Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. Is "Operation Kapkap" valid?

Warrantless search of alleged

obscene magazines.
Read:
1. PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992
Facts:

a telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place.
They saw two men “looking from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other
lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife.
The weapons were taken from them.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is violated

Ruling:

The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be arrested 1 After
he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of
the arresting officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently no offense that has
just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution
has not shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
2. PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338
FACTS:
SPO1 Piamonte and SPO3 Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, received an
intelligence report from a police civilian that he saw Luisito Go also known as “King Louie” with a gun tucked in his
waist, entered the Flamingo Disco House. Together, the three policemen proceeded to the said disco house. When they
arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were conducting an “Operation Bakal,”
whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them.
The police officers saw Go and his lady companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked Go to stand
up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the
gun, but Go was unable to produce any. Instead, Go brought the driver’s license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1
Piamonte confiscated the gun, and invited Go to the police precinct for questioning.

On the way out of the disco, Go asked permission to bring his car, which was parked outside. The police officers Go to
his car. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked Go
why he had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, Go suggested that they talk the matter over, and
intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the police headquarters. Go took out an
attache case from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Go opened the first bag, which
contained shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.

The police officers brought Go to the police station. When they arrived at the precinct, they turned over the attache case
together with the two black clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags containing
granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attache case was opened, the police officers found
that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.1

Consequently, two Informations were filed against Go before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34.
The first Information, charged accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A. 6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The
other Information, charged Go with violation of P.D. 1866,

ISSUE:
Whether or not Go was lawfully arrested.
 RULING:
Yes. The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest having been issued
prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an
arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact
just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.

In this case, the police saw the gun tucked in Go’s waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was
conducted as none was necessary. Go could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or
thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was
necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.

3. PITA VS. CA, 178 SCRA 362

Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)

FACTS:
In pursuant to Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, magazines, publications and other
reading materials that are alleged to be obscene, pornographic and indecent were seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks and later burned in public at the University belt
along CM Recto Avenue Manila in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations. One of which was Pinoy Playboy magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita, the plaintiff.

The plaintiff then filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor
Bagatsing and Narciso Cabrera (superintendent of Western Police District of the City Manila), seeking to enjoin and/or
restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming such materials is a decent, artistic and educational magazine and that publication is
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

Then, an Urgent Motion was filed by the petitioner for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and was later
granted.
In defense of Mayor Bagatsing, he claimed that the confiscation and seizure was done in pursuant to PD No 960 which
the materials were voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities and the plaintiffs’ establishment was not raided.

While, the plaintiff filed his Memorandum raising the issues as to whether or not the defendants and/or their agents can
without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said
magazine is obscene or not".

The trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of
whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are
obscene per se or not". Later, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to be given three days to file a reply to the
defendant's opposition; however, after following such order, the plaintiff’s motion was denied and the case was
dismissed for lack of merit.

The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police officers
could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their
determination that they are obscene.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could
dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the
application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure was constitutional

RULING:
No. As strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the
speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not
only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow
it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present
danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out
a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in
disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, the Court defined police power as "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare ." Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves,
authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin
presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.

Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person.

1. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66

Facts:
 On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court found her
husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence
is the spouses' only minor... child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal
grandparents.
 For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge with
parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations
 Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced,
following which, a judgment of conviction was rendered
 Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child Charmaine
Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.
 Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal
Issues:
 . . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated,
questionable documents, in grave violation of accused's constitutional right to privacy of communication and
papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and... seizure.
 . . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable direct testimony of the
minor daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or
contradictions thereof to the facts clearly and decisively testified by... and/or findings of the police investigators.
 . . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of Firearms despite
the police investigator's undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a situation consistent with the
decisively clear postulate of the... defense.
 . . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the crime of
parricide was committed, the law and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide,
parricide, etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic
 Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must only be considered an aggravating circumstance. This is consistent to
the rule that Penal laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive effects.
Ruling:
 we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio
Mendoza has been duly established.
 Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person

 Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt
 During the trial of the case, it was duly established that... t the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street,
Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Piñas, were the Mendozas,... On... the night Cecilia was shot to death,
no one was there except these three persons. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the trial court of his
innocence by denying that he killed his wife, insinuating that another person is the killer.
 The insinuation of accused-appellant that some convenient intruder perpetrated the killing is absolutely without
basis and unsubstantiated. It... is plainly an afterthought, a devised plot to escape just punishment.

 If indeed, Cecilia was shot and killed by... somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely have
been but natural for him, as a husband to cooperate with police authorities for the speedy apprehension of the
 gunman, by informing them immediately of the alleged intruder-killer. But he did not and... instead... keep
silent about the incident when the police conducted the investigation
 Verily it was only on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came... out with the story about
the handy intruder. He kept silent for two long years.
 Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal
weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim.
 But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the fatal
weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her
mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she... said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense
witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Piñas police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the
same was surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident.
 But accused-appellant claims that these documents were... illegally procured in grave violation of his
constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and
seizure
 The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies.
 the constitutional... protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's
person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
 In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellant's father-
in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
 Finally, contrary to accused-appellant's claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber pistol,
the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and
Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that... accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm holder of any
kind
 While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accused-
appellant, the established circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with
each other and with the hypothesis that accused-appellant... is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses
that he is not.
 And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances
corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the...
accused

2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL VS. SOLUTA, 482 SCRA 660

Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, private individuals can be held civilly liable for violation of constitutional rights and it
is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith.
A violation of one's constitutional right can be the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32.
 In response to reports that sale and/or use of marijuana were going on in the union office at the hotel, Coronel
Maniego, General Manager of the security agency which the Silahis Hotel contracted, conducted a surveillance
of suspected members and officers of the union with the approval of Silahis mgt.
 They entered the union office with the permission of union officer Babay, and searched the premises to which
they marijuana. Maniego was then ordered to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.
 Loida, a laundrywoman of the hotel, heard pounding sounds and saw five men she didn’t recognize in barong
tagalog forcibly opening the door of the union office. Later on, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open
the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed.
 Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer and thereafter the opened the door.   At
that instant, the men in barong tagalog armed arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Soluta and
his companions ran and called for police assistance.
 The Mgt searched the union office over the objection of Babay who asked them if they had a search warrant.
After the search, a plastic bag was found containing marijuana.
 As a result of the discovery of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of
the incident, a complaint was filed against the 13 union officers in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
 Soluta and other union officers filed a case alleging malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional
right against illegal search, under Article 32 of Civil Code.
Whether petitioners are liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code? YES.
 Petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not covered by the standards set forth in People v. Aruta
as the constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is not meant to be invoked against private
individuals. Aruta cannot be applied because it does not involve Article 32 as nowhere in the decision of trial
court is there any reference to Article 32.
 The Court ruled that under the Civil Code, private individuals can be held civilly liable for violation of
constitutional rights. It is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice
or bad faith; otherwise, it would defeat the main purpose of protecting individual rights.
  A violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the recovery of
damages under Article 32. Under the New Civil Code, the injured citizen will always have adequate civil remedies
because of the independent civil action, even in instances where the act or omission complained of does not
constitute a criminal offense.
 Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly or indirectly” responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another.  Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
 In this case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are
jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
 The Court pointed out that in People v. Marti, the issue was whether or the evidence obtained was admissible,
but in this case, the issue is whether or not damages can be recovered for violation of constitutional rights.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI

G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991

"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.
 Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in Switzerland and contracted the
services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
 When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the
packages simply contained books and cigars.
 However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they
suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.
 The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were marijuana.
 In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside.
 After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
 Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State? NO.
 The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to
the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. Its protection is
directed only to governmental action.
 This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
 In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to
prosecute him.
 Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence.
 The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in
compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
 Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence
was procured by police authorities or private individuals.
 The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Additional notes:
When a private individual violates another person’s right to privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is admissible;
however the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A. Search incidental to a valid arrest
1. PEOPLE VS. SPO4 SANGKI ARA, December 23, 2009
Facts:
 On December 20, 2002, a confidential informant informed the Heinous Crime Investigation Section (HCIS) of the
Davao City Police Department about a drug deal involving three suspected drug pushers, and was instructed to
look for an orange Nissan Sentra car at St. Peter's College at Toril, Davao City. The police formed a buy-bust
 team, composed of several officers, with PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr. acting as poseur-buyer. The team proceeded to
the school where PO1 Ayao and the CI waited by the gate. An orange Nissan Sentra bearing plate number UGR
510 stopped in front of them. Accused-appellants Mike Talib, SPO3 Ara, and Jordan Musa were inside the car.

 SPO3 Ara, a member of the PNP for 32 years, testified that he was in Cotabato City and was on his way to the
Ombudsman's Davao City office for some paperwork in preparation for his retirement on July 8, 2003. He
recounted expecting at least PhP 1.6 million in retirement benefits. On December 20, 2002, past three o'clock in
the morning, he and Musa headed for Davao City on board the latter's car. He slept in the back seat and woke
up to find Talib in the front seat. Musa explained that Talib had hitched a ride on a bridge they had passed.
When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be overheating, so they stopped. Talib alighted from the car
and Ara transferred to the front seat. While Talib was getting into the back seat, PO1 Ayao came out of
nowhere, pointed his .45 caliber pistol at Ara even if he was not doing anything, and ordered him to get off the
vehicle. He saw that guns were also pointed at his companions. As the group was being arrested, he told PO1
Ayao that he was also a police officer. Ara insisted that he was not holding anything and that the shabu taken
from him was planted. He asserted that the only time he saw shabu was on television.
 The prosecution presented several witnesses, including Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero, who conducted the
examination and found that the confiscated sachets all tested positive for shabu.
RTC: Guilty Violation of R.A. 9165, death penalty to Sanki
Talib claimed that it was erroneous for the trial court to have used the complaining witnesses' affidavits as basis for
ruling that their arrest was valid.
CA: It ruled that a majority of the errors raised in the appeal referred to technicalities in the conduct of buy-bust
operations that did not invalidate the police officers' actions. On the issue of the evidence presented, the CA held that
the presumption that police officers performed their duties in a regular manner was not overturned.
Issues:
1 Validity of the warrantless arrest and seizure.
2 whether the buy-bust conducted was valid;
3 whether the chain of custody over the shabu was unbroken.
SC Ruling:
1. Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid
 In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable cause and the violation of
their constitutional rights. They claim that the buy-bust team had more than a month to apply for an arrest
warrant yet failed to do so.
 Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation has long been held as a
legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed as an effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an offense.15 We have ruled that a buy-bust operation can
be carried out after a long period of planning. The period of planning for such operation cannot be dictated to
the police authorities who are to undertake such operation.16 It is unavailing then to argue that the operatives
had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-
appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
 It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest accused-appellants. Probable cause,
in warrantless searches, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula for determining probable
cause, for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.17 Probable cause was provided by
information gathered from the CI and from accused-appellants themselves when they instructed PO1 Ayao to
enter their vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal sale of shabu inside accused-appellants' vehicle was
afterwards clearly established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making
the arrests as accused-appellants had just committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao.18 Talib and
Musa were also frisked for contraband as it may be logically inferred that they were also part of Ara's drug
activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthened by Musa's attempt to drive the vehicle
away and elude arrest.
 Moreover, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Suppress or Exclude Evidence. We need not reiterate
that the evidence was not excluded since the buy-bust operation was shown to be a legitimate form of
entrapment. The pieces of evidence thus seized therein were admissible. As the appellate court noted, it was
within legal bounds and no anomaly was found in the conduct of the buy-bust operation. There is, therefore, no
basis for the assertion that the trial court's order denying said motion was biased and committed with grave
abuse of discretion.
2. the court ruled that the presentation of marked money is not a strict requirement and that the absence of marked
money does not create a gap in the prosecution's evidence as long as the illegal sale of drugs is sufficiently proven and
the drugs involved in the transaction are presented before the court.
 The court also rejected the argument that drug transactions are unlikely to take place in public places. Judicial
experience has shown that drug transactions can be carried out in public places without much concern for being
conspicuous.
  The court further held that the specific methods used in a buy-bust operation are left to the discretion of the
police officers, and as long as their testimony is credible, the court will give it full faith and credit. The court also
found that any alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the police officers were insignificant and did not affect
the sufficiency of the evidence against the accused-appellants.
 Overall, the court held that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs and illegal possession of drugs were
sufficiently established, and the buy-bust operation in question was legitimate.

3. RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 requires proper inventory and documentation of seized
items in order to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence. However, recent court cases have clarified
that strict compliance with the chain of custody rule is not required for the admissibility of evidence. What is essential is
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as these will be used in determining the guilt
or innocence of the accused. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to show that the chain of custody of the
seized drugs was properly preserved and documented, through the marking of the seized items, the signing of property
custodians, the submission of requests for laboratory examination, and the receipt of the items at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The seized items were also identified in court and found positive for shabu by a forensic chemist. As such,
the arguments of the accused-appellants were deemed without merit and did not warrant further discussion.

2. PEOPLE VS. PENAFLORIDA, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008

 Salvador Peñaflorida Jr., who was accused of possessing, controlling, and delivering one bundle of dried
marijuana leaves without the necessary license, permit, or authority to sell, administer, deliver, give away,
distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The incident happened on June 7, 1994, in Barangay
Huyon-huyon, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines.
 Police officers, including SPO3 Vicente Competente and SPO2 Ricardo Callo, testified that they received a tip that
Peñaflorida was transporting the marijuana on a bicycle from another barangay in Tigaon to Huyon-huyon. They
intercepted Peñaflorida and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper, along with other grocery
items, and P1550.00 in his possession. The police confiscated these items and took photographs, and
Peñaflorida was booked at the police headquarters.
 Forensic chemist Major Lorlie Arroyo identified the subject marijuana leaves as positive for marijuana.
Peñaflorida denied the accusations and testified that he was merely asked by someone to deliver the package to
Jimmy Gonzales. Another witness, Igmidio Miranda, corroborated Peñaflorida's testimony that they went to San
Francisco, Tigaon to buy a dog and that they met Boyet Obias, who requested Peñaflorida to deliver a package
wrapped in a newspaper to Gonzales.
 The RTC found Peñaflorida guilty beyond reasonable doubt as he was caught in flagrante delicto.
 The appellate court affirmed
Issue: Validity of the arrest and the evidence presented against him.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless arrest of the appellant was justified. The police were tipped off
that the appellant was transporting marijuana and had no time to secure an arrest warrant as the appellant was already
in transit and committing a crime. The arrest was effected after the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was
seen riding his bicycle and carrying the contraband, thus demonstrating that a crime was already being committed. The
Court held that under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that the appellant was committing a
crime, thus justifying the warrantless arrest.

The Court also held that the appellant's possession of marijuana without legal authority is a crime under R.A. No. 6425,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, even without intent, motive, or knowledge thereof. The Court found that the appellant
failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession, and that the surrounding circumstances, such as the
marijuana found in the bicycle he was driving, the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package in plain view,
and the fact that the package was wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram, made it hard to believe
that he did not know the contents of the package.

3. Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439

Facts:
 In May 1904, the defendant was charged with assassination in Manila, Philippines.
 The plaintiff was appointed to defend the defendant during the trial.
 The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death, but the Supreme Court later modified the sentence to
20 years of imprisonment.
 The defendant had about P700 on his person at the time of arrest, which was deposited with the court clerk.
 In October 1906, the plaintiff petitioned the court to order the clerk to turn over P600 to him for his services in
defending the defendant.
 In December 1906, a justice of the peace rendered a judgment against the defendant in favor of the plaintiff for
P550 and costs.
  In January 1907, the plaintiff filed a petition to order the clerk to pay him P559.24 out of the money in his hands
to apply on the judgment obtained before the justice of the peace.
 The defendant was brought into court and stated that he was willing for a portion of the money to be applied to
the execution but wished some of it reserved for his own use.
 The court ordered the clerk to pay the plaintiff P50 and retain the balance for the benefit of the defendant.
Supreme Court Ruling:
 The officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person
which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner
with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
cause.
 There is doubt whether an officer making an arrest has the right to take from the defendant any property found
upon his person unless for some of the reasons mentioned above.
 Unless some special reasons exist, the officer should not deprive the defendant of the possession of his
property.
 To deprive the defendant of his money or property under other circumstances is to deprive him of the lawful
means of defense.
 The defendant had a right to the money taken from him, and the court should not have ordered the clerk to pay
the plaintiff out of that money.
 The court should have required the plaintiff to resort to other legal means to recover his fees.

4. PEOPLE VS. ANG CHUN KIT, 251 SCRA 660

 Accused: ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national
 Accused is reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate operating in Metro Manila.
 Accused was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation.
 Accused sold a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu to an undercover agent for
P400,000.00.
 Accused's car yielded more of the regulated drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box.
 The buy-bust operation was organized on November 8, 1991, at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center.
 The accused was met at the lobby by the Confidential Informer (CI) and introduced to SPO2 Jacobo as the
person interested in buying shabu.
 After ascertaining that the plastic bag contained approximately one (1) kilo of shabu, SPO2 Jacobo handed the
boodle money to the accused.
 SPO2 Jacobo signaled the other NARCOM operatives to move in and effect the arrest.
 The other members of the team closed in, placed the accused under arrest, and seized the money from him.
 The NARCOM operatives also searched the accused's vehicle and found on the dashboard of his car three (3)
packets more of crystalline substance in a Kleenex box.
 The regulated drug recovered from the accused was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory where after a
qualitative examination, the forensic chemist confirmed the substance found in the SM Shoemart bag and in the
Kleenex box to be shabu.
 On August 14, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 155 found appellant Ang Chun Kit guilty of selling
shabu in violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
 The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
 The accused maintains his innocence and faults the trial court in not holding that the crime could not have been
committed under the circumstances narrated by the arresting officers.
 The accused argues that the alleged buy-bust operation was a frame-up and the evidence merely planted.
Ruling:
 The police officers who were involved in the operation were in the regular performance of their official duties,
and that there was no evidence to indicate that they were actuated by improper motives. The court also pointed
out that the accused failed to substantiate his claim that he was a victim of a frame-up.
 The evidence presented against the accused was found to be valid because it was supported by the credible
testimony of the prosecution witnesses and was consistent with the circumstances of the buy-bust operation
that resulted in the accused being caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a sale of illicit drugs to the poseur-
buyer.

5. PEOPLE VS. LUA, 256 SCRA 539

Facts:
 In November 1929, Uy Se Tieng requested a shipment of opium from his correspondent in Hong Kong.
 The collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, gave P300 to the chief of the customs secret
service of Cebu, Juan Samson, and informed him that a shipment of opium would arrive soon.
 Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and he agreed to pay Natividad
P6,000 or P2 per tin.
 The opium was shipped to Uy Se Tieng and marked "U.L.H." on the steamship Kolambugan on November 22,
1929.
  On the morning of December 14, 1929, the Kolambugan arrived at Cebu, and Samson detailed one of his men to
watch the ship.
 Uy Se Tieng was told to pay P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse.
Ruling:
 Uy Se Tieng is found guilty of attempting to import opium into the Philippines, which is a violation of the Opium
Law of 1924.
 Uy Se Tieng is sentenced to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, to pay a fine of P20,000, and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.
 The trial court finds that the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove that Uy Se Tieng had
the intention to possess the opium and to sell it to others, which is essential to constitute the crime of
attempting to import opium.
United States doctrine
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere
entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or
punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission.
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the
offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an
owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the
original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate
notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the
plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of
liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

6. PEOPLE VS. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679

TOPIC SUMMARY: The accused was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. While serving the
warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. The accused
questioned the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and rounds of ammunition which, he claims, were discovered and
taken during a warrantless search.
DOCTRINE: Evidences are not unlawfully obtained when the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of
a lawful arrest.
FACTS:
 Antonio Figueroa was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
 On 10 November 1989, at around seven o'clock in the morning, Captain Rosario and his men arrived at the
residence of Arturo Figueroa to serve a warrant for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Ammunitions.
 While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different
sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested
appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house.
 The search yielded a .45 caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a matchbox containing an
aluminum foil package with "shabu." Figueroa denied ownership of the items.
 When arraigned, the accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty".
 The accused questioned the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and rounds of ammunition which, he claims,
were discovered and taken during a warrantless search.
 On 30 October 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused Arturo Figueroa guilty. An appeal is
interposed by Arturo Figueroa, challenging the admissibility against him of evidence seized following a
warrantless search.
ISSUE(S)/HELD: Whether or not the evidence is admissible as evidence. – YES
 The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. The search and seizure
was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
 A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an
incident to a lawful arrest, as elaborated by this Court in People v. Musa.
 Appellant particularly calls attention to the assertion of prosecution witness Sgt. Atas, to the effect that
appellant was with a companion inside a room when arrested and that the seized firearm was found under the
cushion of the bed, against the statement of Capt. Rosario, another prosecution witness, that appellant was
alone when arrested and that the gun was found under appellant's bed.
 We do not consider these discrepancies to be so major as to warrant a complete rejection of their questioned
testimony. It is not unnatural for witnesses of the same incident to somehow perceive differently and to thereby
vary in their respective accounts of the event. The contradiction of witnesses on minor details is nothing unusual
and should be expected. We see no cogent reason for not according due respect to the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of the witnesses.
  Finally, it is claimed that appellant was just "framed-up." The conduct of the appellant following his arrest would
belie this allegation. Appellant himself admitted that he failed to complain about this matter when he was
apprehended. Neither did he report the so-called "planting of the gun" to the police authorities nor did he bring
it up before the Metropolitan Trial Judge when he appeared for preliminary investigation.

 RULING No plausible reason was given by appellant that would have prompted police authorities to falsely
impute a serious crime against him. Absent a strong showing to the contrary, the Court must accept the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

7. NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541

B. Search of moving vehicles

1. PEOPLE VS. BELEN MARIACOS, G.R. No. 18861, June 16, 2010
FACTS:
 At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG)
at the intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had
previously been issued against Nolasco.
 On the same day, at 12:00 N., a search was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno applied for a search warrant
from the respondent judge Cruz-Pano to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, which was
determined to be the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance"
of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
 Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.
 The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
 The City Fiscal filed the information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents.
 Petitioners contend that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject to the search and seizure, and that probable cause had not been
properly established due to the lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness.
ISSUE:
 Whether the search warrant is a general warrant.
HELD:
 Yes. It is evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and
not particularized. It is an all-embracing description that includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are, what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is no definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized, thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize, as, in fact, a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes were also taken. It is,
therefore, in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring the
particular description of the things to be seized.
 Moreover, the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a
search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and
act in pursuant thereof.
 Out of the 10 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading questions,
not searching. The 6th, 7th, and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical
to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity.
 The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of the said witness.
Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a
warrant may issue.

2. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588

Facts:
Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer
left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house.
The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was
brought to the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense . . . “

Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust
operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within
the area. The police officer saw petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag
of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.

3. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 190 SCRA 122

Doctrine: exception to the issuance of a search warrant: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving
vehicle; 3) seizure of evidence in plain view.
Facts:
 Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat, was charged with a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Only the appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. Their co-accused,
Reynaldo Tia, was discharged as a state witness. In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers
about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and
gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information received, a project was created to bust the suspected
syndicate. As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents" was
carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia.
 On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hong Kong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before they
departed, Tia was able to purchase six (6) tin cans of tea in which the Chinese drugs were placed. The day after
they arrived in Hong Kong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, in the People's Republic of
China. The pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of tea in which the
Chinese drugs were placed. The next day, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. The plane landed
at the NAIA on schedule. Lim met the newly arrived pair at the arrival area. After which, appellant and Tia
boarded a taxicab. Lim followed in another taxicab.
 On the expected date of arrival, the team headed by Captain Palmera proceeded to the NAIA. Upon seeing
appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along Imelda Avenue,
the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path, forcing the taxi
driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The
operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage
compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested permission from the suspects to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the bag owned
by appellant. One of the operatives pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in
the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag.
The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the crystalline
powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three bags opened for inspection. From one of the bags, a total of
six (6) tin cans were found, including the one previously opened.
 Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon City.
Lim was likewise apprehended. The trial court convicted them and stated that the search and seizure was valid.
 On appeal, the appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against the accused is illegal for
being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers concerned could
very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of arrival of the
accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance.
 The fact that the search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not
automatically make the warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the
rule of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics agents
had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.
 In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the
country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected
syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to
enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Issue: WON the search and seizure made against the accused was illegal.
Held: No. The contentions are without merit.
 Ratio: Search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-
recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search
incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view.

The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore,
a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused. The rules governing search and
seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in
the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another
with impunity. 4 We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought."

SHORTER VERSION FOR HANDWRITTEN DIGEST FACTS: - Lo with Tia (government’s agent) went to China where they
secured the shabu to be brought to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, Lim met them. The authorities
relying on the intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate apprehended them in
a taxicab and thereafter were searched. The authorities found shabu inside the tin cans which are supposed to contain
tea. They were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The trial court then convicted them based on the
factual findings.
Issue: WON the search and seizure was valid Held: Yes. The search and seizure was valid.
Ratio: The appellant contends that the authorities could have procured a warrant search. As correctly averred by
appellee, that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three
(3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search
incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view. The circumstances of
the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was
not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused. The rules governing search and seizure have over the
years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the

search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity.

C. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes

1. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

FACTS:
 Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would
be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks,
 Upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, Petitioner Alagao conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone.
 When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
 The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of
the Chief of Police.
 Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a
certain Bienvenido Naguit.
 Remedios Mago, herein respondent, said that she owns the goods seized.
 That she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga;
 that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence
at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila;
 that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by
a competent court;
 that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be
not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined;
 that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods
because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs;
 that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to
seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from
another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally.
  Hence, respondent Mago filed for prohibition and certiorari.
 Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 67496 (regarding restraining respondents from opening 9 bales), Judge Hilarion
Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners. However, when the restraining order was received
by herein respondent, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein
respondent Remedios Mago.
 Also, Remedios Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods which the court granted.
 Petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing
the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector
of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
 Without waiting for the court's action on the MR, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari
with a preliminary injunction before this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure of the imported goods is validly done by herein petitioners
WON an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant
HELD:
1. YES. The seizure is valid.
 The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been
released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the
proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
 It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods,
for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession
or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized
the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction
over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in
question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10
And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of the said warrant was only an attempt to
divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by
respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was
filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the
goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967releasing said goods.
 Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not seize
the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.
 The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other
movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and
tariff laws.
 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other containers wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.  
 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect
the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand the
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said
assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the
search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He
was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo.

2. YES. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court.
 The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any
land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or  to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited
article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases.  But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said: "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon a warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ."  It is our considered view, therefore,
 that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs
law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
 An automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity
production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for a successful commission of a
crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their
advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a
serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootlegging" or "rum running," which is
itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed
for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
which the law especially guards against search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they
are successfully utilized to facilitate the commission of a crime of all degrees, from those against morality,
chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that
problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether the
search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under
which it is made.
 Therefore, the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws

2. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16

 Pedro Pacis, then Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, sought to stop the investigation of a charge
of usurpation of judicial functions allegedly committed by him, when in the course of his official functions he
issued a warrant of seizure and detention for an automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos, who had not
paid the customs duty collectible thereon.
 Respondent Santos filed a writ of prohibition complaint for Judicial usurpation (Art. 241), invoking what he
alleged was a violation of the constitutional provision that only a judge, under the 1935 Constitution could issue
a search warrant.
 Petitioner argued that the power to issue such a warrant is conceded for violations of customs laws.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the law is clear that petitioner had the requisite authority for the issuance of the
contested warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos, and that
the matter was beyond question.
 The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to such search and seizure. Except in
the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect
search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
 The court emphasized the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, which must not
be eroded or emasculated. However, it also noted that the power to issue such warrants is conceded for
violations of customs laws.
 The court ultimately granted the writ of prohibition, holding that petitioner's actions could not be the basis of a
prosecution for the usurpation of judicial functions.

3. HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517

FACTS: Petitioners Hizon, et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous
substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami" led to the apprehension of
such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force
Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial
results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et al.
However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide. The RTC found Hizon et al. guilty
and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together
with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless
search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in
evidence. YES.
(2) Whether or not et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. NO.

HELD: As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels
and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions create a
 presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous substances. However, this presumption is merely prima
facie and the accused has the right to present evidence to rebut this presumption. In this case, the only basis for the
charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The
apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or
obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage
itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the
fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.

Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. "Muro ami", as what was
reported the fishermen were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the
water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred fishermen to
execute. What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight fishermen in their sampans fishing by
hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the
documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under
suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

4. PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

 Two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz received information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded
with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte.
 On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol and
saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by.
 The truck had three persons on board: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed
person.
 The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.
 SPO1 Corpuz found coconut slabs in the cargo, but accused-appellant admitted that there were sawn lumber
inserted in between the slabs.
 Accused-appellant failed to present supporting documents for the cargo and could only show a certification
from the CENRO that he legally acquired the coconut slabs.
 SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the Provincial Task Force's office, where he admitted that there were
sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.
 The cargo was examined and found to consist of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The sawn lumber was
concealed by the coconut slabs.
 The seized forest products included 258 pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet and
total assessed value of P93,232.50.
 Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277.
 Accused-appellant denied the charge and claimed that he acquired the tanguile lumber from a legal source.
 He presented private land timber permits issued by the DENR to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal and alleged that
the tanguile lumber came from their forest area covered by the permits.
 The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Validity of the evidence
 Valid
 The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in  People
vs. Bagista, 20 thus:
 The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a
search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on
the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
 Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall,
among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
 The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and
the seizure of evidence in plain view.
 With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
 This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have
 reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

D. Seizure of evidence in plain view

1. PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25

 In 1996, appellant was charged with planting and cultivating seven marijuana plants without authority of law in
Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and to the damage and
prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
 Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial on the merits ensued.
 The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay who received a tip from an unnamed informer
about the presence of a marijuana plantation allegedly owned by the appellant in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
 A police team formed by Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao was instructed to uproot the plants and arrest the
cultivator.
 The police team, accompanied by their informer, went to the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly
being grown and found seven marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.
 PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and the latter admitted that they were his. The
police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis, which confirmed that it was
marijuana.
 The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that
the land cultivated by appellant was part of the public domain.
 Appellant testified that he was asked by an unknown person to go and see something, and was brought to
where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. He was then made
to stand in front of the hemp plants and was asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there.
When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of
the plants. Appellant admitted owning the marijuana.
 The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and uprooting five of them. They
brought him to the police station at Villaverde, where he was detained.
 The trial court convicted the appellant, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower courts' decisions.
Issue: Validity of the evidence against him.
HELD:
 there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause
given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and
seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.
The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of
high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
 the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue,
which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot,
as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted
and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
 it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the
author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it
must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it
to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s part to have admitted
evidences against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly
tainted.
 In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce
that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution
must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused.
Absent the required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
 Appellant was acquitted

2. MICLAT, JR. VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 176077, August 31, 2011

Facts:
 The police agents were conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to verify the
reported drug-related activities of several individuals, which included Miclat. Led by their informant to the house
 of house Miclat, PO3 Antonio positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of
the group deployed themselves nearby. PO3 Antonio peeped thru a small opening in the curtain-covered
window, and there at a distance of 1½ meters, saw Miclat arranging several plastic sachets containing what
appears to be shabu in the living room of their home.
 PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the house and upon gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a
police officer. After which, Miclat voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio
then placed Miclat under arrest and informed him of his constitutional rights. The RTC convicted Miclat of crime
of possession of a dangerous drugs.
Issue:
1. Was the warrantless arrest valid?
2. Are the drugs seized admissible in evidence?

Held:
1. Yes. At the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest.
Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any
perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case.

At any rate, under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an arrest without warrant is lawful
when, in the presence of an arresting officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person arrested execute an overt act that indicates he has just committed, actually committing, or is
attempting a crime; (2) the overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In this case,
Miclat was caught in flagrante delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest.

2. Yes. It is to be noted that Miclat was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3
Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3
Antonio of the four plastic sachets from Miclat was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the
purview of the "plain view" doctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since Miclat’s arrest is
among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the Miclat
was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting
officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove Miclat’s guilt of the offense
charged.

3. ELENITA FAJARDO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011
 In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG)
were instructed by P/Supt. Mendoza to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang
and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking
liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns. Along with the members of the Aklan
Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area.
 Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in different directions. The
responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the
house of petitioner. Petitioner Fajardo was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the
waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door. To prevent any violent
commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioner’s house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading
apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions.
 At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who
was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw
something. He recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and
members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioner’s house.
  Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the confiscated
firearms and the two recovered receivers, they were convicted by RTC of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. With regard to petitioner’s defense that the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo,
a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
 RTC ruled that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the
law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to ones control and management.
 The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held that
the search warrant was void based on the following observations: [A]t the time of applying for a search warrant,
SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess
firearms as required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during the
application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that effect from the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove
that appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a firearm. There was also no explanation given why
said certification was not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the application for the
warrant. Such vital evidence was simply ignored. Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside
petitioner’s residence were declared inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the
policemen outside the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant
to the plain view doctrine.
Issue: (Contention of Fajardo) - She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to
prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two
receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts
when the police arrived.
Held:
 The seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the
plain view doctrine: First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers
around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively
holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances
and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable
ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed.
 There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak
to apply for a search warrant. Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different
instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects.
 Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe
that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of
committing. Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol
In this case, petitioner Fajardo was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly showed that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were
thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.
 At the very least, petitioner’s possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in
actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioner’s house. Absent any evidence pointing to
petitioner’s participation, knowledge or consent in Valerio’s actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of the receivers. Petitioner’s apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only
proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of
her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete
evidence.
 Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law. The quantum of
proof required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.

4. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547

Summary: Trial Court - finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866; SC - REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED

Facts:
 On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company
at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano,
Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended
revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating
with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items.
  After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment
of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso.
She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group
found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of
Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out
the new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza).
 The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz
Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first,
she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the
house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers
and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita
Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados).
 The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one
of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They
confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the
persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso
(@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso,
was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of
Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo
Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz
Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz.
 Such information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge.
Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the
admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal
for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the
accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Damaso appealed.
Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house.
Ratio: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the
same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the
said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will
not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her .
The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed
Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been
different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search
warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant
them the license to go inside his house.
Other Issue: Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the
identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2),
the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial
number thus:
Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de
oficio.

5. PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA 135

Facts:
 The police of Manila had reliable information that the Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling
house. Detective Andres Geronimo applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the
municipal court. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Other policemen, headed by
Townsend, broke in the outer door.
  Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the
defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant.
Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had
no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket
was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the
game. Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.
 Policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right
forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through
the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of
paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
 In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them
were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who
was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house.
 The defense, contended that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the
pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force.
Issue:
Whether or not Veloso had a legal right to resist the police force because his name was not the one stipulated in the
search warrant but a pseudonym John Doe.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential requirements of
warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a
person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in
unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not
justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae (description
of person) possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient
to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal
appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of
which he can be identified.

The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the
search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No.
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

6. PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252 SCRA 213

Facts:
 The accused Suchinda Leangsiri, a Thai national, was arrested at Ninoy Aquino International Airport carrying
8,225.31 grams of heroin.
 Leangsiri revealed that he was to deliver the heroin to three people at the Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.
 A team of Narcotics Command (NARCOM) agents, headed by Sr. Insp. Adolfo Samala, proceeded to the Las
Palmas Hotel and allowed Leangsiri to check into Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing the
heroin.
 Appellants Amidu, Omogbolahan, and Bhola arrived at the hotel later that evening, and were observed by
NARCOM agents.
 They went up to Room 504, where Leangsiri handed them the black suitcase with the heroin.
 NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg arrested the appellants and Leangsiri as they attempted to leave the
room with the contraband.
 A piece of paper with Leangsiri's name written on it was found in Amidu's room.
 Two black suitcases with false bottoms and masking tape were found in the room of Omogbolahan and Bhola.
 The appellants denied involvement in the transport of heroin by Leangsiri.

Ruling:
Appellants also argue that, they were caught in possession of the heroin, they cannot be held liable under Section 4 of
R.A. 6425 because they were neither delivering nor transporting the drug. They postulate that said provision does not
penalize the recipient of the delivered contraband.
 In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel carrying the suitcase
with a false bottom containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were arrested by the NARCOM agents. At that
point, they were in the act of conveying the heroin to an unknown destination. Their act was part of the process
of transporting the heroin. They were all involved in a conspiracy. The act of Leangsiri in transporting the heroin
 is appellants' act. They cannot isolate and separate themselves from Leangsiri, for in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all.

the argument of appellants that the piece of paper found in Amidu's hotel room, with the name "SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI"
written on it, 46 should not have been admitted by the trial court.
 In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing
Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked
within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and
the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against appellants. The
inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the
prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

E. When there is waiver of right or there is consent;

1. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336
FACTS:
On the question of the search of the hotel room, the petition alleged that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
September 19, 1966, when the vessel was searched, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling
Center operatives headed by NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then being rented by petitioner Tomas
Velasco without any search warrant and in the absence at the time of such petitioner Tomas Velasco or the presence of
any other person, except one Teofila Ibañez, a mere manicurist of Davao City by occupation and "forcibly opened
luggages and boxes from which only several documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away
the same.
" There was this refutation of such allegation in the answer presented by respondents, represented by the then Solicitor
General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo: "(a) After Captain Pantinople informed the team that petitioner
Tomas Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying
smuggled copra and coffee, some members of the team proceeded to the room of petitioner Velasco at the Skyroom
Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said documents; (b) Although petitioner Velasco was not inside the hotel room,
respondent Reynolds, after identifying himself as a police officer and after explaining his purpose, was allowed to enter
the room by Mrs. Tomas Velasco who subsequently volunteered to open the suitcases and baggages of petitioner
Velasco and delivered the documents and things contained therein to respondent Reynolds; ... (c) The said police team
did not search the room; neither did the members thereof forcibly open the luggages and boxes nor seized and
confiscated the documents and things contained therein, since that was not necessary because ... Mrs. Tomas Velasco
voluntarily opened the baggages and suitcases and gave their contents of documents and things to respondent
Reynolds. Such fact is also established by the joint affidavit of PC Lt. Romeo Arceño, Angel Huertas, Gregorio
Esperancilla, Wilfredo G. Agcaoili, Patricio Barnes and Lucero Cordero, a joint sworn statement of Antonio Bonotan,
Vicente Dubria, Alberto Morgady and Virgilio Humol; and another affidavit of Pio Raganit and Winifredo Calamba, ...
"ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was consent to allow the warrantless search and seizure of Velasco's rented hotel room.
HELD:
YES. Where, at the time the government agents entered and searched the hotel room then being rented by petitioner, a
woman who appeared to be the wife of petitioner was inside the room, and, upon being informed of the purpose of the
search, invited the petitioners to enter and search the room and even voluntarily gave the documents and things
requested by the officers, even if the said woman, who could be aptly described as the wrong person, at the wrong
place, at the wrong time, was not the wife of petitioner, but a mere manicurist by occupation, the officers of the law
could not be blamed if they acted on the appearances. There was a person inside who for all indications was ready to
accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why
she was there. Under said circumstances, there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search
warrant.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.

2. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547

Summary: Trial Court - finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866; SC - REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED

Facts:
 On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company
at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
 Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano,
Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended
revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating
with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items.
 After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment
of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso.
She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group
found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of
Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out
the new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza).
 The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz
Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first,
she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the
house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers
and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita
Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados).
 The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one
of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They
confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the
persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso
(@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso,
was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of
Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo
Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz
Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz.
 Such information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge.
Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the
admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal
for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the
accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Damaso appealed.
Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house.
Ratio: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the
same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the
said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will
not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her .
The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed
Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been
different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search
warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant
them the license to go inside his house.
Other Issue: Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the
identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2),
the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial
number thus:
Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de
oficio.
3. P. vs. Ruben Burgos, September 14,1986
FACTS:
 Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered to the authorities at the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary.
He claimed that Ruben Burgos (accused-appellant) and his companions forcibly recruited him to be part of the
NPA, and that he and his family was threatened to be killed if he didn’t join. He also claimed that he saw accused
with a .38 caliber gun, and several pamphlets/ documents in relation to his membership in the NPA.
 The following day, a team headed by PC officer Bioco, found Burgos plowing his field. Accused was questioned
with regards to the firearm he allegedly used to threaten Masamlok. Accused denied possession of the firearm.
However, Burgos’ wife pointed to where the gun was hidden, which was buried on the ground. It was found, to
which the accused admitted possession of the gun but claimed that it was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez,
otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, alleged team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army.
 He (accused) also pointed to the location of subversive documents hidden in a stock pile of cogon.
 The RTC convicted Ruben Burgos of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The RTC
reasoned out that the arrest, even though without warrant, was justified since the authorities received an
urgent report of his involvement in subversive activities from a reliable court.
 The trial court also justified the search as valid since it was incidental to a lawful arrest.
 Accused then appealed his conviction on the ground that his warrantless arrest and the search of his house were
illegal.
Issue: Validity of the warrantless arrest

Ruling:
 Not valid. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
 There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers,
it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given
by the wife of Burgos (D).
 In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
 In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime
not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of
a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is
made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned
tree is necessarily also tainted.

4. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97

"Qualified consent"

The permission to enter a house and search for persons and effects may be qualified, and the searching officer may not
act in excess of the authority granted to him.
Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be
seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary in the context of this case.

 The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City to a caretaker who had keys to the kitchen only.
The Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house.
 Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding there.
 With the help of caretakers, they were able to enter only up to the yard since the owner was not around and
they did not have a search warrant.
 They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the house was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to search the house with the condition
that Major Macasaet, a long-time family friend, must be there during the search.
 Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the children’s room, and confiscated
a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the basis of the charge of illegal possession of firearms against
them.
 Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them, petitioners voluntarily
surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the
complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies
of their warrants of arrest.
  The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence for being obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
 Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was merely for the purpose of
ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include the authority to
conduct a room to room search inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search,
violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
 The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless search. The reason for
searching the house is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers.
While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search
warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant,
hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the
same. Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers.
 Under the circumstances the police officers had time to procure a search warrant but they did not.
 The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does
not follow that the subjects may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary.
 The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally
and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the
petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.

5. PEOPLE VS. BAULA, 344 SCRA 663

Facts:
 After the gruesome killing of Patronicia Caburao, the investigating police went to the residence of the accused-
appellant, Baula et al.
 In the process of questioning the appellants, the police saw bloodstained bolo, short pants, polo shirts and was
subsequently confiscated without search warrant and directed to the NBI for forensic exams. The exam resulted
that the bloods found in the confiscated articles bears the same blood type "O" as that of the victim.
 Thus, the accused were arrested, charged and was convicted in the crime of murder by the RTC Lingayen and
sentenced to suffer RP. Hence this appeal for review on the decision of the bower court in the ground that the
articles sought (bloodstained bolo, shirt and short pants) carnot be admitted as evidence against the accused
since it was seized without a valid search and seizure warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted was valid under a consented search
Held: NO
 The articles are unlawfully searched and seized.
 A search incidental to a valid arrest is one of the statutory exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no
search and seizure shall be effected without a valid warrant. In this instance, the arrest should be lawful before
search and seizure by the arresting officer would be conducted. A warrantless arrest may be effected by the
arresting officer when in his presence the person arrested have committed, committing or attempting to commit
the crime. It cannot be reversed; otherwise, it would unlawful and unconstitutional and the seized article would
be inadmissible evidence.
 In the case at bar, Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were
allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation
about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers
were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure.
 An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by
that search.
 The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have been
voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
 Thus, the bloodstained polo, bolo and shorts are inadmissible as evidence.

F. STOP & FRISK

1. SUSAN ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 182010, August 25, 2010
Facts:
 On the basis of an informant’s tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at
around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the
activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as "Ryan."
  As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced
in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette
case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1
Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting
strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired
about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take
out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.
 After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet7 on which he
marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police
Station
Defence: Planted
The trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu
CA: Affirmed
SC Ruling:
Petitioner did not question her warrantless arrest – before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the
Information on such ground. She only raised this question on appeal. She is deemed to have waived any objections on
the legality of her arrest.

Valid warrantless search and seizure

(1) consented searches;
(2) as an incident to a lawful arrest;
(3) customs searches;
(4) searches of moving vehicles;
(5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;
(6) seizure under the plain view doctrine
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and
(8) "stop and frisk" operations.

The arrest was justified under the plain view doctrine by the police officer which then motivated him to conduct a stop
and frisk.
What is essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband
concealed about him.

2. PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288

FACTS:

 On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
 While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag
and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
 They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee
but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
 They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas)
grenade, and two (2) live ammunition for a .22 caliber gun.
 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation.
 Petitioner failed to show license or authority to possess the weapons.
 Thus, he was charged and eventually convicted for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions by the RTC of
Davao
 CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
 Petitioner questioned the validity of the seizure conducted. However, even the OSG justified the warrantless
search that it is in accordance of Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court that a person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search
warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the
circumstances.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:
  YES. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in
his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
 At the time the peace officers, in this case, identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They
did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
 However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa.
 Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike
in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
 It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.

 Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence,
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 
3. MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997
Facts:
 Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery due to
reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who tumed out to be petitioner Alain
Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be 'highu on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish
eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
 When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked what he was holding in his
hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which they
examined and found to contain crushed marijuana residue.
 Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted
Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425.
 Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
 (In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three policemen
ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of
marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To
some extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.)
Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.
Held:
 Yes. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
 warrant.
 However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law: Search incidental to a lawful
arrest;
 Search of moving vehicles; Seizure in plain view; and Customs search.
 Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the cited cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential requirement. Probable cause (in relation
to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
 A "stop-and-frisk" operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was
established with Manalili's suspicious behaviour.
 A stop -and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizenon the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. It has been held as one of the exceptions to thegeneral rule
against searches without warrant.

4. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159

FACTS:
Police officer Rodolfu Yu, in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, was on foot patrol with three other
police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza
Miranda.
They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted on
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with
[t]heir eyes moving very fast.
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes.
The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions.
As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner.
Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waistline.
Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
recovered.
Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade
and thereafter gave it to his commander.
On cross-examination, Yu declared that:
1. they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade
somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda.
2. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise, at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw
petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade.
3. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the
former was unable to catch any of the latter.
4. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when
Yu saw them on 27 August 1990.
5. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his
companions approached them.
6. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.
7. Also, officer Serapio, took petitioner’s confession without a counsel during the inquest.
 Petitioner as the lone witness denied all the allegations against him and asserted that he was just strolling in
Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air and that he was surprisingly apprehended by the police with the
allegation that he shoots him and he saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.
 The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either
to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.
 Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation
called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature.
 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were [c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as
petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of
bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers
approach, thus [i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not
necessarily to discover evidence of a crime but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence.
 The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and
since petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
 CA affirmed lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was valid

HELD:
 NO. The warrantless arrest is illegal.
 According to the SC, the prosecution failed to establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
 The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures are that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect
the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refer to those
effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
 Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
 A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one
"in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) the search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk."
 In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the
grenade from the accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
 At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
 In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer
may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
 Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
 Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
 In the case at bar, at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
o First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report
or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from
impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason
existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony,
contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended,
the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police
officers, petitioner, and his companions were "immediately collared."
o Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not
creating any commotion or trouble.
o Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside
the front waistline of the petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu.

G. Warrantless search in checkpoints

RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988, September 29, 1989.
Facts:
 On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region.  As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. 
 Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of
checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
  Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down for refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint
despite the warning shots.
II.        THE ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?
III.       THE RULING
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO,  military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.
 xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
 Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
 The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may
take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all
sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonably  conducted, the former should prevail.
 True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Read also the

RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665
 In the Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of
the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
 Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. Before
submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his comment, to which
petitioners filed a reply.
 It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints,
i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se.
Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or
where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the
government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed,
checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
 Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either
military or police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d’etat (stronger than all previous ones) was staged only
last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d’etat is taken almost for granted. The NPA, through its
sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed forces and police personnel.
Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and
ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all-time high. Whether or not effective as
expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals
and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
 No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological
beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one
must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of
government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal
right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The
checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
 Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist’s right to "free passage
without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers
during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
search.
  These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S. Supreme
Court:
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with
legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain
knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both
appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established
checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and
believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by
officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources.
We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on
motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for
abusive or harassing stops of individuals them there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a
particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial
review."

 The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore,
violative of the Constitution.
 As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few
questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies
a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court —
 "Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a
warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct
1302(1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543, 45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so
holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have ‘reasonable or probable
cause’ to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they
begin their warrantless search. . . ." 4
 Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and seizures
accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter. In People v.
Kagui Malasuqui, it was held —
 "To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances." 5
 By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure
areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public
interest, safety, and necessity.
 Lastly, the Court’s decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the
military manning the checkpoints. The Court’s decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government
employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the Court’s
inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular
situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena.
 The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become aware of how some checkpoints
have been used as points of thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the increased prices
of foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and other urban centers, are largely
blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning them have reportedly become "experts" in mulcting
travelling traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy.
 But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the men in uniform are rascals or thieves.
The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to the
checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a military "concoction." It behooves
the military to improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or institution will
succeed unless the men behind it are honest, noble and dedicated.
 In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is
not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those
who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore,
liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts. 7 This tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest
of terms by higher military authorities.
 ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

H. Warrantless search involving “hot logs”

MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430
FACTS:
 On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen
inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of foresters and
 policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the
team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
 On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the
petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra
lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa.
 On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed
under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of
lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.
 The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not
penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of
an illegal seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber
HELD:
 No,
 The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
 While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."
 Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
 The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the
market."
 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.
 And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.