CRUZ VS.

SECRETARY
GR No. 135385
Petioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought
this suit assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA),
and its IRRs on the ground that they amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over the lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Sec 2, Article XII of the Constution.
1) Section 3(a), Section 3(b)
2) Section 5, in relation to Section 3(a)
3) Section 6, in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b)
4) Section 7
5) Section 8
6) Section 57; and
7) Section 58
Whether or not the IPRA and its IRRs
are unconstitutional
Ruling just provided how the
voting went about in the SC.
7 voted to dismiss the petition while 7 other
members of the Court voted to grant the
petition.
The IPRA should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Sec 2, Art
XII of the 1987 Constitution (Justice Puno)
It does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality (Justice Mendoza)
Justice Panganiban also filed stating that he
reserves judgment on its constitutionality which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA.
Whether the IPRA does away
with the Regalian Doctrine
Justice Puno: No.
The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same. Under the Indigenous
concept of ownership, ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property. The
domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed
to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a
community.
Furthermore, the IPRA does not deprive the State
of ownership over the natural resources and
supervision in their development and
exploitation.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domains.
The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is
expressly defined and limited.
REPUBLIC VS. CA
AND DELA ROSA
GR No. L-43938
The cases arose from the application for
registration of a parcel of land file on February
11, 1965 by Jose Dela Rosa and on behalf of his
three children.
The application, however, was opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Atok Big Wedge
Corp. and Republic of the Philippines.
Benguet opposed the application on the ground
that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5
was sold to it on September 22, 1934. On the
other hand, Atok Big Wedge claimed that the
portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by Emma and Fredia mineral claims,
while the Bureau of Forestry argued that the land
to be registered was covered by Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proc. No. 217
dated February 16, 1929.
 Whether or not Dela Rosa have the
rights of ownership over the said lots
No, Dela Rosa does not have the rights
of ownership over the lots in question.

No, the Dela Rosa does not have the rights of ownership over the
lots in question.
An application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule
simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public
and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining."
Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals
are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the
right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of
the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing
that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-
mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which
it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the
State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land
and may not be used by any private party, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such
owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
MARCOS COMILANG VS.
HON. GENEROSO
BUENDIA
GR No. L-24757
Nicolas Comilang staked a mining claim known as the "Bua
Fraction Mineral Claim" over a parcel of land in Tuding, Benguet,
Mountain Province. He stopped the exploration but continue to live
in the house built on a portion of the land with his wife and other
relatives.
The court rendered a decision in the first case, holding that the
writ of possession issued by the respondent Municipal Judge was
within his competence and jurisdiction. On appeal, the decision
became final.
For a second time, a petition for certiorari and mandamus with PI
was instituted by Marcos Comilang in the RTC of Baguio City
seeking the annulment of the order granting the alias writ of
possession in favor of Delenela and Perez, and again the Court of
First Instance of Baguio threw out the petition
 Whether or not the final certificate of
sale conveying the land described in Tax
Declaration No. 4771 to the purchasers in
the execution sale is not a valid
disposition of a portion of the public
domain?
No, it is not a valid disposition of a
portion of the public domain.
The 1½ hectares portions of the Bua Fraction Mineral
Claim described in Tax Declaration No. 4771 in the name
of herein appellant was levied upon and sold at public
auction to satisfy the money judgment against him.
The parties herein subsequently litigated their rights to
the mineral claim in Civil Case No. 735 of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City, and on the basis of their
amicable agreement (appellant was a party in the case),
the court declared the Bua Mineral Claim co-ownership
property of the parties thereto "except the
improvements existing thereon".
There is no room for doubt, therefore, that the right to
possess or own the surface ground is separate and
distinct from the mineral rights over the same land. And
when the application for lode patent to the mineral claim
was prosecuted in the Bureau of Mines, the said
application could not have legally included the surface
ground sold to another in the execution sale.
Consequently,
We have to declare that the patent procured thereunder,
at least with respect to the1-½ hectares sold in execution
pertains only to the mineral right and does not include the
surface ground of the land in question.
 LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. V. VICTOR O.
RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR,
MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.
G.R. No. 127882
January 27, 2004
A petition for mandamus and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
RA 7942 and its IRR, DAO 96-40, and FTAA entered into by RP and WMC
(Philippines), Inc.
July 25,1987 – President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President
may execute with the foreign proponent.
March 3, 1995 – President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to
"govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all
mineral resources.” Inclusive in this act are the modes of entering in EDU
of mineral resources including FTAA. (Published on Mar 10, took effect on
April 9, 1995). IRR was issued on August 15, 1995 and was repealed by
DAO 96-40 on December 20, 1996.
March 30, 1995 – The President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering
99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur
and North Cotabato.
January 10, 1997 – Counsels for petitioners sent a letter to DENR Secretary
to stop the implementation of RA 7942 and its DAO 96-40. No action from
DENR.
Petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for TRO. They alleged that
at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already
been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which
applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of
5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining
company over offshore areas.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7942 and 96-40. Also the
constitutionality of FTAA with WMCP for being a Service Contract
(omitted under the 1987 Constitution)
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
On the issue of foreign ownership, WMCP alleged that on January 23, 2001, WMC
sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation
organized under Philippine laws; that at least 60% of the equity of Sagittarius is
owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned
by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company. It further claims that by such sale
and transfer of shares, "WMCP has ceased to be connected in any way with WMC.“
WMCP concludes that in the event that the FTAA is invalidated, the MPSAs of the
three corporations would be revived and the mineral claims would revert to their
original claimants.
FTAA is valid being in accordance with the constitution. The word "technical" in the
fourth paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. No. 279 encompasses a "broad number of
possible services," perhaps, "scientific and/or technological in basis." It thus posits
that it may also well include "the area of management or operations . . . so long as
such assistance requires specialized knowledge or skills, and are related to the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources.“
Respondents insist that "agreements involving technical or financial assistance" is
just another term for service contracts.
RELEVANT ISSUES OF THE CASE:
WON RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 unconstitutional as that it allows fully
foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit
mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2, paragraph 4,
Article XII of the Constitution and Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.
WON the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between
the President of the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining
Corporation Philippines Inc. illegal and unconstitutional as it is a
service contract.
WON a service contract is synonymous to FTAA.
 SERVICE CONTRACT VS. FTAA
  Service Contract FTAA

A service contract is a contractual arrangement for

engaging in the exploitation and development of
petroleum, mineral, energy, land and other A Financial or Technical Assistance
natural resources by which a government or its Agreement is an arrangement involving
agency, or a private person granted a right or financial or technical assistance that may be
privilege by the government authorizes the other entered into between a Contractor and the
party (service contractor) to engage or participate Government for
1. Definition in the exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the large-scale exploration, development and
the privilege, in that the latter provides financial utilization of gold, copper, nickel, chromite,
or technical resources, undertakes the lead, zinc and other minerals
exploitation or production of a given resource, or except for cement raw materials, marble,
directly manages the productive enterprise, granite, sand and gravel and construction
operations of the exploration and exploitation of aggregates.
the resources or the disposition of marketing or
resources.
   Service Contract FTAA

The contractor shall undertake, manage and

execute petroleum operations, subject to the
government overseeing the management of the
operations. The contractor provides all necessary The government has FULL
services and technology and the requisite CONTROL and
financing, performs the exploration work SUPERVISION; The role of
2. Scope obligations, and assumes all exploration risks such
that if no petroleum is produced, it will not be FC is limited to FINANCIAL
entitled to reimbursement. Once petroleum in and TECHNICAL
commercial quantity is discovered, the contractor ASSISTANCE ONLY.
shall operate the field on behalf of the government.
Hence, the contractor is allowed to manage the
undertaking.
   Service Contract FTAA

Under the 1987 Constitution, The President

may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical
Under the 1973 Constitution, allowed or financial assistance for large-scale
Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang exploration, development, and utilization of
3. Parties Pambansa, to enter into service contracts minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
with any person or entity for the according to the general terms and conditions
exploration or utilization of natural provided by law, based on real contributions
to the economic growth and general welfare
resources. of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
It is important to note that the provisions under Section 2 of the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for
the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources
were omitted. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of public
domain through "license, concession or lease" is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
Consonant with the State's "full supervision and control" over natural
resources, The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the
primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and
utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four
modes:
(1) The State may directly undertake such activities.
(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens.
(4) For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
The fourth and fifth paragraphs of Section 2 provide:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
LIMITATION AS TO FOREIGN
PARTICIPATION
The parties to FTAA is limited to the president and only with corporations.
The size of activities to be undertaken: only large-scale exploration, development, and utilization is
allowed.
The natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the intent being to limit service contracts to those areas where Filipino capital may not be sufficient.
The standards for entering into such agreements. The agreements must be based on real contributions
to economic growth and general welfare of the country.
The agreements must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotion of the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The notification requirement. The President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical
assistance agreement entered into within thirty days from its execution.
The scope of the agreements. While the 1973 Constitution referred to "service contracts for financial,
technical, management, or other forms of assistance" the 1987 Constitution provides for "agreements. . .
involving either financial or technical assistance." It bears noting that the phrases "service contracts" and
"management or other forms of assistance" in the earlier constitution have been omitted.
COURT RULING
On the first issue:
R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Although the statute employs the phrase "financial and technical
agreements" in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats
these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
With respect to some provisions pertaining to FTAA, The underlying
assumption in all these provisions is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
Hence, By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects
of the mining operation, the above-cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in
effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation's mineral resources to
these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
On the second issue:
Based on Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP "the exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize, process and dispose of all Minerals
products and by-products thereof that may be produced from the
Contract Area.“
Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the FTAA, WMCP shall provide "[all] financing,
technology, management and personnel necessary for the Mining
Operations." The mining company binds itself to "perform all Mining
Operations . . . providing all necessary services, technology and
financing in connection therewith," and to "furnish all materials, labour,
equipment and other installations that may be required for carrying on
all Mining Operations.“
These contractual stipulations, taken together, grant WMCP beneficial
ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and
are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress.
On the second issue:
The Supreme Court held that, in accordance with the text of
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be
limited to technical or financial assistance only. They did not
extend to the foreign-owned corporation’s management and
operation of the mining activity. Quoting at length various
exchanges between members of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission and the working group behind a UP Law draft,
the Court held that foreign contractors’ management or
operation of mining activities -- the primary feature of service
contracts under the 1973 Constitution -- was precisely the evil
that the drafters of the1987 Charter had sought to eradicate.
On the third issue:
No, technical or financial assistance agreements are not synonymous to
service contracts. The term technical and financial assistance under the 1987
Constitution is exclusive and does not imply any other means of FC
participation. This is the evil that the framers of the constitution seeks to
avoid.
Are service contracts allowed under the new Constitution? No. Under the
new Constitution, foreign investors (fully alien-owned) can NOT participate
in Filipino enterprises except to provide: (1) Technical Assistance for highly
technical enterprises; and (2) Financial Assistance for large-scale
enterprises.
The intent of this provision, as well as other provisions on foreign
investments, is to prevent the practice (prevalent in the Marcos
government) of skirting the 60/40 equation using the cover of service
contracts. [Emphasis supplied.]
On the third issue:
The service contract as we know it here is antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources restated in
the same article of the [1973] Constitution containing the
provision for service contracts. If the service contractor
happens to be a foreign corporation, the contract would also
run counter to the constitutional provision on nationalization
or Filipinization, of the exploitation of our natural resources.
****************************************
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD
MINING CORP VS. BALITE
PORTAL MINING
CORPORATION
GR No. 135190
This case involves a rich tract of mineral land
situated in Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest River
or known as Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. It has
been embroiled in controversy with hundreds of
people perishing in mine accidents, man-made
or otherwise, brought about by unregulated
mining activities.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper was granted an
Exploration Permit No. 133 over 4,491 hectares
of land which included the Diwalwal area. The
acquisition was challenged by Apex. However,
the Court found out that the latter did not
comply with the procedural requisites of
acquiring mining rights within forest reserves.
Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 7076 or the People’s
small-scale Mining Act where DENR issued an order
declaring 728 hectares of Diwalwal areas as non-forest
lands open to small-scale mining. Later on, a petition for
cancellation of EP No. 133 was filed and while the case
was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to
petitioner herein Southern Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.
On March 3, 1995, RA 7942 was enacted which later on,
allowed the Regulatory Board of Davao, issuance of ore
transport permits to small-scale miner operating in
Diwalwal mines. With this, petitioner filed a complaint
contending that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed
extraction and hauling of 60,000.00 worth of gold.
Whether or not the Memo issued by the Secretary of DENR
divested petitioner’s right to the gold rush are under EP
No. 133
No. The memo did not divest petitioner’s
right to the gold rush area
The challenged memorandum did not conclusively adopt
direct state utilization as policy in resolving Diwalwal
dispute. The terms of the Memo clearly indicate that
what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this
option and nothing else. It did not grant any
management/operating profit-sharing agreement to
small-scale miners or to any party but it simple instructed
DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to
determine its feasibility.
It must be likewise pointed out that under no
circumstances may petitioner’s rights under EP No. 133
be regarded as total and absolute.
EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the
State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded
when the national interest so requires.
Like the timber permits, mining exploration permits do
not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable
right within the purview of the non-impairment of
contract and due process clauses of the Constitution.
CONSOLIDATED CASES OF APEX
MINING CO., INC. V. SOUTHEAST
MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP.
G.R. No. 152870-71
June 23, 2006
The case involves the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area” (Diwalwal), a rich tract of
mineral land located inside the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in Davao
del Norte and Davao Oriental. Since the early 1980s, Diwalwal has been stormed
by conflicts brought about by numerous mining claims over it.
On March 10, 1986, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an
Exploration Permit (EP 133) by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG). A
long battle ensued between Apex and MMC with the latter seeking the
cancellation of the mining claims of Apex on the ground that such mining claims
were within a forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) and thus
the acquisition on mining rights should have been through an application for a
permit to prospect with the BFD and not through registration of a DOL with the
BMG. When it reached the SC in 1991, the Court ruled against Apex holding that
the area is a forest reserve and thus it should have applied for a permit to prospect
with the BFD.
On February 16 1994, MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which
is alleged to be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG
registered SEM’s Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
application and the Deed of Assignment. Several oppositions were filed.
The Panel of Arbitrators created by the DENR upheld the validity of EP
133. During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No. 2002-18 was issued
declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and
ordering the stoppage of all miningoperations therein.
RELEVANT ISSUES OF THE CASE:
WON EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is valid.
WON the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring
729 hectares of the areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale mining
purposes.
Who (among petitioners Apex and Balite) has priority right over
Diwalwal?
COURT RULING
On the first issue:
EP 133 and the transfer to SEM is invalid.
One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: “That this
permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the
permittee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used
for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other
purpose.”
While it may be true that SEM is a 100% subsidiary
corporation of MMC, there is no showing that the former is
the duly authorized agent of the latter. As such, the
assignment is null and void as it directly contravenes the
terms and conditions of the grant of EP 133.
On the first issue:
a. The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication of MMC’s
rights over the permit. It is not a mere grant of authority to
SEM as agent.

b. Reason for the stipulation. Exploration permits are strictly

granted to entities or individuals possessing the resources and
capability to undertake mining operations. Without such a
condition, non-qualified entities or individuals could
circumvent the strict requirements under the law by the
simple expediency of acquiring the permit from the original
permittee.
On the first issue:
c. Separate personality. The fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC does
not automatically make it an agent of MMC. A corporation is an artificial being
invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from persons
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Absent any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is a separate and distinct
entity from MMC.
d. Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil inapplicable. Only in cases where the
corporate fiction was used as a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity may the
veil be pierced and removed. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot
therefore be used as a vehicle to commit prohibited acts. The assignment of
the permit in favor of SEM is utilized to circumvent the condition of non-
transferability of the exploration permit. To allow SEM to avail itself of this
doctrine and to approve the validity of the assignment is tantamount to
sanctioning an illegal act which is what the doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.
On the first issue:
e. PD 463 requires approval of Secretary of DENR. Also, PD 463 (Mineral
Resources Development Decree), which is the governing law when the
assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of
mining rights, including the right to explore a mining area, must be with the prior
approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case.

f. EP 133 expired by non-renewal. Although EP 133 was extended for 12 months

until July 6,1994, MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its expiration.
With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area. SEM, on the other hand, has not acquired any right to the said
area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and
SEM have not acquired any vested right over the area covered by EP 133.
On the second issue:
NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest
reserves into non-forest reserves. Such power is vested
with the President. The DENR Secretary may only
recommend to the President which forest reservations are
to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof. Thus, DAO
No. 66 is null and void for having been issued in excess of
the DENR Secretary’s authority.
On the second issue:
Unlike Proclamation No. 369, Commonwealth Act No. 137 vests solely in the President, with the
concurrence of the National Assembly, the power to withdraw forest reserves found to be more
valuable for their mineral contents than for the purpose for which the reservation was made
and convert the same into non-forest reserves.

A similar provision can also be found in Presidential Decree No. 463 dated 17 May 1974, with
the modifications that (1) the declaration by the President no longer requires the concurrence
of the National Assembly and (2) the DENR Secretary merely exercises the power to
recommend to the President which forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the coverage
thereof. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reads:
SEC. 8. Exploration and Exploitation of Reserved Lands. – When lands within reservations,
which have been established for purposes other than mining, are found to be more valuable
for their mineral contents, they may, upon recommendation of the Secretary be
withdrawn from such reservation by the President and established as a mineral reservation.
On the third issue:
The issue on who has priority right over Diwalwal is deemed overtaken by the
issuance of Proclamation 297 and DAO No. 2002-18, both being
constitutionally-sanctioned acts of the Executive Branch. Mining operations in
the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of
the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7942, the
State can either: (1) directly undertake the exploration, development and
utilization of the area or (2) opt to award mining operations in the mineral
reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, if it wishes.
The exercise of this prerogative lies with the Executive Department over which
courts will not interfere.
****************************************************
 ATLAS CONSOLIDATED
MINING & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
GR No. L-54305, february 14, 1990
Atlas entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ and
BIGA COPPER over mining claims located at Toledo City, Cebu.

ATLAS received numerous letters from third- parties claiming that

they were assignees of BIGA COPPER, BIGA PARTNERS and
CUENCO-VELEZ over the mining claims and thereby asking ATLAS
that they be substituted to the rights under the operating agreement.

ATLAS instituted a petition for declaratory relief with the Court of

First Instance. Cited as respondents therein were BIGA COPPER, BIGA
PARTNERS, CUENCO-VELEZ and some thirty-one (31) assignees. 
Due to the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1281, effective
January 16, 1978, a number of the defendants in the lower court filed
a supplemental motion to dismiss by reason that the trial court is
deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1281.

ATLAS was joined by Epifanio A. Anoos and CUENCO-VELEZ in its

prayer to have the decision of the respondent appellate court set
aside. Anoos alleges that he is one of the defendants in the
proceedings for declaratory relief; and that the trial court in the
same case, under date of February 21, 1979, had already rendered a
summary judgment in his favor. CUENCO-VELEZ alleged that (1)
their right to both substantive and procedural due process was
violated; and (2) that the decision of the appellate court is not in
accordance with law. 
CAN A PERSON WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO A CONTRACT
FILE A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SEEK
A JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SUCH CONTRACT?
1. NO.
• The court rule in the negative. ATLAS cannot be
considered as an interested party under the deeds of
assignment and, therefore, has no standing to institute
the declaratory action. The court conclude that—the
ambiguity is not in the operating agreements
themselves but in the validity of the assignments of
mining rights made by BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-
VELEZ to third parties.
CAN A TRIAL COURT WHICH ALREADY HAD TAKEN
COGNIZANCE OF AN ACTION INVOLVING A MINING
CONTROVERSY BE DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION TO
HEAR AND DECIDE THE CASE UPON
PROMULGATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1281?
2. YES.
• The court rule in the affirmative. With or without
administrative action, the trial court is deemed to have
lost jurisdiction to proceed with the declaratory action
immediately upon the effectivity of Presidential Decree
No. 1281 on January 16, 1978.
• PD 1281 issued on January 16, 1978, gives more teeth to the
Bureau of Mines (Sec. 3) for its regulatory and adjudicative
powers and functions which becomes (sic) 'original and exclusive
even over 'cancellation and/or enforcement of mining
contracts,'—divested judicial tribunals of jurisdiction over
mining controversies including cancellation and enforcement
of mining contracts by making the regulatory and adjudicative
functions of the Bureau 'original and exclusive' (Sec. 7, PD
1281).  
• Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a remedial statute and is a
special law
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR)
UNDER THEN MINISTER ERNESTO R. MACEDA; AND FORMER
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN MALAYANG, ROBERTO
PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. VALERA AND ROMULO SAN JUAN,
PETITIONERS,
VS.
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PEDRO DEL
CONCHA, AND ALEJANDRO AND RUFO DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 149927

March 30, 2004
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law under which it is
granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the
holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of
the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest. – J. Panganiban
The respondents, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha,
Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been granted
permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan.
Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their
tedious efforts and substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau
of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the
corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. The application was
granted under License No. 33
On September 6, 1986, the license was cancelled by the Minister of Energy
and Natural Resources (DENR). Proclamation 84 was then issued confirming
the cancellation of the said license.
The respondents then filed a petition as to the validity of the cancellation and
pray for injunctive relief.
RTC ruled that respondents’ license already became a property right, which is
protected under the due process clause. License cancellation, without notice
and hearing was unjust. Moreover, the proclamation, which confirmed the
cancellation of the license was an ex post facto law.
The CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court and added that the
Constitution provides for the non-impairment of obligations and contracts,
which implies that the license of the respondents must be respected.
RELEVANT ISSUES OF THE CASE:
WON license 33 is valid.
Petitioners: License was issued in violation of PD 463 – a quarry
license should cover not more than 100 hectares in any given
province. The license was issued to Rosemoor Mining and
Development Corporation and covered a 330-hectare land.
Respondents: The license was embraced by 4 separate
applications, each for an aread of 81 hectares. Also, the issue has
been mooted because PD 463 has already been repealed by RA
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
2. WON Proclamation No. 84 – which confirmed the cancellation of the
license, is valid.
Petitioners: The license was validly declared a nullity and terminated.
Maceda’sletter did not cancel or revoke the license, but merely declared
its nullity. Also, the respondents waived their right to notice and hearing
in their license application.
Respondents: Their right to due process was violated because there was
no notice and hearing. Proclamation No. 84 is not valid because it
violates the clause on non-impairment of contracts, it is an ex post facto
law and/or a bill of attainder, and it was issued by the President after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
COURT RULING:
On the first issue:
1. THE LICENSE IS NOT VALID.
The issue has not been mooted because while RA 7942 has expressly repealed
provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it respects
previously issued valid and existing licenses.
When the license was issued, the governing law was PD 463. Thus, it was
subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, including the part where it says
that the quarry license shall cover an area of not more than 100 hectares in any
one province and not more than 1000 hectares in the entire Philippines. The
license in question was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining Development
Corporation and not the 4 individual stockholders. It clearly violates PD 463
because the license covered an area of 330-hectares.
On the second issue:
2.PROCLAMATION NO. 84, CONFIRMING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE LICENSE, IS VALID.
Respondents’ license may be revoked or rescinded by
executive action when the national interest so requires because
it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution. The license itself provides
such condition. The license can also be validly revoked by the
State in the exercise of police power, in accordance with the
Regalian doctrine.
On the second issue:
Also, since the license is not a contract, the non-impairment clause may not be
invoked. Even if it were, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the State.
The proclamation cannot also be said to be a bill-of-attainder, which is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. The proclamation only declares the
nullity of the license. It does not declare guilt or impose punishment.
The proclamation can also be said to be an ex post facto law because it does not fall
under any of the six recognized instances when a law is considered as such. It is not
even criminal or penal in nature.
Lastly, when President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84, she was still validly
exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986.

*****************************************************************************************************
BASIANA MINING EXPLORATION
CORPORATION V. SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
GR No. 191705
Pet. BMEC, headed by its president Basiana, applied for a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the DENR.
While pending for its approval, BEMC assigned all its rights and
interest in MPSA to Manila Mining Corp (MM), with the later
acknowledge BEMC as the real and true owner of the said
application.
Later, Basiana and SR Metals, Inc. (SRMI) executed a
memorandom of Agreement where SRMI to undertake technical
and geological test, exploration and small-scale mining
operations of the site subject of the MPSA.
Permits were issued to SRMI and others.
SRMI, using BMEC’s application, applied for an MPSA for the
extraction of minirals.
Later, the DENR issued a cease and desist order against the
mining operations due to excess in annual production.
Basiana then filed a complaint before the RTC for rescission of
contract against SRMI.
Subsequently, Director of Mines and Geosciences
Bureau(MGB),recommended the approval of the application of
SRMI.
BMEC filed with the MGB a petition to deny and declare the
nullity of the application for MPSA.
Pending the resolution of the protest, the RP, represented by
the DENR Secretary entered into MPSA with SRMI for the
development and commercial utilization of minerals in Agusan
del Norte.
Pet. Assailed the issuance of MPSA on the grounds that there
was violation of due process and the proceedings was
railroaded and suited for the benefit of SRMI, and the approval
of the application is a patent nullity and without any legal basis
Whether or not the DENR Secretary
has authority and jurisdiction to
cancel existing mineral agreements
Yes. The Court acknowledges the
DENR Secretary’s power to cancel
mining agreements.
The DENR Secretary's power to cancel mineral agreements
emanates from his administrative authority, supervision,
management, and control over mineral resources under
Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987;
R.A. No. 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority
over mineral resources, which includes the authority to enter
into mineral agreements on behalf of the Government upon the
recommendation of the Director and cororalilly, the implied
power to terminate mining or mineral contracts;
The power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary
over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral
rights under R.A. No. 7942 demonstrates the authority of the
DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of
mineral agreements; and
The DENR Secretary's power to cancel mining rights or
agreements can be inferred from Section 230, Chapter XXIV of
DENR A.O. No. 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and
termination of a permit/mineral agreement/Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement.
 DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS MULTI-
PURPOSE ASSOCIATION V. ELISEA
GOZUN
GR No. 157882
On June 20, 1994, before the passage of Republic Act 7042
(The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), President Fidel V. Ramos
executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), over a total land
area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva
Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in that area was Barangay
Didipio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single
company that did business under the new name of Climax-
Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), of which the controlling 99
percent of stockholders were Australian nationals.
 Whether or not RA 7942 and the
DENR Rules and Regulations DAO
96-40 are valid.
Yes, RA 7942 and DENR Rule and
Regulations DAO 96-40 were valid.

Their evolution gave a positive indication that mining operators

who were qualified to own lands were granted the authority to
exercise eminent domain for the entry, acquisition, and use of
private lands in areas open to mining operations.
Concededly, for a taking to be valid, it must be for public use.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid.
Indeed there is taking involved but it is not without just
compensation.
Whether or not the Mining Act and its IRR
are void and unconstitutional for
sanctioning an unconstitutional
administrative process of determining just
compensation
No.
There is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its
implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts from
their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in
expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.  
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the
authority to decide cases where surface owners, occupants,
concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating
involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of
the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board is final and conclusive.  
 
The determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all
parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with the grant of
primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the
reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or
occupants. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
to decide determination of just compensation remains intact
despite the preliminary determination made by the
administrative agency.  
Whether or not the State, through RA No.
7942 and the CMAC FTAA, abdicated its
primary responsibility to the full control
and supervision over natural resources
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining
operations.  The following provisions thereof establish the mechanism
of inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations and institute
reportorial requirements.  
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State
to the role of a “passive regulator” dependent on submitted plans and
reports.  On the contrary, the government agencies concerned are
empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct
and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding
minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration,
development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.   
 Whether or not the respondents’
interpretation of the role of wholly foreign
and foreign-owned corporations in their
involvement in mining enterprises,
violates the Constitution
The use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of the
inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do
with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or
technical assistance.  
Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a
conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive
wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression
“agreements x x x involving either technical or financial
assistance” in an exclusionary and limiting manner.  
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution
prohibits service contracts
The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would
invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises,
subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time,
however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses
of the past regime.  
 
Unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between
foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and
on the other, the government as principal or “owner” of the
works.  In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors
provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and
managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-
scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government,
through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control
and supervision over the entire operation.  
REPUBLIC, REPRESENTED BY
THE POLLUTION
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DENR)
VS. MARCOPPER MINING
CORPORATION
GR NO. 137174 JULY 10, 2000
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was issued a temporary
permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system. Before it
expired, MMC filed an application for the renewal thereof with
the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC).

The NPCC was abolished by Executive Order No. 192 dated June
10, 1987, and its powers and functions were integrated into the
Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) who then issued a “cease and desist
from discharging mine tailings."
MMC appealed to the Office of the President for issuance of
restraining orders against the orders of the PAB. The OP granted the
request however during the efficacy of this restraining order, MMC
shall immediately undertake, at a cost of not less than P30,000.00 a
day, the building of artificial reefs and planting of sea grass,
mangroves and vegetation on the causeway of the Bay.

On June 30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay,
hence, it likewise ceased from making further deposits to the
Ecology Trust Fund (ETF). MMC prayed that the Order issued by the
Office of the President be lifted so the Office of the President,
February 5, 1993 rendered a decision in dismissing the appeal;
affirming the cease and desist Order issued by the PAB; and lifting
the TRO.
The PAB ordered MMC to pay the amount of P30,000.00
per day, computed from the date MMC stopped paying on
01 July 1991, up to the formal lifting of the subject Order
from the Office of the President on 05 February 1993.

MMC assailed the aforequoted Order of the PAB as null and

void for having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in the CA. The CA ruled in favor of
MMC. Hence, the instant petition.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE PAB UNDER RA 3931 AS
AMENDED BY PD 984 (NATIONAL POLLUTION
CONTROL DECREE OF 1976) BEEN DIVESTED OF ITS
AUTHORITY TO TRY AND HEAR POLLUTION CASES
CONNECTED WITH MINING OPERATIONS BY VIRTUE
OF THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF RA 7942
No. The PAB is not divested of the authority to
try and hear pollution cases connected with
mining operations.

The provisions of RA 7942 do not necessarily repeal RA 3931, as

amended by PD 984 and EO 192.
Section 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to
adjudicate pollution cases in general. On the other hand, the
authority of the mines regional director is complementary to that
of the PAB.
The power of the mines regional director does not foreclose
PAB’s authority to determine and act on complaints filed before
it.

The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines

Adjudication Board conferred by RA 7942 clearly exclude
adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases. Nowhere is there
vested any authority to adjudicate cases involving violations of
pollution laws and regulations in general. Thus, there is no
genuine conflict between RA 7942 and RA 3931 as amended by PD
984 that precludes their co-existence.
 GONZALES VS.
CLIMAX MINING LTD.
GR No. 161957, February 28, 2005
• Gonzales, as a claim owner of mineral deposit, entered into a
joint-venture via Production-Sharing Letter-Agreement (First
Contract) with Geophil Inc. and Inmex Ltd. Giving them 36
months to develop, operate, mine and exploit the mining claims.
• Thereafter, Gonzales, Armico, Geo, Inmex and Aumex signed an
Addendum Contract (Second Contract) allowing Armico to apply
for FTAA.
• Climax, Climax-Armico and Australasian then executed a Financial
Accommodation Contract (Third Contract) and Assignment
Accession Agreement (Fourth Contract) between Climax-Armico
and Australasian and MOA (Fifth Contract) between Climax-Armico
and Australasian transferring the mining claim to the latter.
• Gonzales sought the nullity of the Second Contract, FTAA, Third
Contract, Fourth Contract, and Fifth Contract with preliminary
injunction with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-DENR (MGB-
DENR)
• The Panels of Arbitrators granted the Motion for Reconsideration
with regard to the issues of nullity, termination, withdrawal or
damages, but with regard to the constitutionality of the
Agreement and FTAA, it held that it had no jurisdiction.
• The Court of Appeals declared that the jurisdiction of the Panel of
Arbitrators is limited only to the resolution of mining disputes,
defined as those which raise a question of fact or matter requiring
technical knowledge and experience of mining authorities.
Whether or not the Panel of Arbitrators
has jurisdiction
No, the Panel of Arbitrator has no
jurisdiction.
The question of constitutionality is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the courts to resolve as this would clearly involve
the exercise of judicial power. The Panel of Arbitrators does not
have jurisdiction since it does not involve the application of
technical knowledge and expertise relating to mining.
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when
there is a disagreement between the parties as to some
provisions of the contract between them, which needs the
interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge
and expertise possessed by members of that Panel.
The validity of a contract cannot be subject of arbitration
proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a
contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
of law.
ASAPHIL CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
VS. VICENTE TUASON JR.,
INDUPLEX, INC. AND MINES
ADJUDICATION BOARD
GR NO. 134030 APRIL 25, 2006
• On March 24, 1975, respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr.  (Tuason) entered
into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore with Induplex, Inc.
(Induplex)
• Tuason executed on May 29, 1976, an Agreement to Operate Mining
Claims in favor of petitioner Asaphil Construction and Development
Corporation (Asaphil).
• On November 9, 1990, Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), a
complaint against Asaphil and Induplex for declaration of nullity of
the two contracts.
• Asaphil and Induplex filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
• The DENR, through the Regional Executive Director, found merit in
Induplex’s arguments and dismissed the complaint.
• On appeal, the MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD (MAB) ruled that the
complaint is for the cancellation and revocation of the Agreement to
Operate Mining Claims, which is within the jurisdiction of the DENR
under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1281.
• Asaphil and Induplex filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the MAB. Hence, the herein petition by Asaphil to the SC.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE DENR HAS JURISDICTION
OVER TUASON’S COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF
THE CONTRACT OF SALE AND PURCHASE OF PERLITE
ORE BETWEEN TUASON AND INDUPLEX, AND THE
AGREEMENT TO OPERATE MINING CLAIMS BETWEEN
TUASON AND ASAPHIL
As a preliminary matter, it should be stated that MAB decisions are
appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In Carpio v. Sulu Resources Development Corp., the Court clarified that while
Section 79 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that petitions for
review of MAB decisions are to be brought directly to the Supreme Court, the
MAB is a quasi-judicial agency whose decisions should be brought to the CA.
1. THE DENR DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER TUASON’S
COMPLAINT
• The Court upholds the finding of the DENR Regional Executive
Director that the DENR does not have jurisdiction over
Tuason’s complaint. The allegations in Tuason’s complaint do
not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within
the jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate
Mining Claims is a mining contract, the ground upon which
the contract is sought to be annulled is not due to Asaphil’s
refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the
agreement,
WHETHER OR NOT THE MAB ERRED IN INVALIDATING
THE AGREEMENT TO OPERAE MINING CLAIMS
2.
Given the DENR’s lack of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Tuason’s complaint, the Court finds it
unnecessary to rule on the issue of validity of the
contracts, as this should have been brought before and
resolved by the regular trial courts, to begin with.
 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. HON.
FRANCISCO ABAD
GR No. L-55132
Prior to 27 March 1978, the Director of Mines issued a commercial
lease permit to one Felix de Castro granting him the exclusive
right to quarry, extract and carry away sand and gravel from the
Sumigar Quarry located at Banawe, Ifugao.
On complaint by Felix de Castro, an Information was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Ifugao (Criminal Case No. 316), presided
over by respondent Judge, charging private respondents with the
crime of "Theft of Minerals" defined and penalized under Section
78 of Presidential Decree No. 483, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1385.
Respondents-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense inasmuch as they
had paid "sand and gravel tax.
Petitioner opposed the quashal arguing that it is error to imply
that consent was given by the Government through the Municipal
Treasurer inasmuch as the taxes paid to the Municipal
Government are not the fees required by the Bureau of Mines.
Whether or not the facts charged in the
information constitutes an offense
Yes. The facts charged in the information
constitutes an offense.
Section 78. Theft of Minerals. Any person who, without a mining
lease or a temporary permit or, any other permit granted by the
Secretary or the Director under existing mining decrees, laws and
regulations to mine, shall extract, remove and/or dispose of minerals
belonging to the Government or from a mining claim or claims
leased, held or owned by other persons, shall be deemed to have
stolen the ores or the products thereof from the mines or mills. He
shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned from six (6) months to six (6)
years or pay a fine from one hundred pesos (Pl00.00) to ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or both, in the discretion of the court,
besides paying compensation for the minerals removed, extracted
and disposed of, the royalty and the damage caused thereby.
The elements of the offense, therefore, are that : (1) the
accused extracted, removed and/or disposed of minerals; (2)
these minerals belong to the Government or have been taken
from a mining claim or claims leased, held or owned by other
persons; and (3) the accused did not possess a mining lease or a
temporary permit or any other permit to mine granted by the
Secretary or the Director under existing mining decrees, laws
and regulations.