1

PEOPLE vs SARAP

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES and ROGER AMAR y MATEO, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 132165.  March 26, 2003]

FACTS:
Armed with a search warrant, SPO4 Gelacio R. Guarino, Chief of Police of Banga,
Aklan together with PO2 Jhanny Navida, raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal St.,
Poblacion, Banga, Aklan on March 2, 1996, relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its
occupants, Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran and Pepe Casabuena. The three were
apprehended for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained at the Banga Police
Station. In the course of their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly from Capiz
and Roger Amar were the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on March 4,
1996.
On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz, caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed
Guarino that there were two strangers looking for the Duran sisters. Then they proceeded to
the house and saw a woman, who turned out to be accused-appellant Melly Sarap. Melly
saw Guarino and Navida in police uniform and immediately threw away her black canvass
bag, which Roger Amar picked up. Guarino Blocked Sarap’s path and grabbed from her the
green plastic bag she was holding. The plastic bag was found to contain two blocks of
marijuana fruiting tops. Navida pursued Amar and arrested him. The accused-apellant
denied the accusations against her. The Court fines accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Article II, Sec 4 of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES:
(1)    Whether the warrantless search and arrest conducted is legal.
(2)    Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to find the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly
issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are
the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant
to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless searches and seizures may be
made without a warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the
evidence in plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
These instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases,
probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime
has been committed or is about to be committed.
 Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellant’s conviction cannot
stand.  There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict her.  That the search disclosed
marijuana fruiting tops in appellant’s possession, and thus confirmed the police officers’ initial
information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality.  An illegal search cannot be
undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search
for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.
All told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty of conviction.  The evidence presented by the
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prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally

ordained
Wherefore the Accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
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Luz y Ong v. People

G. R. No. 197788 : February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a
helmet and this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. He
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down
the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer.
While he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his
jacket. He was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged and slowly put out
the contents of the pocket of his jacket which included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected
shabu. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic
violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of
two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs
Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu was incident to a
lawful arrest.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest

There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor
a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part
of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the
latter.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
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reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost
in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then
the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and
must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

GRANTED.
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VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 164815   February 22, 2008

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines

FACTS:

On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section Division,
Central Police District Command received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3)
other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with
ransom. After  briefing, team conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his
hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated
National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was
about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put him
under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found
tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live
ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject
firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not
issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.

On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but
his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed
the RTC disposition. 

SC affirmed CAs decision.

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the
commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866
which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.

HELD:

(1)   YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the
trial court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non
respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor
a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception
and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws).
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 129756-58       January 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
JULIAN ESCAÑO y DEEN, VIRGILIO USANA y TOME, and JERRY LOPEZ
CASABAAN, accused.

VIRGILO USANA y TOME, and JERRY LOPEZ y CASABAAN, accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

RESOLUTION

For the Court's consideration is a Manifestation and Motion of accused Julian Deen Escaño,
praying that the Court's Decision of 28 January 2000 1 acquitting accused-appellants Virgilio
T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 be applied to him as co-accused,
on the strength of Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure. He then
prays that an order be issued by the Court acquitting him and directing his immediate
release from confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.1âwphi1.nêt

Escaño, together with accused-appellants Usana and Lopez, was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, with violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 95-936. Escaño and Usana were
also charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-937
and 95-938, respectively. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.

In its decision of 30 May 1997, the trial court convicted all three in Criminal Case No. 95-936,
Escaño in Criminal Case No. 95-937, and Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938. Escaño filed
a Notice of Appeal but he withdrew the same by motion, which was granted by the trial court
in its Order of 17 July 1997.

In filing the instant motion, Escaño relies on a single ground, that is, that the 28 January
2000 Decision of this Court on the appeal interposed by his co-accused is applicable and
favorable to him and entitles him to an acquittal pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
New Rules on Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision states as follows:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. –

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(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.2

Escaño argues that the Decision of this Court is applicable and favorable to him in that "the
factual findings therein equally support the conclusion that not all the elements of the offense
charged have been prove[d] and that no criminal liability can, thus, be imputed to [him]." 3

After evaluating the issue and arguments raised by Escaño, the Office of the Solicitor
General manifested no objection to his Manifestation and Motion and recommended that the
same be given due course.

We find merit in the instant Manifestation and Motion. Consistent with our ruling in a number
of cases,4 the acquittal of Usana and Lopez based on reasonable doubt should benefit
movant Escaño notwithstanding the fact that he withdrew his appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the instant Manifestation and Motion is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of 30 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 64, insofar as Criminal
Case No. 95-936 is concerned with regard to accused Julian Deen Escaño, holding him
guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING him on
ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING his immediate release from confinement at the
New Bilibid Prison unless his further detention is justified for any lawful ground. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to report to the Court the release of said
accused within five (5) days from notice of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.
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People vs. Compacion

[GR 124442, 20 July 2001]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 4 concur

Facts:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that Armando Compacio y

Surposa was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2
Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion
who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental on 9 July 1995.

During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the backyard of Compacion
which they suspected to be marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the
result of their surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City,
who immediately formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division
Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special Action Force.
Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL Radio, were
also included in the composite team.

On 12 July 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive
Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that
he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The team then left Bacolod City for San
Carlos City. They arrived there around 6:30 p.m., then went to the house of Executive Judge
Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so because it
was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge to go back
in the morning.

Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the

residence of Compacion in the early morning of 13 July 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the
gate and called out for Compacion. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting
accounts. The prosecution contends that Compacion opened the gate and permitted them to
come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants
and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was
suffering from migraine.

SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of
RA 6425 and informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the
suspected marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using
the Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result. On 15 July 1995, the
plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod
City Police Command, particularly to Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio.
 9

Senior Inspector Villavicencio weighed and measured the plants, one was 125
inches and weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams.
Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the microscopic test, the
chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive results.

On his part, Compacion maintains that around 1:30 a.m. on 13 July 1995 while he
and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went
down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, 4 persons who he thought
were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house.

It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was
lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of
the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his
permission to search his house and the premises.

After about 20 minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to
the backyard. One of the military men said: "Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at your
backyard" to which Compacion replied: "I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana plants
but what I know is that they are medicinal plants for my wife" who was suffering from
migraine. After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took
pictures of him and themselves. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 61 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and the military men spent
the night. At around 10:00 a.m., they brought him with them to the city hall. Compacion saw
that one of the 2 service vehicles they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told
by the military men that said plants were marijuana.

Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met with the mayor and then unloaded the
alleged marijuana plants. A picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with
the alleged marijuana as back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the
SAF Headquarters. A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425, as amended
by RA 7659 was filed against Compacion.

On 2 January 1996, the trial court convicted Compacion of the crime charged, and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Issue: Whether Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.

Held: Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution are safeguards against
reckless, malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. A search and seizure,
therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Evidence
secured thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding."

The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority
prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute.

There are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the
owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of the
premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made
 10

on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws;

when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a "stop and frisk" situation;
when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; or in cases of inspection of
buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. In
these instances, a search may be validly made even without a warrant.

Herein, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of
accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant, It does not appear either that the
situation falls under any of the above mentioned cases. Consequently, Compacion's right
against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.

As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied:

(a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search. Here, there
was no valid warrantless arrest.

They forced their way into Compacion's premises without the latter's consent. It is
undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of
Compacion on 9 July 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana
when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered
his premises on 13 July 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact,
they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be
issued.

The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants
inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into Compacion's residence.
As held in People v. Musa, the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Hence, Compacion is acquitted of the
crime to which he was charged.
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PEOPLE VS PASUDAG
GR No. 128822, May 4, 2001

FACTS:
SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school.
About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were
marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper
nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The store owner told him that Pasudag
owned it. A team was dispatched and the team arrived and went straight to the house of
accused Pasudag. The police looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team
to his backyard garden which was about five (5) meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana
plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag
standing beside one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The
team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. At the police
station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned
the marijuana plants. SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report which accused Pasudag
signed.
ISSUE: WON the arrest and seizure valid?

HELD:
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law
enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. In
the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a
search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was acquainted
with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the
house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the
plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they
would be uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject
of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The
testimony of SPO3 Jovencio Fajarito reveals that appellant was not duly informed of his
constitutional rights. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences
when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-appellant was
a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of
the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.
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ABENES vs CA
GR No. 156320, February 14, 2007

FACTS:

Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high powered
firearm and its ammunitions during the election period. Two Informations were filed for (1)
illegal possession of firearms and its ammunitions; and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election
Code.

The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped
and he was asked to alight the same for routine inspection. The police saw the firearm
tucked in his waist, and asked him to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not
produce one, the police confiscated the firearm. It was then found that Abenes was not a
registered nor a licensed firearm holder.

The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges. Abenes appealed to the CA alleging
that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and that his constitutional
right against unlawful search and seizure was violated. The CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE/S:

1) W/N the checkpoint was legally set up.

2) W/N Abenes’ constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure had been
violated.

HELD:

1) YES. The production of a mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the
checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the
circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure
without a warrant (plain view).

2) NO. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating Abenes where they saw
the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently
when Abenes alighted from the vehicle.

However, there is insufficient evidence that the firearm Abenes carried had no
license. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Abenes was carrying a firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter
 13

must be exculpated from criminal liability under the illegal possession of firearms law.
However, Abenes is still convicted for violation of the Comelec Gun Ban.

DOCTRINE:

Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order
and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection
of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
a. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
b. the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
 14

People v. Doria

People v. Florencio Doria [“ Jun ”] and Violeta Gaddao [ “Neneth ” ]

22 Jan 1999 / Puno / Appeal from a Pasig RTC decision
Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > Warrantless search and
seizure > “ Plain view ” doctrine

FACTS:

Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that

one “ Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest
him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked
bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his
associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.

            The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified her
as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3
Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3
Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s flaps was open, and
inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the
box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana
leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The
bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
            
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA
6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy].
RTC convicted them.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid. NO

RATIO

Re: warrantless arrest

Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the
basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate
in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification
does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no
showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts
 15

implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.
            Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and
home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal
as an incident to her arrest.

“ Plain view ” issue

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. 

Requisites
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.   The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed container.  Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant.  If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of
the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana."  Each of
the ten  bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed
inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-
examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana.  He did not
know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.
It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana;
hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
violation of the law and the Constitution.  It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have
been excluded and never considered by the trial court.

The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao ’s
house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the

submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the
presentation of the drug as evidence in court.

 Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received,

Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
 16

 Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in

the sale of said drug

DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE

GADDAO ACQUITTED

People v. Martinez et al.

G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010

FACTS:
On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty at the
Police Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen
reported that a pot session was underway in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in
Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members
of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from
people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house,
accused Orlando Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales,
Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez. Seized from the accused were open
plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of
used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized items
were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for
Doria, were found positive for methylamphetamine HCL.

On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and
Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II
of RA 9165 and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of
suit.

The CA supported the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:

No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt because (1) evidence against the accused are inadmissible and
(2) even if the evidence were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established .

The evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure.
Searches and seizures without a warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) “plain
view” search of evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs
search, (6) stop and frisk, (7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of
RRCP warrantless arrest can only be done in in flagrante cases, hot pursuit cases, and
fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-appellants were based solely on the report of a
concerned citizen, no surveillance of the place was conducted. Under Rule 113, fugitive case
does not apply. In flagrante and hot pursuit case may apply only upon probable cause, which
means actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable ground of suspicion
 17

when suspicion of a person to be arrested is probably guilty of the offense based on actual
facts, that is, supported by circumstances. In case at bar, this is not the case since the entire
arrest was based on uncorroborated statement of a concerned citizen.

The chain of custody as outlined in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 was not observed as
no proper inventory, photographing, was done in the presence of the accused nor were there
representatives from the media, the DOJ and any popularly elected official present, although
in warrantless seizures, marking and photographing of evidence may be done at the nearest
police station.

Court sets aside and reverses the decision of the CA dated August 7, 2009, acquits
the accused and orders their immediate release.

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA vs CA

G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.  

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes
Street, Davao City, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be
acting suspiciously.They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of
the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .
38 revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas)
grenade, 3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 the petitioner was asked to
show the necessary license or authority to possess the firearms and ammunitions but failed
to do so.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warantless arrest and search was valid.

RULING:

An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person,

among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested
has committed it.

Contrary to the argument of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen
approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and
 18

consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; At the time
the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was
hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
[210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

FACTS: 

The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there
were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded
them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with
a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife.

The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among
the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver.

For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he
was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at
the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

 19

Held: 

An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any

proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5
of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b)
when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. 

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding
his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in
a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.

Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

 20

SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010.
FACTS:

Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of
the arrest, two police officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were
transacting. While the officers were coming, one of the officers saw Esquillo hide a
transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked, she fled but was eventually
caught.

Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against her.

The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-
and-frisk doctrine.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid.

RULING:

The SC denied the appeal.

Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did not
quash it before arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the
appellate court. 

On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain
view doctrine was imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition and
requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People v. Chua - that he should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons.
 21

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals

[GR 123595, 12 December 1997]

Facts:

On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats

reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police
Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot
patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda.

They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised
of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of “stop and frisk,” where a
“warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and
“whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks
to obtain more information”; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental
to a lawful arrest.

The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less
than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than
30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum.

On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was

appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the
Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. 

Issue:

Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.”

Held:
 22

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued
warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:

(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk."

The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must

not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had
just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search
conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:

(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with
a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here,
there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:

First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by
any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased
that group.

Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" —
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions
were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
 23

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was
armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as
to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was
indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are
blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article
III of the Constitution.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA

[288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]

FACTS: 

On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informantthat a certain “Aling
Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a
team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from
Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves
packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”. 

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging
the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed
that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While
about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when
she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old
woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented. 

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.
 24

Held: 

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule

126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search; 

6. Stop and Frisk; 

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. 

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the
street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was
committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s
bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. 

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do
so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

 25

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. 

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. —

An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known,
or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending. 

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority,
may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein. 
 26

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the
warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has
been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained
with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it
that subsection

(a) hereof has been complied with.

(b) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the
log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and
other actions of the judge. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
 27

Valmonte v. De Villa,
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
political development of the National Capital Region.  As part of its duty to maintain peace
and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. 

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro

Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought
the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the
National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in
the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended
that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?

RULING:

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

 28

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light
therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other

areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission
of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,”
not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness
and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part
of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
 29

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, ET AL.

420 SCRA 280 (2004)

FACTS:

On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a
checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise
known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on
board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates
(Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint,
a police officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was
only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant opened the
bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the police
station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police officials
without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents
which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered them guilty for
transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700
grams of marijuana violated there constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure.

HELD:

Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians
passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be
stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable
 30

belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents
of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the
personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell ofmarijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

In light then of Vinecario et al.‘s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and
even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and
nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to
one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped
away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an
attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants
were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some
offense.

ANIAG VS. COMELEC

[237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]

FACTS: 

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel
or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC
also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces,
and establishing spot checkpoints.

Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the
House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the
firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to Congress.

The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the
checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended
and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
 31

Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a
bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information
against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner
to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position.

Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that
“gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts mentioned in
the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of
petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in
Congress in the elections.

ISSUE: 

Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return
the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less
search of his car

HELD: 

A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate

authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection
of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the  guns were not
tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun
cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car.

Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car
lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any
justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not have been valid. 

Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted
for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not
informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not
 32

among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not
informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation.
Such constituted a violation of his right to due process.

Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet
the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the
case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the
petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.

PEOPLE vs VALDEZ

[G.R. No. 127753. December 11, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO VALDEZ Y

DULAY, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45,
Anonas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicting appellant Domingo Valdez y Dulay guilty of two
crimes: (1) murder for which he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and (2) illegal
possession of Firearms and Ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 for which he
was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the following criminal indictments:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8719

That on or about 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque, Municipality of San
Manuel, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack and shot one Labrador Valdez y Madrid, hitting the
latters chest and the gunshot wounds inflicted being mortal, caused the direct and immediate
death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.[1]

 33

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720

That on or about the 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque, Municipality of San
Manuel, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the said
accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody a firearm of an unknown caliber, make and brand without authority of
law, and which he used in shooting to death Labrador Valdez y Madrid.

Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866.[2]

On October 31, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at Sitio Laclac, Barangay
San Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan, Marcelo Valdez was under his nipa house talking with
his son Labrador Valdez. At that time, Marcelos other housemates his wife, son Rolando
Valdez, daughter-in-law Imelda Umagtang and an eight-year-old boy named Christopher
Centeno were staying upstairs preparing to sleep. In the course of their conversation,
Labrador was lying sideways on a carabao sled, placed under the family nipa house. He was
facing his father at the eastern side of the house, at a distance of about less than two (2)
meters from each other. [3] TSN, June 13, 1996, pp. 14 and 17. 3 Suddenly, two consecutive
gunshots were fired coming from the western side of the house by an assailant. [4] The first
shot landed on the left forefinger and thumb of Labrador, while the second shot hit him two
(2) inches from the left shoulder, below the neck which exited at the right side just below his
breast.[5] After firing, the assailant immediately ran away towards the west direction. [6]
Marcelo Valdez who was talking to his son, immediately called for help while the victim
managed to walk upstairs towards the kitchen. The stunning sound of the two gunfire and
Marcelos cry for help alerted Imelda Umagtang and her common-law husband Rolando
Valdez, who were both lying on bed, to verge upon the kitchen where they saw the victim
bathed in his own blood. When Rolando inquired from the victim who shot him, the latter
replied that it was the appellant. At this time, the victims brother and in-laws arrived. They
also asked the victim what happened and the latter once more said that it was appellant who
shot him. At such time, the search for the passenger jeep that will transport the victim to the
hospital continued. After an hour, they were able to find a passenger jeep but the victim
already succumbed to death prior to his transport to the hospital.
The next day, on November 1, 1995, Dr. Asuncion Tuvera of San Manuel Rural Health
Unit conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased in the latters house. The
medical examination revealed the following gunshot wounds-

A. External findings:

Chest - gunshot wound at the left sternal line 2 inches below the left clavicle, 2 cm in
diameter penetrating

- gunshot wound at the right enterior axillary line at the level of the lumbar area.

Extremities lacuated wound on the left thumb and index finger with fracture of the phalanges.

B. Internal findings:

Chest fracture of the 3rd enterior left rib.

Abdomen placuated wound of the liver.

 34

Cause of death:

Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound on

the chest and lumbar area. (Exhibit E; records, p. 7)

Thereafter, appellant was charged before the trial court with two separate information
for murder and illegal possession of firearms to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial,
judgment was rendered convicting appellant as earlier mentioned. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8719:

The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

of MURDER defined and penalized under republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the
Heinous Crime Law, the offense having been committed with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nighttime, hereby
sentences him the ultimum supplicium of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the victim LABRADOR
VALDEZ in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity; P23,500.00 as actual
damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs. 

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720:

The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No.
1866 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay the costs.

Finally, it is said: Dura lex, sed lex, translated as The law is harsh, but that is the law.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Appellant questions his conviction arguing that the court a quo erred -

I. in convicting the accused of murder notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
II. in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
nighttime on the assumption that indeed accused appellant shot the victim.
III. in not applying the provision of R.A. 8294, amending P.D. 1866
IV. in convicting the accused for two separate offenses
V. finding the accused guilty of violating P.D. 1866[8]
After a careful examination of the records, appellants conviction should be upheld.  The
elements of murder concur in this case. Appellant shot the victim twice. The wounds
sustained by the deceased at the left thumb, index finger and at the left shoulder below the
neck exiting to the right side just below the breast were caused by bullets. As a result of
these gunshot wounds, the victim suffered Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to severe
 35

hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound on the chest and lumbar area which was
described in the medico-legal report as the proximate cause resulting to his death.
Appellants defense is premised primarily on denial and alibi. He argues that on the day
of the incident he was hauling and transporting 27 cavans of palay with Reymante and
Conrado Centino[9] from 6 to 9 oclock in the evening of October 31, 1995, to the house of
Mrs. Juanita Centino. Thereafter, they took supper at Conrados house and drank wine and
went home around 11 oclock in the evening. His version was corroborated by Reymante and
Conrado and the latters mother, Mrs. Centino, a sexagenarian. Such defenses, however,
aside from being inherently weak, cannot prevail against a positive and explicit identification
of him not only by Marcelo Valdez but also by the victim himself. To exculpate himself,
appellant must not only show that it was impossible for him to be at the place where the
crime was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission. [10] The distance between the place where the crime happened, to
the Centinos house where appellant claimed he was, is more or less one (1) kilometer, which
could be negotiated by walking for thirty (30) minutes, and twenty (20) minutes by riding a
vehicle.[11] Appellants whereabouts at the time of the incident was insufficient to foreclose
any possibility for him to be present at the scene of the crime, given the proximity of the two
places.
Appellant further contends that witness Marcelo Valdez could not have positively
identified him because there was only a single kerosene lamp lighting the area and the
witness was already seventy years old, who, at such age, would have a nebulous
identification of the assailant. Appellants assertion of impossibility of identification in a period
of a few seconds look at the time of the second shot, which was fired successively, was
negated by the fact that appellant shot the victim at a distance of around two meters from the
kerosene lamp. The distance of the appellant from the kerosene lamp does not preclude the
possibility of identification since the place was properly illumined capacitating the witness to
identify the assailant. In fact, both Marcelo and the deceased were able to identify appellant.
Appellant capitalizes on the alleged failure of Lilia Valdez (wife of the deceased) to
mention to the officer who investigated the killing, that she heard her husband say that the
appellant was his assailant. He argues that her testimony in court that she heard her
husband say that it was appellant who shot him, was merely an afterthought. In support
thereof, appellant quotes the following answers of Lilia Valdez during cross-examination -
ATTY. VIRAY-
Q: Now, in the sworn statement Madam witness which you gave to the police authorities
of San Manuel, Pangasinan, you never mentioned that your husband told you that he
was allegedly shot by the accused, is this correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. VIRAY:
The answer is not responsive, we request the question to be read back.
COURT: She said, she did not tell that to the police.
ATTY. VIRAY:
Q: Why did you not tell to the police authorities that your husband told you that your
husband was shot by Domingo Valdez? 
A: I forgot, sir. [TSN, July 3, 1996, pp. 24-25]
 36

We have thoroughly reviewed the records and studied the alleged contradiction
between the court testimony and the sworn statement of Lilia Valdez only to find that
appellant is misleading the court. In her sworn statement Lilia Valdez stated -
15. Q: Was you (sic) husband able to identify his assailant?
A: Yes, sir. He identified Domingo Valdez as his assailant when asked by brother-in-law
Rolando Valdez before he was brought down to kitchen on the way to the hospital,
sir. [Exhibit D, Folder II, Records, p. 3]
It is also clear from the records that as early as November 1, 1995, the day after the
killing, the principal prosecution witness Marcelo Valdez (father of the deceased), along with
Lilia Valdez (wife of the deceased), Imelda Umagtang (sister-in-law of the deceased) alluded
to appellant as the killer before police officer Avelino Sandi, Jr. who conducted the
investigation. Their respective sworn statements were reduced into writing denouncing and
identifying appellant as responsible for the death of Labrador Valdez. Imelda
Umagtang[12] testified to these utterances of the deceased in court.
The victims septuagenarian father Marcelo Valdez likewise affirmed the identity of the
appellant as the assailant. He testified in court that he recognized the assailant with the
lighting coming from the kerosene lamp hanging on the wall, which illuminated the whole
ground of the nipa hut.[13] He claimed that he recognized appellant at the second shot [14] at a
distance of around three meters (3) away from him. [15] At the time appellant fired the second
shot, appellant was less than a meter away from the victim [16] and around two meters from
the kerosene lamp.[17]
Lilia Valdez, the victims wife, recounting that fateful day, similarly attested appellants
culpability in court. She testified that when her husband was shot she was in her house with
her children, about 25 to 30 meters [18] from the victims location. When she heard the gunfire
and the summons of her parents-in-law that her husband was shot, she rushed to her
husband and saw him bloodied, lying prostrate in the kitchen.She asked the victim what
happened and the latter answered that appellant shot him.
Appellant likewise debunks the probative value given to Imelda Umagtangs testimony
that she heard the victim say that it was appellant who shot him because such statement
was not directed to her by the victim but to Rolando Valdez. [19] This according to appellant
finds support in the following testimony of Imelda
ATTY. VIRAY
Q: So it is very clear from your statement that it was your live-in boyfriend, Rolando
Valdez, who asked question from the victim not you, is this correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You never asked questions from the victim, is this correct?
A: No, sir. I heard what he revealed to my live-in boyfriend, sir.[20]
There is no rule that a person who hears something cannot testify on what she heard. A
dying declaration need not be particularly directed only to the person inquiring from the
declarant. Anyone who has knowledge of the fact of what the declarant said, whether it was
directed to him or not, or whether he had made inquiries from the declarant or not, can testify
thereto. 
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, possesses no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. [21] The
statement of the deceased uttered shortly after being wounded by the gunfire is a dying
 37

declaration, which falls under the exception to the hearsay rule. [22] It may be proved by the
testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom it was made. [23] Appellant contends
that the identification by the deceased of his assailant, which was admitted as a dying
declaration under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, cannot be admitted because
when the said statements were uttered the declarant was not conscious of his imminent
death,[24] relying on the following testimony of Imelda Umagtang and Lilia Valdez, thus
Q: What was your observation when he was lying down waiting for the ride to come?
A: He was already very weak, sir.
Q: Did somebody ask of his physical condition at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: Lago Valdez, sir.
Q: What did he ask?
A: He asked if he can still manage, sir.
Q: What did Labrador Valdez answer?
A: He said, no more, sir.
Q: What do you mean by he cannot manage anymore?
A: He was already very weak at that time, sir.
Q: And?
A: And he was dying, sir.
Q: He said he was dying?
A: No, sir.
Q: But he was feeling weak already?
A: Yes, sir.[25]
and
Q: When you were there near your husband lying in the kitchen in the house of your
father-in-law, what was your observation regarding his physical condition?
A: He was shot, Your Honor.
Q: Did you ask him what was he feeling at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he answer?
A: He said, he was weak, Your Honor.
Q: Did he tell you that he is going to die?
A: No, Your Honor.[26]
The victims statements prior to his death identifying appellant as his assailant have the
vestiges of a dying declaration, the elements for its admissibility are: 
 38

(1) the declaration was made by the deceased under consciousness of his impending death;
(2) the deceased was at time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; and (4) it offered in a criminal case
wherein the declarants death is subject of inquiry. [27]

These requirements are present in this case. The deceased made, before his death,
more than one statement, naming the person who shot him. The statements uttered by the
deceased were in response to the queries about the identity of the assailant. Such
utterances are admissible as a declaration of the surrounding circumstances of the victims
death, which were uttered under the consciousness of an impending death. That the victim
was conscious of his impending death is shown by the extent and seriousness of the wounds
inflicted upon the victim. The victim, prior to his death, was competent to be a witness in
court and such dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he
was himself a victim.
In a further but futile attempt to exculpate himself from liability, appellant contends that
he has no motive to kill the victim. While he admitted that the victim eloped with his wife, he
was not the only suspect having a motive to kill the victim. Suffice it to say that the evidence
on motive is inconsequential when the identity of the culprit has been positively
established[28] as in this case.
Ultimately, the issues raised by appellant fall within the sphere of credibility of witnesses
which, the reviewing court on appeal, ordinarily gives deference to the assessments and
conclusion of the trial court provided it is supported by the evidence on record.  Findings of
facts by the trial court are usually not disturbed on appeal on the proposition that the lower
court had the unique opportunity of having observed the elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying.
The killing was attended by treachery when the deceased was shot at his back while
lying on a carabao sledge conversing with his father, in a sudden and unexpected manner
giving him no opportunity to repel it or defend himself against such attack, [29] and without any
provocation on his part. With respect to the other aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime, this Court cannot appreciate the
same against the appellant for lack of factual basis. There is no evidence on record that
appellant contemplated and took some time of cool reflection before performing his evil act
for evident premeditation to set in. The abuse of superior strength, assuming there is any, is
already absorbed in treachery. Nighttime as an aggravating circumstance was not
established for lack of proof that appellant specifically sought the darkness of night to
perpetuate his deed. In the absence of any evidence that nocturnity was specifically sought
for by the offender in the commission of the crime, such aggravating circumstance may not
be validly appreciated.
In criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [30] The
prosecution ably discharged its duty by establishing its case against appellant through the
required quantum of proof.
In Criminal Case No. U-8720, appellant was found guilty of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition punished under P.D. 1866 and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay the costs. His separate indictment was on
account of the unlicensed firearm used in the killing. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294,[31] if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Although the
 39

crime in this case was committed in 1995, the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8294) which
became effective on July 6, 1997, fifteen (15) days after its publication in Malaya and
Philippine Journal on June 21, 1997, since it is favorable to appellant, [32] shall be given a
retroactive effect. Therefore, the illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearm may no
longer be separately charged[33] and only one offense should be punished, viz., murder in this
case, and the use of unlicensed firearm should only be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.[34] Considering that appellant is liable for murder, the illegal possession case
can no longer be pursued because it is merely treated as an aggravating circumstance.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the killing was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
circumstance will be treated merely as an aggravating circumstance under R.A.
8294. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to death, there being one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty (death) shall be applied. However, the
aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be appreciated in this case
because its retroactive application would be unfavorable to the accused, since the higher
penalty of death would necessarily be imposed. Thus, we could only impose the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in line with the ruling in People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr.[35] -

It must be underscored that although R.A. No. 7659 had already taken effect at the time the
violation of P.D. No. 1866 was allegedly committed x x x there is nothing in R. A. No. 7659
which specifically reimposed the death penalty in P.D. No. 1866. Without such reimposition,
the death penalty imposed in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for aggravated illegal possession of
firearm shall remain suspended pursuant to Section 19(1) of Article III of the
Constitution. Conformably therewith, what the trial court could impose was reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. U-8719 for MURDER, the penalty imposed on accused-
appellant DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY is reduced to reclusion perpetua. In
addition to the death indemnity of P50,000.00, the P200,000.00 moral damages
awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Labrador Valdez y Madrid is reduced
to P50,000.00, and the P23,500.00 awarded as actual damages is likewise
reduced to P19,000.00, the amount actually proved.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-8720 for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, the
sentence imposed on accused-appelant DOMINGO VALDEZ y DULAY is SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED and the case is DISMISSED, the act charged therein
being considered merely as an aggravating circumstance pursuant to P.D. 1866,
as amended by Rep. Act No. 8294.
SO ORDERED.
 40

People of the Philippines v. Romeo Gonzales

G.R. Nos. 113255-56  July 19, 2001

Lessons Applicable: Pro reo doctrine, indeterminate sentence law, buy-bust operation, buy-
bust operation
FACTS:
 Early February 1991: the police received an information that Romeo Gonzales was
selling large quantities of marijuana. 
 February 13, 1991: After 4 days of surveillance, they conducted a buy-bust
entrapment operation. Their informant introduced Sgt. Ortiz to Gonzales as a buyer
(poseur-buyer) of 1 kg. marijuana for P1,200. Then, Ortiz took out his handkerchief
as a pre-arranged signal so the team immediately rushed to the scene introducing
themselves as Narcom agents and arrested Gonzales.  Sgt. Ortiz handed over the
bag of marijuana to Pfc. Danilo Cruz.
 The team confiscated 1 more bag containing 2 blocks of marijuana weighing about
1.5 kg and 10 medium size plastic bags containing 300 grams of marijuana. The
tests yielded positive indications for the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC
 Gonzales orally admitted that he was selling marijuana to different buyers, but
claimed that somebody else owned the marijuana he sold.  When asked to identify
the owner, he kept silent.
 2 informations charging Gonzales with violation of RA 6425:
o    Crim. Case No. 91-180: possession, custody and control of 2 block size of marijuana
weighing (1.5 kilos) and 10 medium size plastic bags of dry marijuana weighing (300 grams)
o    Crim. Case No. 91-181: selling more or less 1 kilo of high-grade marijuana
 RTC: Romeo Gonzales guilty for Violation of Sections 8 and 4, Art. II., RA 6425 and
imposes penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000 for
Criminal Case No. 91-180 life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000 for Criminal Case
No. 91-181.
 Gonzales: Victim of a frame-up since he was inside the comfort room of a neighbor
from whom he borrowed P100 to buy medicines for his sick mother and he was just
wearing underwear when he was brought out of the house.  – NOT proven
 41

 A buy-bust operation, normally preceded by surveillance, is an effective mode of

apprehending drug pushers and, “if carried out with due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards, it deserves judicial sanction.” A warrant of arrest is not essential
because the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. Searches made incidental thereto
are valid.

ISSUE: W/N the Indeterminate Sentence Law should apply to Crim. Case No. 91-180

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.  In Criminal Case No. 91-181,life

imprisonment and fine of P20,000.  In Criminal Case No. 91-180, indeterminate penalty of 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P6,000.

 The Dangerous Drugs Act, Sec. 8 (special law) prescribes as penalty for possession
of Indian hemp (marijuana), regardless of amount, an imprisonment of 6 years and 1
day to 12 years, and a fine of P6,000 to P12,000.  Applying the pro reo doctrine in
criminal law (when in doubt favour the accused), we hold that the penalty prescribed
in R. A. No. 6425, Section 8 while not using the nomenclature of the penalties under
the RPC is actually prision mayor.  Consequently, it is the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which shall apply in imposing the indeterminate
sentence.

(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner
Vs.
LEILA REYES JOHNSON, respondent
[GR 138881, 18 December 2000]

FACTS:

            Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a
resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was
naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered
nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent
homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's
family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July
25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June
1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate
16 of the NAIA departure area.

Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-
912, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson
explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as
a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the
matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty
lang po iyon."

She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection.
Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile
 42

stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the
hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same answer she had previously
given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle."

Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile,
outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a
substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional
Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's
passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her
personal belongings were itemized.

Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine

hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of §16 of RA
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson
appealed.

ISSUE:

 Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right
against unreasonable search and seizure.          
RULING:

 The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that

"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed and
person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx."

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a)
or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial
investigation is far from being accurate.

The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose
the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to
the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern

over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should
these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are.
 43

There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure.

These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional

protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson.
Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant.

[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002]

FACTS:

Canton was charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. She was caught
in possession of metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) without prescription or license.
Susan was bound to Saigon, Vietnam. Prior to her flight, she passed through the metal
detector and beeped. A civilian inspector of the airport searched her and upon frisking, she
felt something that is bulging in the abdomen of Susan. They were able to recover packets
that were wrapped with packing tape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of regulated drugs, as well as the arrest
of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights

RULING:

No, warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as
the arrest of SUSAN, were not violative of her constitutional rights. What was done to Susan
was a stop and frisk search. “stop and frisk” situation refers to a case where a police officer
approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection.
 44

The search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 which states that “Holder hereof and his
hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances xxx”. This is another exemption in warrantless arrest and seizure. After the metal
detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of
packages on her body. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

(WARRANTLESS ARREST)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS OSCAR CONDE
[GR 113269, 10 April 2001]

FACTS:
           
On 25 May 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., Apollo Romero was home sitting by the window
and drinking coffee when he saw 4 men in Santolan Street block the path of 2 Indian
nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. Oscar Conde y Lutoc poked a gun at the two Indians
while his three companions (Alejandro Perez Jr. y Carsillar, Allan Atis y Abet, and another
unidentified man) approached and stabbed the Indians. Atis took the goods which were
being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the four men fled from the
crime scene towards Mabolo Street. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano of the Intelligence and
Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, Kalookan City investigated the incident.

On 30 May 1992, the police arrested Conde, Perez and Atis. Police recovered the
weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the police
station to talk to Conde. These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine
inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected
Felicidad's bag and when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the
 45

stolen items. Conde, Perez and Atis were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
The accused entered pleas of not guilty.

On 15 December 1993 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City found
Conde, Atis and Perez guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of each of the
victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00. Conde, et. al.
appealed. However, the counsel de parte for Perez, Atty. Jose M. Marquez, failed to file brief
for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his appeal.

The decision of the trial court became final and executory with respect to Perez.
Hence the present appeal concerns only Atis and Conde, who filed their separate briefs.

ISSUE:

            Whether the illegal warrantless arrest, which was waived, is sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free of error.

RULING:

            The arrests of Conde, et. al. came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were
seen committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were not armed with
any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant,
namely:

(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present herein.

Conde, et. al. were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not
committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed as 5
days had already passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said
that the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge, as PO3
Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain
unnamed informants.
Further, the lapse of 5 days gave the police more than enough time to conduct
surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, the rights of Conde,
et. al., provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution 28 were violated. Unfortunately, they did
not assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment.

This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his
arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. When they entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to
question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process.
 46

Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been made
before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for them to raise the question of their
warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers
of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error.
The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the
state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their
culpability.

People v. Marti,
G.R. No. 81561, 193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991

"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals.

It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law.

It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.

 Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in
Switzerland and contracted the services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
 When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti
refused, assuring that the packages simply contained books and cigars.
 However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP.
Upon opening, they suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.
 The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected
content were marijuana.
 47

 In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried
marijuana leaves inside.
 After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
 Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which,
according to him, is obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication.
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State? NO.
 The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether
citizen or alien, from interference by government. Its protection is directed only to
governmental action.
 This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a
private citizen.
 In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there
is no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him.
 Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence.
 The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of
the packages in compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
 Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible
any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and
seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private
individuals.
 The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals.

Additional notes:
When a private individual violates another person’s right to privacy, the evidence obtained
therefrom is admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of
the Civil Code.
 48

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship,
M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999,
the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo,
received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected
one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members
of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later
found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher
Bongcarawan.

The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no.
106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused
took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the
 49

security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the
accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard
for assistance.

But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened and searched without his
consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him.

ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid

HELD: YES

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the
search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they
called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and
the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence,
the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and
seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted
by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental function.

NOTE:

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a
regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To

overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi as the owner of
the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses were
presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex
Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has
friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of
the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is
 50

the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will
take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous
drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.

People v. Rodelio C. Exala, et al.,

G.R. No. 76005, April 23, 1993
DECISION
(1st Division)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police

checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection. With Bocalan were his co-accused
Fernandez and Exala. Pfc. Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep
and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc.
Galang proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He then noticed a
black leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide and 2 feet long with its sides bulging. When
he asked what it contained, there was deadening silence from the 3 accused. Nobody
answered. Instead, they suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag
opened, which was found out to contain marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter
prosecuted and convicted of illegal transportation of marijuana. Accused Bocalan appealed
and questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana as evidence against him since
it was seized without a valid search warrant.
 51

II.    THE ISSUE

Was the marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible in
evidence against the accused?

III.   THE RULING

[The 1st Division voted 3-1 to AFFIRM the conviction of the accused. Justices Griño-

Aquino and Quiason concurred with Justice Bellosillo’s ponencia. Justice Cruz, by his
lonesome, dissented from the majority.]

 The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived his objection to the
admission of the seized marijuana because he neither raised this issue before the trial court
nor objected to the admissibility of the marijuana when it was offered in evidence. 

And even assuming that there was no such waiver, the Court held that still Bocalan’s
contention deserves scant consideration because there are instances where search and
seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would
be the “stop-and-search” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court [in Valmonte vs. De Villa].
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched
it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning
the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or
have been instruments in the commission of an offense.

According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not

intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his
person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an
offshoot of a lawful “stop-and-search” at a military or police checkpoint.

The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with “Operational Bakal,”
the main object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in
the possession of unauthorized persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants were
asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the
sides of which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the
accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became
suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang.  The
accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar
apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal,
provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of the
bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.

[NOTE: Incidentally, one of the co-counsels for accused-appellant Bocalan in his

appeal to the Supreme Court was then-Atty. and now Supreme Court Senior Associate
Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr.]