MAX SHOOP

43 Phil 693
1920
Facts:

Max Shoop, already admitted to practice law in N.Y. and practiced for five years in the said
state, requested to be admitted to the Philippine Bar.
The pertinent rule to be applied, by comity, is the N.Y. rule for admitting lawyers to practice
without examinations subject only to the discretion of the N.Y. Appellate Division. The
paragraph 2 of the said N.Y. rule states that:

"Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years in another country
whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law".

Issue:

Whether the jurisprudence of the Philippines is based on the principles of the English
Common Law as required by the paragraph 2 of the N.Y. rule for admission to the bar in the
said state

Held:

Yes. The Philippines, after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the U.S., has adopted
the principles of the English Common Law through the present-day form of the Anglo-American
common law. The Philippines, in deciding cases, adopts the common law principles subject to
the limitation where the old civil law theories of Spain as applied to the country are well-
defined and when the theories and precedents of the Anglo-American cases are inconsistent
with the local customs and institutions. This principle is named the Philippine common law.

Tanada Vs Tuver G.R. No.

 L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. The petitioners invoked the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, dismissed the case on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
for their petition to be given due course. Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuance in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. 

Issues:
Whether the petitioners have legal personality to bring the instant petition? Whether
publication is needed to make the law effective?

Held:
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette.  The publication of all presidential issuance of a “public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law.
 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Hon. Ruben
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

Facts:
As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No.16,
Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domesti c helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA
took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator
also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. PASEI filed a petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their
implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;that the assailed DOLE
and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable , unfair and oppressive;
and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.

Issue:
Whether or not DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess in issuing
circulars.

Held:
 The second and first grounds are not meritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants
the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. I t
reads: “The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict
a n d r e g u l a t e t h e r e c r u i t m e n t a n d p l a c e m e n t a c t i v i ti e s o f a l l a g e n c i e s
w i t h i n t h e c o v e r a g e o f t h i s ti t l e [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Acti viti es] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this ti tle.” On the other
hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by
Executi ve Order No. 797 to take over the functi ons of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of
the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for a m o n g t h e f u n c ti o n s
i n h e r i t e d b y t h e P O E A f r o m t h e d e f u n c t B u r e a u o f E m p l o y m e n t Services was
the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate
private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and
overseas; it assumed from the defunct Overseas Employmen t Development Board
the power and duty to recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract
workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may
dictate; and from the Nati onal Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and
supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of
seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for
contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith.

Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. (G.R. No. L-46158, Nov. 28, 1986)

Facts:
Tayug Rural is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans from Central Bank in 1962 and1963, all
covered by promissory notes, amounting to 813k. In late 1964, Central Bank released a circular; Memorandum
Circular No. DLC-8 thru the Director of Loans and Credit. This circular all informed all rural banks that an
additional 10% per annum penalty interest would be assessed on all past due loans beginning 1965.
This was enforced beginning July 1965.In 1969, the outstanding balance of Tayug was at 444k. Tayug Rural filed a
case in CFI Manila to recover the 10% penalty it paid up to 1968, amounting to about 16k, and to restrain Central
bank from further imposing the penalty. Central Bank filed a counterclaim for the outstanding
balance includingthe10% penalty, stating that it was legally imposed under the Rules and Regulations
Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on 1958, under RA 720.Tayug’s defense was
that the counterclaim should be dismissed since the unpaid obligation of Tayug was due to
Central Bank’s flexible and double standard policy of its rediscounting privileges to Tayug Rural and its
subsequent arbitrary and illegal imposition of the 10% penalty. Tayug Rural contends that no such 10% penalty
starting from 1965 was included in the promissory notes covering the loans. A judgment was rendered by
CFI Manila in favor of Central Bank ordering Tayug Rural Bank to pay10% penalty in the amount of
around 19k pesos for loans up to July 1969, and to pay nothing for the next remaining loans. Tayug’s claim in the
case was however successful, and so Tayug was also ordered to pay 444k, with interest to the Central Bank for
the overdue accounts with respect to the promissory notes. Central Bank appealed to the CA, but also lost on
the ground that only a legal question had been raised in the pleadings. The case was then raised to the SC, with
each party arguing in the following manner: CFI rules that the circular’s retroactive effect on past due loans
impairs the obligation of contracts and deprives Tayug Rural of property without due process of law. C e n t r a l
Bank reasons that Tayug Rural, despite the loans, should have known that
r u l e s   a n d regulations authorize the Central Bank to impose additional reasonable penalties.

Issue:
Whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty via Memorandum Circular No.
DLC-8.

Held:
NO. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that of RA 720, shows that nowhere
therein is the authority given to the Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to the rural banks on past
due accounts with the Central Bank. As said by the CFI, while the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory
powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure
SUPERVISORY in character. Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. All that is required of
administrative rules and regulations is to implement given legislation by not contradicting it and conform to the
standards prescribed by law. Rules and regulations cannot go beyond the basic law.. The law cannot be
given retroactive effect. More to the point, the Monetary Board revoked the additional penalty later in 1970,
which clearly shows an admission that it had no power to impose the same. The Central bank hoped to rectify
the defect by revising the DLC Form later. However, Tayug Rural must pay the additional 10% in case of suit,
since in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in attorney’s fees and costs of suit and collection.

FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CARLOS LARIOSA and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
GR No. 70479 February 27, 1987

FACTS:
Carlos Lariosa works in Firestone as factory worker. When he was about to leave the company
premises, he was frisked by security guard because while his personal bag was inspected, there
were 16 wool flannel swabs all belonging to the company. As a result, he was terminated by firestone on the
ground of stealing company property and loss of trust. The company also files criminal
complaint for att empted theft . Lariosa, on other hand, fi led a case for illegal
dismissal Labor Arbiter found the dismissal just bust the NLRC reversed
the decision Firestone contends that NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosa’s appeal for being
late.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal filed by Lariosa and NLRC was filed late.

HELD:
 Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of 14 days from the notice of
the decision of the labor arbiter. Under the Labor Code, the reglementary period for which an
appeal from decision of labor arbiter may be filed to NLRC is within a period of ten days. The
ten-day period has to be interpreted to mean as ten ‘calendar’ days and not ten ‘working’ days.

MARIANO S. GONZAGA vs. AUGUSTO CE DAVID

GR No. L-14858 December 29, 1960

FACTS:
Mariano Gonzaga, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger bus, registers the vehicles
and pays the fi rst installment for registrati on fees due
on 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, he remitted to the
provincial treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, the amount of P500.00, under postal money
orders. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remitt ance bears the
date August 31, 1957. The registrar of the Motor Vehicle Offi ce ruled that pursuant
to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last
working day of August. The last working day of August 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957. And
consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga which bears cancellation mark dated August 31,1957
was made beyond time fixed by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remittance for second installment of registration fees was made
beyond the time fixed by law.
 
RULING:
The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no office on Saturday, August 31, 1957.However,it
was immaterial the last working day contemplated in the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean the last working day of Motor
Vehicle Offi ce. The fact that August31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday did
not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying
registrati on fees without penalty. Moreover, under the said law, for payment
of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing the
remittance is considered the date of application.

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR.

vs HE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO
GR No. L-32116 April 21, 1981

FACTS:
Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for
industrial loan. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on Castor’s house, after that,
the bank approved the loan of P3000. Valencia obtained from the bank an equal amount of
loan affixing Castro’s signature as co-maker without its knowledge. The sheriff then sent a
notice announcing the property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation. Upon
request, the auction sale which was scheduled for March 10, 1961was postponed for April 10,
1961. But April 10 was subsequently declared a special holiday so the sheriff sold the property on public
auction on April 11, 1961 which was the next succeeding business day following the special holiday. Castro
prayed for the annulment of sale alleging that there was fraud on the part of Valencia who
induced her to sign as co-maker of a promissory note since she is a 70-year old widow who cannot
read and write and it was only when she receive the notice of sheriff, she learned that
the encumbrance on her property was P6000 and not for P3000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public auction sale was null and void for transferring the date
already set by law.
RULING:
The sale is null and void for not having in accordance with Act 3135 which states that
that a notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for not less than 20 days in at least 3public
places and if the property is worth more than P400 such noti ce shall also be
published for in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city once a week for 3
consecutive weeks. The pretermission of a holiday applies only ‘where the day, or the last day for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on
holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to be
done. Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fi xed by
deputy sheriff , the sale cannot be legally made on the next succeeding business day
without the notice of the sale in accordance with Act no. 3135.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

FACTS:
On July 27, 1953, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City charging
Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on the 28th day of May, 1953. The
accused thereupon presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Articles 90 and 91
of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case.
Against the order of dismissal appeal is made directly to this Court under the provisions of
section 17, sub-paragraph 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as only questions of law are involved in
the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term "month" in the Revised Penal Code should be understood to
be a month of 30 days, instead of the civil calendar or calendar month.
HELD:
Yes. The term "month" used in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the
sense that the new Civil Code defines the said term, we find persuasive authority in a decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case decided by it in the year 1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de
1887), prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, it had declared that when the law spoke
of months, it meant the natural month or the solar month, in the absence of express provisions
to the contrary. But after the promulgation of the Civil Code of Spain, which provided in its
Article 7 a general rule for the interpretation of the laws, and with particular respect to months,
that a month shall be understood as a 30-day month, said court held that the two months
period for the prescription of a light offense should be understood to mean 60 days, a month
being a 30-day month. Similarly, we hold that in view of the express provisions of Article 13 of
the new Civil Code the term "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be
understood to mean the 30-day month and not the solar or civil month.
We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days,
said period to be counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the offense, and we find that
when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet been prescribed
because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29.

The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the case ordered reinstated.
Without costs.
 In Re: Filart 40 Phil 205

FACTS:
These proceedings were instituted at the instance of thirty-seven residents of Asingan,
Pangasinan, who filed a complaint against attorney Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging in
substance:

1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan he received of them the sum of P111
as fees for drafting a memorandum in connection with Registration Case No. 3, Record No.
8540;
2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting the appeal to the
Supreme Court, he having practically abandoned the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the facts presented are sufficient to support the allegation of fraud and
negligence on part of the respondent.

HELD:

The court, having in mind the many appeals which have been dismissed because of the
lack of diligence of counsel, cannot let the occurrence pass without expressing a strong
disapproval of such criminal carelessness. While we would not wish to assume a harsh and
uncompromising attitude towards attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them to know that by
indulging in such unprofessional tactics they become unworthy of the trust which the law
reposes in them. The lack of due care is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with his client,
and is indicative of a disregard of the attorney's duties to the court. We bring to the notice of
clients whose rights have been prejudiced by the failure or by the delay of an attorney in
preparing or filing pleadings necessary in the proper conduct of a cause, and in taking such
steps as may be required in the progress of the case, that the client who has suffered damages
as the result of his attorney's negligence or misconduct may recover therefor. Without,
therefore, desiring especially to overemphasize the dereliction of Attorney Anacleto Filart for,
sad to relate, he is only one of a class, it does become our solemn duty to reprimand him for
carelessness and misconduct in attending to the cause of poor clients. Let a copy of this order
be furnished to the respondent for his information with a warning that a more severe
punishment will be meted out to him in case of a repetition of similar acts and omissions; and
let a copy hereof be filed with his personal papers in this court. So ordered.
 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals
GR No. L-5230612 October 1981

FACTS:

During the period pertinent to this case, Petitioner Corporation was engaged in the
business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. For which petitioner paid
rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals. In
implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334.
Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR
30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the
Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code
increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from “such amount”
referring to rents, etc. to “gross income.” In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of
assessment and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The
company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon. 

ISSUE:

Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be
retroactively applied. 

HELD:

Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application

where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein, the prejudice the company
of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued
only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under
General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay
deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time
commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due
from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer
control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are
concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.

PABLO LORENZO VS. JUAN POSADAS, JR 64 Phil 353

G.R. No. L-43082   June 18, 1937

FACTS:
 On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable
amount of real and personal properties. Hanley’s will provides the following: his money will be
given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the real estate owned by him. It further
provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanley’s death. Thus, in
the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M.
Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on
Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal
Revenue, assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which includes
penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that Lorenzo will
be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI granted
Posadas’ motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been assessed after 10 years.
He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so. The latter counterclaimed for the
additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the tax and which was not
included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied
Lorenzo’s claim for refund against Posadas. Hence, both appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance tax and therefore liable
for the P1, 191.27 that Posadas is asking for?

HELD:
Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised Administrative
Code, payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to each beneficiary his
share. This payment should have been made before March 10, 1924, the date when P.J.M.
Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.Although the property was only to be given
after 10 years from the death of Hanley, the court considered that delivery to the trustee is
delivery to cestui que trust, the beneficiary within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b).Even though
there was no express mention of the word “trust” in the will, the court of first instance was
correct in appointing a trustee because no particular or technical words are required to create a
testamentary trust (69 C.J.,p. 711). The requisites of a valid testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient
words to raise a trust, 2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or ascertained object. There is no doubt
that Hanley intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will that certain of his properties
be kept together.

ERRAZZINI VS. GSELL, 34 PHIL 693

FACTS:
Carlos Gsell is engaged in the manufacture of umbrellas, matches and hats. Ferrazzinin was
employed by Gsell as foreman in the umbrella factory at some point he was discharged by Gsell
so he filed this case to recover damages for an alleged wrongful discharged. Gsell admitted the
discharge of Ferrazzini without “written advice of six months in advance” as provided in the
contract. He claims that the discharge was lawful on account of absence, unfaithfulness and
disobedience of orders. He also sought a counterclaim for further alleged breach by Ferrazzini,
after his discharged that he cannot enter into employment of any enterprise in the Phil., during
his employment and within 5 years after termination except when given written permission; if
he does, he will pay Gsell P10,000. The trial court favored Ferrazzini and decline to consider the
counterclaim, so Gsell appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Was the discharged lawful?
2. Is the stipulation preventing Ferrazzini to enter employment of any enterprise in the
Philippines without the written consent against public policy?
RULLING:
1. The discharge was lawful on the account of Ferrazzini’s absences, disobedience and
unfaithfulness justifies the same.
2. The contract under consideration, tested by law, rules and principles above set forth is
clearly one is undue or unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore against public
policy. It is limited as to the time and space but not to the trade. It is not necessary for
the protection of the defendant, as this is provided for in another part of the clause. It
would force the plaintiff to leave the Philippine Island in order to obtain livelihood
incase the defendant decline to give him written consent to work elsewhere in this
country.

BOCOBO vs. ESTANISLAO

G.R. No. L-30458 August 31, 1976

FACTS:

A criminal complaint for libel filed by a Municipal Judge, Vicente Estanislao of Balaga,
Bataan with the Municipal Trial Court of Bataan, against petitioner, Francisco Q. Bocobo.
Pursuant to such complaint, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation. Then
came the challenge order to the effect that the offense charged is one that falls with the
concurrent jurisdiction of the place with the record of the case being referred to the Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan pursuant to such order of respondent Judge, filed an information for libel
against petitioner in the Municipal Court of Balaga, Bataan.
ISSUE:

Whether or not court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court be exercised over libel cases.

HELD:

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as last amended by RA 4363 that took effect in 1965,
insofar as pertinent, reads; “Any person who shall publish, exhibits or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means shall be responsible for the same as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of the
First Instance of the province, city, or municipality where the libellous article is printed,
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides. Thus it was in the earlier
statute, Republic Act No. 1289 of 1955. The writ of certiorari is granted and challenged order of
January 15, 1968 as well as January 27, 1969 are nullified and set aside on the ground that the
exclusive jurisdiction of libel cases belong to the Court of the First Instance.

LICHAUCO & COMPANY vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL and RAFAEL CORPUS

G.R. No. L-19628 December 4, 1922

FACTS:
Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of mandamus and injunction against Silverio
Apostol and Rafael Corpus allegedly refusing Lichauco & Co to import from Pnom-Pehn, in
French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum
except upon the condition, stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture contending that
said cattle shall have been immunized from the rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.
The petitioner asseted that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code
(amended by Act no. 3052), the petitioner has “an absolute and unrestricted right to import
carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from phom-
pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippin Islands” and that the respondents have no authority to
impose upon the petitioner previous said restrictions. Respondents relied upon section 1770 of
the Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order
No. 6

ISSUE:
Whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to draft
animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum?
HELD:
Section 1762 is for the general rule, while section 1770 is for particular contingency and
not inconsistent with Section 1762. Petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the
writs of mandamus and injunction.

We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason
that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a
particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. Section 1770 is
therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as amended; on the other
hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of section 1762. Of course the two provisions
are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is considered alone, the cattle
which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section
1770 is still in force the cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in
only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No. 21. But this difference
between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense
that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amended Act (3052).
That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in
section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we find that while
section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the Island at any
time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal
with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some
defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation
continues.
U.S. vs Palacio 33 Phil 208

FACTS:
The undersigned charges Mateo P. Palacio with having violated section 87 of Act No. 82,
in the following manner, to wit: Said accused, on or about the 26th day of September, 1914, in
the municipality of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, P.I., he being then and there a deputy to the
provincial assessor of Leyte, charged with the duty of assessing real property, did willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally upon revising the assessment and in reassessing the property of
Francisco Madlonito, situated in the barrio of Di-it, municipality of Tacloban, omit from the tax
list certain real properties and improvements belonging to said Francisco Madlonito, knowing
that the properties omitted were lawfully taxable; in violation of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act committed by the defendant constitute an infraction provided
for and punished by section 87 of Act No. 82, known as the Municipal Code.

HELD:
Section 49 of the same Act, No. 82, provides that the real estate of the municipality shall
be valued and assessed for taxation by a board, to consist of the president, the municipal
treasurer, and a specially authorized deputy of the provincial treasurer, which board shall be
known as the municipal board of assessors. On February 11, 1913, Act No. 2238 was passed,
section 1 of which created the position of provincial assessor for each province containing
municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code. As may be seen, the
purpose of Act No. 2238, in creating the office of provincial assessor and allowing him such
number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the approval of the
Executive Secretary, was the same as that of Act No. 82, in creating, in section 49 thereof, the
municipal board of assessors. Furthermore, one of the rules of interpretation, as very properly
said by defendant’s counsel in his brief, is that “when there are two laws on the same subject
enacted on different dates, and it appears evidently by the form and essence of the later law
that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the whole of the subject, and that it is
a complete and perfect system, or is in itself a provision, the latest law should be considered as
a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all that is
not shall rejected and repealed.” By reason of the foregoing, and the judgment appealed from
being in accordance with the merits of the case and the law, we hereby affirm the same, with
the costs against appellant. So ordered.

Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation

GR 30642; April 30, 1985

FACTS:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation,
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically,
the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently
and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned
before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can
no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

HELD: 

Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not
availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may
be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized
that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be
defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him.
 ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A
Pacifi c Banking Corporati on Check was paid and drawn against the account of
EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company
traced source of check and later
discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Balt
a o .   A l b e n s o n   m a d e   a n extra-judicial demand upon Baltao but latt er
denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company fi led a
complaint against Baltao for violati on of BP 22. It was later  discovered that
private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business
establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such
information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE:

Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause
damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to
them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22.
Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on the
following inquiries: SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao (EB).
Bank said signature belonged to EB.
 
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 EBs, Jr., Sr. and the III. There
was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson. A p e r s o n w h o h a s n o t b e e n
p a i d a n o b l i g a ti o n o w e d t o h i m w i l l n a t u r a l l y s e e k w a y s t o compel the
debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the
check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or
of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse
result of an acti on does not per se make the acti on wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of  damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate.
 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
445 SCRA 500

FACTS:
Private respondent Emerald Resort Hotel Corporation (“ERHC”) obtained a loan from
petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (“DBP”). To secure the loan, ERHC mortgaged
its personal and real properties to DBP. On 5 June 1986, alleging that ERHC failed to pay its
loan, DBP filed with the Office of the Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, an Application for
Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgages. Sheriffs issued the required
notices of public auction sale of the personal and real properties. However, they failed to
execute the corresponding certificates of posting of the notices. The Office of the Sheriff
scheduled on 12 August 1986 the public auction sale of the real properties. The first scheduled
public auction was published. However, the Office of the Sheriff postponed the auction sale on
12 August 1986 to 11 September 1986 at the request of ERHC. DBP did not republish the notice
of the rescheduled auction sale because DBP and ERHC signed an agreement to postpone the
12 August 1986 auction sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosre of real and chattel mortgage are valid.
RULING:
Valid as to chattel mortgage. Void as to real estate mortgage. There is no question that
DBP published the notice of auction sale scheduled on 12 August 1986. However, no auction
sale took place on 12 August 1986 because DBP, at the instance of ERHC, agreed to postpone
the same to 11 September 1986.
Publication, therefore, is required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably wide
publicity such that those interested might attend the public sale. To allow the parties to waive
this jurisdictional requirement ought to result in converting into a private sale what to be a
public auction.
DBP, however, complied with the mandatory posting of the notices of the auction sale
of the personal properties. Under the Chattel Mortgage Law, the only requirement is posting of
the notice of auction sale. There was no postponement of the auction sale of the personal
properties and the foreclosure took place as scheduled. Thus, the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the chattel mortgage in the instant case suffers from no procedural infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 38569 and
38604 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
is valid whereas the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage is void. The award of
moral damages is deleted for lack of basis. No costs.

ELADlA DE LIMA, vs.LAGUNA TAYABAS

G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this decision seeking its modification so that
the legal interest awarded by the Appellate, Court will start to run from the date of the
decision of the trial court on December 27, 1963 instead of January 31, 1972, the date of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Potenciano Requijo as heir of the deceased Petra
de la Cruz further sought an increase in the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 to P 12,000.00. The
Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration holding that since the plaintiffs did not
appeal from the failure of the court a quo to award interest on the damages and that the court
on its own discretion awarded such interest in view of Art. 2210 of the Civil Code, the effectivity
of the interest should not be rolled back to the time the decision of the court a quo was
rendered.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeal; erred in granting legal interest on damages to
start only from the date of its decision instead of from the date of the trial court's decision;
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not increasing the indemnity for the
death of Petra de La Cruz (in Civil Case No. SP-240) from P3,000 to P12,000.00.
RULING:
Under the first issue, petitioners contend that the ruling of the Appellate Court departs
from the consistent rulings of this court that the award of the legal rate of interest should be
computed from the promulgation of the decision of the tonal court. Respondents counter that
petitioner having failed to appeal from the lower court's decision they are now precluded from
questioning the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It is true that the rule is well-settled that a party
cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he may
make counter assignment of errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on other grounds
but not to seek modification or reversal thereof, for in such case he must appeal. A party who
does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate
court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought
up on appeal.
Moreover, under the circumstances of this case where the heirs of the victim in the
traffic accident chose not to appeal in the hope that the transportation company will pay the
damages awarded by the lower court but unfortunately said company still appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which step was obviously dilatory and oppressive of the rights of the said
claimants: that the case had been pending in court for about 30 years from the date of the
accident in 1958 so that as an exception to the general rule afore stated, the said heirs who did
not appeal the judgment, should be afforded equitable relief by the courts as it must be vigilant
for their protection. The claim for legal interest and increase in the indemnity should be
entertained in spite of the failure of the claimants to appeal the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the subject decision is modified in that
the legal interest on the damages awarded to petitioners commences from the date of the
decision of the court a quo until actual payment while the civil indemnity for the death of Petra
de la Cruz is increased to P 30,000.00.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ
481 SCRA 384 (2006)
FACTS:
 Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante hired the services of Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. to send a telegram to her sister respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog asking her
to send money for their mother Editha Verchez who at that time was confined in a hospital in
Sorsogon. But it took 25 days before such message was conveyed to Zenaida. When Editha
died, her husband, respondent Alfonso Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida
and their respective spouses, filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon. They alleged that the delay in the delivery of the message contributed to the
early death of Editha. RCPI argues that there is no privacy of contract between other
respondents except with Grace, also the delay in the delivery is caused by force majeure,
maintaining further that they exercised due diligence in choosing their employees; hence they
must be released from any liability. The RTC rendered judgment against RCPI. RCPI appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper despite the fact that there was
no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts
RULING: 
RCPI‘s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or
breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-
respondents. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It
took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the
alleged radio noise and interference which adversely affected the transmission and/or
reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate
the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the
telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked
to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences
of such a loss. Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from
delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of
the non-transmission and the non-delivery that she could have taken steps to remedy the
situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.

RHODORA M. LEDESMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 160 SCRA 449

[G.R. No. 113216. September 5, 1997]

FACTS:
Violeta Delmo was treasurer of an organization formed by students of the West Visayas
College. She extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school.
As a result, the school president (petitioner) denied her the right to graduate MAGNA CUM
LAUDE despite the order of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools that she be conferred
such honor.

ISSUE:
Is the school president liable for damages?

RULING:
It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal, which was
brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but
proper. The Solicitor- General tried to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform
Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the
Director's decision.
Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said
decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision XXX and even though
he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it, which
consisted of only 3 pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet Mr.
Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the
petitioner failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court
correctly pointed out in its decision.
 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007
FACTS:

The petitioner, Rommel Jacinto Silverio filed a petition to change his first name from
“Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his gender from male to female in his birth certificate so that
he can marry as a woman to a man.
The petition is based on the ground that  he has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand a year before the petition was filed. The petition was granted by the said
court yet on August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed by the appellate court.
The latter ruled that the decision of the former lacked legal basis. Wherefore with the decision
rendered the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Should the court allow the change of name and gender based of the ground that
petitioner is now physically a woman?

RULING:

No. The court denies the petition. The Supreme Court denies the motion on the ground
that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination of a person’s sex is at the
time of birth, if it is not by error then it cannot be changed.
Thus, the court explained that the change in gender sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences, for it will greatly affect the rules
of marriage and family relations and affect public policy considering laws governing women.
 ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Alicia Reyes (petitioner) is a Filipino citizen while the private respondent is an American
citizen. The two were married in Hongkong in 1972; then established their residence in the
Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alicia Reyes re-married in
Nevada this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed suit against Alicia Reyes Van
Dorn stating that petitioner's business (Galleon Shop) in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of
the parties and asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent
had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". The Court denied the
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree had no bearing in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Galleon Shop is a conjugal property of the petitioner and the private
respondent even after their divorce obtained in USA.

RULING:
No. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the husband
of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his county,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him.
He is also estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to
the petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be subject to a wife's obligation. The private
respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs.HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was
married to private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national in the Federal
Republic of Germany. After 3 and a half years, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding
against the petitioner in Germany and promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure
of marriage of the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed for two complains of
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent,
petitioner had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and with Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.
The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against the petitioner. The Secretary of Justice directed the respondent city fiscal to
defer any arraignment proceedings if the accused has not yet been arraigned and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review. On October 21, 1987 this Court issued a
TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with the criminal case. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Petitioner argues
that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing of the criminal
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the filing of the criminal action.
RULING:
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence an adultery case on the ground that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
the suit. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Thus, it follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action, and by this it meant that he is still married to
the accused spouse at the time of the time of the filing of the complaint.
 FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

FACTS:
Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than
she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise
to marry.

RULING:
When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot
recover moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages
for medical and hospitalization expenses as well as attorney’s fees.
Because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love
for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a
woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore,
moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of
the new Civil Code.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-2008 December 26, 1964
FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their promise to love, decided to get
married. Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage
had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram
informing her “nothing changed rest assured returning soon”. Francisco was never heard from
again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:

Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

RULING:

The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages
may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be
awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in
a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

SALAS JR. V. AGUILA GR NO. 201370 Sept 23, 2013

Facts:           
On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila
gave birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child.
On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have
no conjugal properties whatsoever”.
 On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of their
conjugal property, if any.
On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion stating that she
discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper instruments of conveyance the
discovered properties. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and
Aguila, thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.
Ruling: 
Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the validity
of their marriage.
The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner, Salas.Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property
acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s
joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership.
Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

FELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and
church ceremony respectively. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon
City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.
Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, private
respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church
wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until private respondent petition
that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time
they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married
petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She submitted
the marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the evidence. However,
RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital
obligations of the respondent.

RULING: 
There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation.
Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for
another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.
She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages
from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused
her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her
parents.
Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays the
wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR. vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ

GR 85140 17 May 1990

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas cohabited with Tomas Eugenio. Unfortunately, Vargas died due to
heart failure while giving birth. The brothers and sisters of the former filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus on 27 September 1988. They stated that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
and had resided her in the palacial residence in Misamis.
RTC issued the writ of Habeas Corpus but Eugenio refused to surrender the corpse to
the sheriff due to the reason that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus. The court
consequently ordered that the corpse of Vitaliana Vargas be delivered to the funeral parlor for
autopsy but Eugenio stated that the court does not have jurisdiction. Eugenio insisted that he
has a right on Vargas’ corpse because he is her common law husband.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio can claim custody for the deceased’s body

RULING:
No, Eugenio cannot claim custody for the deceased’s body. The court ordered for the
dead body of Vargas be awarded to her brothers and sisters. As stated in the Revised
Administrative code, the duty of burial of an unmarried person should be left to any kin.
Even if the deceased and the petitioner cohabited, they are still not considered husband
and wife as the Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman
can cohabit for years even without marriage; however, their legal status remains that of an
unmarried person.
The petitioner has an existing marriage with another woman which serves as an
impediment from marrying Vitaliana when she was still living. Therefore in this case, the
custody of Vargas’s dead body is with her relatives.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY (1996)

GR No. 961088

FACTS:
Dapa, Surigao del Norte Mayor Navarro filed a complaint against respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and
ignorance of the law. As for the first act complained, it was alleged that Judge Domagtoy
solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite the lack of summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of Ida Peñaranda, Tagadan’s first wife.
Respondent states that the joint affidavit presented by Tagadan stating the fact that he
and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7) years is sufficient proof of
Peñaranda’s presumptive death, and therefore, he could rightfully solemnize the marriage.
Second, it was alleged that Judge Domagtoy performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction. The judge holds his office and
therefore has jurisdiction in Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with gross misconduct and in gross
ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Yes. As in the first issue, the respondent judge solemnized the wedding despite the
declaration in the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga
stating that Tagadan’s civil status is separated. Furthermore, he also maintained that the joint
affidavit stating that the first wife, Ida Penaranda, has not returned nor been heard of for
almost seven years thereby giving rise to her presumptive death, is enough reason to proceed
with the marriage.
These of course are in disagreement with Art. 41 of the Family Code which provides that
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse, and therefore, by reason that no
such summary proceeding was made by Tagadan, made their marriage void. As for the second
issue, it is covered by Art. 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus Art. 7 could not justify the judge’s
action for the reason that his jurisdiction covers only the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, thus he is without authority to administer the wedding in Dapa, Surigao Del Norte.
Furthermore, the judge could not cite Art. 8 to validate his actions as this would only
demonstrate his lack of understanding of the basic principles of the civil law since the parties
did not fall under any of the exceptions aforementioned in the provision.

FABIAN PUGEDA vs. RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS

GR No. L-16925 March 31, 1962

FACTS:

The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same were
acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in
January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934. The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad,
Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia
Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer. The plaintiff alleges that
during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they
acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot
No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No.
2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the aid interest in the lots above-mentioned;
that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of
said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff
prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein of
plaintiff.

ISSUE:
The defendants questioned the marriage of the plaintiff, when they produced a
photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite or the month
of January 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage.

HELD:

Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented
it to proof marriage.

Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ELIAS BORROMEO 133 SCRA 106
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

FACTS:

At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told
Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her.
Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and
together, they went to Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying
infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-
appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable
for “homicide” and not “parricide”. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract
issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the
victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.

ISSUE: 

Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

HELD:

In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are
presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society.
Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites
of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such
marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. And, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as
long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a
copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000.
 MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages
during his lifetime.  He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor.  He had 4
children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.  Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria,
Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina.  Ireneo on the other hand had a son
named Ruperto.  On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had
a daughter named Cresenciana.  Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco
and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.  Jacinto testified that his parents got
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as
husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupo’s descendants by his
first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated
themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration
proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued.  The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: 
Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage,
no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate;
and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

FACTS:

Tenebro was married to Ancajas before a judge in a trial court in Lapu-lapu city.
Thismarriage took place in 1990. Eventually Tenebro showed Ancajas a marriage
certificateinvolving him and a Villareyes, a marriage consummated in 1986. Tenebro left their
home andsaid that he will cohabit with Villareyes. However, in 1993, he married another
woman namedVillegas. After discovering this, Ancajas corresponded with Villareyes asking her
if their marriage did take place and Villareyes answered in the affirmative. With this, Ancajas
filed acase for bigamy. Tenebro claimed that he only had children with Villareyes but there was
noexisting valid marriage between them because there was no ceremony that took place and
alsothere is no record of their marriage in the civil registrar. The lower court found him guilty
of bigamy and said decision was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner
contestedthis by invoking psychological incapacity in the second marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tenebro’s marriage to Villareyes was valid and whether he may
invoke psychological incapacity in the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on liability for
bigamy?

HELD:

With regard to the first issue, the court ruled in the affirmative and ruled in the negative
on the latter. For the first issue, Villareyes was able to present a valid marriage certificate and
her handwritten statement. These were sufficient documentary evidence that can prove that a
marriage was solemnized since that is what is stated in the document and signed by the
parties.When a court declares a marriage null and void by reason of psychological incapacity it
does not declare the marriage non-existent from the very beginning. This means that a
marriage is still considered to have taken place. With this, the court ruled that a subsequent
marriage was considered contracted while another marriage subsists thus constituting bigamy

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE A. DAYOT

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu
of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual.They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. 
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July
1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a
sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD: 

Court of Appeals indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.  Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage on November 1986.  Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the
Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. 
The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptibly.  The right to impugn
marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he
had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received
a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed
for collection of money against Nicdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was
declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous
marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized
without the required marriage license.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
legitimes.
HELD: 
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has
been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.  Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law,
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries
earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to
the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void.

EPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas.  They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that
she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for
only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest
desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. 
She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage.  Her lawyer then found
out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven
by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is

sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties.  Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro
is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the
peculiar circumstances of her case.  Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the
absence of the subject marriage license.

ENGRACE BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.  They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners.  Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to
Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal.  1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license.  They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5
years exempting from securing the marriage license.  Pepito died in a car accident on February
19, 1977.  After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity
of Pepito’s marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.  They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for
at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law.  Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.  It can
be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.
 ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.,
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the RTC.Petitioner
is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the USA.They were married
in Hong Kong and established residence in the Philippines and produced two children. They
divorced in Nevada and it is also where petitioner remarried Theodore Van Dorn.Private
respondent filed a case against petitioner with regard to a business in Ermita, which respondent
claims as Conjugal property and he asks to be declared with right to manage.Petitioner claims
that said act is barred by his confirmation in their Nevada divorce that they had no community
property. The court denied dismissal because said property is in the Philippines and so the
divorce has no bearing in the case. Hence, the certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether the Nevada divorce is to be given merit in the Philippines?

Held:

The private respondent contends that the divorce cannot be held valid in the
Philippines because it is against our laws. However, the Philippines recognizes divorce by an
alien in another country. The divorce that took place between private respondent and
petitioner received no contention from private respondent. In fact he sent his lawyers on his
behalf, stating that they wish to get a divorce by reason of incompatibility and that there is no
community property to be adjudicated. With this, the court cannot rule in favor of private
respondent because being a citizen of the United States it was his own laws that made the
divorce valid.DOCTRINE Article 15 of the Civil Code talks about laws on family rights binding
upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.

However, private respondent is a citizen of the USA and pursuant to his national law, he
is no longer the husband of petitioner, and it being a valid divorce, is recognized here in the
Philippines.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs.HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was
married to private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national in the Federal
Republic of Germany. After 3 and a half years, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding
against the petitioner in Germany and promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure
of marriage of the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed for two complains of
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent,
petitioner had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and with Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.
The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against the petitioner. The Secretary of Justice directed the respondent city fiscal to
defer any arraignment proceedings if the accused has not yet been arraigned and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review. On October 21, 1987 this Court issued a
TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with the criminal case. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Petitioner argues
that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing of the criminal
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the filing of the criminal action.
RULING:
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence an adultery case on the ground that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
the suit. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Thus, it follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action, and by this it meant that he is still married to
the accused spouse at the time of the time of the filing of the complaint.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in Ozamis City in the year 1941.This
relationship gave birth to a son and daughter. Said son was with Lady when she left for the
States in 1986. Cipriano knew eventually that his wife has become a naturalized citizen of the
States and learned that she has married another man after acquiring a divorce decree. Cipriano
asked the declaration of the court permitting him to remarry.

The Solicitor General as representative for the State contends that he cannot be granted
permission to remarry because Lady was not a foreign citizen specifically when he married her
and the law only recognizes divorce acquired by the alien spouse. Petition was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Code permits Cipriano to remarry after a divorce was acquired?

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative, however, it denied Cipriano permission to remarry.
The court in answering in the affirmative on the issue based their decision on paragraph 2of
Section 26 of the Family Code which provides for the recognition of a divorce decree validly
acquired by the alien spouse in another country. This is to permit the Filipino spouse to remarry
as a matter of fairness because the foreign spouse ceased to be attached to the Filipino. What is
relevant here is that Lady was no longer a citizen of the Philippines when she acquired the
divorce bringing her within the purview of Section 26. She is considered an alien who obtained
a divorce decree. This then capacitates Cipriano to remarry.

Unfortunately, for his petition to be granted, he has to prove to the court that a divorce
decree has been validly acquired by his wife. However, he failed to do so, hence, the court
cannot permit him to remarry.

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE 345 G.R. No. 124371.
November 23, 2000

FACTS:

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the
outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal
home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he
went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was
having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo
married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his
last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a
petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On
appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they
have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: 
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD: 
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce
abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held
that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of
the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the succession rights allowing proof of
foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity” since he was a foreigner.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.Crasus Iyoy was
married to Fely Iyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to five children. Fely Iyoy eventually
left for the States to provide for their family in 1984 and in lessthan a year sent Crasus
documents to sign with regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasus eventually found out
that Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship has conceived of a child.
Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Fely’s subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals
in deciding this case sided with Fely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid
and recognized in the Philippines?

HELD:

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. Basing from
the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus
a year after. This means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that,
Fely is not yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and therefore she does
not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered as subsisting.

The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and status
are governed by Philippine laws regardless of where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then,
is not permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the
Philippines.

MANUEL G. ALMELOS vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

GR 179620 August 26, 2008

Facts: 
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor and respondent Leonida Trinidad were married on January
29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. Their union bore three children. 
    Leonida averred that Manuel’s kind and gentle demeanor did not last long.  In the public eye,
Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father.  At home, Leonida described Manuel
as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.  Manuel’s unreasonable way
of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.
Manuel’s deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession. Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel
kissed another man on the lips.

Issue:
    The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the trial court as regards the order
declaring the marriage as null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or
conjugal property and both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property
regime jointly. The RTC decreed dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida
and forfeited Manuel’s share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld
valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel’s share in the property regime is
unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.
 LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Facts:
Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva on the ground of
Lilia‘s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. Lilia admitted to the previous
marriage but claimed that it was null and void since she was forced to enter the said union. In
the pre-trial that ensued, both parties agreed that the issue was whether the previous marriage
was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the court for an opportunity to present more evidence
but the respondent judge denied the petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying the
―agreed facts‖ and to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

Issue:
Whether or not the prior marriage was void or voidable. ?

Held:
The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to prove that her marriage was vitiated by
force. Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be irrelevant since the previous marriage
wasn‘t void but merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since no annulment was
made, her current marriage is therefore void.
 PEDRO Odayat vs DEMETRIO Amante 77 SCRA 338
A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977

FACTS:

Pedro Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance,
Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document. 

Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent grabbed a portion
of complainant's land, and, when this latter resented, the former arrogantly challenged the
complainant to bring the matter to court; (2) that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz
Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still
alive; and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely represented his status as single in the
information sheet be submitted in connection with his appointment to his present position as
Clerk of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance with law and the
evidence in record.

HELD:

The charges were investigated by District Judge Segundo M. Zosa of said Court. The
accusations of Odayat against Atty. Amante regarding oppression, immorality and falsification
of a public document was not proved and supported by proper evidence. The Investigator
found that the complainant failed to prove this charge.  In the course of formal investigation on
August 26, 1974 before Judge Zosa, complainant acquiesced to the dropping of this charge of
oppression against respondent, inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to a boundary
dispute between the complainant and the respondent and admittedly being more properly a
cause for a civil action. 6 Hence, the scope of the investigation by Judge Zosa is limited to the
other two charges. Contrary to the allegation of the complainant the document in
question, shows that the respondent actually placed in "Civil Status" therein the word
"Married". In view of the foregoing, we find that the recommendation of the Investigator is in
accordance with law and the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the charges filed against
him by complainant.
 Agueda Benedicto vs Esteban De La Rama 3 Phil 341
G.R. No. 1056 March 13, 1907

FACTS:
This is an action for divorce. The complaint, which was filed on October 29, 1901,
alleged, as the grounds therefor, abandonment and adultery. The answer charged the plaintiff
with adultery, denied the adultery imputed to the defendant, and asked for a divorce.
Judgment was rendered on July 5, 1902, in favor of the plaintiff, granting her divorce and
81,042.76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property. The defendant excepted to the
judgment and moved for a new trial on the ground that the facts were not justified by the
evidence. This motion was denied, and the defendant excepted. The record before us contains
all the evidence received at the trial.

ISSUE:
Whether the parties are entitled for a divorce.

HELD:
Neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. The result makes it unnecessary to
consider that part of the judgment which relates to the settlement of the conjugal partnership.
Section 497 1 authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such findings upon the facts and
render such final judgment as justice and equity require.

The judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts:

(1) The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as to the acts of
adultery committed by the defendant are true as therein stated except as to the date of the
adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo.

(2) The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros,
committed adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard.

As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled to
judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing
by her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other
any costs either in this court or the Court of First Instance.
Judgment will be entered accordingly forty days from the filing of this decision, and the case
remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.

Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:
 Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City and they got married on September
20,1 9 8 6 . L e o u e l a n d   J u l i a   l i v e d   w i t h   t h e   l a tt e r ’ s   p a r e n t s . The
ecstasy,however,did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
a v e r r e d because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents in to the young
s p o u s e s ’ f a m i l y a ff a i r s . O c c a s i o n a l l y , t h e c o u p l e w o u l d a l s o s t a r t a
“quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should start
living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents. On May 18, 1988, Julia
fi nally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his husband ’s pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months aft er her departure,  Julia called Leouel for the
fi rst ti me. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his eff orts were of no avail. Leouel argues that
the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life.

Issue:

Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Famliy

Code.

Ruling: 

The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus, correlated psychological incapacity
s h o u l d   r e f e r   t o   n o   l e s s   t h a n   a   m e n t a l incapacity that causes a party to be truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parti es to the marriage which, as so expressed by Arti cle 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligati ons  to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila
Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina’s expectations that the newly weds were to enjoy
making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred
during their first night, second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on
the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect).
Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to him every time he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.
ISSUE:
Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with
petitioner a psychological incapacity

HELD:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple
got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered
his money, depends in his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship
was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987
and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
 The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflict on
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s
action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would compromise
grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered
as psychological incapacity.

LEONILO ANTONIO VS. MARIE IVONNE REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

Facts:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. 
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990.  A child was born but died 5 months
later.  Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.  She even did not conceal bearing an
illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.  They
were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good
in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes
declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.

Ruling:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of

marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.  The petitioner, aside from his
own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s
fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.  The root causes of Reyes’
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven
by experts.  The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent.  It would be difficult for
an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect.  Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.  

BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000

FACTS: 
Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that
Wilson Marcos has Psychological Incapacity. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null
and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES: 
1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for determining of Psychological Incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case determines
Psychological Incapacity.

HELD: 
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of the evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition since qua
non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of a state of Psychological Incapacity. There is
absolutely no evidence that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support and even left
the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage. Significantly, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot
declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
Psychological Incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurable; and for
her failure to observe the guidelines presented in the Molina Case.
 Kenneth Ngo Te vs Rowena Yu Te (G.R. No. 161793)

FACTS: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After
almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondent’s, that of the narcissistic
and antisocial personality disorder.
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s
court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent,
for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the
instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage
void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist
to personally examine respondent.
ISSUE: Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is
null and void?
HELD: The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed
and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with
grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared
null and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court
is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred
bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the
same is void from the very beginning.
 Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011

FACTS:

Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child,
Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her
four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three
more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children.
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1)She leaves the
children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She
leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following
day; and 3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he
saw half-naked in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s
psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder and that it “may have been evident even prior to her marriage” because it is rooted in
her family background and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is
rooted in her role as the bread winner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to
the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became
secondary.

ISSUE:

Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psychological incapacity

HELD:

No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
partying with friends.  Malyn’s sexual infidelity was also not proven because she was only
dating other men.  Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual
infidelity cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men.  Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.

Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis

G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000

Facts:
 Respondent was married to the petitioner on January 25, 1996. Unknown to the
petitioner, her other half has contracted his first marriage with a Maria Dulce B. Javier on
October 21, 1985 and has not been nullified. The respondent once again entered into marriage
with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.  A case of bigamy was filed against the respondent on the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, consequently he initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a license.
Respondent has filed a motion to suspend the trial and has been granted. Petitioner filed for a
motion for reconsideration but has been denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a

question to a criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:

No, respondent’s subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a

question to a criminal case for bigamy. During the time when he contracted his second
marriage, he was considered already considered as a married man even if it was a marriage
without a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code, which has already been promulgated
on his second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before the respondent could have married for the second time. Whether or not the first
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It is not for the
parties, especially the accused to determine if his first marriage was null or void, but of a court.
The respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage in
order to escape the bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that
the subsequent marriage is also void due to the absence of judicial declaration of nullity of the
first. Thus, the decision in the civil action has been reversed and may proceed with the criminal
case.

ROLANDO LANDICHO vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968

Facts:

Elvira Makatangay was married to Rolando Landicho (Petitioner). Petitioner then

contracted a 2nd marriage to Fe Pasia w/o dissolving his 1st marriage. Landicho was charged
w/ Bigamy by his 1st wife Elvira. Fe then sought to declare her marriage to Petitioner void due
to alleged threats & force. Petitioner then sought to declare his 1st marriage void on the
ground that he contracted it under duress. Petitioner moved to suspend his criminal case for
bigamy pending the result on the validity of his marriage on the grounds that the validity of his
marriage was a prejudicial question

Issue:

Whether or not the validity of his marriage is a prejudicial question to warrant a suspension
of petitioner’s bigamy charge.

Ruling:

The validity of the marriage is NOT a prejudicial question and thus may not suspend the
bigamy case.

Parties to a marriage cannot determine its nullity. Only competent courts may decide on
the validity of a marriage. Prior to a declaration of nullity by a court, a party who contracts a 2 nd
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

SOLEDAD DOMINGO vs COURT of APPEALS 226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.  She did not know that Domingo
had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969.  She came to know the previous
marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her.  Furthermore, when she came home
from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with
another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by
Roberto.  The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of
such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous.  On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide
a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE: 

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of

remarriage.  However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who
believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same.  With
this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.When a marriage is declared void
ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children
and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence,
the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless.  The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of
the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to
the regime of property relations governing them.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After
that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of
Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January
1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter
from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left.Nolasco
went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He did so by securing
another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first
met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death
of Janet. 

ISSUE:
 
Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD: 
 The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to
show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of
seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another
contract.  More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities
to find his wife.

Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez – Lorino

G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005
Facts:
Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was
unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had
the propensity to go out with his friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left
him and returned to her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to work for
her support her children. From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his
relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under
the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order
for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. In November 7, 2001,
the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final and executors under
the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a
notice of appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the factual and legal basis for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the family code were duly established.

Held:
Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family
Law, sets the tenor for cases scoured by these rules, to wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be
decided in an expedition’s manner without regards technical rules.
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending
judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.
 ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5
kids. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Art. 36 of the FC. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage
null and void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Art.147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51and
52 of the FC. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the
FC did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in “unions without
marriage”. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the
family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined
efforts and the property would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and
partition of property would be governed by the regime of co-ownership. The court
also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of
conjugal partnership property. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion
was denied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the
case at bar.

Whether or not Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the
trial court are AFFIRMED. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the
cohabitation period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148. In the case at bar, Art.
147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their marriage and they were
capacitated where in the word capacitated refers to legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage.

Mercado vs. Tan

337 SCRA 122

FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know.  Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Oliva.  The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva
null and void. 

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.

HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted.  One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.  This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as “void.”

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva
right after Tan filed bigamy case.  Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. 
He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity.  The fact that the
first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. 
 THE UNITED STATES vs. VICTORIANO JOANINO
G.R. No. L-9762     August 3, 1914
FACTS:

From the evidence it appears that on or about the 22d day of May, 1890, the defendant
was joined in the bonds of holy matrimony to one Hipolita Rosario; that he continued to live
with the said Rosario as her husband until the year 1896, or 1897, when he was deported by
the Spanish Government from the Philippine Islands to the island of Guam; that he remained in
the island of Guam until the year 1901 or 1902, when he returned to the Philippine Islands; that
while he remained in the island of Guam he acted as a clerk in the court of first instance in said
island; that when he returned to the Philippine Islands he found that his wife, Hipolita Rosario,
had been living and cohabiting with one Gregorio Malinit, and that as a result of such illicit
cohabitation the said Hipolita Rosario had given birth to two children during the absence of the
defendant; that within a short period after the return of the defendant from the island of
Guam, he, being informed of the illicit relations of his wife with the said Gregorio Malinit,
commenced proceedings to be divorced from his wife, Hipolita Rosario, in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Pangasinan; that after the trial of the said divorce proceedings, the
court found that the facts justified the petition of the plaintiff (the defendant, Victoriano
Joanino) and granted the divorce prayed for; that thereafter, on the 9th day of May, 1908, he
was joined in wedlock with one Maria Roque; that at the time of the second marriage the said
Hipolita Rosario was still living.
During the trial of the cause the defendant admitted all of the foregoing facts. He
attempted, however to justify his second marriage upon the ground that he believed that when
a divorce had been granted him he had a right to remarry. He alleged that while he was in the
island of Guam he had known some cases in which a divorce had been granted and the where
the parties had remarried. He admitted, however, that at the time he was granted a divorce
from his wife, Hipolita Rosario, he had been informed by the court that the divorce which he
had been granted him did not permit him to remarry. In this court the defendant, through his
attorney, has filed every interesting brief, in which he attempts to justify his second marriage
upon the ground of his belief of the fact that when a divorce had been granted to parties under
the laws of the Philippine Islands they were permitted to remarry during the life of the former
spouse.

ISSUE: Whether or not divorce is allowed in the Philippines.

HELD:
Under the laws in force of the Philippine Islands, the granting of a divorce does in no way
annul the marriage. The divorce does not destroy the marriage vinculum. (Law 3, Title 2, Partida
4.)

ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939.  However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the
spouses.  Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique.  During their marriage, she naturally
uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden
name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it
violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing to use her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: 

Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated
from his husband.   

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum.  The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It must be considered that the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership
between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.  Hence, there could
be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name
of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

Hatima C. Yasin vs. Shari’a District Court

G.R. No. 94986 (February 23, 1995)

Facts:
The summary case filed by the petitioner, a divorcee, to resume the use of her maiden
name was denied by the Shari’a Court, holding that said petition needed to go through a
judicial process under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name.

ISSUE:
 Under Article 16 (1)(g) of the CEDAW, as a wife, a woman has the right to choose a
family name, and the right to enjoy the same personal rights as the husband. In this instance,
the Court ruled that a women need not undergo a special proceeding to change her name back
to her maiden name after a divorce.

Held:
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right
of a divorcee woman to reuse her maiden name and surname.
A woman marrying a man is not required to seek judicial authority to use her husband’s
name. In the same way, when the marriage ties no longer exists, in case of death or divorce, as
authorized in the Muslim Code, the widow/divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to reuse her maiden name.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband’s surname during the marriage (Art.
370), after annulment of the marriage (Art 371), and after the death of the husband (Art. 373),
is permissive and not obligatory, except in the case of legal separation (Art. 372).
* Concurring Opinion, Justice Flerida Ruth Romero
“Sec. 14. The state recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.”
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the
same rights accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon
marriage.

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010

The case is about a petition for review of the decision of the Office of the President
dated May 27, 2005 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 87710. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President and in turn affirmed the
decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying the petitioner’s request to revert to the use
of her maiden name in the issuance of a renewed passport.
 Statement of Facts
The petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipina whose passport was expiring on
October 27, 2000. The following entries appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname,
“Maria Virginia” as her given name and “Remo” as her middle name. Petitioner who at that
time her marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of
Foreign Affairs in Chicago, Illinois.
On August 28, 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota denied the request to
revert the use of her maiden name, thus stating; that the Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines
the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases
of annulment, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these
conditions. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in
a letter dated 13 October 2000. The Office of the President also dismissed the appeal on July
27, 2004.
 Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport.
.
Held
The court denied the petition due to unjustified changes in one’s name and identity in a
passport. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she should not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to
the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE 

G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the
outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal
home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he
went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was
having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo
married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his
last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a
petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On
appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they
have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: 
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD: 
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce
abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held
that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity” since he was a foreigner.

People of the Republic of the Philippines vs. Genosa

G.R.No. 135981 15January2004

FACTS:

Marivic Genosa attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death.
According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it
was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Appellant
after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then
found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was
attacked while asleep.

ISSUE:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be
held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?
HELD:
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the
appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The
reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer
in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON

and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23482 August 30, 1968

Facts:
Feb 14, 1953 when they got married. Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home
in Bacolod to go to Manila March 12, 1963 – Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as
well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Before it pushed through
though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and
the youngest would stay with Carmen. This was affirmed by the CFI. May 7, 1963, respondent
filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only
entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given
custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old.CA: ruled that compromise
agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the
execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE: 
Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD: 
Yes, should have but was filed out of time. NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated
from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure." Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared
null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise. However the children are
now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec.
6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) – already 1968. Court may also award
custody to who they deem fit through evidence. Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual
development.
 However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is
valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation

MARIANO B. ARROYO vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived
together as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home
with the intention of livingseparate from her husband. Mariano’s efforts to induce her to
resume marital relations were all in vain.Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her
to return to the matrimonial home and live with himas a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of
defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled toleave because of the cruel
treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation bedeclared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance.The trial
judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the
husbandwas more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justificationfor her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking
off of marital relations with him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other?

HELD:

NO.It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
tocohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair
are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclinedto sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compelthe restitution of the purely
personal rights of consortium . At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the
spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of marriedpeople shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable.We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the
unconditionaland absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the
petitorypart of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife
haspresented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.Therefore, reversing the judgment
appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and thecross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de
Arroyo has absented herself from the marital homewithout sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her
duty to return. The plaintiff is absolvedfrom the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of
either instance.
 ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263  November 2, 1916

FACTS:

 Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were

legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino,
where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of
her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they
had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant
got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff
appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of
action. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. 

HELD: 

Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties
and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The
law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to
evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may
claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal
home.

CARMEN QUIMIGUING ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN vs. FELIX ICAO
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations.  Despite the fact that Icao was married,
he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and
intimidation and without her consent.  As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.  Plaintiff claimed for
support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.  The complaint was dismissed by the
lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action.  Plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the
court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action”. 

ISSUE: 
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:
Supreme Court held that “conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceived child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.

Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao
being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear
violation of Carmen’s rights.  Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage
caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO vs. GABRIEL FUSTER

G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913

FACTS:

On 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Contanza Barnuevo, both citizens of Spain, got married in a
Catholic ceremony in Malaga, Spain. On 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippines and
acquired real and personal property. Towards the middle of 1896, Contanza came to Manila
and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899. On April 4, 1899, they made an
agreement in a public document by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both
consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move
to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases". Fuster undertook in the same
document to send his wife a sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid
from June 1899, but he only complied until August 1899. Contanza Barnuevo returned to
Manila in 1909 to file a divorce against her husband on the ground of adultery committed by
Fuster. Fuster denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila. He argued
that they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain and he alleged that both of them were natives
and subjects of Spain. Fuster denied Barnuevo's statements concerning the possession of real
and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their
qualification as being all conjugal property. The Court of First Instance of Manila decreed the
suspension of life-in-common between Barnuevo and Fuster and directed the communal
property to be divided between the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction over the divorce filed by Barnuevo
against Fuster who are citizens of Spain and W/N the the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over
the partition of properties of a Spanish couple who were married in Spain obtained their
divorce in the Philippines

HELD:
Yes. The CFI did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although
Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of Manila and had their domicile herein. The
defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than which he
manifestly had in the Philippines during the 17 years preceding the date of the complaint. He
had kept open house and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is
not the object of conjugal society. The plaintiff is without proof to the contrary that his wife
resided in Manila from middle of 1896 until April 1899.
Article 36 of the Civil Code: "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country,
where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents
therein, shall be required in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their
wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of
Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children they may
have."

FELISA S. MARCELO vs. DANIEL ESTACIO

G.R. No. L-46626 November 7, 1939

FACTS:

This is an appeal taken by the defendant Daniel V. Estacio from the orders of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal of November 18 and 28 respectively, the first of which denied his
motion to reconsider the order of August 23, 1938 directing his arrest, and the second of which
denied his motion of  November 7, 1938, for the same purpose. It appears from the record that
the plaintiff-appellee, Felisa S. Marcelo, married the defendant-appellant, Daniel V. Estacio, on
April 24, 1921, but she separated from him after a year of marital life. On May 17, 1937, when
she learned that the defendant had been named justice of the peace of the municipalities of
Moncada and San Manuel, Province of Tarlac, said plaintiff-appellee brought suit for support. In
its judgment of October 25, 1937, the court ordered the said defendant-appellant to pay to the
plaintiff-appellee a monthly allowance of P30 from May 18, 1937. On November 18, 1937, the
defendant-appellant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the court in its order of
December 7, 1937. On January 8, 1938, the said defendant-appellant announced his exception
and intention to appeal. On February 5, 1938, the said defendant-appellant filed his bill of
exceptions. On February 8th of the same year, the attorney for the plaintiff-appellee filed in the
Court of First Instance of origin a motion asking that the said defendant-appellant be ordered to
pay her the allowance awarded to her in the decision, or to post a bond of P2,000
notwithstanding the appeal taken by him to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not affording the defendant an opportunity to
prove his poverty and his inability to pay his wife, the plaintiff-appellee, the allowance for
support to which he was sentenced.

HELD:

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, in ordering the execution of the judgment, rendered by it against the
defendant-appellant Daniel V. Estacio, sentencing him to pay an allowance to his wife, and the
issuance of an order of arrest in case of non-compliance with said judgment, after the approval
of the bill of exceptions, acted without jurisdiction, wherefore, said order of execution of the
judgment is illegal and void. Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed insofar as it orders
the defendant Daniel V. Estacio to pay an allowance for support to his wife, Felisa S. Marcelo,
and the arrest of the defendant for non-compliance therewith, issued after the approval of the
bill of exceptions and the elevation thereof to the appellate court, is reversed, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.

Canonizado vs. Almeda-Lopez109 Phil 1177

FACTS

Petitioner and her husband, Cesar Canonizado lived together until February 18, 1956.
The latter left the conjugal home for reason of insufferable conduct of the herin wife/petitioner.
He left with him his child named Chrisitina Beatriz who is now 13 years old and since then,
remained under the custody and care of wife/petitioner. In order to assert support for her and
daughter, petitioner filed a petition to ask for support from Cesar Canonizado. In resolving the
case, the respondent judge rendered decision denying the petition of support pendente lite by
reason that herein petitioner is engaged in gainful occupation.

ISSUE

Whether or not the court erred in its ruling denying the petition for support pendente
lite for the by reason that herein petitioner is engaged in gainful occupation.

HELD
 Yes, court erred in its ruling when it denied the petition for support. The law expressly
provides for the properties to be exempt from attachment and executions; courts cannot
provide for the other exemptions. Cost against respondent

ENRIQUE T. JOCSON and JESUS T. JOCSON vs. THE EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
G.R. No. L-10792 April 30, 1958

FACTS:

Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his minor
children Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co.
for surety and managed his children’s properties that included war damage payments, which
formed part of their inheritance from their mother.
In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic accounts to the court for
expenses for education and clothing of the children.
After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority and thereafter
appointed guardian of her still minor brothers Enrique and Jesus, filed a petition for the
reopening of Agustin’s accounts, claiming that illegal disbursements were made from the
guardianship funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of majority, Enrique and
Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of illegality of disbursements—which
Empire Insurance Co. and Agustin’s administratrix appealed from—on the ground that these
should have come instead from the support, which they were entitled to receive from their
father.
 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners-appellants’ contention their father’s disbursements from

their guardianship funds are illegal are valid
 

HELD:
 No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes education and clothing) must
be demanded and established before it becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners’
mere relationship with their father. “The need for support, as already stated, cannot be
presumed and especially must this be true in the present case where it appears that the minors
had means of their own.” Therefore, the disbursements made by Agustin, which were even
sanctioned by the lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support should also be done in a
separate action, not in guardianship proceedings. Judgment affirmed; without costs since
(case) is a pauper’s appeal.

SYBIL SAMSON vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO RSENIO SAMSON and DOROTEA ANGELES VDA. DE
SAMSON
G.R. No. L-15952 April 28, 1961

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court to set aside
an order entered on 1958 by the CFI of Rizal, Quezon city that dismissed with prejudiced a
petition for support (Civil Case no. Q-2620). That among the facts of the case are as follows:
Sybil Samson, a minor is legitimate child of Consuelo Enriquez (petitioner/plaintiff) and Arsenio
Samson (respondent) whom after years of living in the maternal house of the latter, Consuelo
Enriquez, , decided to leave the house of her mother-in-law bringing with her their child Sybil
Samson for the reason that she had been maltreated in the said house. Subsequently said
spouse filed a petition for support for her and her child. In one of the hearings, petitioners
failed to appear before the court and reasoned-out that said minor child is sick. Upon
verification by the court, said child was found to be only experiencing a slight fever and that
said minor can still walk. That the following circumstances led to the dismissal of the petition
for support upon failure to appear in court on the part of the petitioner/plaintiff.

ISSUE.

Whether or not said CFI erred in dismissing said petition for mere reason of failure to
appear in court on the part of the petitioner/plaintiff.

HELD:

Yes. The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted. The petitoners right to support from the
respondent, under article 301 of Civil Code cannot be renounced, and they should not be
deprived of their right to present and future support. With cost against the respondent.
 Leouel Santos and Rosario Bedia Santos
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel
Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter
alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy
because petitioner could not afford to do so. The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the
United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts
and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit
and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

ISSUE:

Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

HELD:

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art.
214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when
both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. The Court of Appeals held that although there is
no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he
may nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed
to have custody of the minor. The respondent appeal to court. His being a soldier is likewise no
bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to
different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their
children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children
merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as
temporary separation from their families. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated
November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel
Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr. SO ORDERED.
 Flores Vs. Esteban 97 Phil 439

FACTS:

Eduardo Flores (petitioner) is married to Adoracion Esteban and that they had a son
named Reynaldo Cenon E. Flores born on Dec 22, 1946. That her wife died on Dec 27, 1953 and
since then, their son lived with her mother in law named Maria De leon Vda. De Esteban, herein
referred as respondent. That said respondent alleged that said child was under her custody
since he was twenty days old up until now that said child is already aged eight years old, and
that she is paying for all the expenses of said minor and never restrains the minor of his liberty
but the latter refuses to go with his father whom he hardly knows due to the fact that herein
petitioner has been away from this country, and since then the respondent has been supporting
the child and is sending him in a primary school in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The petitioner prayed
that custody of the child be granted to him being the biological of said child.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for the custody of the child be granted to the father being
the biological father.

HELD:
For the sake of the welfare of the child, we are of the opinion that the respondent
grandmother should have the legal custody over him, without prejudice to the obligation of the
father to contribute to his maintenance. In view of the foregoing, it is decreed that the
respondent Maria de Leon Vda. de Esteban have custody of the child. The petition is dismissed.

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus of Minor Angelie C. Cervantes

GR 79555 Jan. 27, 1989
FACTS:

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed with this court over the persons of minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes. Among the facts of the case are as follow: said minor was born on 14
february 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and gina Carreon who are common-law
husband and wife. Said respondents offered the child for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-
Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes (petitoners). Said adoption wasgranted by the RTC of Rizal in
favor of the respondents with all the vested rights inherent to the adoption of the child, hence,
the child was known as Angelie Anne Cervantes. Sometime March or April of 1987, said
petioners received a demand letter from herein respondents asking for P150, 000 otherwise
they would get back their child. Petioneers refused to yield on the demand which prompted
said respondent to took the child from her “yaya” under the pretext that she was instructed to
do so by her mother. Despite demand for the respondent to return the child, same proved
futile as the herein respondent reasoned-out that she has no plan of returning the child, and
that the consent of adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. That she will only
return if she were paid the amount she had earlier demanded. That said respondent is now
cohabiting with other man other than the natural father of the minor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the child rightfully belongs to the respondents or the
otherwise, to the adopting parents.

HELD:

The custody of the child rightfully belongs to the petitioners. It was held time and again
by this court that in cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the
latter’s welfare is paramount. The provision that no child under five years of age shall be
separated from her mother cannot be applied in this case where the court finds compelling
reason to rule otherwise.

MARIA QUINTANA vs. GELASIO LERMA

G.R. No. L-7426 February 5, 1913

FACTS:
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from the judgment of the
lower court granting his wife, the plaintiff-appellee Maria Quintana, a sum of money allegedly
due her based on a contract they made for support. As shown in the evidence, the two were
married in 1901 and entered, in February 1905, into a written agreement of separation,
renouncing certain rights as against each other, dividing the conjugal property between them
and the defendant undertaking the duty to provide plaintiff P20-worth of monthly support and
maintenance to be given within the first three days of each month. In his original answer to the
action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right to support by committing adultery.
However, this special defense was stricken out by the court on the ground that under Art. 152
of the Civil Code, adultery is not a recognized ground upon which obligation to support ceases.
The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when defendant reentered it in his
amended complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the written agreement made by parties is void and whether or not
adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for support
HELD:
Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that “in default
of express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the property of the consorts,
during marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case provided
by article 50.” However, the wife has a right of action against defendant under the Code.
Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the defendant may also
set up adultery as a special defense, which if properly proved and sustain will defeat the wife’s
action. Judgment reversed.

Mrs. Henry Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company

38 Phil. 464
FACTS:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a
gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines.
The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the
Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering
some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value
disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an
estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).

In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to
the cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also
stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is
void under the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

HELD:
Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr.
Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of
the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then
thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr.
Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of
the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this
valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of
necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the
validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated
value.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 March 31, 1971

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the
deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix
died. Thereafter ,appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister
and nearest collateral relati ve of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue
of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in1962, had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon
declared that the donati on was valid inasmuch as it was made at the ti me when
Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.
HELD:

While Arti cle 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donati on between
the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As
stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of
validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant
having exclusive right to  the disputed property.  As
a widow, Cervantes is enti tled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the
other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower ,the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

AHERN v JULIAN
39 PHIL 607

FACTS:

The petitioner had set forth that he had no property, estate, or effects of any kind
whatsoever, other than his personal clothing valued at P50.00 and a claim of P186.67 due from
Sofronia Garcia de Ahern, his wife, for the services rendered as manager of his wife’s rice mill.

The petitioner was indebted the sum of P3,578.80 to the respondent-objector, who
contended that the rice mill was not an exclusive property of his wife but rather form part of
the marital community of the spouses, therefore subject to payment of the petitioner’s debt.

Petitioner further proclaimed that the money used to acquire the said rice mill came from
his wife’s money, borrowed by his wife on her own account from her aunt, in the amount of
P25,000.00. The aunt shall be the capitalist partner while his wife be the industrialist partner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rice mill form part of the marital community property.

RULING:

No written or documentary evidence was introduced in support of the alleged loan or gift,
or advance of P25,000.00 and the testimony as to the conditions under which it was loaned,
donated, or advanced is, in the highest degree, unsatisfactory.
 The court found nothing which will disturb the findings of the lower court and would agree
that the petitioner should be required to include the rice mill property in his schedule of
property subject to the payment of his debt.

JOSE L. PONCE DE LEON vs. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION,

GR. No. L-24571 December 18, 1970

FACTS:
On August 14, 1945, herein plaintiff Jose L. Ponce de Leon and Francisco Soriano, father
of third-party plaintiffs Teofila Soriano del Rosario, Rosalina Soriano and Rev. Fr. Eugenio
Soriano, obtained a loan for P10,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Manila,
mortgaging a parcel of land in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, as
security for the loan. Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), Manila, his loan application for an industrial loan, for putting up a sawmill. The
application was approved for P495,000.00 and the mortgage contract was executed on October
8, 1951 by Jose L. Ponce de Leon, his wife Carmelina Russel, and Francisco Soriano.
At the time that Francisco Soriano signed the mortgage deed, his spouse Tomasa
Rodriguez was already dead leaving as her heirs, her children namely, Rosalina, Teofila and Rev.
Fr. Eugenio Soriano, none of whom signed the said mortgage deed or the promissory note. The
Sheriff sold the land covered by original certificate of Title No. 8094 in the name of Francisco
Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, on June 15, 1954 and the deed of sale, dated April 19,
1955 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser thereof, the RFC, including all the
other properties sold.
The Sorianos contend that the lot covered by original certificate of title No. 8094 in the
name of Francisco Soriano belonged to the conjugal partnership of the latter and his wife,
Tomasa Rodriguez, now deceased.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not said property, registered in the name of "Francisco Soriano, married to
Tomasa Rodriguez”, is presumed belonging to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs.
Francisco Soriano.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the property was registered in the name of "Francisco Soriano,
married to Tomasa Rodriguez," and that based upon this fact alone — without any proof
establishing satisfactorily that the property had been acquired during coverture — the lower
court presumed that it belongs to the conjugal partnership of said spouses. We agree with the
RFC that the lower court has erred in applying said presumption.
 Needless to say, had the property been acquired by them during coverture, it would
have been registered, in the name not of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez,"
but of the spouses "Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez."
It is thus clear that the lower court erred in annulling the RFC mortgage on the
Parañaque property and its sale to the RFC as regards one-half of said property, and that the
decision appealed from should, accordingly, be modified.

MOISES JOCSON,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the
only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while
respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her
husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972. The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents
executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale,
to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his
one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents
and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. In his Second
Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed the evidence
documents for being null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R
rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's. 

Issue: 
Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property
of their parents. 

Held: 
NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name
of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing.It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he
was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. There being no
such proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist.
Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio
Jocson. 
 NATIVIDAD SIDECO VS ANGELA AZNAR
G.R. No. L-4831 April 24, 1953

FACTS:
This is an action for partition and for the recovery of plaintiff and appellants’ share in
the produce of the land sought to be partitioned. The defendant and appellee is the judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased Crispulo Sideco, who died on the 26th of May,
1942. She is the decedent’s widow by his third marriage, which took place on January 26, 1912.
The plaintiffs and appellants are his (Crispulo Sideco’s) children and grandchildren by his wife
Matilde Jimenez, who died on March 14, 1906. The subject of the action is a parcel of riceland
134.6671 hectares in area, situated in the Sitio of Pulong Pandan, Barrio Sangitan, Municipality
of Cabanatuan, surveyed on May 21, 1908, and registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco,
widower, on March 12, 1909, under certificate of title No. 77 (Exhibit 6). The land was declared
for the land tax in the year 1906 in Crispulo Sideco’s name (Exhibit 5). The land was mortgaged
to the Philippines National Bank on May 10, 1912, for P8,000, on July 30, 1917, for P6,400, and
on September 28, 1922, for P5,800. In June, 1923, the loan with the Philippine National Bank
was paid, but the land was sold with pacto de retro to Margarita David for P16,000 redeemable
in two years, this period extendible for one year. In 1928 Margarita David resold the property to
Crispulo Sideco, but the same was again mortgaged to her for P6,000 (Exhibit 6). In 1933
certificate of title No. 77 was canceled, and No. 7631 issued in lieu thereof in the name of
Margarita David (Exhibit D). The land, however, was reconveyed to the estate of Crispulo Sideco
on August 31, 1946 (Ibid). The land is now covered by transfer certificate of title No. T-303 in
the name of his estate (Exhibit 21-A).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the finding of the trial court that the land is not conjugal property of the
spouses Crispulo Sideco and Matilde Jimenez, but the exclusive property of Crispulo Sideco.

HELD:
It is well-settled that land already decreed and registered in an ordinary land registration
proceeding can not again be subject of adjudication or settlement in a subsequent cadastral
proceeding. (Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil. 587; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 588; Addison vs.
Payotas, 60 Phil. 673). This does not mean, however that in proper cases and upon proper
application or the consent of the registered owners, or of the person in whose name the decree
is issued, the court may not order a change in the names of the owners by inclusion or
exclusion of some, or in the rights or participation of each in the land registered.

ROSARIO OÑAS vs. CONSOLACION JAVILLO, ET AL

G.R. No. L-39670 March 20, 1934

Facts:
Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of May, 1927, in the municipality of Sigma,
Province of Capiz, Philippine Islands. On the 25th day of July, 1927, a petition was filed in the
Court of First Instance of that province praying that an administrator of this estate be
appointed, and after hearing Santiago Andrada was named administrator. He submitted two
projects of partition. The first was disapproved by the lower court and from that order some of
the heirs appealed to this court which appeal was dismissed.  1The second project of partition
dated September 9, 1931, is the one now on appeal in this case. Crispulo Javillo contracted two
marriages. The first, with Ramona Levis. To this marriage five children were born, to wit,
Consolacion, Mercedes, Caridad, Soledad and Jose Javillo, the appellees in this case. After the
death of Ramona Levis, Crispulo Javillo married Rosario Oñas. To this marriage four children
were born, to wit, Joaquin, Ana, Bernardo and Porillana. Rosario Oñas the appellant in this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court committed errors in deciding the case:

Held:
The project of partition approved by the lower court is based on the above-mentioned
absurd claim and furthermore is not in conformity to law. One-half of all the conjugal property
of both marriages corresponds to the deceased Crispulo Javillo and must be divided share and
share alike among all the children of both marriages. One-half of the conjugal property
pertaining to the first marriage should be divided share and share alike among the five children
of that marriage. One-half of the conjugal property of the second marriage must be adjudicated
to the widow Rosario Oñas and furthermore she has a right of usufruct over the property of her
deceased husband equal to one-ninth of the two thirds of that property which constitutes the
legitime of the children of both marriages which is two-twenty-sevenths of the property
corresponding to her husband. The property of the second marriage consists of parcels 12 to
31, inclusive, and the remainder of the carabaos and large cattle mentioned in the agreement
copied above.If it is true as alleged by the appellant that there are houses on any of these
parcels of land, it is to be presumed that they were included in the valuation made by the
committee on claims and appraisal and therefore they would belong to the person to whom the
land, upon which they are built, is adjudicated. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and
this case is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this decision without
pronouncements as to costs.

DOROTEA DE OCAMPO vs URBANA DELIZO

G.R. No. L-32820-21 January 30, 1976

Facts:

These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two
marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from
April 20, 1891 until Rows death on December 7, 1909, or a period of eighteen (18) years; and
the second, with Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46) years, or from
October, 1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at the age of ninety (90) years.
The action for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by a daughter and a son of the first
marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and Severino Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, another
son, who died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and
Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were represented by their mother, Rosenda
Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and
their nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino, Crispina, Carmen,
Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all surnamed Delizo.

Issue:

Whether or not the aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the
properties described in the complaint were those of the second marriage.

Held:

Since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties
although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and
Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second
marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%)
thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage.

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs MARGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A.

ANSALSO
G.R. No. L-22383 October 6, 1924

FACTS:

The appellants pray for the dismissal of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff,
alleging that the judgment appealed from is erroneous: (1) Because it holds that the document
Exhibit A does not contain anything that makes the plaintiff agent of the defendants; (2)
because it finds without any ground that the defendant were husband and wife when they
executed said document; (3) because upon this finding, it considers unnecessary to discuss
whether or not the obligation evidence by said document is solidary between the defendants
(4) because to maintain such opinion amounts to compelling the defendants to comply with
said obligation in a manner distinct from that stipulated in the contract; and (5) because it
sanctions an arbitrary, unjust and illegal procedure.

ISSUE:
 whether or not appellants executed the aforesaid document Exhibit A as husband and
wife was decided by the trial court in the sense that the defendant appellant Mr. Ansaldo is the
husband of the other defendant Doña Margarita Q. e Iparraugirre

HELD:

We agree with the appellants that, according to the contract of pledge Exhibit A,
attached to the complaint, the defendants authorized the plaintiff to act as their agent with full
power and authority to dispose of the effects pledged in the manner stipulated in said contract;
but it appears that the plaintiff had also an option, not an obligation precisely, to enforce the
securities given. For the reason above given we cannot alter this finding of the trial court and
consequently if the defendants are husband and wife, it is immaterial whether the debt was
contracted by one or the other, for in either case as the debt was contracted during the
marriage of the defendants it must be paid for the account of the conjugal partnership in
accordance with article 1408 of the Civil Code. 1awph!l.net
          After a thorough study of the judgment appealed from, we do not find therein any
substantial error that justifies the reversal thereof and therefore the same must be, as is
hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

NABLE JOSE v. NABLE JOSE

41 Phil 713

FACTS:
In the year 1880, Mariano Nable Jose was married in first wedlock to Doña Paz Borja and
had by her the following children: Remedios, Feliciano, Rocio and Mariano, the first three of
whom are now of age, Remedios is married to Fernando Arce, but the last child, Mariano, is still
a minor and is represented in this suit by the said Fernando Arce as curator ad litem. Paz Borja
died intestate in the year 1898, and left no heirs than the said four children and her surviving
husband, Mariano Nable Jose.
The community partnership between Mariano Nable Jose and his Paz Borja has not been
liquidated since its dissolution in the year 1898. No proceedings whatever have been had for
the judicial administration of the properties of this partnership. Mariano Nable Jose got
indebted and mortgaged the community properties to Amparo Nable Jose de Lichauco and
Asuncion Nable Jose, niece Carmen Castro, The Standard Oil Company on September 27, 1909.
This property is encumbered by another mortgaged in favor of Carmen Castro. Paz Borja's
heirs had no knowledge mortgages nor did they give their consent to them. In order to recover
payment and foreclosure of mortgages, Amparo N. Jose de Lichauco and Asuncion H. Jose, The
Standard Oil Company of New York; and then Carmen Castro commenced actions against
Mariano N. Jose y Vinluan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving husband, after the death of his wife may sell or mortgage the
community property acquired during coverture?
HELD:
The trial court erred in declaring the mortgage invalid in so far as it affects the one-half
undivided share of said property, which the court erroneously held to be the property of these
heirs. The judgment entered by the trial judge should be reversed, and that the record should
be returned to the court below, where a new judgment will be entered disposing of the
contentions of the various parties to this litigation as herein before indicated, and providing for
the sale of the mortgaged property in the form and upon the conditions prescribed by law.

MARGARITA QUINTOS DE ANSALDO and ANGEL A. ANSALDO

vs.
THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FIDELITY & SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS and LUZON SURETY COMPANY
G.R. No. L-43257 February 19, 1937

FACTS:
Upon the express guaranty of the appellant Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine
Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Romarico Agcaoilia credit in current account not
to exceed at any one time P20,000. Appellee Angel Ansaldo, in turn, agreed to indemnify
the surety company for any and all losses and damages that it might sustain by reason of having
guaranteed Agcaoili's obligations. Agcaoili defaulted, and the surety company, as hisguarantor,
paid the Philippine Trust Company. Thereafter, the surety company brought an action against
the appellee Angel Ansaldo for recovery of sum of money, and after obtaining a judgment on its
favor, caused the sheriff of the City of Manila to levy on the joint savings account of
Spouses Angel and Margarita Ansaldo. Appellees instituted an action against the appellants
in the CFI to have theexecution levied by the sheriff declared null and void. The court
below granted the relief prayed for and sentenced the appellants, jointly and severally, to pay
the appellees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Angel Agcaoli may be enforced by the Sheriff against
the joint savings account of the spouses.

RULING:
NO. Since there is a failure to prove that the obligation of the husband was produced
benefit to the family, it cannot be charged against the conjugal partnership.T he sum in
controversy was derived from the paraphernal property of the appellee, Margarita hence it
forms part of the conjugal partnership
under Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. Construing the two relevant provisionstogether, it
seems clear that the fruits of the paraphernal property which become part of the assets
of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of personal obligations of the
husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to
the family. No attempt has been made to prove that the obligations contracted by the appellee,
Angel, were productive of some benefit to his family. It is, however, claimed that, as the sum of
P636.80 has become the property of the conjugal partnership, at least one-half thereof
was property levied on execution, as the share of the appellee Angel Ansaldo. This contention is
without merit. Theright of the husband to one-half of the property of the conjugal partnership
does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when the conjugal partnership is also
dissolved. (Civil Code, arts. 1392 and 1426.)

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL, vs PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC

G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973

Facts:  
P l a i n ti ff   Z u l u e t a ,   h i s   w i f e   a n d   d a u g h t e r   w e r e   p a s s e n g e r s   a b o a r d defe
ndant’s plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers
were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about30 minutes. Plainti ff went
to the toilet at the terminal building but fi nding it f u l l w a l k e d   2 0 0 y a r d s   a w a y .
U p o n   r e t u r n i n g   h e   t o l d   a n   e m p l o y e e   o f   t h e defendant that they almost made
him miss the fl ight because of a defecti ve announcing system. He had a discussion
with either the plan captain or the t e r m i n a l   m a n a g e r .   H e   w a s   t o l d t h a t
they would open his
bags which her e f u s e d   a n d   h e   w a r n e d   t h e m   o f   t h e   c o n s e q u e n c e s .   J u s
t   t h e   s a m e   t h e y opened his bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him
to go out of the plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money
and h e w a s a b l e t o l e a v e W a k e I s l a n d a n d r e t u r n t o M a n i l a t h r u H o n o l u l u
a n d Tokyo after two days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages may be recovered.

Held:
“The records amply establish plaintiffs’ right to recover both moral and exemplary
damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received a t t h e h a n d s o f S i tt o n
o r C a p t a i n Z e n t n e r w h e n t h e l a tt e r m e t h i m a t t h e r a m p ( ‘ W h a t i n t h e
h e l l d o y o u t h i n k y o u a r e ? G e t o n t h a t p l a n e ’ ) ; t h e menacing attitude of
Zentner or Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags
(‘open your bag’, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, ‘I don’t give a damn’);
“will you pull these three monkeys out of here?”); the unfriendly atti tude, the ugly
stares and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by
men in uniform as if they were criminals, M r s . Z u l u e t a ’ s h a v i n g s u ff e r e d a
n e r v o u s breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults
and humiliati ons to which plainti ff s were exposed by the conduct of PAN AM’s
employees; Mrs. Zulueta having suff ered shame, humiliati on and embarrassment for
the treatment received by her parents at the airport–all t h e s e j u s ti f y a n a w a r d f o r
m o r a l d a m a g e s r e s u l ti n g f r o m m e n t a l a n g u i s h , serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs”. Plaintiffs were awarded
Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos
75,000.00 attorney’s fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.
 JOVELLANOS vs. Court of Appeals
210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)

Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement
over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom
he had three children, the petitioners. Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married
private respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st
marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos,
Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter
donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow
thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower
court that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their
marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by their parents during the
existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife
of September 2, 1955.

Issue:
Whether or not the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES

Held:
In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of
the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred
upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full
payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually
known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales
on the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition.
The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force. Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it
was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his
favor. Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the
deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Upon the execution of said deed
of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. NB: But since it pertained to
the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners
who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family
Code on property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such
property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.

FLORES V FLORES

FACTS:

Jose Flores, deceased, had been three times married and left children surviving from
each of second marriages. In the settlement of his estate, various questions have arisen as to
the nature of property to be divided. The children of 2 nd marriage insisted that all of the
property acquired by the testator during his 2nd marriage pertained to the conjugal partnership
which should be liquidated and that the half pertaining to their mother should be segregated
before any general distribution of the estate should occur. It appears that after the death of the
2nd wife, Flores instituted proceedings to register said lands and procured the Torrens certificate
of title thereto in his sole name making this land the exclusive property of Flores and
extinguishing their character as conjugal property of the prior marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said land part of the conjugal partnership.

RULING:

The property acquired during the 2nd marriage pertains to the conjugal partnership of said
marriage regardless of the form in which the title is then or there afterwards taken. The
surviving husband is the ex-officio manager or administrator of the conjugal estate. He has the
power to alienate the property for the purpose of liquidating the estate and the purchaser
under him undoubtedly gets valid title. But as long as the husband retain the property in
whatever form, he holds it in the character of administrator and is virtually a trustee fro this
interested in the conjugal partnership. It is clearly shown that the registration in the name of
the one who holds in a trust character does not extinguish the trust or destroy the rights of the
beneficiary.

TECSON V SSS 3 SCRA 735

FACTS:

The late Lim Hoc, a former employee of the Yuyitong Publishing Company, was at the time
of his death on November 3, 1957, a member of the system. In the SS Form E-1 accomplished
and filed by him with system, he gave his civil status as married, but made no mention of the
members of his family or other relatives. Instead, he designated the herein petitioner Jose
Tecson, reportedly a friend and his co-worker as beneficiary. After the death of Hoc, petitioner
in his capacity as beneficiary, filed with the system acclaim for death benefits. The SSS
Commission denied the payment of death benefits.

ISSUE:

Whether the system is liable to pay the said benefits to Tecson.

RULING:

Yes, the contribution of the employer is for the benefit of its employee. Hence, the
beneficiary should primarily be the one to profit by such contributions. It may be true that the
purpose of the coverage under the SSS is protection of the employee as well as his family, but
this purpose or intention of law cannot be enforced to extent of contradicting the very
provisions of said law as contained in Sec. 13 of RA 1161.

RA 1161 Section 13: Upon the covered employee’s death or total and permanent disability
under such conditions as the Commission may define, before becoming eligible for retirement
and if either such death or disability is not compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, he, or in case of his death, his beneficiaries as recorded by his employer shall be entitled to
the following benefit: …

ELISEO SANTOS, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, vs. PABLO BARTOLOME

G.R. No. 18032 November 23, 1922

FACTS:
Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon were united in marriage many years ago and lived
together as man and wife in the Province of Pampanga until in the year 1914, when Estanislao
Santos died. The widow, Dña. Marcela Tizon, survived until December, 1917, when she also
died. No children appear to have been born to the pair, and the persons now interested in their
properties are the collateral heirs of the two spouses respectively. After the death of Estanislao
Santos the community property pertaining to the two spouses came into the possession and
under the control of his administrator, Eliseo Santos, with corresponding duty to collect assets,
pay off the debts, and liquidate the estate according to law. In connection with the discharge of
these duties, said administrator also came into the possession of certain property pertaining to
the widow in her own right, which he managed to the same extent as the community property
itself.
ISSUE:
The liquidation of the community estate pertaining to the spouses Estanislao Santos and
Marcela Tizon, both of whom are now deceased, and whose respective estates are now
represented before the court by Eliseo Santos, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, and Pablo
Bartolome, as administrator of Marcela Tizon
HELD:
` Assuming the facts as to this items to be as thus suggested, there can be no doubt that the
amount thus paid out to effect the redemption of the property should be deducted from the
community assets in liquidation, thereby in effect charging one-half thereof against the portion
pertaining to Marcela Tizon. It is undeniable that when the property to which reference is here
made was redeemed, it remained, as it had been before, the particular property of Marcela
Tizon, for if the right of redemption pertained to her, so also must the property belong to her
after redemption. From an observation contained in the appealed decision we infer that the
action of the trial judge in rejecting the various claims to which reference has been made was
based in part on the idea that said claims should have been submitted to the committed
appointed to appraise the property and allow claims against the estate of Marcela Tizon in
administration, in conformity with the requirements of section 695, and related provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure. From what has been said it results that the judgment appealed
from must be reversed, and the clause will be remanded for further proceedings in conformity
with this opinion. It is so ordered, without express pronouncement as to costs.

AGAPITO LORENZO, ET AL vs FLORENCIO NICOLAS ET AL.

G.R. No. L-4085  July 30, 1952

FACTS:
Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the deceased Gregorio
Nicolas, Manuel Lorenzo, former husband of the deceased Carlosa Santamaria, was also at that
time a widower. On January 16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted
marriage. Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on January 31, 1934.
During their coverture, the two had no children. In his first marriage, however, Manuel Lorenzo
left, as heirs, the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo, deceased, who
had been succeeded by his children, the plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel all
surnamed Lorenzo; while Magdalena Clemente, in her first marriage, left as heirs, the deceased
Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad, Cecilia and Basilisa,
all surnamed Nicolas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the two parcels of land are part of the Friar Lands as provided in Act No.
1120.

HELD:
From the provisions of sections 11, 12 and 16 of Act No. 1120 it is apparent that the
pervading legislative intent is to sell the friar lands acquired by the Government to actual
settlers and occupants of the same. In case of death of a holder of a certificate which is only an
agreement to sell it is not the heirs but the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be
sold by the Government. Only do the heirs succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a
certificate if no widow survives him. The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during
the lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena
Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in her name in
spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that the two parcels of land belonged
to Magdalena Clemente. The petitioners, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled
to one-half of the two parcels of land. But the installments paid during covertures are deemed
conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to the
late Magdalena Clemente. Upon these grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of
Appeals under review is affirmed, without cost.

FELISBERTO GONZALES v. CHARLES H. MILLER

G.R. No. L-46827

FACTS:

Having issued writ of execution, is embargoed the lots 356 and 357, described in the
certificates of title 8373 and 8372, respectively, which lots had bought Catalina Climacus of
Isabelo Front and Julian In Front on 26 November 1928 with money from its exclusive property.
Having passed the deadline for the retracted them and not having exercised the right, the
Sheriff of Zamboanga Provincial granted final deed of sale of these lots in favor of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lots in question are here paraphernal Catalina Climacus or spouses of
her and her husband, Charles H. Miller?

HELD:

Article 1407 of the Civil Code states that "It inhere acquired all the assets of the marriage
while it is proved that privatimente belong to the husband or the wife." While it is true that
when Catalina Climacus acquired by purchase from Isabelo Front and Julian before November
26, 1928 lots. 356 And 357 was already married to Charles H. Miller, consists for his statement
not contradicted or challenged of false that the money with which the acquired was its
exclusive property or parafernal. The fact that the transfer certificates of title we. 8372 AND
8373, relating to the menmencionados lots, does not say that the registered owners are
Catalino Climacus and her husband Charles H. Miller, but that is said to be Catalina Climacus
says, "the wife of Charles H. Miller," indicates the paraphernal wife Catherine Climacus, since
the English phrase "the wife of Charles H. Miller" is simply a description of their marital status.
 PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST CO. v
REGISTER OF DEEDS 60 Phil 167

FACTS:
Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled
“Agreement and Declaration of Trust” in which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval
living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee was to redeem mortgage
constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof, grant a loan of
P10,000.00 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived from said
property while remained unsold. 

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the rents collected are fruits of the wife’s property which therefore
belongs to CPG,
2.  whether or not management belongs to husband
3. whether or not contract is null and void since husband did not give consent.

HELD:
Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to
collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have to
answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the paraphernal property. She
may likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse by husband or his
heirs, thus rendering such contract merely voidable or void. 
 ANTONIO PEREZ vs ANGELA TUASON de PEREZ
109 Phil 64

FACTS:

Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a civil case against defendant
Angela Tuason de Perez at the CFI Manila. He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place
under guardianship based on the following allegations:
she was squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloix, she was spending the
conjugal partnership of gain and defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have
children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass her husband. CFI dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile
Domestic Relations Court.

HELD: 

Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relation
Court which has jurisdiction. Material injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations
between man and wife) and not patrimonial or financial.
MATEA RODRIGUEZ vs SUSANA DE LA CRUZ, ESCOLASTICO DE LA CRUZ, AND PROCESA DE LA
CRUZ
G.R. No. L-3629  September 28, 1907

FACTS:

Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez (married to Hilarion de la Cruz) – both their second marriages
- filed in CFI Albay a complaint for the purpose of recovering certain parcels of lands from the
defendants (children of Hilarion dela Cruz). Plaintiff alleges that she had acquired said lands
during her first marriage from deceased father and that she had permission from Hilarion to
commence this action in her own name against Hilarion’s children. She claims that Hilarion had
been administering the said lands during the entire period of his marriage to her. However, CFI
Albay dismissed the case in favour Hilarion’s children through his first marriage and found as a
fact, from evidence during trials, that the lands described in the complaint were acquired by
Hilarion during his marriage to his first wife, one Andrea de Leon. And thus, granted the land in
question to the children of Hilarion from his first marriage. Rodriguez appealed to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Hilarion was the owner of said lands since he had been administering
the land in question during the entire period of his marriage to Matea and did the CFI Albay err
in finding that Hilarion acquired the land in question during his marriage to Andrea de Leon.

HELD:

No. “There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from
administering the property of his wife, as her representative, and certainly it cannot be
concluded that the property which he administers for his wife is his for the mere reason that he
has administered the same for a long time.”“…the mere fact that she has permitted her
husband to administer her property does not mean that she has thereby lost her property and
that the same has become the property of her husband.”SC examined the evidence adduced
during the lower court trials second marriages - filed in CFI Albay a complaint for the purpose
of recovering certain parcels of lands and found that the lands in question were acquired by
Matea from her deceased father through inheritance.

BABAO v VILLAVICENCIO
44 PHIL 921
FACTS:

In the proceedings of the intestate estate of Ignacio Trillanes, Maria Babao, the herein
appellee, petitioned the court that an additional inventory be made of certain properties of the
deceased and an allowance be made to her minor children for their support, pending the
distribution of the estate. These minors are children of Jose Trillanes, son of the deceased
Ignacio Trillanes. The petition was opposed by the administrator of the estate on the ground
that the said minors are not entitled to support applied for because Sec. 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides only for the support of the children of the deceased and not of his
grandchildren. The lower court however, hold otherwise and allowed P15 monthly pension.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisional support granted by Sec. 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure
extends to the grandchildren.

RULING:

The ordinary acceptation of the word hijo or child does not include nieto or
grandchildren. The reference made in the aforesaid section to allowances as are provided by
the law in force in the Philippine Islands does not have the effect of extending the right to this
provisional support to her petition, whose provision in this point do not, in the opinion of the
court, extend to the grandchildren of the deceased. She cannot invoke the CCP because the
grandfather against whose estate the allowance claimed is to be charged is now dead, and
therefore the obligation of such grandfather to give support was already extinguished.

MOORE and SONS MERCANTILE CO v WAGNER

50 Phil 128

FACTS:
Widow of the deceased Samuel William Allen in the settlement proceedings petitioned
the court to require the administrator of the estate to give her and her daughter Avelina Allen
an allowance of P80. The special administrator appointed in the case objected to the allowance
of the widow upon the ground that the estate is insolvent, in view of the claims presented and
approved by the committee on appraisal and claims. Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of several
creditors also entered his opposition to said order. Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of
the estate, the lower court entered the order referred to of March 5, 1925, citing in its support
article 1430 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the order granting the allowance to the widow and daughter valid?

HELD:
NO. Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving spouse and his or her children
shall be given an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the liquidation
of the inventoried estate, and until their share has been delivered to them, but it shall be
deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits
or income. Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the said judgment of May
28, 1896, wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased
spouse, but the general estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is
meant the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue
of the estate, the wife can always be allowed support as part payment of the income of her
property. In any case, the support is given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the
partnership, and it does not seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of
the liquidation, just because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the
ground of estimates more or less uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality.In this
case, it appears from the record that the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of Samuel
William Allen and that his widow, by her own admission, had not contributed any property to
the marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful, in the present case, to grant the support, having the
character of an advance payment to be deducted from the respective share of each partner,
when there is no property to be partitioned, lacks the legal basis provided by article 1430.

IN RE: JOSE BERMAS & PILAR BERMAS 14 SCRA 327

G.R. No. L-20379
June 22, 1965

FACTS:
In May 1962, petitioner-sps Jose Bermas, Sr. & Pilar Manuel Bermas executed an
Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership & Sep of Property. It states that during their
marriage, they acquired 12 parcels of land and 2 buildings. The purpose of this Agreement is to
prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future,
particularly because petitioner Jose has 2 sets of children: 1 by former marriage, another by his
present. The peti ti on was fi led stati ng the above menti oned facts and that this
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage is allowed, under Art
191 of CC, subject to judicial approval.  Moreover, the sps have no outstanding
debts/obligations and the sep of properties would not prejudice any creditor or 3rd party.
However, after the hearing, the court denied the petition on the ground that under CC Art 192,
a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered and
exceptions, under Art 191, are civil interdiction, declaration of absence or abandonment . And
upon approval of the peti ti on for dissoluti on, the court shall take such  measures
as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conjugal  partnership may be dissolved without noti fi cati on
of children of the parties’ previous marriages.

HELD:
No, in a proceeding for dissolution of a conjugal partnership under Art 191CC, it is
essential that children of previous marriages shall be personally notified of said proceeding. In
this case, the names and addresses of children by previous marriage of Jose Bernas,
Sr. have not been given and it appears that they have not been notified personally of the filing
of the petition and of the date of its hearing even though the danger of substantial injury to
their rights would seem to be remote. At any rate, the rights of the children by the first marriage
are still affected in the event that when there is doubt, the partnership property shall be
divided between diff erent conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and
to the property belonging to the respective sps. Decision appealed set aside. Case remanded to
lower court for further proceedings

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

GR 82606 December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. 
The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children.  Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was consolidated.  RTC decision was a definite disposition of
the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.The
complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground
that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code.  Prima contested
that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial

separation of conjugal property.

HELD:
 Supreme court is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the case filed.  For abandonment to exist, there must be an
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation.  The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of
resuming their conjugal relationship.  From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial
support to Prima.  Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the
private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Wherefore, the petition was
granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the
spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. 

GUILLERMA TUMULOS vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ

GR 137650 12 April 2000

FACTS:

Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumulos,

Toto Tumulos, and Gina Tumulos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the
defendants to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any
rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, they will pay rental but which agreement
was not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the
defendants vacate the premises. Guillerma Tumulos was the only one who fi led an
answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of
action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in
questi on together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the
complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their
memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they
acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years,
and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the
other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his
marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the peti ti oner is the co-owner of the property In litis.

RULING:
 Peti ti oner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Her claim of having administered the property
during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her
claim for nothing in Article 148 of the family code provides that the administration of the
property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s
claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents.

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted his fi rst marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church
at Pangasinan. Out their union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. He left to work in
Hawaii and when he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child
and also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. Miguel then c o n t r a c t e d   h i s s e c o n d
marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. Both jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land and a house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed
of Donati on and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to
their only child. Two years later, Miguel d i e d a n d t h e r e a ft e r C a r l i n a fi l e d
a   c o m p l a i n t   o f   concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the
riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitati on with
peti ti oner. Peti ti oner contended that she had already given her half of the rice land
property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought with
her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.

ISSUE:

W h e t h e r   o r   n o t p e ti ti o n e r m a y   o w n t h e   t w o p a r c e l s   o f   l a n d acquired
during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.

RULING: 

The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale
but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donati on made by
Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
 USAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969 without a license and
without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage - he married Susan Yee on
November 10, 1992. Cariño died due to diabetes on November 23, 1992 under the care of
Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both spouses of Cariño claimed and
collected monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies as
death benefits. Susan Yee filed a case to collect one half of the sum of the death benefits
received by Susan Nicdao. At the time she married Cariño, Susan Yee claimed that she had no
knowledge of Cariño’s marriage with Susan Nicdao.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the first marriage contracted by Cariño is void ab initio.

RULING:

YES. The first marriage contracted by Cariño is void ab initio. The marriage of Cariño and
Susan Nicdao is void since it was solemnized without the required marriage license. Under the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.

Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola vs.

 JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA
GR 177703, 28 January 2008

FACTS: 
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed a Special Civil Action with the RTC against
Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (peti ti oners) for the  judicial
partition of the properties left by the deceased Fidel Arriola. Respondent is
the son of Fidel with his fi r s t wife Victoria C.
C a l a b i a ,   w h i l e   p e ti ti o n e r   A n t h o n y Ronald is the son of Fidel with his second wife, petitioner
Vilma. The RTC ordered the partition and public auction of the subject land covered by TCT No.
383714. The public aucti on was scheduled on May
31,2 0 0 3   b u t   w a s   r e s c h e d u l e d   w h e n   t h e p e ti ti o n e r s refused to
i n c l u d e   t h e   s u b j e c t house standing on the land. This prompted the respondent to file with
the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying that petitioners be
declared in contempt but was denied. Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
where the decision of the RTC was reversed and set aside, and the sheriff is ordered to
proceed with the public a u c ti o n s a l e   o f   t h e s u b j e c t l a n d a n d , c o n s t r u c t e d
t h e r e o n . P e ti ti o n e r s fi l e d a M o ti o n f o r R e c o n s i d e r a ti o n b u t t h e C A
d e n i e d   t h e   s a m e resolution. The petitioners filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is part of the judgment of co- ownership
and partition.

RULING:
T h e s u b j e c t h o u s e i s d e e m e d p a r t o f t h e j u d g m e n t o f p a r ti ti o n f o r
t w o compelling reasons: first, under the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 440, 445,a n d
4 4 6 . F o l l o w i n g   t h e Principle of Accession, improvements including the house even not
included in the alleged complaint of parti ti on are deemed included in the lot
in which they stand. Second, the subject house was part of the estate of the deceased, as
such it is owned by the heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of  Civil
Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, the respondent’s
recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered.

JOSE E. HONRADO vs COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO

Facts:
On December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC
of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business
under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. For failure of Honrado, as well as his
counsel, to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was declared in default. It turned out that the
Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba City for the
judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrado’s name under Transfer
Certificate of Title T-143175 located in Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their family
house. 
On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution
under Article 155 of the Family Code of the Philippines. It was alleged therein that the property
is exempt from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as such
before he incurred his indebtedness with Premium.  He also alleged that he and his family had
no other real property except the land which was levied upon and sold on execution It further
averred that the law does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution and
there was no showing that its present value does not exceed the amount allowed by law under
Article 157 of the Family Code

Issue:
Whether or not finding and concluding that failure to assert his claim for exemption of his
family home from execution at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time is fatal to his
claim.

Ruling:
Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. The family home continues
to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by Law. It is a real right, which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases. Such provision finds no application in this case.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. SO
ORDERED.

SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006

Facts:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses
Eduardo and Elsa Versola, seeks to nullify and set aside the 28 April 2004 Decision and 28 July
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Orders dated 6 January 2003 and
14 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Civil Case No. Q-93-
16003. This case has its genesis from a loan transaction entered into by private respondent Dr.
Victoria T. Ong Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein the former granted a P1,000,000.00
loan to the latter. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for
the same amount dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a deed of real estate
mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The execution of the
deed of real estate mortgage did not materialize, but Ledesma delivered the owner's duplicate
copy of the TCT No. RT-51142 to private respondent. With the dishonor of the checks and with
Asiatrust's refusal to release the P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners, private respondent came
away empty-handed as she did not receive payment for the P1,500,000.00 loan she granted to
Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is
exempt from execution.

Ruling:
Under Article 153 of the Family Code provides:The family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Under the cited provision, a family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there
is no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79300, for lack of merit, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners. SO ORDERED.

FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC

[G.R. No. 97898.  August 11, 1997]

Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-
square-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The property,
located in Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against
petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45.  Instead of filing an answer,
petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the
salient portion of which provides: “c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount
of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their
collectibles will be collected.”
Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the
ground that the property covered was exempt from execution.  On March 21, 1991, the Court
of Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion.  It anchored its ruling on
Modequillo v. Breva which held that “all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.”

Issue:
 Whether a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under
the provisions of the said Code.

Ruling:
We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and
applicable jurisprudence. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should
take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses
or head of the family who owns the home.

JOSE MODEQUILLO vs HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-

SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA G.R. No. 86355
May 31, 1990

Facts:
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of  Appeals
entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.”  The said judgment having
become fi nal and executory, a writ of  execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to
satisfy the said judgmenton the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and
Benito Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at
Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located
at Malalag, Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by
defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residenti al land located at
Oblation Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of
this case and as such is exempt from execution forced sale or attachment under Articles 152
and 153 of the family Code except for the liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that
the judgment debt sought to sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not
of those enumerated under Article 155 of the family code. The opposition was filed by the
plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be sati sfi ed by way
of executi on of a family home consti tuted under the Family Code.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of
the family who owns the home. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner
was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extra judicially under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operati on of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code.

Reynaldo Espiritu vs. Court of Appeals

242 SCRA 362

Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as
a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo
was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a
brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to
the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was
born on 1988. 

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and
the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the
Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back
by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and
her family. 

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting
the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be
agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. 

Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children
be granted. 

Ruling: SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of
the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against
the children. 

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The
children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in
their emotional growth by her behavior.
 PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005

Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old
son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when
she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear
despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the
child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another
witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Held:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.”
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise,”
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the
Civil Code, w/c reads:
“Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

 Hontiveros, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
132 SCRA 745

Facts:
Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. and Private respondent Brenda M Hernandez are the
parents of Margaux H. Hontiveros born on Nov. 27, 1981.
From Nov. 1981 to June 1982 the child is under the custody of the mother. On June 21, 1982
Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr.  passed by the house of the respondent  to take the child and
promised to returned it but it never happen.
On August 24, 1982 the mother file a petition for habeas corpus against the father to produce
their child Margaux. On the other hand the petition Alejandro filed a petition for custody of the
minor Migaux under the special proceeding no. 9788. However, Alejandro abandoned the
petition, for which reason Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera dismissed said petition. 
On May 24, 1983 Alejandro file an urgent ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent Brenda to take Margaux outside the country (U.S.). On May
30, 1983 the petition was denied because the motion of Brenda for withdrawal of habeas
corpus was granted because it becomes moot and academic when Margaux appeared before
Judge Rañada. The petition of Alejandro is just an ancillary action to Habeas corpus. Hence,
Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the respondent Judge Cainglet
for the reason of lack of factual and legal justification on August 17, 1983.

Issue:
1.    Whether or not the order of respondent judge dated May 30, 1983 was issued with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petitions of the petitioners.
2.    Whether or not Alejandro is entitled to the custody of his child Margaux.

Held:

The petition is hereby denied with cost against petitioner.

1. The respondent judge merely exercised his sound discretion in allowing the withdrawal
of the habeas corpus. The case of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the
body of Margaux was already produced in court before Judge Rañada.
2. The petitioner also chose the wrong remedy, he should not abandoned his custody case
No. 9788 where his petition for injunction can be raised properly.
3. It is clear that the mother has a legal right to take the minor child under her custody and
the petitioner failed to justify that the mother is unfit to take care of their child.
4. If the petitioner believed that Brenda will bring their child to the U.S. he should raised
that to the custody proceeding no. 9788 that he abandoned

UNSON III v HON. NAVARRO and ARANETA

101 SCRA 182

FACTS:
 The petitioner and private respondent Araneta executed an agreement for the separation
of their properties and to live separately. The parties had no agreement on specific provision
regarding the custody of their child, Maria, because they would have their own private
arrangement in that respect. After the knowledge of the petitioner of their child’s
unwholesome environment on the relationship of the mother with her own uncle-in-law, the
petitioner took custody of the child.

The order of the respondent judge of December 28, 1979 ordering petitioner to produce
the child, Teresa Unson, his daughter and return her to the custody of the mother, further
obliging petitioner to continue his support of said daughter, allegedly was issued without a
“hearing” and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his
order of December 28, 1979.

RULING:

It is deemed a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge to have acted
precipitably in issuing his order of December 28, 1979. Considering that in the decision on the
separation of properties, mention made for support of the child, to avoid multiplicity of
proceedings and is under Sec. 6 of Rule 99, the matter of the custody of children of separated
spouses may be brought before the Court of first Instance by petition or as an incident to any
other proceedings, the respondent court indeed has jurisdiction to decide the question of
custody. However, the petitioner’s claim of denial of hearing and due process before the
issuance by respondent judge of his order of December 28,1979 contradicts the fact that
petitioner was given sufficient time and opportunity to be heard as evident of his written
opposition filled before the court. Thus the court does not see the need for the calling of
witnesses and the hearing of testimony in open court.

The court decided further that the order of respondent judge be set aside and a restraining
order issued was made permanent. The parties as well was ordered to submit their own
agreement as to the visitorial rights of the private respondent.

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 156343   October 18, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel
Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese
national and is presently residing in Japan.
Issue:
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?

Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could
be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law
explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that
only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the
putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE GARCIA, (ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD)

GR NO. 148311

Facts: 
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to
be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of
the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower
court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.
Issue: 
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Held: 

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section
17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Lahom vs. Sibulo

G.R. No. 153989 July 14, 2003
Facts:
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption in which she averred,
that, despite the proddings and pleadings of the petitioner and her husband, respondent
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner
particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his
desire to revoke respondent’s adoption, but was prevented by petitioner’s supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or
interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

Issue:
May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

Ruling:

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975.  By then, the new law, had already abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption.  Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold
that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the
passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five–year bar rule
under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period.  The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection.  It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a “right,” the privilege to
adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.
It is a privilege that is governed by the state’s determination on what it may deem to be for the
best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of
the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has
been exercised.

BOBANOVIC ET AL VS.MONTES ETC

FACTS:

A petition to adopt a minor Adam Christopher Sales was filed by the spouses Slobodan
Bobanovic and Diane Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic, both Australian citizen with established
residence at Melbourne, Victoria, Australia but who then were temporarily residing at No. *
Aries, Bel-Air, Makati. They are childless since their marriage due to primary infertility on the
part of the wife. Adam Chistopher Sales was given to Dianne by Lulu, child’s natural mother as
shown by Deed of Surrender and waiver and gave her written consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MSSD can grant and issue travel clearance to the petitioner’s adopted
child.

HELD:
 It is a logical effect of the decree of adoption that the adopted minor should be allowed to
travel and join adoptive parents. Only aliens whose government the Republic of the Philippines
has broken diplomatic relations with are ones disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil
Code.