
the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to
confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been awarded to them by
virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose
took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive prescription.
Issue:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the matter

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. The Supreme Court
said that the Decree “has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in
the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court.” The amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits,
the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts
the authority to act not only on applications for registration’ but also ‘over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such
applications or petitions.

13 SM Prime Holdings vs Madayag 578 SCRA 552 2/12/2009

Borja, Mark Joseph
Facts:
Respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square
meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached to the application
was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management
Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1,
San Fernando City. Petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief,
Regional Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s
survey plan because the lot encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot
owners and that, despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the
survey conducted on June 8, 2001. Acting on petitioner’s request for the cancellation of the
respondent’s survey plan, DENR Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and
Public Affairs advised the petitioner to file a petition for cancellation in due form so that the
DENR could properly act on the same.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and try the case?
2. Whether or not the RTC has to wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition for
cancellation of survey plan in order to proceed with the proceedings?

Held:

1. Yes.
2. No.
It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when
acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and
decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial
issues.22 When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.23 It may, therefore, hear
and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.

In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine
whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of
title.24 An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on
the existing title, 25 which is not allowed by law.26 But the RTC need not wait for the decision of
the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject
property is already titled or forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify this
allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the certificates of title of the petitioner
and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the true
identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already
covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped
by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.

14 Delos Angeles vs Santos 12 SCRA 622 12/24/1964 Borja,

Mark Joseph
Facts:
An application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land in Ampid San Mateo Rizal was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor de los Angeles and seven co-applicants. Among
other things it alleged that applicants are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid
land. The Director of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land is a portion of the public
domain. The Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition asserting the required 3.00 meters
strips of public easement on lots along Ampid River and a creek. The aforesaid private
oppositors, Julio Hidalgo among them, filed their written opposition claiming they are the lawful
owners of the parcels of land in question for having acquired homestead patents over said lots.
A "Report" was filed in court by the Land Registration Commissioner, stating:
1. That the parcel of land described as Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857, applied for in the above-
entitled land registration case, is a portion of that described on plan Psu-148997, previously
patented on June 12, 1961 under Patent No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo
Issue:
Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction on the property by virtue of a homestead patent
issued to the private oppositors?
Held:

No. Since the existence or non-existence of applicants' registrable title to Lot 11 is decisive of
the validity or nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on said lot the court a quo's
jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could not have been divested by the homestead
patent's issuance. Proceedings for land registration are in rem whereas proceedings for
acquisition of homestead patent are not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose
of the public or private character of the land as far as courts upon proceedings in rem are
concerned.

15 Bureau of Forestry vs CA 153 SCRA 351 Borja, Mark

Joseph
Facts:
Four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan Psu-150727, containing
an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for registration by
Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land
having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had
bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo. The Director of Lands opposed said application on
the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over
the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have
never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years
prior to the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his
opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject matter of
the application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps
and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista,
Iloilo. the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of land
in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which
is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the
road-of-way of 15 meters width.

Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be the subject of registration proceeding before the
RTC?

Held:
No. Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of the
municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry as lands needed for forest purposes and
hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration
proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of
Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for
agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of whether the land is forest land
or not.

16 Martinez vs CA 56 SCRA 647 Caratiquit, Reyville

FACTS:
Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered owner of a fishpond in Lubao,
Pampanga. The fishpond was originally owned by Montemayor who secured “titulo real” over it.
After Montemayor’s death, the property was passed to his successors-in-interest, who in turn,
sold it to Garcia. Because Garcia was prevented by then municipal president of Lubao, Beltran,
from restoring the dikes on the constructed property, Garcia filed a case to retrain Beltran in his
official capacity from molesting him in possession of the parcel and applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The writ was issued against the municipal president and was declared
permanent by the Court and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Garcia applied for the
registration of the land in his name and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land
registration court, granted the registration. Pursuant to this decision, OCT was granted to
Garcia. Ownership of the property changed hands until eventually acquired by Martinez by
virtue of TCT. To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the
Committee on Rivers and Streams which appointed a sub-committee. The sub-committee
submitted a report that the parcel was not a public river but a private fishpond own by Martinez.
The committee rendered a decision that Martinez should be restored to the exclusive
possession, use and enjoyment of the parcel. The municipal official of Lubao refused to
recognize the decision. Martinez filed a case against the mayor praying that the latter be
enjoined from molesting them in their possession of the property and in the construction of the
dikes therein. While the case was still pending, then Sec. Moreno of Public Works and
Communications ordered another investigation, directing Martinez to remove the dikes they had
constructed, on the strength of the authority vested in him by RA 2056 entitled “An Act to
Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes, or Any Other Walls in
Public Navigable Waters, or Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works
in such Water or Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, and to Provide Penalties for its
Violation, and for other Purposes.” The order embodied a threat that the dikes would be
demolished should the Martinez fail to comply in 30 days. Martinez filed a case in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga which ruled in his favor. The lower court declared that the decision
rendered by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications null and void. The
officials of the Department of Public Works and Communications appealed contending that
Martinez have no cause of action because the property in dispute is a public river. The CA
reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared parcel covered by TCT of Martinez is a
public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public
domain. Martinez assails this decision being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the
torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of their predecessor-in-interest.

ISSUE:
Whether the Land Registration Court can adjudge the registration of a land of the public domain.

HELD:
No. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as
public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not
bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations. The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently registered and which
are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.

17 Republic vs CA 299 SCRA 199 Caratiquit, Reyville

FACTS:

RA 1899 authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities. Invoking the
provision of RA 1899, Pasay City Council passed an ordinance for the reclamation of 300
hectares of foreshore lands, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation
contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The ordinance was amended
authorizing the Republic Real Estate Corporation (“RREC”) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay
City under certain terms and conditions. The Republic of the
Philippines (“Republic”) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. The complaint was amended questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and
RREC on the grounds that the subject matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of
man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was
executed without any public bidding. CFIC issue an order that the defendants, their agents, and
all persons claiming under them, to refrain from ‘further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession or despoliation over any area within the Manila Bay or the

Manila Bay Beach Resort.’ It also issued a writ of preliminary injunction which enjoined the
defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons claiming under them “from
further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession.” The CFIC ruled in favor of Pasay City
and RREC. Republic appealed to CA. Before appeal could be resolved, PD 3-A was issued,
thus: “The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under
water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under a proper contract. All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall
be forfeited to the State without need of judicial action. Contracts for reclamation still legally
existing or whose validity has been accepted by the National Government shall be taken over by
the National Government on the basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of the project
involved by administration.” Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (“CDCP”) signed a Contract for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I
and II) which contract included the reclamation and development of areas covered by the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 which transferred to the Public Estate Authority (“PEA”) the rights and obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP. CA Affirmed
the Decision of the CFIC and RREC has the option to buy 60% of 21 hectares of land already
reclaimed. Pasay City and RREC filed a motion that 55 hectares had been reclaimed. CA
modified its decision and ordered the turn-over to Pasay City of the ownership and possession
of 9 lots titled in the name of CCP.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct in deciding that the ownership and possession of the 9 titled lots be
turned-over Pasay City.

HELD:
No. A notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or
ownership of a parcel of land. In the present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in
the main case, did not counterclaim for the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots
aforementioned. What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of
validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action
brought to impugn or annul it. Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in
accordance with law.

18 Alvarez vs PICOP 606 SCRA 444 12/3/2009 Caratiquit,

Reyville
FACTS:
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application
to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the
processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the
DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Alvarez. PICOP seeks the
issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and
deliver an IFMA to PICOP.
While PICOP did not seek any certification from the NCIP that the former’s concession area did
not overlap with any ancestral domain, PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement
under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code to procure prior approval of the
Sanggunians concerned. However, only one of the many provinces affected approved the
issuance of an IFMA to PICOP. Undaunted, PICOP nevertheless submitted to the DENR the
purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP’s
application for IFMA conversion, apparently hoping either that the disapproval of the other
provinces would go unnoticed, or that the Surigao del Sur approval would be treated as
sufficient compliance.
The cause of action of PICOP in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is that the
government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then Pres. Marcos, to enter into
an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

ISSUES:
a) Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause
by which the government may be bound for the issuance of the IFMA.
b) Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior approval of the
Sanggunian concerned by submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur
indorsing the approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion.
HELD:
a) No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or a privilege, which
can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
‘A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it a property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation’. Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked.
b) No. The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local
government has control over such project, but because the local government has the duty to
protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. Again, Section 26
states that it applies to projects that “may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
nonrenewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal
or plant species.” The local government should thus represent the communities in such area,
the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or even climatic change if the project
is not properly regulated, and who likewise have a stake in the resources in the area, and
deserve to be adequately compensated when these resources are exploited. Indeed, it would be
absurd to claim that the project must first be devolved to the local government before the
requirement of the national government seeking approval from the local government can be
applied. If a project has been devolved to the local government, the local government itself
would be implementing the project. That the local government would need its own approval
before implementing its own project is patently silly.

19 Heirs of Clemente vs Heirs of Vicente Ermac 403 SCRA 291

Castillo, Frinz Lemwel
Facts:
At Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his
children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. Clemente Ermac registered the said Lot to his name
alone without regards to the other predecessors-in-interests. The respondents were able to
prove consistently and corroboratively that they as well as their predecessors-in-interests had
been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owners.
According to the appellate court, “[t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates
of title which apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire
property described therein [has] no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs’ claim, it appearing that
such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs
whose title by succession were effectively disregarded.”

Issue:
1. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title
over the property in the names of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente
Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco

2. Whether or not laches has set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666

The Court’s Ruling

First Issue:
Ownership of the Disputed Lot
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of
respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling
that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.
We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is
a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a
hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court’s findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court.19
Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership,
they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a
period sufficient for prescription.20 Considering that respondents have been in possession of
the property for a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and
realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.

Second Issue:
Prescription and Laches
Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and
laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive
trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been
established in the present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of
Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since
respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and
recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.
Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations.23 It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.24 Its
application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been
fraudulently registered in the name of another.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

20 Republic vs Iglesia ni Cristo 591 SCRA 438 6/30/2009

Castillo, Frinz Lemwel
Facts:

Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre.
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate
sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao.
Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical
description of subject lot,[3] the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,[4] Tax Declaration No. (TD)
508026[5] covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale[6] executed by
Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an
Opposition to INCs application.
Issue:
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
[MCTC] DECISION GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION

Held:

INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot

With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a quo that INC
had indeed sufficiently established its possession and occupation of the subject lot in
accordance with the Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title over subject lot.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive
on, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are borne out by the record
or are based on substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[24]
This is applicable to the instant case.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased
the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its
predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way
before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from
his parents. These possessions and occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of his parents, to
INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC had been in the concept of owners: open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondents witnesses.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
21 Chavez vs PEA 384 SCRA 152 12/9/2002 Castillo, Frinz
Lemwel
FACTS:

President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then
president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later,
PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These
two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the
JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded
that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the
certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an
investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the
conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full
disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.

ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed
or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources
are owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain,
natural resources cannot be alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the
750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will
reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other
reclamation costs to be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain,
waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such,
foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA
doesn’t convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the
law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

22 Oh Cho vs Director of Lands 75 Phil. 890 8/31/1946

Castillo, Kaycelle
Facts:
Oh Cho is a citizen of the Republic of China who purchased a residential parcel of land in
Guinayangan, Tayabas in 1938. The subject land has been in the continuous, public, and
adverse possession of the predecessors in interest since 1880. In June 1940, Oh Cho applied
for the registration of the subject land, which was opposed by the Director of Lands following the
Constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring private or public agricultural lands. The CFI
however overruled the opposition and decreed the registration applied for. Hence, the present
appeal by the Director of Lands. The Director of Lands maintained its opposition on the ground
of lack of title to the lot and of disqualification as alien from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He also failed to show that he and ay of his predecessors in interest had
acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant.
Issue:
Whether Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration he was applying for, considering that he
failed to show title to the lot and that he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of public
domain.

Held/Ratio:
NO, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration because the earliest possession of the
subject land by Oh Cho’s first predecessor in interest began in 1880 and because his immediate
predecessors failed to apply for registration.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain, unless the land has been in the possession of an occupant and
predecessors in interest since time immemorial since such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
As such, the applicant does not qualify under the exception.
Oh Cho is neither entitled to a decree of registration under the provisions of the Public Land Act
since he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain.
Arguably, Oh Cho’s immediate predecessors in interest could have been entitled to a decree of
registration had they applied for registration; consequently, the right of the immediate
predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed to also have been acquired.
However, Oh Cho’s immediate predecessors failed to apply for registration. As such, they did
not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title, which was transmissible to the applicant.

Judgment was reversed and the application for registration was dismissed.
23 Diaz vs Republic 181502 2/2/2010 Castillo, Kaycelle
Facts:
Flora Garcia filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land in Laur, Nueva Ecija and
Palayan City in 1976, alleging that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed,
and harvested the agricultural products and benefits from the land continuously, publicly, and
adversely for more or less 26 years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed such application
because the subject land was inalienable as part of public domain for being within Fort
Magsaysay Military Reservation established in 1955.
In an earlier case (Reyes case) involving the same land, the Supreme Court already ruled that
such property was inalienable as it formed part of the military reservation. Also, the existence of
the possessory information title to which the applicant in the Reyes case anchored its claim,
was not proven. In said case therefore, the decree of registration issued was declared null and
void.
Despite the Reyes case, the CFI ruled in favor of Garcia in the present case. The Republic
appealed the decision to the CA, who reversed the CFI decision, ruling that the Reyes case
shall apply in Garcia’s case since both cases involve the same property. The CA concluded that
Garcia did not validly acquire title to the land since her ownership to the land traces to the same
possessory information title, the probative value of which was already passed upon by the SC
and because the land was situated inside military reservation.
Meanwhile, the CA approved a compromise agreement between the Republic and petitioner
Diaz, who substituted applicant Garcia, excluding from the claim a portion of the land
supposedly not within the military reservation. The OSG however moved for reconsideration
informing the CA that the land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military
reservation. The CA annulled the compromise agreement. The SC denied the petition for review
filed by Diaz, as well as the first two MR filed. Hence, the present letter of petitioner deemed by
the SC as a third MR.

Issue:
Whether the registration of land subject of the compromise agreement between Diaz and
Republic should be granted, considering that in a previous case involving the same property,
the Supreme Court ruled that the subject land is inalienable for being part of a military
reservation, and the existence of the possessory information title, to which applicant Garcia’s
claim of title can also be traced, was not proven.

Held/Ratio:
NO, the decree of registration could not be granted since the SC Order in Reyes case
dismissing the application for registration and declaring the land as part of public domain bars
the claim of applicant Garcia and present petitioner Diaz. Petitioner’s contended private rights
over the land could not be respected because the SC had already recognized the same land to
be public forest even before the FMMR was established.
In registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation
of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and
declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the
adverse claimant, but also against all persons. It was incumbent upon the lower court to respect
the SC ruling in Reyes case.
Before the military reservation was established, evidence showed that the subject land is largely
forested and mountainous. It was ruled in Reyes case that forest lands are not registrable under
the Public Land Act. The inclusion of a forest land in a title, whether issued using Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. Forest lands
may only be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a
clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her
predecessors-in-interest. Since petitioner did not produce such evidence, her occupation
thereof, and that of her predecessors-in- interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the
subject land because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under the Public Land Act.
Moreover, the fact that the possessory information title on which Diaz bases their claim of
ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes case, thus rendering its probative value
questionable, further works against granting the decree of registration applied for.

24 Carino vs Insular Government 212 US 449 Castillo,

Kaycelle
Facts:
Mateo Carino applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the court, but
the Government of the Philippines and the government of the United States appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Benguet, because they were taking the property for public and military
purposes. The CFI dismissed the application for registration. On appeal, the CFI decision was
affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. The case was brought to the US Supreme Court via
writ of error.

Carino is an Igorot, and possessed the subject land for more than 30 years before the Treaty of
Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them
as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around the
property. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to
Igorot custom. However, no title was issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to
have it registered during the Spanish occupation but was not successful. In 1901 he filed a
petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.
Relevant Laws:
• Philippine Commission’s Act No. 496

• Philippine Commission’s Act No. 926 (An Act Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Homesteading, Selling, and Leasing of Portions of the Public Domain of the
Philippine Islands) – this law dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun
under the Spanish law. Benguet was one of the excluded provinces under this Act.
Carino’s contention: he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which
covered the entire Philippine archipelago.
Government’s contention: Spain had title to all the lands in the Philippines except those it saw fit
to permit private titles to be acquired. There was a decree issued by Spain that required
registration within a limited time but Carino’s land wasn’t registered, hence, such land became
public land.
Issue:
Primary: Whether Carino could register title to the land albeit Benguet was excluded from Phil
Com Act No. 926.
Based on the issue: Whether Carino owns the land.

Held/Ratio:

YES, Carino could register the land if ownership could be maintained.

“Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be
deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property,
through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.”
Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US would view
Carino to have lost all his rights to the land – this would amount to a denial of native titles
throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have granted to anyone in the province the
registration of their lands.
The Organic Act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the
US would be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and it provides that “'no law shall be enacted in
said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws”. It would be hard to believe
that “any person” didn’t include the inhabitants of Benguet, nor it meant “property” to refer only
to those lands which had become such under a ceremony (of registration) many of the people of
the land may have not even heard of.
Although in Sec. 14 of the Organic Act, it is said that the Philippine Commission may prescribe
rules and regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section
refers to those cases where the land was admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to
suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title, a trespasser.
The question still remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?
In cases such as the instant case, the presumption would and should be against the
government. As far back as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim
of private ownership; it was never public land. It would not be proper to just let the conqueror to
dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it really meant to use the rights acquired by them
“for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof”.

The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. They didn’t intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was
admitted: that if they weren’t able to produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title
or else lose his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who
wrongfully occupied royal lands. It doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as
Royal land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same
decree provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove possession for the
necessary time. There were indications that registration was expected but it didn’t mean that
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to confer title to them
but to establish it.

25 Baguio City vs Masweng 578 SCRA 88 2/4/2009 Castillo,

Rio Star
Facts:
City Mayor of Baguio Yaranon issued three 3 orders for the demolition of the illegal
structures constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation without the required
building permits and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,
Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.
Private repondents Gumangan et al filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and claimed that
the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been
occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership
thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15. Thus, demolition of their
residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands
accorded by the Constitution and the law.

NCIP granted private respondent’s application and was affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
1. Whether or not NCIP has jurisdiction or authority to issue temporary restraining orders
and writs of injunction

2. Whether or not private respondents Gumangan et al are entitled of relief

Ruling:
1. Yes, NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction.

Under Sec. 5, Rule III of the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03:
The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation,
enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371.
The allegations in the petition prove the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a
particular tribunal, squarely qualify it as a dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.
 Sec. 69 of IPRA & Section 82, Rule XV of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 says
NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition
against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue
temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over which the
NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause them grave or
irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ
because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private
respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
1. No, private respondents are not entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.

Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and
Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a
portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.
Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement.
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as
inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest
Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. The courts are not endowed
with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.

The petition is granted.

26 City Mayor of Paranaque vs Ebio 621 SCRA 555 6/23/2010

Castillo, Rio Star
Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was an
accretion of Cut-cut creek, originally occupied by their great grandfather Vitalez. The city
government later advised all the residents to vacate the said area for the proposed road
construction, however respondents immediately registered their opposition which caused the
suspension of construction. Later, City Administrator Aldip sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days. The respondents then applied
for a writ of preliminary injunction against Petitioners in the RTC.

RTC denied while the CA reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject
property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.
Ruling:

Yes, the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested
land entitles them to the avails of the action. A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable
right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right
in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or
one which may never arise.
 From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one
conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc.
nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the
accreted portion. Respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject
property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have
yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land
registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant
already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring
ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through
judicial proceedings or through administrative process. Respondents’ application for sales
patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their
vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application should instead be
considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to
buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover,
the State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a
patent if the land is no longer a public land. Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give
what he does not have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that
is the State.

27 PNB vs Garcia, et. al. 182839 6/2/2014 Castillo, Rio Star

Facts:
Jose Sr is indebted to Garcia spouses. To secure payment, he issued special power of
attorney in favor of the Garcia spouses for purposes of their loan application with PNB. Jose Sr.
also executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The transactions were
without the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.’s children.
Garcia failed to pay their loan. Respondents then filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against
the spouses Garcia and PNB claiming they acquired subject property during their marriage and
became owners with his children upon death of his wife Ligaya and that consent of his children
were not obtained.

RTC dismissed the complaint CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the subject property is conjugal

2. Whether the registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse destroy the
presumption that the property is conjugal

Ruling:

1. Yes, all property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal.

Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife. PNB failed to rebut the allegation that the subject property was acquired during the
former’s marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line
with Article 160 of the Civil Code.
2. No, registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its
conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired.
The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of
the husband or the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the name of the
husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable
consideration during marriage. It retains its conjugal nature. To rebut the presumptive conjugal
nature of the property, the petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
In the present case, the petitioner bank failed to overcome the legal presumption that the
disputed property was conjugal.

28 Director of Lands vs Reyes 68 SCRA 177 11/28/1975

Castro, Floricel
FACTS:
Applicant Alinsunurin claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance of a vast tract of land
admittedly inside the boundary of military reservation of Fort Magsaysay sought the registration
of title under Act 496. Petitioners opposed the application claiming that the applicant was w/o
sufficient title, not in possession in the concept of an owner for atleast 30 years preceding the
filing of application.
Applicant filed a motion for substitution of parties, requestion P.I.D Corporation be considered
as applicant having acquired all his rights over the property. The court granted the motion and
ordered that the parcel of land applied for be registered in favor of P.I.D Corporation 2/3 portion
and the other 1/3 in favor of certain Tamayo.
Petitioners filed Notice of Appeal from the said decision to Supreme Court. PEnding Approval of
Record
On Appeal applicant PID Corporation and Tamayo filed a motion for issuance of decree of
registration and despite opposition of the petitionert, Lower Court granted the motion and issued
a decree of registration.

ISSUE:
WON the issuance of a decree of registration to PID Corporation and Tamayo is valid despite
the Appeal filed by the Petitioner.
HELD:
No. Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a Land Registration proceeding. It is fraught
with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real
properties upon reliance on a judgement w/c may be reversed on appeal.
A torrens title issued on the basis of a judgement that is not final is a NULLITY, as it is violative
of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be
issued only after decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory.

29 Benin vs Tuazon 57 SCRA 531 6/28/1974 Castro, Floricel

FACTS:
Plaintiffs filed three separate complaints alleging that they were the owners and possessors of
three parcels of agricultural land and while enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands,
defendants illegally entered and started destroying the dwellings and improvements.
Plaintiffs prayed that they be declared owners as well as to declare null and void all transfers
certificate of title issued by Register of Deeds because they were based on the Original
Certificate of title which was allegedly null and void. According to the petitioner, when the
registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of title applied for the registration, the
original application was published in the Official Gazette but they alleged that the amendment
and alteration made on the area boundaries and technical description of the parcel prior to the
decision was NOT published. Despite the failure of said publication, the decision rendered in
Land Registration Case was based on the amended plan.
Now the plaintiffs are questioning the jurisdiction of Land Registration Court to render the
decision for lack of publication.
ISSUE:
WON LRC has jurisdiction to issue the decree based on the amended plan despite its failure to
be published.

HELD:
LRC lacks jurisdiction to the area and parcel added on the amended plan. Under Sec. 23 of Act
496, the registration court may allow or order an amendment of the application for registration
when it apperas to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Sec 24 of
same act, the court may at anytime order an application to be amended by striking out one or
more parcels or by severance of the application. The rule is, if the amendment is consist of an
inclusion of area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application for
registration a new publication of the amended plan must be made. The purpose of the new
publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application.
WIthout the new publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or
parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of
the registration court would be nullity in so far as the decision concerns the newly included land.

30 SM Prime Holdings vs Madayag 578 SCRA 552 2/12/2009

(supra)

31 Mendoza vs CA 84 SCRA 67 7/14/1978 Castro, Floricel

FACTS:
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title.
During pendency of the application before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to
Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land
title. The registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two
parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz to pay
Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land
registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier
decision in issuing the land title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of title initiated
by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”.

HELD:
Yes. First of all, it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz
pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land
Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a
registration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has
been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the
application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title. A stranger or a third party may
be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that
the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the
same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the
parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that
these requirements have been complied with in this case.

32 Director of Lands vs CA 276 SCRA 276 7/28/1997 Chua,

Christian Edmund
Facts:
Private respondent filed a petition for original registration of his title under PD No. 1529. The
Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for non-compliance with the mandatory
publication of notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling. The CA held that the publication in the Official Gazette, personal
notice by mailing and posting at the site were sufficient to comply with the requirements under
PD No. 1529.

Issue:
Whether the publication in general circulation of the notice of hearing is a mandatory
requirement for land registration

Held:
Yes. Although the law only requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is still required. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed.
33 Adviento vs Alvarez 562 SCRA 434 8/20/2008 Chua, Christian
Edmund
Facts:

Adviento allegedly acquired the property against the interest of Alvarez. He traced his title to a
person, who bought the property from Gaya. Alvarez allegedly constructed a building in the
subject property. Adviento filed a case for damages against Alvarez. The RTC and CA ruled in
favor of Alvarez. Among other faults of the Adviento, Adviento failed to give notice to the
respondents for the registration of the property.

Issue:
Whether publication of the notice is enough to inform the respondents about the registration of
the property

Held:
No. The applicable law for the case was Act No. 496. Under Act No. 496, applicants, who wants
to register an imperfect title, must provide notice to the contiguous owners, occupants and those
known to have interests in the property, among other requirements. In this case, the
respondents have interests in the property and Adviento admitted that notice was not provided
to the respondents. Hence, notice of publication was not enough to fulfill the requirements of
land registration.

34 Garcia vs Bello 13 SCRA 769 Chua, Christian Edmund

Facts:
A writ of possession over the subject property was issued in favor of Guzman. Garcia
(Benjamin, Anatalia, Fabian and Vicente) filed for an action of prohibition to restrain the Court of
First Instance from enforcing the writ of execution. Garcia argued that the decision on the writ of
possession is not binding upon them, because they were not parties in the decision.

Issue:
Whether the decision is not binding to the respondents because they were not parties in the
case

Held:
No. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem. The decision rendered is binding upon the
whole world.

35 De Castro vs Marcos 26 SCRA 644 1/27/1969 De Vera,

Queenie
Respondent Akia filed a petition before the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, for the reopening of
cadastral proceedings, pursuant to R.A. No. 931. Respondent there sought the registration in
his name a 15,922 sqm of land. Petitioner De Castro then moved to intervene. Her interest is in
the 1000 sqm allegedly included in the 15,922 sqm of land specified in the respondent’s petition.
According to the petitioner, the land was awarded in her favor since she was the highest bidder
in a public auction. Petitioner fully paid the purchase price with interests and she also claimed
that she had been paying taxes on the lot. Petitioner’s motion for intervention was granted.
Petitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence in support of her opposition to the
inclusion of said 1000 sqm of land. Respondent judge ruled out petitioner’s intervention and
dismissed her opposition to the reopening of the cadastral proceedings. Petitioner filed two
Motions for Reconsideration and both motions were denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the reopening of the cadastral case is jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication.

HELD:
NO. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 931 establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings.
Such procedure does not include publication. Neither publication is mentioned in any of the
provisions of the said law. Sec. 1 of the said law merely states that, “the competent Court of
First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor
General.”
If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by an alleged right that has occurred prior to
the institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he is to be deemed to have
received notice through publication therein made. If his rights are derived from government after
the land has been declared part of the public domain by the cadastral court, the notice to the
government of a reopening petition as provided by law, should suffice. For, the government is
supposed to take up the cudgels for a public land grantee, or, at the very least, notify the latter.

In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening – a parcel of land claimed by the
respondent – was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of lands.
Consequently, the Baguio cadastral already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The
petition need not be published. the authority of the cadastral court over the reopening
proceedings below is not impaired by failure of publication.

36 Valisno vs Plan 143 SCRA 502 De Vera, Queenie

FACTS:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently declared
ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a
caretaker over the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the
owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor
from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an
apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court
decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the complaint is
different from the subdivision plan provided by the respondents with their respective area and
boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the
requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil
Code, Articles 433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just
title and he need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear
that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment
on the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court
choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the
land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks.
Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works.
Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI
which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that
the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether res judicata can be set up in a land registration case.

HELD:
YES. Res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the
former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must
be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the
application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One
right of a co owner is to defend in court the interests of the co ownership. Although the first
action was captioned for the recovery of possession, possession is sought based on ownership,
thus the action was one in the nature of accion reinvidicatoria. The second action is for
registration of title where the registration is sought based on one’s ownership over the property.
The difference between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from
ownership over the property in the first action while it seeks to exclude the whole world in the
second action. The cause of action however remains the same. The employment of two
different actions does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one
and the same cause of action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first action was litigated
before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no
significance since that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res
judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the application for
registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both parties have been
settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed
the petition.

37 Republic vs Lee 197 SCRA 13 1991 De Vera, Queenie

FACTS:
Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was
opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor in interest
acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at
least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a public domain
belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she
has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her
predecessor in interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the
property from Mataban and Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the
land, Diaz and Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was
in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land
from her predecessor in interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions
provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of
acquisition of ownership through their predecessor in interest or by themselves have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in
public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.
ISSUE:

Whether the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial evidence as complying with
the requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of the land in dispute.

HELD:
NO. The most basic rule in land registration cases is that “no person is entitled to have land
registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the
same, even though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons.
In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same
registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title the burden is upon him to
show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple. Equally basic is the rule that no
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through
his predecessors in interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
under a claim of title since 26 July 1894 or prior thereto. The doctrine upon which these rules
are based is that all lands were not acquired from government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain.
It is incumbent upon the private respondent to prove that the alleged 20 year or more
possession of Diaz and Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the 30 year period prior to the
filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners.
This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the court. The bare
assertion that Diaz and Vinluan had been in the possession of the property for more than 20
years found in private respondent’s declaration is hardly the “well nigh incontrovertible”
evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented specific
facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The phrase “adverse, continuous,
open, public and peaceful and in concept of owner” by which she described her own possession
in relation to that of her predecessors in interest are mere conclusions of law which require
factual support and substantiation.
Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied
with the requirements of the law for confirmation of her title to the land applied for, it ws error on
the part of the lower court to have granted her application.

38 Republic vs Sayo 191 SCRA 71 1990 Dimao, Sittee Junaira

DOCTRINE: Under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the state. Hence, it is that all applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent
and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere
conclusion of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.

FACTS
In a compromise agreement entered into between different parties in an application for
registration of lot 7454 situated in the Municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela now
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya, Judge Sofronio G. Sayo (respondent) approved and confirmed
such and the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms on March 5, 1981.
The Solicitor General has taken the present recourse in a bid to have the decision on March 5,
1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion contending that:

1) No evidence was adduced by the parties to support their registration

2) Some of the parties in the compromise agreement has no authority to enter into the
compromise agreement
3) The counsel of the Republic of the Philippines was not given notice of the agreement to
take part therein nor the decision approving the same.
The respondents argued that the proposition of the Solicitor General are premised on the
proposition that the lot is public land.According to them, the private character of the land is
demonstrated by the following circumstances:
a) The possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest

b) The fact that the lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in
the proper cadastral proceedings
c) The prewar certification of the National Library appearing in the Bureau of Archives that
the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private
property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants predecessors-in-interest.
d) The proceedings for registration brought under Act 496 (Torrents Act) presupposes that
there is already a title to be confirmed by teh court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the
Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.

ISSUE
Whether or not the subject land belongs to the respondents as part of their private property.

HELD/RATIO
No. The respondents failed in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property
involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of
public lands. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his
claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusion of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title. Hence, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain.
Th principal document relied upon and presented by the applicant to prove the private character
of the land was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library to the effect that the
property in question was registered under the Spanish System of land registration as private
property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But the court ruled that Spanish document cannot be
considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime and
obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership.

The argument that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the Torrens Act is
proof that the land is of private ownership cannot be given merit. It is precisely the character of
the land as private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. In the absence of any
adverse claim to show a proper title for registration, the applicant is not assured of a favorable
decree by the Land Registration Act 496.
Further, the decision of the Registration Court is based solely on the compromise agreement of
the parties.The compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any
competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding.
What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking
part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition.
As to the Informacion posesoria invoked by the respondents, it requires condition such as
inscription in the Registry of Property and actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession
of the land for 20 years to be considered a mode to acquire public lands. The proof of fulfillment
of these conditions are absent, hence, cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie
evidence of possession.
Under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the state. Hence, it is that all applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they
are hereby, declared null and void and set aside.

39 Ong vs Republic 548 SCRA 160 3/12/2008 Dimao, Sittee

Junaira
DOCTRINE/S:
* Applicants for registration of title must prove the following:
1) That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain
2) That they have been in an open, continuous , exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
* The law requires possession and occupation to acquire title to alienable lands of public
domain. Occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exrcise over hiw own property.

FACTS
Petitioner Charles L. Ong in his behalf and as duly representative of the brothers Roberto,
Alberto, and Cesar files and Application for Registration of Title over a lot situated in Brgy.
Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the lot and an
exclusive property purchased from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24,
1998. That they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous and
peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

The Office of the Solicitor general opposed the application contending that the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot as required by the Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073. Also the applicants failed to
adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the
application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage;
that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under PD No. 892 and that the subject
lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and his brothers. In an appeal to the
supreme court , the decision was reversed and set aside. The CA ruleed that despite the land
being of public domain, it is part of those disposable and alienable lands and is incumbent upon
the applicant to prove that they possessed the lot in the nature and for the duration required by
law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in
adverse possession of the lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945. It was also noted
that the earliest tax declaration presented is dated 1971. Hence, could not fairly claim posession
of the land prior to 1971. Neither they can prove that they actually occupied the lot prior to the
filing of the application.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ong and his brothers and their predecessors-in-interest have been in an open,
continuous and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners
for more than thirty (30) years.

HELD/RATIO
No. Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in an open,
continuous and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot since June 12, 1945. The
records shows that petitioners bought the lot from spouses Tony Bautista abd Alicia Villamil on
August 24, 1998 who in turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera on Jnauary 16,
1997. The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia cacho et al on July 10, 1979. The earliest
tax declaration submitted was issued in 1971 in the name of of spouses Cacho. If to tack the
petitioners claim of ownership with his predecessors in 1971, still it would fall short of the
required possession from June 12, 1945.
Moreover, petitioner’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the
nature and duration required by law. Petitioners admitted that none of them occupied the
subject lot. No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot
on several occasions. Tony Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest also testified that they
also never actually occupied the lot.
As held in Republic vs Alconaba: “ the law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.

40 Republic vs Guinto Aldana 175578 8/11/2010 Dimao, Sittee

Junaira
DOCTRINE:
* While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is teh original
tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the land Management services of DEBR),
blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
* Application for registration requires teh establishment of evidence taht teh applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under the bonafide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. He must prove that for at least 30 years he
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous , exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land.
* Tax declarations and realty tax payments constitute at least prof that a holder has a
claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. It announces his adverse claim
against all other parties who may have conflict with his interest.

FACTS
Respondents Guinto-Aldana filed with the RTC of Las Pinas City an application for registration
of title over teo pieces of land in talango Pamplona Uno. Las Pinas City. They professed
themselves to be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by successsion from their
predecessors (parents of the respondents) who in turn had acquired the property under a 1969
documents denominated as “Kasulatan sa Paghahari ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may
Pagpaparaya at Bilihan”. Under this document, the parents of the respondent acquired such in
for a consideration in his respective share from Romualdo Guinto. They also alleged that until
the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in an actual, open,
peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of owner
and that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate
taxation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the blueprint of plans well as copies of the
Technical descriptions of each lot, certification from the geodetic engineer and the pertinent tax
declarations together with the receipts of payment therefor. They averred that the property’s
original tracing cloth plan had previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Pinas on a previous
registration case in an LRC case No. LP -125.
Opposing the application. Petitioner through the Office of the City Prosecutor, advanced that the
land sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that neither of the
respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that
the muniment of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of a prior possession in the concept of owner.
Petitioner Zenaida Guinto-Aldana,in her testimony declared that the subject land was owned by
her family since she was 5 years of age and her grandparents had lived in the lots until teh
death of her grandmother in 1961. That aside from her grandparents, there are caretakers who
had tilled the land and who had lived until sometime between 1980-1990. She remembered that
her grandmother constructed a house on the property. That sometime on 1970, her family built
an adobe fence around the perimeter and on 1990s they reinforced it with hollow blocks and
concrete after an inundation caused by the flood. She claimed that she and her father had been
religiously paying real estate taxes shown in the tax declarations and tax receipts submitted to
the court. Zenaida’s claim or prior open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land was
corroborated by Josefina Luna, one of the adjoining lot owner, who strongly declared that
Zenaida’s parents are the owner of the land had not of her knowledge that she came to know of
any other claim.
The Regional Trial Court on July 10, 2003 rendered a decision denying the application for
registration. It found that respondents failed to establish with certainty the identity of the lots
applied for registration because of failure to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan s
mandated by the Presidential Decree no. 1529.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. In the petition to the SC, Petitioner
avers that the CA committed an error as Section 17 of PD No. 1529 states that the submission
in court of the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory
requirement in registration proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of the property.
Invoking Del Rosario vs Republic of the Philippines, petitioner believes that respondents are not
relieved of their procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan,
because they could have easily retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court. It suggests
that the blueprint submitted cannot be an approximate substantial compliance of the Section 17
of PD no. 1529 and is illegible ad unreadable for it does not even bear the certification of the
lands Management Bureau. Further, it also attacks claim of the respondent’s prior possession
as there was no clear and convincing evidence to show proof.

ISSUE
1) Whether or not blue print, technical specifications and tax declaration and real estate
payments are sufficient evidence to provide identification of the subject land claimed of
ownership in compliance of the Section 17 of PD 1529.
2) Whether or not the respondents has exercised acts of dominions over the land under a
bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

HELD/RATIO
1) Yes. If the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the
exact identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not
overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration
application must be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially when it
is accompanied by pieces of evidence- such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and
a duly executed technical description of the property which may likewise substantially and with
as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.
As laid down in the doctrinal precept laid down in the republic of the Philippines V CA
and in the later cases of spouses Recto vs Republic of the Philippines and Republic of
the Philippines vs Hubilla, that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan, blueprint copies and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification. Therewith, the submission of the respondents of the
blueprint plan together with the technical description of the property operates as substantial
compliance with the legal requirements of the law. It was noted that the blueprint
submitted proceeded officially from the Land Management services and bears the
approval of Surveys division Chief and was endorsed by the Community Environment
and Natural resources Office of the DENR. This accompanied by the technical
descriptions of the lot executed and verified also by the Geodetic Engineer.
2) Yes. Respondents had established evidence that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have exercised acts of dominion over the land complying the number of more than 30 years in
an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land.
From the records, possession of the respondents of the said land dates back to 1937 and had
been declared for taxation by Zenaida’s father. Such declaration for tax purposes continues up
to 1979, 1985 then to 1994. The respondents could have served further proof of declarations if
not for the filed being burned as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor when a
fire broke out in that certain office. Also, respondent’s receipt for tax expenditures between 1977
and 2001 are likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents the herein
respondents are the name owners of the property with Zenaida being identified as the one who
delivered the payment in 1994 receipts.
These unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondent’s predecessors as
demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yield no other conclusion than that as early as1937,
they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property.
No. Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in an open,
continuous and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot since June 12, 1945. The
records shows that petitioners bought the lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on
August 24, 1998 who in turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera on January 16,
1997. The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia cacho et al on July 10, 1979. The earliest
tax declaration submitted was issued in 1971 in the name of of spouses Cacho. If to tack the
petitioners claim of ownership with his predecessors in 1971, still it would fall short of the
required possession from June 12, 1945.
Moreover, petitioner’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the
nature and duration required by law. Petitioners admitted that none of them occupied the
subject lot. No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot
on several occasions. Tony Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest also testified that they
also never actually occupied the lot.
As held in Republic vs Alconaba: “ the law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and tax realty
tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are a good indication of
possession in the concept of owner these documents such as tax declarations and realty tax
payments constitute at least proof that a holder has a claim of title over the property, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. It announces his adverse claim against all other parties who may have
conflict with his interest.
Indeed the respondents have been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner which
makes the right thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving protection under the law.

41 Republic vs Cuaves 167 SCRA 150 11/9/1988 Fadera, Juna

Carlo
Facts:
Romerico Chavez, the alleged owner of the subject property which consists of 181.4776
hectares, applied for its registration with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. He claimed that the
land was originally owned by his grandfather who had been in peaceful, exclusive, continuous
and open possession of the land since time immemorial and he acwuired the land by virtue of a
Deed of Definite Sale. He also claimed that he had been paying taxes on the property and had
planted coconut and mango trees thereon. The Director of Lands opposed with such application
but this was granted by the CFI after due hearing relying on Chavez’s lone testimony. Herein
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the said decision but reduced the
area to 144 hectares. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that: first, the land
was not sufficiently identified with indubitable evidence because what was submitted was only a
blueprint copy of the survey plan contrary to the statutory requirement of mandatory character
thst the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which must be approved by the Director
of Lands should be submitted; and second, the nature and length of possession required by law
had not been adequately established.

Issue/s:
1. WON the land was not sufficiently identified by presenting a blueprint copy of the survey
plan?
2. WON the nature and length of possession required by law had not been adequately
established

Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
As a rule, the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes was the original
tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, however, blueprint copies and other evidence could
also provide sufficient identification.
Here, there was a considerable compliance with the requirement of the law as the subject
property was sufficiently identified with the presentation of the blueprint copy which was certified
by the Bureau of Lands including the technical description that goes with it. Hence, the subject
land was sufficiently identified by the blueprint copy of the survey plan.

2. YES.
As a rule, the applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and
cannot offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law that factual evidence of
possession.
Here there is not enough evidence to support his claim except his own unsupported
declarations.

Hence, private respondent failed to prove his claim of ownership.

The petition was GRANTED. Although the subject property was sufficiently identified, the
applicant has failed to prove the peaceful, exclusive, continuous and open possession
necessary to support his claim of ownership. Hence, the registration was denied.

42 Serra vs CA 195 SCRA 482 3/22/1991 Fadera, Juna Carlo

Facts:
The Hernaezes (Primitivo, Rogaciana, and Luisa), herein private respondents, filed with the CFI
of Bacolod City a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title covering 3
lots which was supported by a certification from the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental that
no certificates of titles had been issued covering the properties. The petition was granted and
the ROD of Negros Occidental reconstituted original certificates of title to the subject lots and a
transfer certificates were issued in their names. Upon learning of the existence of the TCTs,
Serra Serra, herein petitioner filed with the ROD an adverse claim against reconstituted
certificates of title. They filed a motion for cancellation of said certificates of title, claiming that
they are holders of valid existing certificates of title and that they are in actual possession of the
properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of titles since before the war. The CFI denied
the motion for cancellation without conducting a formal hearing. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but this was denied. The Hernaezes filed a motion for execution of the order
granting the petition for reconstitution and prayed that they be placed in possession of the
subject properties. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of possession. This was
challenged by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals which issued a writ of preliminary
injunction and thereafter lifted the same. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:
WON the issuance of a writ of possession was proper. (procedure and reconstitution of original
certificate of title)
Held/Ratio:
NO. As a rule, writ of possession may be issued only in the following cases; 1)land registration
proceeding; 2)extra-judicial foreclosure of REM; 3)judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in
rem proceeding, provided that the mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no
third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; 4)execution sales. In land
registration case, a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in
an original land registration proceedings “not only against the person who has been defeated in
a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree. However, it cannot be issued in a
petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title. Reconstitution does
not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property covered by the reconstituted title as in
original land registration proceedings where, in the latter, a writ of possession may be issued to
place the applicant-owner in possession. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document,
book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law
in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. A person who seeks a
reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actually possess cannot, by a
mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the
actual occupants of possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be
threshed out in a separate proceeding. Here, petitioners were not mere possessors of the
properties covered by the reconbsituted titles, they are possessors under claim of ownership.
Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership.
Hence, the writ of possession was not proper.

Petition GRANTED.

43 Republic vs Nilas 512 SCRA 286 1/23/2007 Fadera, Juna

Carlo
Facts:
In 1941 The trial court adjudicated the subject property to the Calingacions and ordered the
Chief of the General Land Registration, upon finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. Spouses Abiera, Respondent Nillas’ parents, acquired the subject lot
through Deed of Absolute Sale and thereon Respondent Nillas acquired it from her parents
through a Deed of Quitclaim. No decree of registration has ever been issued over the subject lot
ever since the decision was made by the trial court. Nillas now (1997, 56 years after the 1941
decision) sought the revival of the 1941 decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree
of registration for the said lot with the RTC which granted the petition and directed the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
confirmation and registration. Office of the Solicitor General appealed the RTC decision, arguing
that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed and Nillas should have
established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Admonistrator of
the LRA. The appeal was denied by CA which reiterated that the provisions of Sec.6 Rule 39 of
the ROC, which imposes a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgment by motion, refer to
ordinary civil actions and NOT to “special” proceedings such as land registration cases. Hence
this petition. The OSG contends that the principles of prscription and laches do apply to land
registration cases, that under Sec 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes
that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
statute of limitations.

Issue/s:
1. WON the principles of prescription and laches applies to the decision in a land registration
cases.
2. WON the judgment in Land Registration cases may be executed on mition or enforced by
action within the purview of Rule 39.

Held/Ratio:
1. NO. In the case of Sta. Ana v. Menla (Sta. Ana Doctrine), the court extensively explained that
the provision of Sec. 6 Rule 39 refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civilaction must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to
act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel
of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when
the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom. Further, There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in
character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,
the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to
be registered.
2. NO. Sec. 39 of PD 1529, lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of
judgment and the issuance of certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section
39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title.
The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order
directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of
registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the
Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the
decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations
are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond
discretion of amendment or review. The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do
their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from
ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can.

Petition DENIED

44 Manotok Realty vs LLT Realty 540 SCRA 304 12/17/2007

Aguilar, Charles Tito R.
FACTS:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in
turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over
three (3) cities within Metropolitan Manila. CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought
to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the
possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLT’s claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of
Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolito’s title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title
appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that
Dimson’s title, the proximate source of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same
and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their
ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees
of the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT
No. 994. The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.
ISSUE:

Whether the title issued in the name of CLT is valid.

HELD:
It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s, Hipolito’s and Dimson’s—that the properties they purport
to cover were “originally registered on 19 April 1917” in the Registration Book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No.
994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit
such proof but it did not. The established legal principle in actions for annulment or
reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance
of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.
In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in
the action for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for
ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court.
As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17
April 1917. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of
the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date when the title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the
decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917.
There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of
title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of
the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in
pursuance of the decree of registration. It was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the
title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.
Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the
certificate of title is to take effect.
Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such
mother title is inexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994
dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent
OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the CLT claims over the subject property
if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on
remand. In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special
Division is directed to make further determinations based on the evidence already on record and
such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.

45 Manotok Realty vs LLT Realty 582 SCRA 583 3/31/2009

Albay, Miami Frianz F.
FACTS:
This case springs from the 2009 case filed by Manotok Realty against CLT Realty wherein the
court decided to remand the case for further proceedings, requiring CLT to prove his title and
provide clear and convincing evidence that their title is valid and legal.
ISSUE:
Whether CLT convinced the court and was able to provide evidence as proof that their title is
valid.
HELD:
The report of special division shows that there is flaws in the title of CLT. There is an error as to
the date of registration and the judge who declared the title to be true and valid had been the
subject of controversy of a previous case filed by Araneta questioning the genuineness and
authenticity of the judge’s signature and the order granting confirmation by other judge, judge
Sayo. The admission of Judge Sayo that he had not seen the original of the Palma Order,
neither the signature of Palma was presented to him, leaves doubt to the title of CLT. The court
therefore conclude that the title of CLT shall be declared null and void.

46 Rosales vs Burgos 577 SCRA 264 1/30/2009 Añonuevo, Jon-

jon
FACTS:
Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-
petitioners Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel,
they acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 406851 which is the
subject of the present controversy. Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged
the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of Sale dated September 8, 1978 to make it
appear that the disputed property was sold to her by the spouses Rufloe. On the basis of the
said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining a title in her name, TCT No. S-
74933.Thus, in November 1979, the Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes
alleging that the Deed of Salewas falsified as the signatures appearing thereon were forged
because Angel Rufloe died in 1974, which was four (4)years before the alleged sale in favor of
Delos Reyes.During the pendency of the case, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to
respondent siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelitoand Amy (Burgos siblings). A new title, TCT No.
135860, was then issued in their names.The Burgos siblings, in turn, sold the same property to
their aunt, Leonarda Burgos.

However, the sale in favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was issued in
her name. The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos siblings who also continued
paying the real estate taxes thereon.The RTC rendered its decision declaring that the Deed of
Sale in favor of Delos Reyes was falsified as the signatures of the spouses Rufloe had been
forged. The trial court ruled that Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject
property. Such was the state of things when the Rufloes filed their complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Contract and Cancellationof Transfer Certificate of Titles against respondents
Leonarda and the Burgos siblings, and Delos Reyes.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring that Leonarda and the Burgos siblings were
not innocent purchasers for value and did not have a better right to the property in question than
the true and legal owners, the Rufloes. The trial court also held that the subsequent conveyance
of the disputed property to Leonarda by the Burgos siblings was simulated to make it appear
that Leonarda was a buyer in good faith. The CA reversed and set aside that of the trial court,
declaring in the process that respondents were purchasers in goodfaith and for value. Thus, this
petition.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings and the
subsequent sale by thesiblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and
(2) Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite the
forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes
HELD/RATIO:
Petition Granted. The issue concerning the validity of the deed of sale between the
Rufloes and Delos Reyes had already been resolved with finality which declared that the
signatures of the alleged vendors, Angel and Adoracion Rufloe, had been forged. It is
undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-
settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One
can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right
than what the seller can transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes acquired
no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the
transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are
likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to
go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this rule admits of
an unchallenged exception: . . . a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the
party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in
his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of
the title of the property in litigation.
This simulated sale is the handiwork of Amado who apparently acted advisedly to make
it appear that his sister Leonarda as the second transferee of the property is an innocent
purchaser for value. Since he or his children could not plausibly assume the stamp of a buyer in
good faith from the forger Elvira Delos Reyes.

47 Pajomayo vs Manipon 39 SCRA 676 6/30/1971 Fernando,

Niezel
Facts:
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs (Pajomayo) filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Branch IX, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are co-owners pro-indiviso
of the parcel of land described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 1089 in the name of Diego Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan; that they had acquired the land as an inheritance from their late father Diego
Pajomayo; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept of owners for a period of more than 70
years until the early part of the year 1956 when the defendants dispossessed them of said
property.
The defendants (Manipon), after denying some of the allegations of the complaint, alleged that
they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, the said land having been
adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings of the Malasique cadastre, and that apparently
the plaintiffs are claiming the same parcel of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the
land mentioned in their answer by inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon,
and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse
possession of said land for more than 70 years, to the exclusion of plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether the Title No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs-appellees (Pajomayo) which was issued
in virtue of the homestead patent should prevail over the Title No. 14034 held by the
defendants-appellants (Manipon) which was issued in connection with the cadastral
proceedings.

Held:
Yes, Title No. 1089 should prevail. The Court held the trial court correctly ruled that
plaintiff's O.C.T. No. 1089 prevails over defendants' O.C.T. No. 14034, the former having been
issued on 27 November 1931, or prior to the issuance of the latter on 1 April1957.
The plaintiffs base their claim of title to the land in question, on Original Certificate of Title No.
1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo, on November 27, 1931 in virtue of a free patent
that was granted to him. Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land
Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, the Certificate of Title issued
in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration
Act.
When one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and
void and should be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of
land pursuant to a valid certificate of title said party is entitled to the possession of the land
covered by said valid title. The decree of registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does
not have the effect of annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with the
provisions of the land Registration Law (Act 496).

48 Wee vs Mardo 202414 6/4/2014 Fernando, Niezel

Facts:
Respondent (Mardo) was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April 26,
1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.

On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through a

Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration of
P250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the
subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.
Petitioner (Wee) file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that she
is the owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.

Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the
application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was however,
denied. A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were
subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by the RTC.
Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC, hence, respondent
appealed to the CA.
The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of
possession and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the
subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her
title suggested that she was not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an
essential element in the requirement and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D.
No. 1529.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the subject property as evidenced by the alleged
deed of absolute sale and despite respondent’s possession of the subject property.

Held:

No, the petitioner is not entitled to the subject property. The Court held that the subject land is
already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite, under the name of respondent Felicidad Mardo.
In addition, the Court held that the applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. (Republic v. Manimtim,
G.R. No. 169599, March 16, 2011)

The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have
complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529 considering that she admitted that it was not physically turned over to her.

49 Campit vs Gripa, et al. 195443 9/17/2014 Fernando,

Niezel
Facts:
Subject of this case is a 2.7360 hectare agricultural land situated in Umangan, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, presently occupied by respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga, and Severino
Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga, but covered by TCT No. 122237 issued in
the petitioner’s name. The petitioner (Campit) claimed to have purchased the property from his
father Jose Campit in 1977.
On the other hand, respondents (Gripa) claimed to be the rightful owners of the subject
property, as earlier adjudged by the court in Civil Case No. 11858 decided on June 12, 1961,
and in Civil Case No. 15357 decided on August 8, 1978. The Court, in these cases, cancelled
the titles of the petitioner and his father Jose because they were obtained through the
misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather, Isidro Campit.
Issue:
Whether that the title of the petitioner to the subject property shall prevail because the
August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, which declared his title null and void, was
never executed and under the Torrens system of registration, a certificate of title is an
indefeasible and incontrovertible proof of ownership of the person, in whose favor it was issued.

Held:
No, the title of the petitioner will not prevail. The Court held the validity of petitioner’s
title, having been settled with finality in Civil Case No. 15357, could no longer be reviewed.
Because the doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and
constitutes as an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action.
The Court also held that it cannot allow the petitioner to maintain his title and benefit from the
fruit of his and his predecessors’ fraudulent acts at the expense of the respondents who are the
rightful owners of the subject property. The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others.
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still be
compelled under the law to re-convey the property registered to the rightful owner under the
principle that the property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the
person in whose name it is registered.
An action for re-conveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. There is, however, an exception
to this rule where the filing of such action does not prescribe, i.e., when the plaintiff is in
possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the
property, does not prescribe.

50 Republic vs Vera 120 SCRA 210 1/27/1983 Frias, Helen

May
Facts:
Private respondents filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496
over parcels of land located in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan. The Court of First Instance
of Bataan confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of the
private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an
opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation. Petitioner stressed that
the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they
have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
Issue:
Whether the lands in question being a subject of a cadastral proceeding may be a subject of
private appropriation in favor of the private respondents.

Held/Ratio:

No.
In cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the
petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or
within such further time as may be allowed by the court. In the absence of successful
claimants, the property is declared public land.
In this case, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid
cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then
occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been
issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and
its decision had already become final and conclusive.

51 Pamintuan vs San Agustin 43 Phil. 558 6/22/2022 Frias,

Helen May
Facts:
The lot in question was decreed in favor of petitioner Florentino Pamintuan by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga and that certificate of said lot was thereupon issued to him by virtue of
the decision in a land registration case. In the meantime, a cadastral case was instituted. Due to
the petitioner’s failure to claim the lot at the trial of the Cadastral case, the said lot was awarded
to the private respondents. Petitioner then presented a motion to the Court of First Instance,
asking that the decision of the court in regard to the lot in the Cadastral case be set aside and
that the writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled.

Issue:
Whether a final decree in an ordinary land registration case can be set aside by a subsequent
decree of the Court in a cadastral case.
Held/Ratio:

No.
The title to the land is fully as well settled and adjudicated, within the meaning of the Cadastral
Act, by a final decree in an ordinary land registration case as it would be by a similar decree in a
Cadastral case. Obviously, it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature to provide a
special proceeding for the settlement and adjudication of titles already settled and adjudicated.
In this case, the subsequent filing of a cadastral case does not give the court the jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land is null and void. The jurisdiction of the court in cadastral cases
over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the
description of the lands.

52 Director of Lands vs Pastor 106 SCRA 426 7/31/1988

Frias, Helen May
Facts:
Respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas an application for
confirmation of imperfect title over thirteen (13) lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas
City. In her application, the respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest had
been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession of the lots
under claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. The Director of Lands filed an
opposition to the application on the ground that said lots were declared public land in a previous
cadastral proceeding.

Issue:
Whether lands declared as public land in a cadastral proceeding may still be a subject of a
judicial confirmation of title.

Held/Ratio:

Yes.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant
from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3
and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

53 Navarro vs Director of Lands 5 SCRA 834 7/31/1962

Gaffud, Marvela Angela
Facts:

This is an appeal by Anacleto P. Navarro from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing his application for registration of 2 residential lots in Malate. The Director of Lands
interposed an opposition claiming that both lands belong to the State. Navarro submitted an
evidence wherein the Director of Lands filed a motion to dismiss on 2 grounds: 1) that the
application was barred by prior judgment and 2) that the same was improper as an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land law which is only applicable to
public agricultural lands and not to those which are residential in character.

It appears that sometime in 1950 the Director of Lands filed a cadastral proceeding in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to settle and adjudicate title to the same lots in question. The State
claimed it as part of the public domain.

Issue/s:
Whether the lots applied for are part of the public domain or have so far been possessed by
appellant that he must be deemed to have acquired title thereto which is sufficient for
registration in his name?

Held/Ratio:

The lots applied for are part of the public domain.

The declaration by final judgment in the cadastral proceeding that they are public lands settled
this issue.
It is a rule long familiar in this jurisdiction that all lands are presumed to be a part of the public
domain; that to overcome this presumption, evidence must be more than a mere preponderance
and that vague and indecisive proofs are insufficient even in the absence of opposition on the
part of the government.
Appellant Navarro admits that neither Caridad Guillen Cortez nor her predecessors ever
declared the land in question for taxation purposes; And that none of them paid taxes on said
land. In spite of the averment that the two lots in controversy constitute privately owned
property, the evidence is unanimous to the effect that none of the alleged owners ever declared
the land for taxation purposes. None of them ever paid taxes on the property. It has been
truthfully said that tax declarations and tax receipts constitute evidence of great weight in
support of possession or ownership. Any owner, the most ignorant included, knows his
obligation of seeing to it that his real property is declared for taxation purposes and that he
regularly pay the taxes thereon.
54 Lahora vs Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346 1/30/1971 Gaffud,
Marvela Angela
FACTS:

Spouses Francisco lahora and Toribia Moralizon brought this appeal to this court from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing their petition with the lot in issue (Lot No.
2228) on the ground of previous registration.
The records show that appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of Davao for registration
of 9 parcel of lands located in Manay, Davao, ½ of which was acquired by Toribia Moralizon by
inheritance and the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adverse
possession in the concept of owner. One of the said parcels of land was identified as lot no.
2228. Such petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang Jr. claiming that the lot no. 2228
belonged to him in his wife covered by OCT P-6055 in his wife’s name. The Director of Lands
also alleged that the applicants never had a sufficient title over the lands, nor have they been
open, continuous and notorious possession for at least 30 years.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the patent issued to the wife of Emilio Dayanghirang Jr. as well as the original
certificate of title obtained by her were null and void?

(2) Whether the same lot can be the subject of two registration proceedings?

RATIO/S:

(1) No, the patent and original certificate of title issued to Dayanghirang Jr.’s wife is valid.
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is, recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; Thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding.
(2) No, the same lot cannot be the subject of 2 registration proceedings.
In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of oppositor’s wife as of
21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants’ petition for registration of the same
parcel of land on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No.
P6053) covering the said property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly administration of
justice precludes that Lot 2228, of the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two registration
proceedings. Having become registered land under Act 496, for all legal purposes, by the
issuance of the public land patent and the recording thereof, further registration of the same
would lead to the obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title being issued for the
same piece of land, even if both certificates should be in the name of the same person. And if
they were to be issued to different persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most
valued characteristics of Torrens Titles, would be torn away.
For this reason, the Supreme Court has ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, that in
a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
decreed in an earlier case; and that a second decree for the same land would be null and void.

55 Republic vs Aquino 120 SCRA 186 1/27/1983 Gaffud, Marvela

Angela
Facts
Vivencio p. Angeles filed an application of registration of title over a parcel of land in San Mateo,
Rizal with the Court of First Instance of Rizal wherein an opposition was filed jointly by Victorino
Perez and Dionisio, Conrado, Jose, Nicanor, Lourdes and Trinidad, all surnamed Sta. Maria,
and individually by Felix Lorenzo, as representative of the heirs of Victor Lorenzo. Unfortunately,
their opposition was dismissed. One of the grounds of the opposition was that the said lot was
declared a public land by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The same lot was also a subject of
a homestead application filed by Gonzalo Lorenzo wherein he sold such property to Vivencio P.
Angeles – who was also granted with his homestead application and withdrew such for the
application of the registration on the said property.
Issue
Whether the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the application for registration of title
and in ruling that the applicant-respondent Vivencio P. Angeles has a registrable title over the
lot in question?

Ratio
Yes, the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the applicatition for registration f title and
in ruling that Vivencio Angels has a registrable title over the lot.
In the first place, in Land Registration Case No. 1196, GLRO Rec. 50288, entitled “Isabelo
Lorenzo et al. vs. The Director of Lands, et al. the Court of First Instance of Rizal had already
declared subject property as a public land. That the decision had long become final and,
therefore, cannot be disturbed anymore on the ground of res judicata. And, Republic Act 931
does not apply to persons claiming title to land which has been declared public land in an
ordinary registration proceeding.

The fact that he had filed a homestead application over the property is an admission that their
possession was not in the concept of an owner.

56 Republic vs T.A.N. Properties Inc 555 SCRA 477 6/26/2008

Galicia, Monico King A.
FACTS:
Case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties,
Inc. covering Lot located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.on 11 November 1999, the
trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was an Opposition of the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). During the hearings, respondent
presented three witnesses: Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager; Evangelista, a 72year
old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and the Records Officer II of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Kabesang Puroy had peaceful,
adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942.
Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio. The land was adjudicated
to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). Then on 8 August 1997, Porting sold
the land to respondent.
Respondent submitted two certifications issued by the DENR. First certification by the CENRO,
that the lot falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Second certification by Regional
Technical Director of DENR, stating that the subject area falls within an alienable and
disposable land.
RTC adjudicated the land in favor of respondent, that a juridical person or a corporation could
apply for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest
have possessed the land for 30 years or more. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s
Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent, a private corporation, is qualified to apply for registration of the land under
the Public Land Act.
HELD/RATIO:
No, respondent TAN Properties is not qualified.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable
rests with the applicant.
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court traced the
law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution
limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino
citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present
1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant
for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private
land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had
already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to
complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations
from acquiring lands of the public domain.

In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its
predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right.—Under RA 9176, the application for
judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of
alienable and disposable land.

57 Nieto vs Quines 1 SCRA 227 1/28/1961 Galicia, Monico King

A.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1917, Quines filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead application covering a
tract of land. Upon the approval, homestead by Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044, and he
began clearing and cultivating the land.
In the years 1923 to 1925, cadastral surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands. On 1927,
cadastral proceedings were initiated by the Director of Lands, and Quines did not file any
answer therein.

Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044.

On August 16, 1930, the cadastral court awarded Maria Florentino Lot No. 3044.
On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the original
certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to
Bartolome Quines, and issued Original Certificate of Title in his name.
Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her,
including Lot No. 3044.
Sometime in 1952, Maria Florentino sold all the lots to Arturo Nieto, who subsequently secured
the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. On the other hand, Quines executed a
deed of sale on 1953 transferring Lot No. 3044 to Atty. Miguel P. Pio.
Nieto filed a complaint against Quines that the homestead patent and Original Certificate of Title
No. 623 were obtained through fraud and misrepresentations, prayed that the patent and title be
cancelled and that the title issued in plaintiff's name be declared as the true and valid title over
the lot in dispute.
Lower court rendered judgment in defendants' (Quines and Pio) favor dismissing the complaint.
Nieto appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the title issued to a homestead applicant prevail over a subsequent registration of an
awardee in cadastral court proceedings.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes. As a homestead applicant, the defendant religiously complied with all the requirements of
the Public Land Act and, on August 29, 1930, a homestead patent was issued in his favor.
Also, the defendant having complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle him to
a patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has unquestionably acquired
a vested right on the land and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. (Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). Under these circumstances and applying by analogy the principles
governing sales of immovable property to two different persons by the same vendor, Bartolome
Quines' title must prevail over that of Maria Florentino not only because he had always been in
possession of the land but also because he obtained title to the land prior to that of Maria
Florentino.

58 Del Prado vs Caballero 148225 3/3/2010 Sevilla, Victor

Emmanuel

59 DBT Mar Bay vs Panes 594 SCRA 578 7/31/2009 Ganchero,

Kevin Ken
Facts:
The subject land was conveyed by B. C Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago for services
rendered. On June 24, 1992, the respondents Ricaredo Panes and his sons filed a complaint for
quieting of title with damages and petition for injunction against Regalado and DBT because the
transferred land covered the Panes' lot which they alleged was exclusively theirs. In the
complaint, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner of the covered portion which he had
declared for taxation purposes in his name. Respondents claimed that Ricaredo and his
immediate family had been and still are in actual possession of the subject property, and their
possession preceded the 2nd world war. For its part, DBT, alleged that it is the legitimate owner
and occupant of the subject property after they registered the same among other defenses.
Ricaredo Panes insists that despite DBT’s registration of the TCT, he has acquired the land
through acquisitive prescription.
Issues:

Whether title to registered land may be acquired through prescription.

Held:
No. Respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under
Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the
Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as
amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. In the instant case, proof of
possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.

60 Lonoy vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform 572 SCRA 185

11/27/2008 Ganchero, Kevin Ken
Facts:
After her husband Gregorio died, Hilaria Tabuclin sold their conjugal land to Deleste. Hilaria
died soon after and her brother-in-law, Juan was appointed as special administrator of the
estate together with Noel as regular administrator. However, Noel could not take possession of
the subject property as it was with Deleste already hence he filed an action for reversion of title.
The case reached the Supreme Court which ruled in favor of Noel and held that Deleste is only
entitled to ½ of the subject property as Hilaria is only entitled to the same since the property is
conjugal. They were adjudged as co-owners as was their heirs who failed to partition the land.
Portions of the subject property was expropriated and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries under
Operation Land Transfer. But since Deleste has long since passed away, with the land
remaining unpartitioned among his heirs, the just compensation cannot be awarded. The heirs
of co-owners then filed an action for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents given to
farmer-beneficiaries as the awarding was done without sufficient notice to them.

Issue:
Whether the certificates of title may be cancelled because of DAR’s failure to issue sufficient
notice.

Held:
No. A certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one
year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent as in the present
case. Land covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding,
nor can it be decreed to another person. After the expiration of the one year period, a person
whose property has been wrongly or erroneously registered in another’s name may bring an
ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree gives petitioners only one
other remedy, i.e., to file an action for damages against those responsible for the fraudulent
registration

61 Ybanez vs IAC 194 SCRA 743 3/6/1991 Ganchero, Kevin Ken

Facts:
Respondent Ouano was able to secure homestead patents over the subject land. After
complying with all the requirements he was issued an original certificate of title. He occupied the
land and harvested its fruits for 19 years until petitioner, together with his sons, contested his
ownership and forcefully took possession of the said land effectively evicting Ouano. Petitioners
alleged that the Director of lands had issued a ruling favorable to them as the true owners and
that Ouano wasn’t in actual possession of the land as he did not have a house built on it.
Issue:

Whether Ouano’s title may be revoked on the basis of the Director of land’s decision.

Held:
No. It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to
private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery
of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in
their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the
investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as
amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of
title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of
the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on the matter does not
allow a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule
now finds expression in Section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. In the instant case, the public land certificate of title issued to private respondent
attained the status of indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance of patent on April 15, 1963,
hence, it is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Consequently, the filing of
the protest before the Bureau of Lands against the Homestead Application of private respondent
on January 3, 1975, or 12 years after, can no longer reopen or revise the public land certificate
of title on the ground of actual fraud. No reasonable and plausible excuse has been shown for
such an unusual delay. The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who
sleep when the law requires them to act.

62 Ponce de Leon vs RFC 36 SCRA 289 1976 Garcia, Anne

Sherina Bianca
FACTS:
Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) Manila, his loan
application, in the amount of P800,000.00 offering as security certain parcels of land, among
which, was the parcel which Ponce de Leon and Soriano mortgaged to the PNB. The
application stated that the properties offered for security for the RFC loan are encumbered to
the PNB, Bacolod, and to Cu Unjieng Bros. The application was approved for P495,000.00 and
the mortgage contract was executed by Jose L. Ponce de Leon, his wife, and Francisco
Soriano. The same parties signed a promissory note for P495,000.00, with interest at 6% per
annum, payable on installments every month for P28,831.64 in connection with the mortgage
deed. The mortgage deed specifically stipulated that the proceeds thereof shall be used
exclusively for the purchase of machinery and equipment, construction of buildings and the
payment of obligations and that the release of the amounts loaned shall be at the discretion of
the RFC. Subsequently, none of the amortization and interests which had become due was paid
and, for this reason, the RFC took steps for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties consisting of real estates and the sawmill and its equipments of Ponce de Leon
situated in two places in Samar. Previous to the expiration of the one-year period of redemption,
Francisco Soriano, through Teofila Soriano del Rosario offered to repurchase the Soriano lot the
last day for the redemption of the lot but the offer was rejected and they were told to participate
in the public sale of the land to be conducted by the RFC. Jose L. Ponce de Leon did not offer
to redeem the mortgaged properties sold at anytime before the expiration of the period of
redemption. Subsequently, Ponce de Leon instituted the present action alleging that there was
delay in the releases of the amount of the loan and the sheriff’s sales were null and void
because the properties were sold in an inadequate prices and that the it was not in accordance
with law. These allegations were denied by RFC sustaining the legality of the mortgage and
Sheriff's sales. On the other hand, Francisco Soriano wrote a letter, to the President asking the
latter's intervention so that the projected sale on the same date to be conducted by the RFC
may be suspended insofar as the lot in his name is concerned and that he be allowed to redeem
it which was granted under the conditions that the property could be redeem in its appraised
value of P59,647.05, payable 20% down and the balance in ten years, with 6% interest. Soriano
did not redeem the lot under the conditions of the RFC. In due course, the lower court ruled in
favor of RFC. The Sorianos appealed this decision pointing out that the selling price of the said
properties were ridiculously inadequate.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sheriff’s foreclosure is valid.

HELD:

Yes. Mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff's sale unless shocking to the
conscience will not be sufficient to set aside the sale if there is no showing that, in the event of a
regular sale, a better price can be obtained. The reason is that, generally, and, in forced sales,
low prices are usually offered. The records further show that two (2) days after the execution of
the deed of mortgage for P10,000 in favor of the PNB — Francisco Soriano received P2,000
from plaintiff, Francisco Soriano received a letter informing him that the PNB mortgage on the
Parañaque property would be foreclosed, unless the debt guaranteed therewith were settled;
that, accordingly, his children came to know of the mortgage in favor of the PNB; that said
mortgage was transferred to the RFC. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that
Sorianos did not know then of the mortgage constituted by Francisco Soriano in favor of the
RFC. Their aforementioned failure to contest the legality of the mortgage for over five (5) years
and these attempts to redeem the property constitute further indicia that the same belonged
exclusively to Francisco Soriano, not to the conjugal partnership with his deceased wife,
Tomasa Rodriguez. Apart from the fact that said attempts to redeem the property constitute an
implied admission of the validity of its sale — and, hence, of its mortgage to the RFC — there
are authorities to the effect that they bar the Sorianos from assailing the same.

63 Mercado vs Liwanag 115 Phil. 469 6/30/1976 Garcia, Anne

Sherina Bianca
FACTS:
Ramon Mercado and Pio D. Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land situated in
Quezon City. The said sale was issued in the name of the Ramon Mercado and Basilia Mercado
as co-owners PRO-INDIVISO, and the sale was without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff
Basilia Mercado. The said land was thereafter expropriated by NPC at a price of P10,000.
ISSUE:

Whether the Deed of Sale was vaild.

HELD:
Yes. A co-owner may dispose of under Article 493 is only his undivided aliquot share, which
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. He has no right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part by metes
and bounds. The title is the final and conclusive repository of the rights of the new co-owners.
The question of whether or not the deed of sale should be annulled must be considered in
conjunction with the title issued pursuant thereto. Since, according to this title, what appellee
acquired by virtue of the sale is only an undivided half-share of the property, which under the
law the vendor Ramon Mercado had the absolute right to dispose of, the trial court committed
no error in dismissing the action.

64 Guaranteed Homes Inc vs Valdez 577 SCRA 441 1/30/2009

Garcia, Anne Sherina Bianca
FACTS:
Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo), filed a complaint seeking
reconveyance of a parcel of land situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales. The property had
already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales.
They alleged that Pablo died intestate and was survived by his four children, one of whom was
the deceased Cipriano who declared himself as the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the sales
made by the decedent during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the disputed property to
spouses Rodolfo. Subsequently, the spouses Rodolfo sold the disputed property to petitioner by
virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. On the other hand, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. The RTC
granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Noting that respondents had never claimed nor
established that they have been in possession of the property and that they did not present any
evidence to show that petitioner has not been in possession of the property either, the RTC
applied the doctrine that an action to quiet title prescribes where the plaintiff is not in possession
of the property. The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a case of
implied or constructive trust on the part of Cipriano who had inaccurately claimed to be the sole
heir of Pablo in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate which led to the issuance of TCT
No. T- 8241 in his favor. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:

Whether the sale of the property was valid.

HELD:
YES. It is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has
to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since "the act of registration is the operative
act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned," it follows that where
there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than
what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that
may subsequently defeat his right thereto. It is enough that petitioner had examined the latest
certificate of title which in this case was issued in the name of the immediate transferor, the
spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but only by the
certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the property. Registration in the
public registry is notice to the whole world. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall be, if registered,
filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing
or entering.

65 Panganiban vs Dayrit 464 SCRA 370 7/28/2005 Gonzales,

Liezel
FACTS:
The petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they
inherited from the late Juan and Ines Panganiban, father and daughter respectively. The
owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had been lost but upon petition with
the trial court by Erlinda Pacursa (one of the heirs and petitioner herein) the trial court granted
the petition. The Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owner’s duplicate copy to
Erlinda.
Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo asserted
ownership over Lot 1436 and believing it was unregistered, sold a portion of it to respondent.
The latter discovered that what she had bought was registered land. Unable to annotate the
deed of sale at the back of the OCT, respondent fraudulently filed a petition for issuance of the
owner’s copy of said title. This petition alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda was lost in the
fire. It was granted and the Register of Deeds issued an owner’s duplicate certificate to
respondent which contained the annotation of a Notice of Adverse Claim filed by Erlinda
wherein it is alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan and Ines, the registered
owners of the property and she has legitimate claim thereto. Moreover, petitioners alleged that
the newly issued owner’s duplicate certificate to respondent was prejudicial to their previously
issued title which is still in existence.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that Lot 1436 was sold by the petitioners and their father
which was covered by a Deed of Definite Sale and Salcedo came into ownership. Salcedo sold
the property to respondent.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the petitioners’ duplicate certificate of title is valid and subsisting
(2) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the possession of the property

HELD:
(1) The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title on petitioners’ possession is valid
and subsisting. The Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v CA that if a certificate of title has
not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and
the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of a
new title. Since the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier issued to Erlinda is still in
existence, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for
reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title subsequently issued to respondent is
therefore void and of no effect.
(2) The Court rules in the negative. Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover possession of
the property by virtue of the equitable defenses of laches. In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined
rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches.
The petitioners’ inaction for 45 years reduced their right to recover the subject property into a
stale demand.

66 Mejia de Lucas vs Gamponia 100 Phil. 277 10/31/1956

Gonzales, Liezel
FACTS:
Free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in the name of Domingo
Mejia which was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya and
certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. After the issuance of the patent
but before the registration of the same, Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias Ciscar. Upon his
death the property was included in the distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque
Sanchez. Sanchez sold the land to Andres Gamponia.
Domingo Mejia, upon his death, left his brother Pedro Mejia who is survived by his daughter
Concordia Mejia de Lucas.
The court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void, as the
sale was made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the provisions of
section 35 of Act No. 926. It further held that since the land is registered land no title in
derogation to that of the registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or
Sanchez and Gamponia.

The main defense is plaintiff’s right of action has already prescribed by virtue of the possession
of the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest for a period of 37 years. This
defense was overruled by the court a quo on the ground that as the land is registered, with a
certificate of title in the name of patentee Domingo Mejia, title thereto may not be acquired by
the defendant and his predecessors in interest against said registered owner. This ruling is
evidently based on Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, which provides that “no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Mejia de Lucas is entitled to the property

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

While no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that
is, the equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of prescription or adverse
possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that
of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that while defendant may not be
considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors’ long continued
possession for 37 years, the original owner’s right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by
patentee’s inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
It is to be noted that all the complications would never had been occasioned had the original
patentee and his successors in interest not slept on their rights for more than a generation. Add
to this the fact that the original conveyance made by the patentee is not absolutely null and void.
The prohibition against the sale of free patents is for a period of seven years (Section 35, Act
No. 926) ; after that period of time a patentee would be free to dispose of the land. Within seven
years from the conveyance the original patentee could have brought an action to recover back
his property. Since nothing of this sort was done by him, it was certainly natural for the purchase
to have assumed that the original patentee gave up his right to recover back the property and
acquiesced in vendee’s right and title. The successor in interest of the original purchaser must
also have believed in good faith that the patentee and his successors in interest were reconciled
to the idea of allowing the property to stay in the hands of the successors in interest.

67 Manotok vs Borque (or Manotok vs CLT Realty?) 582 SCRA 583

12/18/2008 Sevilla, Victor Emmanuel

68 Gregorio Araneta vs RTC 580 SCRA 532 3/4/2009 Gonzales,

Liezel
FACTS:
The Gonzales or Maysilo estate in Malabon, Rizal was expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines, with the understanding that the Government would resell the property to its
occupants. However, due to its failure and its instrumentality, PHHC, the occupants and tenants
of the estate filed a complaint to compel PHHC to sell to the tenants their respective occupied
portions of the Gonzales estate.
The Gregorio Araneta University Foundation (GAUF) sought to intervene in the case on the
ground that 52 tenants of the property and Araneta Institute of Agriculture entered into a
“Kasunduan” whereby the former conveyed to the latter priority rights to purchase portion of the
estate.
In the basis of this “Kasunduan,” a compromise agreement was duly approved by the court.
Included in this compromise agreement are Lots 75 and 54 awarded to Gregorio Bajamonde.
Incidentally, it appears that on the basis of the “Kasunduan” and the forged compromise,
Araneta University was able to register in its name with the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
TCT No. C-24153 for Lots 75 and 54 which had been awarded to Gregorio Bajamonde.
On the other hand, the compromise agreement between Araneta University and the tenants was
declared null and void for being a forgery and the partial decision rendered in accordance
therewith was likewise declared null and void and of no force and effect.
The lower court ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel the title of GAUF and
to issue a new TCT over Lots 75 and 54 in the name Gregorio Bajamonde or heirs and ordered
the Clerk of Court to issue writ of possession in favor of Gregorio Bajamonde or heirs.
GAUF filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Joint Order alleging that the twin orders
in question were issued by the trial court without jurisdiction. The CA denied the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to issue the Joint Order which directed the
cancellation of the petitioner’s title over Lot 54 and 75

HELD:

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify
the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is
direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or collateral when, in an action or proceeding to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

Here, while it may be true that Civil Case No. C760 was originally an action for specific
performance and damages, nonetheless the case cannot constitute a collateral attack on the
petitioner’s title which, to begin with, was irregularly and illegally issued. It bears stressing that
the source of GAUF’s title was the Compromise Agreement purportedly executed by Gregorio
Bajamonde, et al. which were declared null and void. Well settled is the rule that the
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. In view
of these circumstances, it was as if no title at all was ever issued in this case to the petitioner
and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk of collateral attack against a title.
The Court agree with the CA that the trial court had jurisdiction to annul petitioner’s title. It must
be emphasized that, notwithstanding the original denomination of the said action as one for
specific performance and damages, it was petitioner GAUF no less which sought to intervene in
Civil Case No. C760 and claimed that it has rights or interests in the subject matter being
litigated therein. It is undeniable that petitioner’s TCT was issued in enforcement of a partial
decision in Civil Case No. C760. As it were, the validity of petitioner’s title was an issue litigated
in Civil Case No. C760 on account of the presentation therein of the Compromise Agreement
which, to stress, was the springboard of petitioner’s title. Hence, when that same Compromise
Agreement and the Partial Decision in connection therewith were eventually nullified, the trial
court acted very much within its jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s title in the
same Civil Case No. C760.

69 Ono vs Lim 614 SCRA 514 3/9/2010 Julo, Ma.Victoria

Facts:
Vicente Lim filed an action in the RTC a petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate
copy of the OCT alleging it has been lost during the World War II by his mother, Luisa. The land
was sold to Luisa by the spouses Diego Ono and Estefania Apas. The deed evidencing the sale
had been lost without being registered. Antonio Ono, the only legitimate heir of the spouses,
executed a notarized confirmation of sale in favor of Luisa. Zosimo Ono and Teofisto Ono
opposed Lim’s petition contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as the
successors-in-interest of the Spouses Ono. Lim converted the petition for reconstitution into a
complaint for quieting of title, stating that he had been in the actual possession of the property
since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes of the land.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Lim. RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register
the land in favor of Luisa Lim. The lower court found that Lim had been in peaceful possession
of the land since 1937; that the possession had never been disturbed by Ono; that Lim declared
the lot in their name for taxation purposes; that Lim paid the tax related to it; and that the
signature of Antonio Ono on confirmation of sale document was genuine.
On the appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC. CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was
not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that Lim’s undisturbed possession had given
them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on their own title. The CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicate certificate of title in the name
of Luisa, considering that the owners duplicate was still intact in the possession of the Ono.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary
civil action to quiet title;
2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or
adverse possession;
3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono in favor of Luisa and
whether or not said deed was lost during World War II;

4. Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of Lim and declared that the petition has no merit.
Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. The attack is direct when the objective
is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack
is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Lim was asserting only that the existing title
registered in the name of the petitioners predecessors had become inoperative due to the
conveyance in favor of Lim’s mother, and resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby
assail the validity of OCT or challenge the judgment by which the title of the lot involved had
been decreed.
Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing
ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the
conditions laid down by law. However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the
dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an adverse
possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been
voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-
interest. Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the property by virtue of sale; that
from the time Luisa had acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over its possession in the
concept of an owner, and had performed her obligation by paying real property taxes on the
property, as evidenced by tax declarations issued in her name; and that in view of the delivery
of the property, coupled with Luisa’s actual occupation of it, all that remained to be done was
the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her name.

70 Radiowealth Finance vs Palileo 197 SCRA 245 Julo,

Ma.Victoria
Facts:
The defendant spouses Enrique Castro and Herminia R. Castro sold to plaintiff-appellee
Manuelito Palileo (private respondent herein), a parcel of unregistered coconut land. The sale is
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The deed was not registered in the Registry of
Property for unregistered lands. Since the execution of the deed of sale, appellee Manuelito
Palileo exercised acts of ownership over the land through his mother Rafaela Palileo, as
administratrix or overseer. Appellee has continuously paid the real estate taxes on said land
from 1971 until the present.
In another civil case, a judgment was rendered against Enrique Castro and was directed by the
RCT to pay Radiowealth Finance Company. A writ of execution was issued. The Provincial
Sheriff sold at public auction the subject land that defendant Enrique Castro had sold to
appellee Manuelito Palileo. A certificate of sale was executed by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of
defendant- appellant Radiowealth Finance Company, being the only bidder. After the period of
redemption has expired, a deed of final sale was also executed by the same Provincial Sheriff.
Both the certificate of sale and the deed of final sale were registered with the Registry of Deeds.
The Private respondent Manuelito Palileo filed an action for quieting of title over the same. After
a trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision in his favor. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed.
Issue:
As between the two buyers of unregistered land, who is the rightful owner (the first buyer in a
prior sale that was unrecorded, or the second buyer who purchased the land in an execution
sale whose transfer was registered in the Registry of Deeds)?
Ruling:

Palileo has the better right over the land.

There is no doubt that had the property in question been a registered land, this case would have
been decided in favor of petitioner since it was petitioner that had its claim first recorded in the
Registry of Deeds. It must be stressed however that this case deals with a parcel of
unregistered land and a different set of rules applies. The Court affirm the decision of the CA.
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is “without prejudice
to a third party with a better right”. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean
that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the
vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil
Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Section 35, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to
benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even
if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of
unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor,
and merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property was
levied upon. Applying this principle, the CA correctly held that the execution sale of the
unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the
judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale. Findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive on this Court and will not be disturbed unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The
finding of the CA that the property in question was already sold to private respondent by its
previous owner before the execution sale is evidenced by a deed of sale. Said deed of sale is
notarized and is presumed authentic. There is no substantive proof to support petitioner’s
allegation that the document is fictitious or simulated. There is no reason to reject the
conclusion of the CA that private respondent was not a mere administrator of the property. That
he exercised acts of ownership through his mother also remains undisputed.

71 Bernabe vs Court of Appeals 559 SCRA 53 7/21/2008 Julo,

Ma.Victoria
Facts:
Titan Construction Corporation filed a case before the RTC against petitioners predecessor-in-
interest, Antonio F. Bernabe, and his siblings Patricio F. Bernabe, Jose F. Bernabe and Cecilia
Bernabe Perez who are co-owners of an undivided one-half share in two parcels of land located
in Paranaque. The Deed of Sale of Real Estate is entered into by Titan and the defendants.
A compromise agreement was subsequently entered into by Titan and the remaining
defendants, whereby the latter agreed to the sale of their one-half share in the properties to
Titan and waived whatever cause of action for damages they might have against each other. By
virtue of the compromise agreement, similar Deeds of Conditional Sale were separately entered
into by respondent Titan as vendee, and defendants Patricio, Cecilia, and Antonio, as vendors
of their undivided shares in the two properties. The three deeds were similarly worded and
contained the same terms and conditions and differed only as to the amount of the purchase
price.
Defendant Jose and Antonio died. Titan subsequently filed a supplemental complaint alleging
that Antonio had already received a substantial portion of the down payment for the sale of his
share in the properties; that prior to his death, Antonio executed a SPA in favor of his two
children, Jose III and Shirley Ann, empowering them to execute in his favor the Deed of
Conditional Sale involving his share in the properties; that on the basis of the deed, it made
additional substantial advances on the purchase price and even expended certain amounts to
satisfy the judgment debt of Antonio in Civil Case No. 92-2328; that the heirs of Antonio refused
to execute the formal deed of sale; and that through its exclusive efforts, the one-half share of
the original defendants in both properties was segregated and TCT No. 86793 covering the
same was subsequently issued.
The trial court upheld the validity of both the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and the Deed of
Conditional Sale. It held that there was no basis to rescind the contracts since petitioners had
not proven that Titan had failed to comply with its undertaking under them. The RTC modified
the decision, specifying that in view of the compromise agreements entered into by Titan and
defendants Patricio and Cecilia, the decision should be rendered against the heirs of Antonio.
Accordingly, said heirs were ordered to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale over the
one-third (1/3) share of Antonio in the property covered by TCT No. 86793 of the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque, pursuant to the Deed of Conditional Sale, upon Titans payment to them of
the amount of P3,431,058.42 representing the balance of the purchase price.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed in
the Decision dated 22 January 2002, and the RTC decision was affirmed in toto.
Petitioners, contending that the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and Deed of Conditional Sale are
contracts to sell and not contracts of sale, allege that Titan has no cause of action to file the
complaint for specific performance since it failed to pay the purchase price in full as agreed
upon in the contracts. The Deed of Conditional Sale, which necessarily superseded and nullified
the Deed of Sale of Real Estate, expressed this intent more clearly when it stated that upon full
payment of the purchase price, Vendor shall execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Vendee transferring and conveying all his undivided shares in the properties.
Titan dismisses petitioners’ claim. Instead, it relies on the declaration of the Court of Appeals
that there was a perfected contract of sale of real estate evidenced by the Deed of Sale of Real
Estate. However, Titan expounds, said contract was not in the form required for registration
under the law and so the courts below, in affirming it and requiring petitioners to execute a
registerable deed, simply followed the provisions of the Civil Code governing the form of
contracts, particularly Articles 1356, 1357 and 1358. Titan adds that it is only upon the execution
of a registerable deed of sale that full payment of the consideration should be made, and that
since the contract still has to be put in a registerable form as required by law, there is nothing
yet to rescind.
Issues:
(1) Under a deed of conditional sale of a parcel of land, may the vendee compel the vendors
to execute a registerable deed of sale based on the allegation that it had paid a substantial
portion of the P1 million down payment of the total consideration of P17,700,000.00, where it
was expressly stipulated that the vendors would execute the necessary deed of absolute sale in
favor of the vendee only upon full payment?
(2) May the vendors in a deed of conditional sale ask for rescission of contract for failure of
the vendee to pay in full the agreed consideration?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. Respondent Titan Construction Corporation is ORDERED to PAY
petitioners Heirs of Antonio F. Bernabe and petitioners are ORDERED to ACCEPT the payment
and thereupon EXECUTE the proper deed of absolute sale. Both parties are ORDERED to
COMPLY with the other stipulations in the Deed of Conditional Sale.
Ratio:
No. Petitioners cannot ask for rescission of the Deed of Conditional Sale since it has been
proven that far from violating the conditions of the deed, Titan was ready and willing to perform
its contractual obligations. That the balance had not yet become due and demandable is a result
of the appeal from the RTC and CA decisions, and is not due to Titans alleged refusal to comply
with the contract. Accordingly, the Deed of Conditional Sale remains valid, but petitioners
cannot be compelled by specific performance to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of
Titan until and unless Titan settles the balance of the purchase price as agreed upon.
The whole essence of a compromise is that by making reciprocal concessions, the parties avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement can be entered
into without novating or supplanting existing contracts, but in this case, the irreconcilable
incompatibility between the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and the Deed of Conditional Sale
inevitably resulted in extinctive novation.
The difference between contracts of sale and contracts to sell is relevant. In a contract of sale,
the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to
sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until
full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses
ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the
price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of
which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
becoming effective.
Titan has a cause of action since it has already partially performed the contract by making down
and other payments on the purchase price, as well as effecting and spending for the
segregation and titling of the shares of petitioners and their co-owners in the properties. Titan
seeks only to enforce the contract. The first condition, i.e., that Eriberta Development
Corporation must agree to make the vendors share pertain to the northern half of the properties,
was deemed fulfilled with the segregation and titling of the interests of Antonio, Patricio and
Cecilia under TCT No. 86793. The separation of the property was registered on 12 October
1994, just a few months after the parties executed the Deed of Conditional Sale. With the
segregation of the property and the issuance of TCT No. 86793, the fourth condition, i.e., that
the titles to the properties be surrendered to Titan, was also satisfied since the segregation
would not have transpired had the old titles not been surrendered. The second condition
involving the co-owners waiver of their right of first refusal was also complied with, as evidenced
by similar declarations in the deeds of conditional sale executed by Patricio and Cecilia. It is
only the third condition the acquisition of a right of way over the northern part of the propertythat
had not yet been fulfilled at the time of the filing of the supplemental complaint. It was on the
basis of the fulfillment of all the conditions that the RTC ordered the execution of the
registerable deed of sale but only upon Titans payment of the balance. But since the trial courts
decision was appealed all the way to this Court, it could not attain finality and execution could
not be ordered. In short, the pendency of the appeal put resolution of the controversy on hold.

72 Egao vs CA 174 SCRA 484 1989 Manuel, Maurice Victoria

Facts:
The private respondents filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and and/or Recovery of
Possesion and Ownership. They alleged that they are the legitimate owners and possessors of
two parcels of land Lot 662 and Lot 661 through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Marfori in
favor of the respondents, the Tax Declarations were transferred to them. Marfori acquired the
properties from Egao through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 7, 1964, January 14 and
October 6, 1965 while the Lot 661 is from Conejos to Marfori by Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 3, 1965. The private respondents also alleged that the petitioners occupied illegally
portions of the land, hence this complaint.
The petitioners alleged that the Lot No. 662 is covered by Free Patent dated August 12, 1965
and the OCT No. P-3559 was issued March 1, 1966 in the name of Apolonio Egao, that he and
his family has been occupying the land even before the free patent was issued. They are aware
that the land cannot be a subject of the sale since it is still under the five year prohibition period.
Petitioners likewise deny the authenticity of the Deeds of sale to Marfori.

Issue:
Whether the sale of patented lands perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period is null and
void.

Held/Ratio:

Yes.

In the Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits the alienation or
encumbrance within a period of five (5) years from the date of issuance of the patent lands
acquired under free patent or homestead; In the present case, it is clear that the deeds were
executed within the prohibited period of 5 years. The free patent was issued August 12, 1965
and the Deeds of Sale were executed May 24, 1964, January 4 and October 6, 1965, assuming
the authenticity of the said Deeds of Sale still it is considered within the prohibited period.
Therefore, no title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to herein
respondents Bontilao and Dignos.

73 Soliven vs Franciso 170 SCRA 218 1989 Manuel, Maurice

Victoria
Facts:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Davao as evidenced by TCT No. T-
10985. They alleged that Tompong and Ngoho obtained an agreement to sell the property to
certain Espinosa from Masbate for P60,000.00. Tompong and Ngoho gave a partial payment of
P10,000.00 and persuaded the petitioners to give them the Certificate of Title of the property
and promised that the sale will be consummated and the balance will be paid within six months,
however they never returned to make good their promise.
A number of Deed of Sales were executed in favor of different persons, such as Atty. Mapayo
and Paulino Cagas. The Deeds were supported by a power of attorney constituting the fact that
Ngoho is appointed as an Attorney-in-fact of the Solivels. The said power attorney was allegedly
forged. Cagas, one of the buyers, obtained the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title in
the name of Solivels and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. Upon the
knowledge of the Solivels, they procured an inscription of an adverse claim on the title.
Issue:

Whether the title to the real property is passed to an innocent purchaser by a deed of sale in his
favor executed in the name of the owners by one falsely claiming to be said owners’ duly
appointed and authorized attorney-in-fact.
Held/Ratio:

No.
The innocent purchaser for value protected by the law is one who purchases a titled land by
virtue of a deed of sale executed by the registered owner himself and not by virtue of a forged
deed. It is also ruled the case of Joaquin vs Madrid that, in order that the holder of a certificate
for value issued by a virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a
holder in good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. When the
instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title,
the registered owner does not thereby lose his title and neither does the assignee in the forged
deed acquire any right or title to the property.
Therefore, the deed of sale of September 8, 1972 executed by Isaias Ngoho as purported
attorney-in-fact of the petitioners in favor of Cags is declared null and void.

74 Llanto vs Alzona 450 SCRA 288 1/31/2005 Manuel,

Maurice Victoria
Facts:
Bernardo and Maria Sales are spouses and they have twelve children, 11 of whom are the
petitioners while the remaining child Estela is one of the herein respondents. Maria was the
registered owner of a certain parcel of land covered with Original Certificate of Title No. P-3225
which she acquired under a Free Patent. On January 29, 1990, a real estate mortgage contract
whom Estela is a witness, was executed in favor of herein respondent Dominador Alzona. Maria
died on August 27, 1986 which shows that Maria was not the one who executed the said Real
Estate Mortgage.

The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed due to the mortgagors’ failure to settle their
obligation. Ernesto Alzona was the highest bidder and caused the cancellation of the OCT in the
name of Maria and acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. Upon the knowledge of
the said cancellation of OCT, the petitioners caused the inscription of an adverse claim on the
title of the property. They alleged that the Real Estate Mortgage was not executed by the owner
of the property hence it is void, while the respondents alleged that they mortgagee in good faith.

Issue:
Whether Dominador is a mortgagee in good faith to validly transfer the title to the highest bidder.

Held/Ratio:

Yes.
The mortgagee is considered as a mortgagee in good faith. Under this doctrine, even if the
mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. The principle is
based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrents Certificate of
Title, as buyers or mortgagees; are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the
title and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no
obligation to undertake further investigation. However, those persons who are engaged in real
estate or financing business like herein respondents Ernesto and Dominador to be considered
as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence requires that they should take the necessary
precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of the properties
offered as a collateral and to verify the identity of the persons they transact business with,
particularly those who claim to be the registered property owners.
In the present case, Ernesto sufficiently established that he acted in good faith in exercising due
diligence in ascertaining the status of the property by visiting the property and he also identify
the owners and occupants, it was Estela and the persons represented themselves as Bernardo
and Maria who perpetrated the fraud, hence Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good
faith and are entitled to the protection of the law.

75 LP Leviste vs Noblejas 89 SCRA 520 4/30/1979 Geologo,

Noel Paolo
FACTS:
This involves property with a total area of 1.6 hectares which is situated in Paranaque, Rizal,
covered by a Transfer certificate in the name of Z. Garcia Realty, Inc converted the property into
a subdivision called the Garville subdivision. Blocks and certain lots are the controversy
specifically Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd-56800).
Notice of lis pendens was presented by Melecio B. Emata, noting the pendency of Civil Case of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal entitled Vivencio R. de Guzman vs. Z. Garcia & Company
referring specifically to Lot 3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the new subdivision plan.

The lis pendens does not refer to Lot 6, Block 4.

Affidavit of Adverse Claim covering Lot 1, Block 5 presented by J. Antonio Leviste, Executive
Vice President of petitioner company, based on an assignment in his favor by one Leticia P.
Ramos, buyer of said lot from Garcia Realty.

No reference to Lot 6, Block 4.

Affidavit of Adverse covering Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd 56800),
consisting presented by respondent Maria Villanueva based on an agreement to sell in her
favor executed by Garcia Realty. (Disputed Lot)
Attachment (Disputed Lot) was presented by Leviste & Co and participation with Garcia Realty,
Inc.

Attachment(Disputed Lot) and participation of the defendants of Z.

Garcia Realty and respondent Villanueva consummated a contract of sale over the Disputed
Lot.
Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title issued in her favor, free of
any encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste and Berthelsen objected alleging that they had
registered adverse claims and attachments.

The Register of Deeds refused to issue a new title to Villanueva without carrying over

(A) Two annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim,

(B) Attachments covering the entire property annotated on the title subsequent to Villanueva's
adverse claim

ISSUE:
Whether Villanueva's adverse claim is, in fact, registerable, and if so, whether it can be
preferred over the attachments.

HELD:

No, Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to sell considering that
Section 62 of the Land Registration Act prescribes the procedure for the registration of
Villanueva's interest less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and there being no
showing of her inability to produce the owner's duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in
Section 110 of Act 496, which was resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the
purpose of protecting her right or interest on the disputed lot.
Adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the same did not have the effect of a
conveyance of her right or interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that may
have arisen thereafter in favor of third parties. Consequently, the attachments of Berthelsen,
Leviste, and that in Civil Case No. 2489-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal covering the
disputed lot are superior to that acquired by Villanueva and will have to be carried over to the
new title to be issued in her favor.

Thus, Section of Act 496 provides that:

If at the time of any transfer there appear upon the registration book encumbrances or claims
adverse to the title of the registered owner, they shall be stated in the new certificate or
certificates, except so far as they may be simultaneously released or discharged

76 LBP vs Republic 543 SCRA 453 2/4/2008 Geologo, Noel

Paolo
FACTS:
OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969 in favor of one Angelito C. Bugayong. The
mother title came from Sales Patent No. 4576 issued in Bugayongs name which covers a parcel
of land located in Bocana, Kabacan, Davao city. It was originally identified and surveyed as
marshy and under water during high tide, it used to be a portion of a dry river bed near the
mouth of Davao River.
The land was subdivided into 4 lots initially. Bugayong sold all the 4 lots to different persons. 2
of the lots was sold to Spouses Du. The previous TCT under the name of Bugayong was
cancelled then registered to spouses Du.

Spouses Du sold one lot to spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola.

Du spouses TCT was cancelled and was replaced by another TCT registered in the name of
Lourdes Farms, Inc which is the subject of this case.

Lourdes Farms, Inc mortgaged this property to petitioner LBP.

Some residents of the land it covered, particularly along Bolton Diversion Road, filed a formal
petition before the Bureau of Lands.

Investigation and ocular inspection were conducted on the subject land.

They found that:

(1)Sales Patent No. 4576 was issued to Bugayong, the land it covered was still within the forest
zone, classified under Project No. 1, LC-47; it was released as alienable and disposable land
only on March 25, 1981

(2) the land was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide;

(3) Bugayong was never in actual possession of the land.

Bureau of Lands resolved that the sales patent in favor of Bugayong was improperly and
illegally issued and that the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of the subject land.
Upon recommendation of the Bureau of Lands, the Republic of the Philippines represented by
the Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), instituted a complaint
before the RTC in Davao for the cancellation of patent and reversion of the land covered by
OCT No. P-2823 into the mass of public domain.
The complaint, as amended, was filed against Bugayong and other present owners and
mortgagees of the land, such as Lourdes Farms, Inc. and the latters mortgagee, petitioner LBP.
The mother Title, OCTP-2823 in the name of defendant Bugayong was issued at a time when
the area was not yet released by the Bureau of Forestry to the Bureau of Lands.
The area covered by OCT No. P. 2823 was not yet declared by the Bureau of Lands alienable
and disposable when the said OCT was issued.

ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in not finding that petitioner Land Bank of The Philippines mortgage right and
interest as an innocent purchaser (mortgagee) for value and in good faith over the subject land
is valid and subsisting in accordance with the law and existing jurisprudence in our country.
HELD:

No, LBP has no valid and subsisting mortgagees interest over the land
It has been established and admitted by LBP that:
(1) the subject land mortgaged to it by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is covered by TCT No. T-57348;
and

(2) the said TCT is derived from OCT No. P-2823 issued to Bugayong
It was ascertained the land it covered was still within the forest zone. It was declared as
alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981.
The mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which LBP obtaining its alleged interest has never
been the owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is
legally impossible as the land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25,
1981. Hence, LBP acquired no rights over the land. Since Lourdes Farms, Inc. is not the owner
of the land, it does not have the capacity to mortgage it to LBP.

77 St Dominic Corporation vs IAC 151 CRA 577 1987 Geologo,

Noel Paolo
FACTS:

Two decisions of the appellate court are involved in this case

1 ) Court of Appeals rendered a decision in an action for specific performance filed by the
private respondents against the St. Dominic Corporation

2) Promulgated by the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in an action to set aside an

order of the Regional Trial Court directing receipt in consignation of the amount ordered to be
paid by the Court of Appeals in its 1981 decision

Private respondents Constantino B. Acosta and Eva Acosta signed a Land Purchase
Agreement wherein herein Petitioner St. Dominic Corporation sold to the former Lot No. 1-A, S-
2, Block 8, covered by T.C.T. No. 842,00, Quezon City.
The Acostas were about 7 months in money debt of the corresponding monthly payments due,
when they sent to the St. Dominic Corp. two separate money orders on. These payments were
rejected by the St. Dominic Corporation in a letter sent to the Acostas by its Corporate Secretary
because their contract had been cancelled said Corporate Secretary had sent to the Private
Respondents herein a letter informing the latter that their contract had been cancelled one
month after their final notice, and that postal money order sent by the Acostas were sent back to
them.
Private Respondents Acostas instituted in the then CFI of Manila an action against the St.
Dominic Corporation to compel the latter to accept payment of the lot in question. Later a
decision was rendered in said case adverse to the Acostas.
Acostas appealed the same to the then Court of Appeals. The CA rendered its decision, setting
aside the decision of the CFI of Manila.
The petitioner corporation sought reconsideration of the appellate court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether IAC erred in not finding that it is legally impossible for the petitioner, without its fault, to
transfer to the Acostas the title to land in question, it having been transferred to a third party.

HELD:
The respondents did not have a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title of the property
during the whole time that said property was in litigation.
A notice of lis pendens in an announcement to the whole world that a particular piece of real
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so on his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.
Since the private respondents failed to file such notice, the subsequent purchaser for value
cannot be prejudiced by the outcome of the litigation and in the absence of proof of any fraud on
his part, such purchaser is presumed to have acquired his title in good faith and for a valuable
consideration. The rule is elementary that fraud is not presumed. Private respondents were
given by the Court of Appeals only until December 29, 1981 to pay the remaining balance of
unpaid installments. Actual consignment was made on October 25, 1982 or almost ten (10)
months late.
Innocent third party who has the title to the land and who has built a residence on it should be
respected and protected in his possession and ownership. The petitioner should, however, pay
damages to the private respondents after returning all amounts it has received from them.

78 Maglaque vs Planters 307 SCRA 156 5/17/1999 Ong, Gecel

Facts:
A real estate mortgage was executed to secure a loan obtained by the spouses Sabina and
Egmidio Maglaque from Bulacan Development Bank now known as Planters Development
Bank. After the death of Sabina, partial payment was made by Egmidio which the Bank
accepted. However, the real estate mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed for non-payment in
full of the loan. Title was consolidated in the name of the bank as the highest bidder. The
defendant-Bank contends that the formalities provided for by law were duly observed while the
plaintiff claims that there was no such compliance. After the lapse of the redemption period, the
bank consolidated its title to the property, and became its registered owner. Thereafter,
petitioners, heirs of the spouses, filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance of title,
with damages, and injunction. The bank sold the property to the spouses Angel S. Beltran and
Erlinda C. Beltran, for thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos. The plaintiff amended the complaint
twice to implead the other heirs of the spouses Maglaque, and defendant Beltran spouses, the
buyers of the property in question.
Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the bank should have filed
its claim in the settlement of estate of the deceased mortgagor.
Issue:
Whether the Bank should have filed its claim in the settlement of estate of the deceased
mortgagors
Ruling:

No. The rule is that a secured creditor holding a real estate mortgage has three options in case
of death of the debtor. These are:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at anytime before it is barred
by prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency.

Obviously, respondent bank availed itself of the third option.

79 Nagtalon vs UCPB 172504 7/31/2013 Ong, Gecel
Facts:
Spouses Nagtalon entered into a credit agreement with respondent UCPB. To secure the credit,
Spouses Nagtalon executed real estate mortgage over several properties. Upon failure to pay,
the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction to UCPB as highest
bidder. With the petitioner’s failure to exercise her right to redeem the properties, UCPB
consolidated the ownership over the properties and TCTs in the name of UCPB were issued.
Thereafter, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the
RTC. The petitioner opposed the petition, citing mainly the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity of foreclosure, etc. Petitioner argued that the issuance of a writ of
possession was no longer a ministerial duty on the part of the court in view of the pendency of
the case.

Issue:
Whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit agreement, the
promissory notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of possession after the
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year redemption
period.
Ruling:

No. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial

function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for
the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale. Once title to the
property has been consolidated in the buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right
belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at
anytime. Its right to possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner
and the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise
of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an application for its issuance, should issue the
writ as a matter of course and without any delay. (Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3135, as amended by
Act 4118)

There are however exceptions to the rule that issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial
function, as follows:

1. Gross inadequacy of purchase price

2. Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor

3. Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor

The petitioner's case does not fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

80 Labora vs Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346 1/30/1971

(SUPRA)
81 Republic vs Aquino 120 SCRA 186 1/27/1983
(SUPRA)

82 Republic vs TAN Properties INC 555 SCRA 477 6/26/2008

(SUPRA)

83 Nieto vs Quines 1 SCRA 227 1/28/1961

(SUPRA)

84 Register of Deeds vs RTC of Malabon 181 SCRA 788 2/5/1990

Ong, Gecel
Facts:
A Deed of Absolute Sale of a property covered by TCT No. R-3899 in the name of Salome
Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to the Register of Deeds (Atty. Francisco
Romero) in Caloocan City for registration. It could not be given due course because the original
of said TCT No. R-3899 in the Registry of Deeds was missing. As the missing title covered a
parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio Cena, the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed in the
RTC of Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original of TCT No. R-3899. The
court directed that a copy of its order setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 be published in 2
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as provided in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26.
However, the certificate of publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office
stated that the order of the court was published in the May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the
Official Gazette and that the May 30, 1988 issue was released for circulation on October 3,
1988 (i.e., 47 days after the date set for hearing). The RTC of Malabon dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of the petition was not published in the Official Gazette
"at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing which had been set on August 17, 1988.

Issue:
a. Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette 47 days
after the hearing, instead of "at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing" was sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition.

b. Whether the Register of Deeds of Malabon is the proper party to file the petition for
reconstitution
Ruling:
a. No, it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been
filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within 30 days before
the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of
jurisdiction.
b. No. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 26, which allowed the Register of Deeds to motu
proprio reconstitute a lost or destroyed certificate of title from its corresponding owner's
duplicate certificate, was expressly repealed or declared to be "inoperative" by Section 6 of
Republic Act 6732, approved on July 17, 1989. A petition for reconstitution may now be filed
only by "the registered owner, his assigns, or any person who has an interest in the property"
(Section 12, Republic Act No. 26).

85 Tahanan Development vs CA 118 SCRA 273 11/15/1982

Orquia, Basil Ian
Facts:
The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondent hereinafter referred
to as the
Pascuals, claiming as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on January 26, 1967, filed a
petition for judicial reconstitution of lost certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as
Reconstitution Case No. 504P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal. Manuela Aquial, the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the registered owner of
those contiguous lands, Lots 2 and 4 San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal now, Cupang, Muntinlupa,
Rizal. The private respondents said that original certificate of title, original and owner's
duplicate copies, covering said lands have been lost or destroyed in the last World War II and
diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain; that said title was subsisting and in force
at the time it was lost or destroyed, free from liens and encumbrances of any kind and nature up
to the present; that there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or any land grant over
said lands to any person or entity; that no Co-owner's, Mortgagee's, Lessee's or any lien
holder's copy of said Original Certificate of Title have ever been issued.

Issue:

Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted.

Ruling:
The Court denied the petition for reconstitution. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition for reconstitution.

Rationale:
Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of
Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed" approved on September 25, 1946 confers
jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial
reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure
that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or
authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and
procedure are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific
jurisdictional fact and the notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted
in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of
the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed.

These sections state as follows:

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c),
3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the
registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition
shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed: (c)
the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings
or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and
addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of
the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed
description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if
there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or
authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this
Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the
property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified
copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of the covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette,
and to be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at
the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is
known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other
things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the
owners of the adjoining properties and an other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must
appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall at the hearing,
submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

As the Court have earlier quoted in fun the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution Case No.
504P and substantially the Notice of Hearing issued by the court published in the Official
Gazette together with the Certification of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff, it would not be a difficult
task to check and verify whether the strict and mandatory requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of
Republic Act No. 26 have been faithfully complied with by therein petitioners Pascuals, now the
private respondents here.
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing, it is at
once apparent that Tahanan has not been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner,
occupant or possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to which is sought to be reconstituted.
Neither does the petition and the notice state nor mention that Tahanan is the occupant or
possessor of a portion of said Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan was
never notified of the petition for reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.
We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only in the bulletin
board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law specifically
require that the notice of the petition shall be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or
city on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building at least
30 days prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as certified to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio
C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted on the bulletin board of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay
City. Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the main entrance of the provincial
building in Pasig, Rizal. It was not posted at the main entrance of the municipal building of
Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio Cupang, or at least in the municipal
building of Paranaque where Barrio San Dionisio was then embraced.

86 Alabang Development vs Valenzuela 116 SCRA 261 8/20/1982

Orquia, Basil Ian
Facts:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of reconstitution alleges that the
petitioners are registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer Certificates of Title issued by
the Register of Deeds of Rizal covering parcels of land located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa.
The parcels of land surrounded by a high perimeter wall on their boundaries were sold to
innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration as part of Alabang Hills Village
Subdivision, owned by petitioner Alabang Development Corporation, many of whom were
already issued in turn the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor. These
innocent purchasers for value have been in open, actual, adverse, continuous, notorious and
uninterrupted possession of their respective lands since 1969. Petitioners alleged that in the
reconstitution case below, filed only in 1977, herein respondents as petitioners therein sought to
reconstitute a lost certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, allegedly lost or
destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last World War II. On the basis of the technical
descriptions contained in petitioners' titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to be
reconstituted, the latter overlap the parcels of land owned by petitioners and duly registered in
their name. The petitioners alleged that being actual possessors and registered owners were
not served with notice of the hearing of the petition for reconstitution in violation of Republic Act
26 such that the court a quo acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the
reconstitution and that there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

Issue:
Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted. The trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over t

Ruling:

The Court denied the petition for reconstitution.

Rationale:
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential
data required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and
description of the buildings or improvements, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and
the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, and the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the
adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do
these data appear in the Notice of Hearing such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor
was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. And since the above data do
not appear in the Amended Petition, the same data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing
of the petition published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which
enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13 which
similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these
multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above cited sections of the Act. The
Court rules that said defects have not invested the lower court with the authority or jurisdiction to
proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by
the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings
utterly null and void.

87 Serra vs CA 195 SCRA 482 3/22/1991

(SUPRA)

88 Republic vs Ramos 169481 2/22/2010 Orquia, Basil Ian

Facts:
On February 23, 2001, respondents filed a Petition for Reconstitution before the RTC. The late
Julio Ramos, grandfather of herein respondents, is the original claimant of Lot No. 54 of the
Cadastral Survey of Orani, Bataan, as evidenced by a Relocation Plan of said lot duly approved
by the Chief, Regional Surveys Division, Ruperto P. Sawal, and the Regional Technical Director
Eriberto V. Almazan.The Acting Registrar of Deeds of Bataan likewise issued a Certification to
the effect that OCT No. 3613 covering Lot No. 54 of Orani Cadastre is not among the salvaged
records of the said Registry. The owner’s copy of OCT No. 3613 was lost and all efforts exerted
to locate the same are in vain. The said Lot No. 54 is declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Julio Ramos and taxes due thereon are fully paid up to the current year. There is no
document pending registration with the Registry of Deeds of Bataan affecting said Lot 54.
Respondents prayed for the issuance of an order directing the Registrar of Deeds to
reconstitute OCT No. 3613 on the basis of the approved plan and technical description.
Respondent Reynaldo Ramos Medina, a 62year old watch technician, testified on the material
allegations of the petition. He likewise declared on the witness stand that his mother used to
keep the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3613. During the Japanese occupation, however, it was
buried in a foxhole and since then it could no longer be found. Reynaldo further testified that he
and his coheirs are the present occupants of Lot 54.

Issue:

Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted.

Ruling:
The Court denied the petition for reconstitution. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition for reconstitution.
Rationale:

RA 26 lays down the specific procedure for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens
certificates of title. It confers jurisdiction upon trial courts to hear and decide petitions for judicial
reconstitution. However, before said courts can assume jurisdiction over the petition and grant
the reconstitution prayed for, the petitioner must observe certain special requirements and mode
of procedure prescribed by law.
Perusal of respondents’ Petition for Reconstitution, for the purpose of verifying whether the strict
and mandatory requirements of RA 26, particularly Section 12 (b) and (e) thereof, have been
faithfully complied with, would reveal that it did not contain an allegation that no co-owner’s,
mortgagee’s or lessees duplicate had been issued or, if any had been issued, the same had
been lost or destroyed. The petition also failed to state the names and addresses of the present
occupants of Lot 54. Correspondingly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the court a quo did not
also indicate the names of the occupants or persons in possession of Lot 54, in gross violation
of Section 13 of RA 26. Because of these fatal omissions, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over respondents’ petition. Consequently, the proceedings it conducted, as well as
those of the CA, are null and void.

89 Ragua vs CA 88521 1/21/1991 Sevilla, Victor Emmanuel

90 Manotok vs Barque 574 SCRA 468 12/18/2008 Sevilla, Victor

Emmanuel

91 Alipon vs CA 305 SCRA 118 Borja, Mark Joseph

92 OCA vs Matas 247 SCRA 9 Ramirez, Karen Tatiana

FACTS:
Private respondent Judgw Matas took cognizance of the petition for issuance of new duplicate
copies of OCT Nos. P-12658, P-12659, P-12661 and T-9857 filed before his Sala,
notwithstanding the fact that his court has no jurisdiction over Kapalong and Sto. Tomas Davao
where the subject properties covered by the aforesaid titles where located.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Matas acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Miscellaneous Case No.
1626.

HELD:
Administrative order No. 7 defines the territorial jurisdiction of RTC in Regions 1 to 12 of RTC
Davao Del Norte. Br. 1 and 2 has jurisdiction over Kapalong and Br. 4 has jurisdiction over Sto.
Tomas. Branch 1 of RTC of Davao del Norte the presided by Judge Matas has jurisdiction ocer
Mis. 1626. Sec. 2 of Pd 1529 states that CFI shall have jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands including and interest therein and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title. Also, Sec. 17 of PD 1529 provides that the application for land
registration shall be filed with CFI, now RTC. Of the province or municipality where the land lies.
Petition for replacement of lost certificates as in Mis. 1626 was properly taken cognizance by Br.
1 of RTC Davao del Norte since the petition stated that lots covered by the lost duplicate are
situated in Kapalong and Sto. Tomas which are both in the province of Davao del Norte. If at all,
there was an unwitting violatiom of Adm. Order 7 which places Kapalong within either Br. 1 or 2
and Sto. Tomas with Br. 4. He exceeds the territorial area of his branch for at the time Mis. 1626
was filed, Sto. Tomas which was composed of the barrios of Kapalong was not yet declared as
non existent. The error consisted merely of the impropriety of the venue of the petition.

93 New Durawood vs CA 253 SCRA 740 2/20/1996 Ramirez,

Karen Tatiana
FACTS:
Petitioner-corporation filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of the lost owner's duplicate
certificates of TCT Nos. 140486, 156454, 140485. attached thereto was an afgidavit of loss.
subsequently, petitioner discovered that the original TCTs on file with the RD were cancelled
and in lieu thereof,TCTs in the name of Durawood Corp. & Lumber Supply Inc. Were issued.
Petitioner found out about the reconstitution and filed a suit before the CA praying for the
annulment of the assailed order and for the cancellation of TCTs in the name of Durawood. CA
dismissed the suit and in effect affirmed RTC order declaring TCTs 140486, 156454, 140485
null and void.

ISSUES:
1. Whether a court has jurisdiction to issue a new owner's duplicate of Torrens Certificate of
Title, when in fact, the existing owner's copy has not been lost or destroyed.
2. which law governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificate of title in lieu of lost
ones?
HELD:
Petition was granted. The owner's duplicate of certificates of title were in the possession of the
petitioner's chairman of the board and the certificates were not in fact lost or destroyed, hence,
there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copy of certificate of title. The court never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of
new certificates. Thus, the newly issued duplicates are null and void. The remedy in case of
refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificates of title is a petition
in court to compel surrender of the duplicate certificate to the RD and not a petition for
reconstitution.
Section 109 of PD 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title which was lost or stolen or destroyed. RA 26 applies only in cases of
reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates on file with the RD.

94 Gocheco vs CA (Republic vs. CA?) 317 SCRA 504

Ramirez, Karen Tatiana
FACTS:
Vicente Yupangco, owner of a unit in a condiminium building in Makati, filed a petition for the
issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of his lost copy pursuant to Sec. 109 Pd
1529. Register of Deeds of Makati posted no objection. RTC granted the petition and the
Solicitor General was furnished with a copy of the decision. The Solicitor General moved for
revonsideration on the ground that no copy of the petition or notice had been given to him. RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration. The Courtb of Appeals affirmed RTC order.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the solicitor General is required to be notified and be heard in a
proceeding for issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title.
HELD:
CA decision was affirmed. The request for representation should have come from the Register
of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to this case; who was notified and manifested no
objection to the petition. The petition is anchored on Sec 109 Pd 1529 does not impose a
notification requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of
title. The lack of notice to the Solicitor General as counsel for the Register of Deeds, was at
most, only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect.

95 Spouses Alcazar vs Arante177042 12/10/2012 Rementina,

Mary Grace
Facts:
Petitioner Crisanto Alcazar filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title. He alleged that the original owners were his deceased parents and
he is the sole heir. Being unknowledgeable about the procedures for transferring the title of the
property in his name, he entrusted to a group of individuals (who identified themselves as
connected with the Land Registration Authority) the owner’s duplicate of title for the transfer.
However, the said group never contacted the petitioner. The fact of its loss was reported to the
Register of Deeds of Pasig by way of Affidavit of Loss.

The RTC of Pasig ruled in favor of Alcazar, declaring the owner’s duplicate copy of title null and
void and ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate of Transfer
Certificate of Title based on the original thereof on file in its office. The RTC Decision has
become final and executory.
Respondent Arante filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Final Decision
contending that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain Alcazar’s petition because the subject
owner’s duplicate title was not in fact lost but actually exists. She alleged that the petitioners
obtained a loan from her and as a security, they executed a real estate mortgage over the
subject property. She added that the petitioners personally delivered and turned over the
original owner’s duplicate copy of title. Due to the failure of the petitioners to pay their loan,
respondent decided to register the mortgage with the Register of Deeds of Pasig but she was
informed that the petitioners had caused to be annotated to the copy of TCT on file, an affidavit
stating the owner’s duplicate copy thereof was lost.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for reconstitution filed by the petitioners.

Held/Ratio:
NO, the RTC has no jurisdiction. When the owner’s duplicate certificate of title has not been
lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void,
because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be
made only in case of loss of the original certificate. Thus, with proof and with the admission of
petitioners that the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT was actually in the possession of
respondent, the RTC Decision was properly annulled for lack of jurisdiction.

96 Selph vs Aguilar 107 Phil. 443 3/29/1960 Rementina,

Mary Grace
Facts:
The subject property was first acquired by Spouses Capule. Valentin Devilles obtained a
judgment against Spouses Capule and the latter’s right and interest to the property were levied
upon which culminated in the sale to Devilles of the land at an auction. The sale was noted on
TCT No. 4610.
Capule filed Civil Case No. 2614 against Devilles wherein Capule won and, thereafter,
reacquired the land at the Sheriff's sale. Capule mortgaged the property to Manila Trading &
Supply Co. to secure the payment of 16 promissory notes.
Devilles filed Civil Case No. 3145 to annul the execution of the judgment in favor of Capule and
to cancel the Sheriff's sale. He also caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be inscribed in Capule's
certificate of title and in the land records.
The Capules failed to pay Manila Trading and judgment having been rendered in favor of the
latter, the Sheriff sold the property at foreclosure sale. Capule's TCT was cancelled and a new
one, TCT No. 8578, was issued to Manila Trading. The notice of Lis Pendens was annotated in
this new TCT.

A judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 3145 in favor of Devilles, declaring the sale in Case
No. 2614 null and void and ordering the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of Devilles.
Devilles sold the property to Spouses Aguilar and Gliceria Vda. de Aguilar, herein respondent.

Instead of surrendering the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 8578 to the Register of Deeds, as
required, Manila Trading sold the property, subject to the Lis Pendens, to Julius Reese. Reese
presented to the court a petition under Act 496 for cancellation of the annotation of lis pendens.
According to him, the lis pendens may not adversely affect him because the Supreme Court
decision in Case No. 3145 was not shown to the Register of Deeds until after 21 years, contrary
to Sec. 79 of the Land Registration Law.
Issue:
Whether Reese may invoke the ground of non-enforcement and prescription of the Supreme
Court decision in Civil Case No. 3145 to bar the issuance of a new TCT in favor of respondent.
Held/Ratio:

NO. Sec. 79 does not say that if the judgment is not registered within 60 days, the notice will not
be binding. And even if it said so, the judgment will not be binding only as against persons other
than the parties to the suit. It is still binding on the parties (the Capules) and their successors
(Manila Trading and Reese), particularly because the titles of these successors bear the
annotation relating to the lis pendens.
Although action on a judgment prescribes after ten years, the period begins from the time such
judgment becomes final and no proof exists as to the date when the judgment in Case No. 3145
became final. And then, in so far as Reese's attempt to get possession, the decision may be
invoked in defense as res judicata which does not prescribe.
Reese may not object on the ground of non-enforcement and prescription of the SC decision,
because if any one could object thereto, it was the Register of Deeds who was called upon to
implement the order of cancellation and issuance; and yet he has shown willingness to comply.
It is true that in complying, the Register is now requiring Reese in turn to surrender his title. But
the latter may not properly refuse, because he received such title from the Register upon his
undertaking to respect the outcome of the litigation, the title being expressly subject thereto, by
the annotation of lis pendens.

Manila Trading’s refusal or failure to surrender the title, upon the request of the Register of
Deeds, gave Devilles’ successors the right to petition the court for appropriate orders.

97 Ligon vs CA 244 SCRA 693 6/1/1995 Rementina, Mary

Grace
Facts:
Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against the
Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), alleging that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale,
IDP sold to it two parcels of land, both of which IDP is the registered owner. They stipulated in
the Deed that IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property
within 45 days from the execution of the contract. IDP failed to fulfill its obligation hence INK
prays that the trial court order IDP to comply and to pay damages.

IDP contended that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the
purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.

The trial court rendered a partial judgment, granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except
damages. INK filed a motion praying that petitioner Ligon, who was in possession of the
certificates of title over the properties, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of
Deeds for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that the
document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver
the certificates of title despite requests.
The trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the owner’s
copy of the certificates of title for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in INK’s name
and the annotation of the new mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new transfer
certificates of title to be issued to INK.

Issue:
Whether INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner’s copies of the certificates of
title.

Held/Ratio:
YES. Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the
Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented together with such
instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the
person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to the
Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued,
Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 states:
Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates.—Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of
title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against
his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or
failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest
may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court,
after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate
to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such
surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of
the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be delivered,
the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of
title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum
of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting
merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only
on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who wants to
compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Registry of Deeds, this does not
preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated under said
section, especially if the subject certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected
with the subject matter of the principal action.
The principal action filed by INK was for specific performance with damages based on a
document of sale. Such action was well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. When IDP did not question the genuineness and validity of said deed of sale and its
obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs sought by
INK was also an exercise of its general jurisdiction. Hence, when INK filed a motion for the
issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of
title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale
subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case.

98 PNB vs Fernandez 61 Phil. 448 5/13/1935 Sanchez,

Antonio
FACTS:
PNB argued that it has acquired first the interest over the property in question and the deed of
sale as regards Leonor Villaranda’s interest could not prejudice third persons, because it was
not registered on the TCT of Lot no. 971 due to the reason that Simon Fausa failed to present
the owner’s duplicate of TCT 2207 (Lot 971) to the registry of deeds, as required by Section 55
of Act 496.

ISSUE:
Has Fernandez acquired better title than PNB over the lot in question despite its failure to
surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title to the Registry of Deeds?

HELD:
No. By his failure to present the owner’s duplicate certificate of title to the Registry of Deeds, as
required by Sec. 55 of Act No. 496, that resulted to the deed of sale with Leonor Villaranda not
being registered in TCT 2207, Simon Fausa did not acquire any right to the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title in his favour with respect to the interest of Leonor Villaranda.
PNB acquired better title to the property based on the foregoing and since it has acquired first
the interest over the property that Jose Fernandez.

99 Avesta vs Caguion 146 SCRA 459 12/29/1986

(SUPRA)
100 Cuyugan vs Sy Quia 24 Phil. 567 3/27/2013 Sanchez,
Antonio
101 Del Prado vs Caballero 148225 3/3/2010
(SUPRA)
102 Concepcion vs Concepcion 448 SCRA 31 1/11/2005
Sanchez, Antonio
103 Sajonas vs CA 258 SCRA 79 7/5/1996 Taguiling, Chrislyn
Faith
Facts:

Domingo Pilares filed for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25,
1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which
Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed
to pay the same in two years from June 25, 1980.However, Uychocde failed to comply with his
undertaking in the compromise agreement so Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement. The court granted it so
Sheriff Garcia presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of
Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073.
Meanwhile, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land to spouses Sajonas on
installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple
caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the
subject property.Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of
Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984.
Hence TCT No. N79073 was cancelled and TCT No. N109417 was issued in the name of the
Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried
over to the new title. The Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution upon Pilares but Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation.

Issue:
Whether the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N190417 still in force
when Sheriff Garcia caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in
the said title

Held:
Yes. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the
law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides: “The
adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty daysfrom the date of registration.”
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim
to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should
be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads: “After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the
party in interest.”
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the
lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to
clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in
interest to do a useless act.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase“may be cancelled,” which obviously
indicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order the
cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an
adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such
period as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on
the period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim
which is the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the
evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of
the adverse claim or not. To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and
without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides
for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or
Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better
right than the registered owner thereof.
Hence, the disputed inscriptions of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N79073
was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the
notice of levy on execution thereto.
104 Register of Deeds vs Nicandro 111 Phil. 989 4/29/1961
Taguiling, Chrislyn Faith
Facts:

People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) sold to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), 159 lots which were included
in a larger parcel of land covered by TCT No. 1356. Subsequently, without the knowledge of the
DBP:
1) the 159 lots were segregated and a new transfer certificate of title No. 36533 covering
the same was issued;
2) that the subdivision plan segregating them was not annotated on the bigger title No.
1356; 3) the fact that title No. 1356 was pro tanto cancelled by the new title No. 36533.

4) PHHC sold 2 parcel of lands which were among the 159 lots already sold to the appellant
DBP

A month later, Honesto C. Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro presented to the Register of Deeds
for registration two deeds of sale executed by the PHHC in their favor yet were denied
registration. Hence, Nicandros filed affidavits of adverse claim over the two lots, which were
annotated on TCT No. 3653 to protect their right.
DBP on the other hand, discovering that the lots it had purchased are already covered by TCT
No. 36533, caused the annotation thereon of its deed of sale of October 20, 1955.

Issue:

Whether adverse claim is the right remedy for the Nicandros

Held:
No. "SEC. 110 provides that “Whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to
the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the
volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land
in which the right or interest is claimed. x x x."
In this case, Although admittedly we have here a case of double sale, actually this is not an
instance of double registration. Only the deed of sale in favor of appellant was inscribed on the
certificate of title covering the lots in question. The Nicandros were not able to register their
deeds of sale; Instead, informed of the prior registration by the DBP, they sought to protect their
right by filing adverse claims based on the said deeds of sale under Section 110 of Act496.

It is clear from the above quotation that for this special remedy (adverse claim) to be availed of,
it must be shown that there is no other provision in the law for registration of the claimant's
alleged right or interest in the property. The herein claim of the Nicandros is based on a
perfected contract of sale executed in their favor by the lawful owner of the land.
Considering that the Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the procedure for registration
of a vendee's right on a registered property, the remedy provided in Section 110. Which was
resorted to and invoked by appellees, would be ineffective for the purpose of protecting their
said right or interest on the two lots.
Furthermore, the adverse claim of the Nicandros was annotated on TCT No. 35633 only on
February 17, 1959 and the sale to the DBP was registered as of January 15, 1959, the
certificate of title on the two lots in controversy should be issued in favor of the first registrant,
the DBP.

105 Villaflor vs Juezan 184 SCRA 315 4/17/1990 Taguiling,

Chrislyn Faith
Facts:
On February 22, 1961 Juezan registered his affidavit of adverse claim in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T1217 (formerly a part of Original Certificate of Title 806) under primary entry No.
26083 of the Register of Deeds of Davao. On March 1, 1961, Juezan filed Civil Case 3496
seeking from Villaflor the surrender of owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title T1217 in
order that the deed of sale in his favor will be registered or annotated in the certificate of title.
Juezan further questioned the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Villaflor.
More than four (4) years after Juezan’s adverse claim was annotated that is, on October 15,
1965 and while case No. 3496 is pending, Villaflor presented for registration two (2) deeds of
sale affecting the land subject of the action, the first dated March 21, 1963 conveying 8.6186
hectares and the second dated September 6, 1986 conveying the remaining 3.0219 hectares
and as a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title T1217 was cancelled so Transfer Certificate
of Title T7601 was issued to Villaflor wherein the adverse claim annotated was carried on.

Issue:

Whether the adverse claim of Juarez should be cancelled

Held:
Yes. The basis of Civil Case No. 3496 is a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1956, allegedly
executed by Simon Maghanay in favor of Juezan. This document is also the basis of the
Affidavit of Adverse Claim ordered cancelled by the trial court. The purpose of said adverse
claim is to protect the interest of the appellant pending this litigation. Thus, considering that a
notice of lis pendens had been annotated on T.C.T. No. T7601 Vi, the Court finds no basis for
maintaining the adverse claim. This Court sees no reason for disturbing the questioned order of
the trial court dated August 25, 1967 directing the cancellation of the Juezan’s adverse claim at
the back of transfer certificate of Title No. T7601. The notice of lis pendens filed by Juezan
affecting the same property in connection with Civil Case No. 3496 is sufficient.

106 Ching vs Enrile 565 SCRA 402 9/17/2008 Trinidad, Nathaniel

FACTS:
On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a 370¬-
square meter lot covered by TCT No. 83618.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
La Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the Owner’s
Duplicate Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners took physical possession of the subject
property.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
The conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds as prescribed by Section 51 of PD
1529. Instead, on November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which
was recorded and annotated at the back of TCT No. 83618 reflected in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances under Entry No. 86¬ 62262.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
On August 19, 1988—three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners
received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of respondents, in Civil Case No. 54617 entitled Sps. Adolfo Enrile
and Arsenia Enrile v. Raymunda La Fuente.
The Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 83618 under
Entry No. 3433¬2 while the Writ of Execution was inscribed under Entry No. 3434¬2. Also
inscribed in the TCT is the Certificate of Sale dated January 26, 1989 covering the disputed
property in favor of respondents.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
Petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property asserting
ownership of the disputed property.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners upholding the latter’s superior right over the
disputed property in view of the registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the
Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of respondents.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
Respondents appealed to the CA, principally arguing that the RTC committed reversible error in
ruling that petitioners had a better right over the disputed property. Respondents theorized that
the prior conveyance of the disputed property made by La Fuente to petitioners being a
voluntary dealing with a registered land, mere registration of their adverse claim was insufficient.
To respondents, in order to have petitioners’ interest protected, they should have registered the
Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds pursuant to Section 51 of PD 1529 and not
merely register an adverse claim under Section 70 of the same law. Citing the second
paragraph of Section 70 which provides that an adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration, respondents insisted that the annotated Adverse Claim
of petitioners had already expired, hence, it offered no protection when respondents acquired
the disputed property through execution sale.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
The CA rendered the herein challenged decision reversing that of the RTC. Even as the CA
viewed the prior sale of the disputed lot in favor of petitioners as perfected and consummated, it
nonetheless upheld respon¬dents’ preferential right over the disputed property.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
The CA declared that respondents, as attaching creditors who registered the order of
attachment and the sale of the property to them as the highest bidders, acquired a valid title to
the disputed property as against petitioners who had previously bought the same property from
the registered owner but failed to register their deed of sale.
____________________________________________________________________________
_
The CA further declared respondents as purchasers in good faith. On the premise that
petitioners’ filing of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim was procedurally flawed and that the
annotated adverse claim had already prescribed on December 20, 1986 after the lapse of 30
days from its registration which was November 20, 1986, the CA ruled that it cannot be
considered sufficient notice to third person like the respondents who were not aware of the sale
of the disputed lot to petitioners prior to the levy on attachment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim is still valid
RULING:

The adverse claim is still valid.

The Court finds that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the annotated adverse
claim had already prescribed by the mere lapse of 30 days from its registration. The issue is no
longer of first impression. In the 1996 case of Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,we explained that a
notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30 ¬day period provided by
Section 70 of PD 1529. Section 70 provides:

“Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in
this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be
effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period,
the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the
party in interest. Provided, however that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on
the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.”
In the same case, we held that for as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the
notice of adverse claim remains subsisting: Thus:
 “At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the
adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated
separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of the adverse claim may be cancelled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect
after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing
caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has
been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party
in interest to do a useless act.”
In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing
will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim

107 Lozano vs Ballesteros 195 SCRA 681 4/8/1991 Trinidad,

Nathaniel
FACTS:
Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the original registered
exclusive owner of the land in question comprising Lots Q, B and O as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. 46076. However only Lot Q is the subject of this present action. By virtue
of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the land in question to Marciana de Dios.
____________________________________________________________________________
____
Augusto, Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano, together with
Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
seeking the approval of the consolidation¬subdivision plan and for the annotation of several
documents at the back of the Original Certificate of Title No. 46076.
The court approved the consolidation¬ subdivision plan and directed the inscription, among
others, of said deed of sale at the back of the title. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26537 was
issued in the name of Marciana de Dios.
____________________________________________________________________________
____
Plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the title of the said lot.
Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusto Lozano was filed by the
plaintiffs.
____________________________________________________________________________
____
De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63171
was later transferred in his name.
____________________________________________________________________________
____
Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dio alleging that the estate of Augusto
Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B.
____________________________________________________________________________
____
The court rendered a default decision in favor of the plaintiffs. However, the judgment was not
satisfied on the ground that De Dios was insolvent and did not have any registered property.
Having failed to effect the recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed several
complaints before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for reconveyance and recovery of
possession
____________________________________________________________________________
____
The trial court rendered a decision declaring defendant Ignacio Ballesteros the absolute owner
of the land in question; ordering the cancellation of plaintiffs’ adverse claim at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63171 at the expense of the plaintiffs;
Hence, plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals in
its resolution ruled that “the matter submitted for determination is purely a question of law that is
beyond the jurisdiction of this court." Thus, the records of the case were elevated to this Court.
The appellants insist that “the said adverse claim has been carried along in the subsequent
titles of the defendants.” Thus, they conclude that the consequence of this cautionary notice is
that whatever would be the result of their claim against Marciana de Dios is binding on
subsequent purchasers or successors¬ in¬interest. They contend that the “defendants¬-
appellees should have waited for the decision of the court on the question of the validity of the
adverse claim or should have first moved for the removal or cancellation of the adverse claim.”
Hence, appellants conclude that defendants-¬appellees are purchasers in bad faith as they
have knowledge of the claims against De Dios.
However, the appellee stresses that “a cursory examination of the adverse claim filed by the
plaintiffs¬ appellants readily reveals that the same has failed to comply with the formal
requirements of Section 110 of Act 496 with respect to adverse claims. And for which, and for all
legal purposes, the adverse claim under comment is not valid and effective.” Appellee argues
that “there was a fatal non¬-joinder of necessary or indispensable parties.” Thus, the position of
the appellants is untenable because “the non¬-joinder of necessary and indispensable parties
renders null and void as against them any decision in a case in which they were not made
parties -litigants.” Furthermore, appellee “submits that the protection given by the law to adverse
claimants in regard to the property subject to an adverse claim is available only to the party
whose registered adverse claim meets all the formal requisites of law, and not when the same is
a nullity.”
Hence, appellee concludes that “an invalid and ineffective adverse claim cannot validly serve as
a notice or warning to third parties who may deal with the properties subject thereto because
such adverse claim by reason of its nullity is deemed not existent and unregistered.”
ISSUE:

Whether or not the adverse claim is valid

RULING:
NO. The applicable law in the case at bar is still Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act despite the modification introduced by Section 70 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.

The said section particularly deals with adverse claim, to wit:

“Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,
and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
“The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence,
and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in
interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim
and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to
be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing
shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble costs in its discretion.”
Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the above quoted provision, as
amended, the following are the formal requisites of an adverse claim:

1. The adverse claimant must state the following in writing:

a. his alleged right or interest;

b. how and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired;

c. the description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed, and
d. the certificate of title number
2. the statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other officer
authorized to administer oath; and
3. The claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices may be served
upon him.

The lower court quoted in part the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs, to wit:
“That this adverse claim is being filed prior to the filing of a court action because all the
properties above¬ described formerly belong to my husband, the late Augusto Lozano.”

However, the lower court noted that “the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the
title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did not meet the
requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is setting forth fully how or under
whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the property.
We adhere to the lower court’s findings and find appellee’s position meritorious. A cursory
reading of the afore quoted adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs shows that the same has failed
to comply with the formal requisites of Section 110 of Act 496, more specifically the appellants’
failure to state how and under whom their alleged right or interest is acquired. Thus, the effect of
such non¬compliance renders the adverse claim non-¬registrable and ineffective.
In a case where the adverse claim filed for registration did not fully comply with the formal
requisites of Section 110 of Act No. 496, or more specifically, there being no description of the
land in which right or interest is claimed nor the place to which all notices may be served upon
the adverse claimant given, such adverse claim could not be registered. (LRC Consulta No.
144, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, pet., February 18, 1957)

108 Portes vs Arcala 468 SCRA 343 8/30/2005 Trinidad,

Nathaniel
FACTS:
Respondents Segunda, Eulalia, Salustancia, Vamerco, Josefina, Felomino, Marciano, Lydia,
and Salome, all surnamed Arcala claimed that as early as 1908, their parents, Vicente and
Felisa had already occupied and developed the disputed parcels of land, Lots 2 and 3.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
On 20 June 1912, the Director of Lands approved Vicente’s homestead application for Lots 2
and 3.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
Respondents filed the complaint against their cousins, Vicente, Jr., Perfecta, Sotera, and
Consolacion, all surnamed Arcala, the nephew and nieces of respondents’ father, Vicente.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
Respondents alleged that on 30 November 1917, Felomina, the aunt of Luis, registered Lots 1,
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in her name.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
The decree of registration dated 11 November 1920 was issued to Felomina by the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental in GLRO Case No. 15426.

____________________________________________________________________________
__

However, on 26 July 1930, the cadastral court issued another decree of registration excluding
Lots 2 and 3 from the decree of registration issued to Felomina.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
The cadastral court amended Felomina’s decree of registration because Vicente and Felisa had
already obtained a homestead patent over Lots 2 and 3.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
Despite the amended decree of 26 July 1930, Felomina was still able to have the title of Lot 2
reconstituted by invoking GLRO Case No. 15426.
____________________________________________________________________________
__

The reconstituted title of Lot 2, OCT No. RO¬8932, was issued to Felomina.
____________________________________________________________________________
__

Felomina then subdivided Lot 2 into Lots 2¬A and 2¬B.

____________________________________________________________________________
__
Lot 2¬A was issued to Luis while TCT No. T¬39332 covering Lot 2¬B was issued to Felomina.
Luis sold Lot 2¬A to Napoleon
____________________________________________________________________________
__
Heirs of Napoleon insisted that Napoleon acquired ownership of Lot 2¬A in good faith and for
value.
____________________________________________________________________________
__

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Napoleon has a right on the property

RULING:
The heirs of Napoleon has no right over the property.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible
as a Torrens Title.
____________________________________________________________________________
__

Respondents’ parents, Vicente and Felisa, owned Lots 2 and 3 by virtue of a homestead patent.
Felomina had no right over Lot 2.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
Reconstitution is simply the restoration of a lost or destroyed instrument or title to its original
form and condition. Felomina had nothing to reconstitute as no certificate of title was ever
issued to her over Lot 2. Luis, from whom Napoleon purchased Lot 2¬A, was just as guilty as
his aunt Felomina in defrauding respondents.
____________________________________________________________________________
__

Luis was definitely not a buyer in good faith. Respondents were still in possession of Lot 2 when
Luis supposedly purchased the lot from Felomina and when Luis had the lot subdivided and the
subdivided lots titled.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
The only way for the heirs of Napoleon to validly claim Lot 2¬A is to prove that Napoleon
purchased Lot 2¬A in good faith.
____________________________________________________________________________
__

The trial and appellate courts ruled that Napoleon was not a purchaser in good faith. We agree
with the two courts.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
The trial and appellate courts pointed out that as early as 1966, there was already a brewing
dispute between respondents and Luis over Lot 2.Maria, Napoleon’s widow, testified that she
was with Napoleon when Luis sold to them Lot 2¬ A. Maria asserted that she was familiar with
the history of Lot 2¬A and the supposed previous owners Luis and Felomina. It was thus
impossible for Napoleon and Maria not to have known of the Bureau of Lands’ pending
investigation at the time Luis sold to them Lot 2¬A.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
The controversy between respondents and Luis should have prompted Napoleon to inquire into
the status of Luis’ title over Lot 2¬A. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts that should put
a reasonable man on his guard and still claim that he acted in good faith.
A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law.
____________________________________________________________________________
__
Assuming that Napoleon was unaware of the conflict over Lot 2¬A at the time of the execution
of the deed of sale, Napoleon was, however, already charged with knowledge of the flaw in Luis’
title at the time of the registration of the sale. Inscriptions of an adverse claim dated 23
November 1970 and lis pendens dated 14 September 1971 were already annotated on Luis’ title
over Lot 2¬A when Napoleon registered the Deed of Sale on 16 December 1971.
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property
is in litigation. The inscription serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
litigated property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over
the property. By disregarding the inscriptions and pursuing the registration of the sale,
Napoleon assumed the risk of losing Lot 2¬A to respondents. Napoleon’s heirs, being merely
the juridical continuation of his personality, hold Lot 2¬A in trust for respondents.

109 People vs RTC 178 SCRA 299 10/4/1989 Caratiquit, Reyville

FACTS:
Private respondents sold several parcels of land located in Dasmariñas, Cavite, in favor of
Ricardo Silverio. These parcels were at that time registered in the names of the private
respondents. One of the parcels is the subject matter of a litigation between the private
respondents and Pedro Caragao and his co-owners for reconveyance and cancellation of title
and damages before Branch XVIII of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Tagaytay City. Pedro
Caragao then caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original of the
Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) of the parcel of land under litigation, on file in the Register of
Deeds for the province of Cavite, without the knowledge of the private respondents. Hence,the
private respondents’ copy of the title in question did not bear any annotation of such notice of lis
pendens. When the private respondents sold the two parcels of land to Silverio, including the
one under litigation for reconveyance between Caragao and the private respondents, they
warranted that the properties are “free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever.” On the
basis of this express warranty vis-à-vis the notice of lis pendens duly annotated at the back of
the original of the Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.110942) on file in the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Cavite, Assistant Fiscal Napoleon V. Dilao of the City of Manila filed an
information for “Falsification of Public Document” against the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether notice of lis pendens is a lien or encumbrance within the contemplation of criminal law,
in particular, the crime of falsification of public document.
HELD:
No. Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation while
a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is
in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the said property does
so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is
but a signal to the intending buyer or mortgagee to take care or beware and to investigate the
prospect or non-prospect of the litigation succeeding before he forks down his money. Notice of
lis pendens has been conceived and, more often than not, availed of, to protect the real rights of
the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution or decision. With the
notice of lis pendens duly recorded, and remains uncancelled, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation. “[T]he doctrine of lis pendens is
founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or the decree shall have
been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree
shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution.” The lower court is therefore correct in
ruling that a notice of lis pendens being a mere cautionary notice to a prospective buyer or
mortgagee of a parcel of land under litigation, then it imposes no obligation on the owner, but on
the prospective buyer. It cannot conceivably be the “lien or encumbrance” contemplated by law.

110 Villanueva vs CA 281 SCRA 298 11/5/1997 Castillo, Frinz

Lemwel
Facts:
Records show that TCT Nos. 262631; 273873 and 2777938 [sic] were issued in the name of
Valiant Realty and Development Corporation and Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. and the same were
mortgaged in favor of Equitable Banking Corp. Upon failure of the mortgagors to comply with
the terms and conditions of the mortgage, the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties [and]
sold the same to the Equitable Banking Corp. as the highest bidder at public auction sale. After
the expiration of the redemption period, mortgagors did not exercise the right of redemption and
as a consequence thereof, the mortgagee sold all its rights, interests and participation of said
properties to the herein oppositor, Oo Kian Tiok.

Issue:
May the Register of Deeds refuse to register an application for a notice of lis pendens on the
ground that the applicant does not have any title or right of possession over the subject
properties?
Held:
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property
is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.[13]
The registration of a notice of lis pendens is governed by Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court:[14]
Sec. 24. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real
property, the plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant, at the time of filing
his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterwards, may
record in the office of the registrar of deeds of province in which the property is situated a notice
of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties and the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. From the time only
of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or incumbrancer of the property affected
thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
TO REQUIRE THAT AN APPLICANT MUST PROVE HIS OWNERSHIP OR HIS INTEREST
OVER THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE AFFECTED WITH THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
WILL UNDULY RESTRICT THE SCOPE OF THE RULE. IN SUCH CASE, A PARTY
QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE REGISTERED OWNER WILL LITIGATE HIS OR
HER CASE WITHOUT AN ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPERTY WILL BE PROTECTED
FROM UNWANTED ALIENATION DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE ACTION, THEREBY
DEFEATING THE VERY PURPOSE AND RATIONALE OF THE REGISTRATION.KYLE
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED. THE ASSAILED DECISION IS
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS HEREBY
ORDERED TO ANNOTATE THE APPLICATION FOR A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS IN TCT
NOS. 262631, 273873 AND 277938. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED

111 SLOC vs CA 449 SCRA 99 1/21/2005 Castillo, Kaycelle

Facts:
In August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold two parcels of land to respondent Pablo
Babasanta, with downpayment as evidenced by a memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu on
the same date. Later on, Babasanta demanded the execution of a final deed of sale in his favor
but Pacita reminded Babasanta that when the balance of the purchase price became due, he
requested for a reduction of the price and when she refused, Babasanta backed out from the
sale.

San Lorenzo Development Corporation (Petitioner) filed a Motion for Intervention. San Lorenzo
alleged that in May 1989, the subject two parcels of land had been sold to it in a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and
therefore it had a better right over the property.
Babasanta argued that San Lorenzo could not have acquired ownership of the property and
emphasized that at the time San Lorenzo registered the sale in its favor in June 1990, there was
already a notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of the property, which was made as early
as in June 1989. Hence, petitioner’s registration of the sale did not confer upon it any right.

Issue:
Whether the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis pendens obliterate
the effects of delivery and possession in good faith, which admittedly had occurred prior to
San Lorenzo’s knowledge of the transaction in favor of Babasanta.

Held/Ratio:
NO, because from the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment of transfer and
delivery of possession of the lands to San Lorenzo, it had acted in good faith; and as such, the
subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no effect at all on the consummated sale
between San Lorenzo and the Spouses Lu.

As early as February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed the Option to Buy in favor of
San Lorenzo upon receiving option money from it. After San Lorenzo had paid more than half
of the agreed purchase price, the Spouses Lu subsequently executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in May 1989 in favor of San Lorenzo. At the time both deeds were executed, San Lorenzo
had no knowledge of the prior transaction of the Spouses Lu with Babasanta.
San Lorenzo qualifies as a buyer in good faith since there is no evidence extant in the records
that it had knowledge of the prior transaction in favor of Babasanta. At the time of the sale of
the property to San Lorenzo, the vendors were still the registered owners of the property and
were in fact in possession of the lands.

112 Magdalena vs CA 184 SCRA 325 4/17/1990 Castillo, Rio

Star
Facts:
MEI donated certain part of the lot to the City Government for use as parks and
playgrounds; and the donation was ratified by the City Council. An area within this lot, was
subsequently conveyed to the DBP by way of dacion en pago. The rest were sold to third
parties who thereafter constructed houses. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc., believed
that the act of the Quezon City Government of authorizing the release of said as open space,
after it had been so declared and earlier dedicated as such—and its substitution by another
portion of the subdivision—was beyond the City Government’s authority. MHA brought suit
against MEI for the recovery of said Lot as “open space” for public use of the residents of the
subdivision. While the case was pending, notices of lis pendens were inscribed by the Register
of Deeds.
Trial court dismissed the case. While the case was pending adjudgment in CA, MEI and
DBP filed separate motions with the Court of Appeals praying for cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens annotated on the titles

Issue:

Whether or not the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles may be cancelled

Ruling:
Yes.
According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz.:

(a) An action to recover possession of real estate;

b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;

d) An action for partition; and

e) Any other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to the land or the
use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. The notice of lis pendens—i.e., that
real property is involved in an action—is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of
the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an
extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal
with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
 action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And
its continuance or removal—like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment
or injunction—is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs’ appeal. It therefore had power to deal
with and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before
final judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have
reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional
remedies. Now, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, “after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.”

113 Lagula vs Casimiro 98 Phil. 102 12/17/1955 Castro, Floricel

FACTS:
Lagula, et al., filed a petition praying that a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 4250 be
subdivided in accordance with the subdivision plan and technical description attached to the
petition and that, a new transfer certificate be issued in the name of petitioners. The Chief of the
General Land Registration Office recommended the approval of the request. Petitioners then
filed an amended petition wherein they included the heirs of Felipe Lagula and Apolinario
Casimiro. The court approved the petition as amended and ordered the Register of Deeds to
cancel TCT No. 4250 and issue transfer certificates of title in the name of petitioners.
Heirs of the late Apolinario Casimiro, a co-owner of the land, filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the order directing the cancellation of TCT No. 4250 and the issuance of new
transfer certificates of titles in the name of petitioners, be set aside on the ground that they have
not agreed to the subdivision plan as submitted to the court nor were they notified of the petition
as required by law.
ISSUE:
Whether the court could acquire jurisdiction to hear the petition for the subdivision of the land
without need of a previous notice to the movants.
HELD:

YES. It is not disputed that appellants were never notified of the petition which initiated these
proceedings although they were mentioned therein as co-owners of the land to be subdivided.
The court, however, expressed the opinion that such notice was not necessary because the
purpose of the petition was merely to subdivide a parcel of land which is already covered by a
certificate of title among its new owners and that this can be done by merely filing with the Chief
of the General Land Registratin Office a subdivision plan and that, once the plan is approved,
the Register of Deeds may issue new certificates of title in pursuance of section 44 of Act No.
496, as amended by Republic Act No. 440. The court expressed the view that notice of hearing
is only necessary if there are streets or passageways included in the subdivision in which case
a petition shall be filed by the registered owner and the court shall not act thereon "after notice
and hearing as required by law. In the present case, the court intimated, no such street or
passageway is involved and so notice of hearing is unnecessary.

114 Rojas vs Tagaytay 106 Phil. 512 11/24/1959 Chua, Christian

Edmund
Facts:
Rojas sold a property ("Lot No. 1") to the City of Tagaytay. The City of Tagaytay filed for an
original registration of Lot No. 1 and plan Psu-103196-Amd with the Court of First Instance. The
Court of First approved the registration. However, Rojas (same person who sold the Lot No. 1 to
the City of Tagaytay) and other respondents filed a petition on the same proceeding to set aside
the decision. They argued that Lot No. 1 was part of a bigger land already decreed in previous
land registration case and covered by an original certificate of title. In this case, there were two
survey plan, Psu-103196 which was previously registered and Psu-103196-Amd which was
made by the City of Tagaytay and shows the division of bigger property into four lots, including
Lot No. 1.

Issue:
Whether the CIty of Tagaytay can file an original registration on a property already covered by
an original certificate of title.
Held:
No. The previous decree and the certificate of title duly registered are binding upon all, including
the City of Tagaytay. The remedy for the City of Tagaytay is to secure first the Court's approval
of the subdivision plan segregating Lot No. 1. Then, have the deed of purchase registered and
secure the transfer certificate of title.

115 Republic vs Abrille 71 SCRA 57 5/7/1976 De Vera,

Queenie
FACTS: Defendant (Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land containing an
area of more or less 525,652 sqm. Deceased Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision
of the said parcel of land into two lots. Under the Subdivision plan, Lot 1 contains an area of 30,
100 sqm while Lot 2 contains an area of 577,679 sqm or a total area of 607,779 sqm, which is
82,127 sqm more than the original area. After the approval of the Land Registration
Commissioner, Abrille was able to secure and order from the CFI directing the Register of
Deeds to correct the area and thereafter to cancel the Certificate of Title. The Register of Deeds
registered Lot 1 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrile and Lot 2 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille.
The registration of Lot 2, which includes the excess area was not in accordance with law for lack
of the required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Law. The excess area as a result of the approval of the subdivision
survey was formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of
course of the said river; hence a land belonging to the public domain. And, as a consequence
thereof TCT of Lot 2 wherein the excess area of land belonging to the public domain is null and
void ab initio.

ISSUE:
Whether the TCTs which cover the increased area in question totaling 82,125 sqm shall be
cancelled.

HELD:
YES. The increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is
so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of
land of the defendant appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their
grandfather. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a
former riverbed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration
Law, Act 496, proceedings in registration of land title should have been filed instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan. Under Sec. 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor in interest of the herein defendant appellant took, is good only insofar as it
covers previously registered lands. In this case, part of the tracts of the land, particularly the
area of 82,127 sqm, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System.
Worse still, the approval of the subdivision plans was without the notice to all parties in interest,
more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title
or claim to a land to be originally registered Act 496 provided certain requisites to be satisfied
and in this case, the said requisites were not complied with. Thus, the judgment appealed is
affirmed.

116 Ong Cung Po vs CA 239 SCRA 341 Dimao, Sittee Junaira

DOCTRINE: The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold landa of the public domain. The 1935 constitution reserved the right to
participate in the “disposition, exploitation, development and utiization” of all “lands of the public
domain and other natural resoutces of the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals,
corporatioon, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
FACTS
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad Parian, wife
of Ong Yee. Ong Yee is the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po.The sale was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Sale and subsequently registered with the register of Deeds of Manila of
which transfer of certificate of Title was issued to the private respondent. According to the
private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to petitioner Ong
Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded
the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, Ong Ching Po refuses to
vacate the land.

On March 19, 1981, the private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.The inferior court dismissed the case. The dismissal was both
affirmed by the Regional trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners ,on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1949, Ong Ching Po bought the parcel
of Land from Ong Joi Jong evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale conveying therewith
the he is acceding to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po to sign another document in favor of
Soledad Parian forthe purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the Register of
Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino.
On December 12, 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po and his children filed an action for re
conveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC of Manila.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against Ong Ching Po.
Upon the motion, the case was consolidated and on May 30, 1990, the TC rendered a decision
in favor of private respondent. On appeal by the petitioners to the CA, the court affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence the petition to the SC.

ISSUE
1) Whether or not Ong Ching Po as a Chinese citizen can validly acquire the land executed
under the Deed of Sale.

2) Whether or not the private respondent took possession of the property.

HELD/RATIO
1) No. An Alien is disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. The Supreme Court
did not go along with the claim of the petitioner that Ong Ching Po merely used the private
respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because
being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such
contention is a violation of the nationalization laws. Assuming that the Deed of sale is in
existence and was duly executed, still the petitioner cannot claim ownership of the land by virtue
of Section 5 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that “ save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualifies to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
the Philippines,” this was further reiterated in the Section 14 Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
and adopted in the 1987 Constitution, Section 7, Article XII which further states that “save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain
of the Philippines”.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of public domain. Private land maybe transferred or conveyed to individuals or entities
“qualified to acquire lands of the public domain.”The 1935 constitution reserved the right to
participate in the “disposition, exploitation, development and utilization” of all “lands of the public
domain and other natural resources of the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals,
corporation, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands. Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen;
therefore he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the
genuineness and due execution of the Deed of sale has been established, the same is null and
void, it being contrary to law.
2) Yes. The private respondent took possession of the land. Under the law, possession is
transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Art 1498 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, “when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. If what the petitioners meant was that
the private respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her
family had settled in Iloilo. It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private
respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.

117 Lee vs Republic 360 SCRA 524 Fadera, Juna Carlo

Facts:

The Dinglasans (vendors) sold the subject property to Lee Liong (vendee), a Chinese citizen.
Later on, the vendors filed an action against the heirs of the vendee for the annulment of sale
and recovery of the land assailing the validity of the sale on the ground of the constitutional
prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership private or public land. The RTC, CA and SC ruled
neither for the vendors and vendee applying the principle of pari delicto. Another case was filed
against the same defendants by the same plaintiffs but this was barred by res judicata as
decided by the SC. After the war, the widows, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee, of the
heirs of Lee Liong, both Filipino Citizens, herein petitioners filed with the RTC a petition for the
reconstitution of title of the subject property and granted the same. The Solicitor General filed a
petition for annulment of judgment of reconstitution. OSG contended that the petitioners were
not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong
did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not
qualified to own the subject land. CA ruled in favor of the OSG. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:

WON the successors-in-interest (petitioners) of an Aliens has the right to acquire the subject
property.
Held/Ratio:
YES. The sale of the land was consummated in 1936, under the 1935 Constituion, aliens could
not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Here, Alien Lee
Liong is disqualified to acquire the land however ownership of the land cannot revert to the
original seller because of the principle of pari delicto. Now, the subject land is in the hands of
the petitioners, both Filipinos. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non Filipinos.
In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.” Thus, the
subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the
basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep
our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Petition GRANTED.

118 Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She21 SCRA 52

Galicia, Monico King A.
FACTS:
Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property in Manila, as her sister died. Then
already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid,
she was left with no other relative to live with. She lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng,
a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a longtime lessee of a portion
of the property. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for
safekeeping, including rentals from her property.

“In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her,” Justina Santos
executed a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the entire property, including the portion
on which the house of Justina Santos stood.

She then executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises. The
option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for
naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. In
1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption
would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings
were abandoned.
Later on, she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99 years,
and another fixing the term of the option of 50 years.
In two wills executed on, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into
with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that
the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised by
him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. Action was filed,
and the court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of
the contracts
Both parties died during the pendency of the action. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She,
while Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
ISSUE:

Whether an alien may validly acquire lease right and an option to buy a real property.

HELD/RATIO:

No.
A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to
buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:
“[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for
residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.”

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50
years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the
owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi,
jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi)—rights the
sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred,
tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which
ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties
in this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos’ ownership of
her property was reduced to a hollow concept.
As this Court said in Krivenko:

“It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are
construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect
of our construction is to preclude where they may build aliens admitted freely into the
Philippines from owning sites their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity,
xxx
“For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private
or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is
affirmed, without costs.”