Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9069 March 31, 1915

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA, defendants-appellees.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellant.

J. Y. Pinzon for appellees.

TORRES, J.:

Appeal filed through bill of exceptions by the Attorney-General, representing the plaintiff municipality
of Cavite, from the judgment of March 27, 1913, whereby the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge,
dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff party, declaring that the said municipality had
no right to require that the defendants vacate the land in question.

By an instrument dated December 5, 1911, afterwards amended on March 14, 1912, the provincial
fiscal of Cavite, representing the municipality of that name, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of said province alleging that the plaintiff municipal corporation, duly organized and
constituted in accordance with Act No. 82, and as the successor to the rights s aid entity had under
the late Spanish government, and by virtue of Act No. 1039, had exclusive right, control and
administration over the streets, lanes, plazas, and public places of the municipality of Cavite; that the
defendants, by virtue of a lease secured from the plaintiff municipality, occupy a parcel of land 93
square meters in area that forms part o the public plaza known under the name of Soledad,
belonging to the municipality of Cavite, the defendants having constructed thereon a house, through
payment to the plaintiff for occupation thereof of a rental of P5,58 a quarter in advance, said
defendants being furthermore obligated to vacate the leased land within sixty days subsequent to
plaintiff's demand to that effect; that the defendants have been required by the municipality to vacate
and deliver possession of the said land, but more than the sixty days within which they having done
so to date; that the lease secured from the municipality of Cavite, by virtue whereof the defendants
occupy the land that is the subject matter of the complaint, is ultra vires and therefore ipso facto null
and void and of no force or effect, for the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of public
domain and use, and the municipal council of Cavite has never at any time had any power or
authority to withdraw it from public use, and to lease it to a private party for his own use, and so the
defendants have never had any right or occupy or to retain the said land under leasehold, or in any
other way, their occupation of the parcel being furthermore illegal; and therefore prayed that
judgment be rendered declaring that possession of the sad land lies with the plaintiff and ordering
the defendants to vacate the land and deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff, with the costs
against the defendants.

The demurrer filed to the foregoing complaint having been overruled, with exception on the part of
the defendants, in their answer of April 10, 1912, they admitted some of the allegations contained in
the complaint but denied that the parcel of land which they occupy and to which the complaint refers
forms and integral part of Plaza Soledad, or that the lease secured by them from the municipality of
Cavite was null and void and ultra vires, stating if they refused to vacate said land it was because
they had acquired the right of possession thereof. As a special defense they alleged that, according
to the lease, they could only be ordered to vacate the land leased when the plaintiff municipality
might need it for decoration or other public use, which does not apply in the present case; and in a
cross-complaint they alleged that on the land which is the subject matter of the complaint the
defendants have erected a house of strong materials, assessed at P3,000, which was constructed
under a license secured from the plaintiff municipality; that if they should be ordered to vacate the
said land they would suffer damages to the extent of P3,000, wherefore they prayed that they be
absolved from the complaint, or in the contrary case that the plaintiff be sentenced to indemnify them
in the sum of P3,000 as damages, and to pay the costs.

After hearing of the case, wherein both parties submitted parol and documentary evidence, the court
rendered the judgment that he been mentioned, whereto counsel for the municipality excepted and
in writing asked for a reopening of the case and the holding of a new trial. This motion was denied,
with exception on the part of the appellant, and the forwarded to the clerk of this court.

It is duly proven in the record that, upon presentation of an application by Hilaria Rojas, he municipal
council of Cavite by resolution No. 10, dated July 3, 107, Exhibit C, leased to the said Rojas some
70 or 80 square meters of Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance
according to the schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, land within sixty days subsequent to notification
to that effect. The record shows (receipts, Exhibit 1) that she has paid the land tax on the house
erected on the lot.

The boundary line between the properties of the municipality of Cavite and the naval reservation, as
fixed in Act No. 1039 of the Philippine Commission, appears in the plan prepared by a naval
engineer and submitted as evidence by the plaintiff, Exhibit C of civil case No. 274 of the Cavite
court and registered in this court as No. 9071. According to said plan, defendant's house is erected
on a plat of ground that forms part of the promenade called Plaza Soledad, and this was also so
proven by the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses.

By section 3 of the said Act No. 1039, passed January 12, 1904, the Philippine Commission granted
to the municipality of Cavite all the land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad. In the case of
Nicolas vs. Jose (6 Phil. Rep., 589), wherein the municipality of Cavite, represented by its president
Catalino Nicolas, sought inscription in its name of the land comprised in the said Palza Soledad, with
objection on the part of Maria Jose et al. who is sought that inscription be decreed in their name of
the parcels of land in this plaza occupied by them, this court decided that neither the municipality nor
the objectors were entitled to inscription, for with respect to the objectors said plaza belonged to the
municipality of Cavite and with respect to the latter the said Plaza Soledad was not transferable
property of that municipality to be inscribed in its name, because he intention of Act No. 1039 was
that the said plaza and other places therein enumerated should be kept open for public transit;
herefore there can be no doubt that the defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land of the
municipality leased by her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which if for public use and is
reserved for the common benefit.

According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the
promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces."

The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not
in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit
of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for
private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing
a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.
The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside he commerce of man
may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was
decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 195, which says: "Communal
things that cannot be soud because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for
public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."

Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby he municipality of Cavite
leased to Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect,
because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. On the
hyphotesis that the said lease is null and void in accordance with the provisions of article 1303 of the
Civil Code, the defendant must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint
to the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may
have received from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly
leased. For the same reasons as have been set forth, and as said contract is null and void in its
origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim that the
plaintiff municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the removal of her house from
the said land.

For all the foregoing reasons we must reverse the judgment appealed from and declare, as we do
declare, that the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza called Soledad, and as
the lease of said parcel of land is null and void, we order the defendant to vacate it and release the
land in question within thirty days, leaving it cleared as it was before hr occupation. There is no
ground for the indemnity sought in the nature of damages, but the municipality must in its turn to the
defendant the rentals collected; without finding as to the costs. So ordered

G.R. No. L-17635 March 30, 1963

EDUARDO SANCHEZ, GREGORIO NUÑEZ, SULPICIO BANAAG, LINO BASA and RODOLPO
FERNANDEZ,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF ASINGAN, Province of Pangasinan, respondent-appellee.

Castillo, Diaz, Tayabas and Torres for petitioners-appellants.

Guillermo, Navarro, Rame and Venture for respondent-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This case is before us on appeal by the plaintiffs from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: The defendant municipality, appellee herein, is
the owner of a triangular strip of land situated between the site of the municipal school building and
the provincial road, measuring 42 x 26-1/2 x 46 meters. On that land appellants, with the knowledge
and implied consent of the municipality, constructed temporary stores and buildings of light materials
shortly after the end of the last war. Between 1952 and 1959 they paid rents to appellee. When a
new local administration took over after the elections of November 1959 the municipal council
passed a resolution notifying the occupants of the land that the same was needed for certain public
purposes, such as parking space, expansion of school grounds, widening of the road and waiting
area for pedestrians. Appellants were therefore advised to vacate on or before May 15, 1960, some
five (5) months after the date of notice. Instead of moving, however, appellants filed a petition for
prohibition with the court a quo on May 10, 1960 to prevent the municipality from ejecting them from
the land, with the alternative prayer that should they be ejected, appellee be ordered to reimburse to
them the rents which they had paid, in the total sum of P1,178.20. There was also a demand for
damages and attorney's fees. After trial, the court dismissed the petition and ordered appellants to
vacate the land, with costs.

Appellants' first contention here is that the land in question belongs to the Province of Pangasinan
and therefore appellee has no right to order their ejectment. The premise of the contention is
incorrect, for the clear and specific finding of the court a quo is that the said land is owned by the
Municipality of Asingan. This is a factual conclusion that is no longer open to review in the present
appeal. The additional statement by the court "that it is part of the broad shoulder of the provincial
road" does not make the land provincial property, such statement being merely descriptive of its
location and not indicative of its ownership..

The next issue raised by appellants is with reference to the sum of P1,178.20 paid by them as rents
from 1952 to 1959. They claim the right to be reimbursed in case they should be ejected, and cite
the case of Rojas v. Municipality of Cavite, 30 Phil. 607, where this Court, after declaring null and
void the lease of a public plaza belonging to the said municipality and ordering the lessee to vacate
the same, ordered the municipality to reimburse the rentals collected. It should be noted that while
the property involved in that case was clearly devoted to public use, and therefore outside the
commerce of man, and could not under any circumstance have been the object of a valid contract of
lease, appellee's position herein is that the land in question is patrimonial character, not being
included in any of the categories of municipal properties for public use enumerated in Article 424 of
the Civil Code, namely: "municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades and public
works for public service in said municipality." There is indeed nothing in the decision appealed from
or in the briefs of the parties to show that the land was devoted to any of those purposes when
appellants began their occupancy. Consequently, the implied agreement of lease with them was not
null and void, although terminable upon the notice as appellee herein elected to terminate it. That
being so, there is no ground on which reimbursement of the rents may be ordered.

In any event, even granting that the land in question is for public use and therefore the municipality
of Asingan could not legally lease it to private parties, we see no justification for the stand
maintained by appellants that after having occupied said land and derived benefits therefrom they
should still be entitled to recover what they have paid as a condition for their ejectment. That would
be to enrich them unduly to the prejudice of appellee. Besides, it may be said that when they built
their temporary structures on the land with the latter's knowledge and implied consent they both
treated it as municipal patrimonial property. Insofar as the rents already paid by them are concerned
appellants are estopped from claiming otherwise in order to obtain a recovery.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with cost against appellants.

G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,defendants-appellants.

Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39
was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act
also provided that —

Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the
capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to
be fixed by the Auditor General.

The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed
thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in
the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can be gleaned from the records, 1 said properties were
being utilized as follows —

No. of Lots Use

1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
1 ................................................ Curuan School
1 ................................................ Trade School
2 ................................................ Burleigh School
2 ................................................ High School Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque
23 ................................................ vacant

It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to

Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the
municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
 On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga
Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. 3

On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into
two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the
old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided:

Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the
obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.

Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets and
obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by
Zamboanga City.

On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a
ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-
indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price
thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13,
1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as
of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an
amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the
quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first
quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P764,220.05 due it.

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that —

All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga
and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of
the said City of Zamboanga. (Stressed for emphasis).

Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to
Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of
Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039,
P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.

This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint
entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just
compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and obligations under said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of
Finance and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of
P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.

On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction as prayed for.
After defendants filed their respective answers, trial was held. On August 12, 1963, judgment was
rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039

unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties,
consisting of 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under certificates of title
(Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province of Zamboanga; ordering
defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof
to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25% thereof
every quarter until said amount shall have been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of
Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the
regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit
the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been
fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper officials the
corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of
land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon
payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the
counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to the order of the Court dated June
4, 1962. No costs are assessed against the defendants.

It is SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff province filed a motion
to reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump
sum with 6% interest per annum. Over defendants' opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff
province's motion.

The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.

Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the property of declaratory relief filed in the
lower court on the assertion that the law had already been violated and that plaintiff sought to give it
coercive effect, since assuming the same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the conversion of
the proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We proceed to the more important and principal question of
the validity of Republic Act 3039.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in
question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a
municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is
owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its
private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. 6

The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under
the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question?
 The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide: 1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property
for public use and patrimonial property.

ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as
High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works
for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must
be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the
first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be said that its actuation was
without jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 8 and
in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the school sites
in municipalities constitute their patrimonial properties. This result is understandable because, unlike
in the classification regarding State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are
not classified as public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm, the lower
court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service
are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is
enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc. 10

Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, 11where it was stated that "... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for
public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, or other
necessary municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from
the States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked only
as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for governmental
purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the
police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots used as
markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial
properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot
which had always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not
patrimonial property of a municipality.

Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as
capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school
playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in
its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots
considered as public property are the following:

TCT
Lot Number Use
Number
2200 ...................................... 4-B ...................................... Capitol Site
2816 ...................................... 149 ...................................... School Site
3281 ...................................... 1224 ...................................... Hospital Site
3282 ...................................... 1226 ...................................... Hospital Site
3283 ...................................... 1225 ...................................... Hospital Site
3748 ...................................... 434-A-1 ...................................... School Site
5406 ...................................... 171 ...................................... School Site
High School Play-
5564 ...................................... 168 ......................................
ground
157 &
5567 ...................................... ...................................... Trade School
158
High School Play-
5583 ...................................... 167 ......................................
ground
6181 ...................................... (O.C.T.) ...................................... Curuan School
11942 ...................................... 926 ...................................... Leprosarium
11943 ...................................... 927 ...................................... Leprosarium
11944 ...................................... 925 ...................................... Leprosarium
5557 ...................................... 170 ...................................... Burleigh School
5562 ...................................... 180 ...................................... Burleigh School
5565 ...................................... 172-B ...................................... Burleigh
5570 ...................................... 171-A ...................................... Burleigh
5571 ...................................... 172-C ...................................... Burleigh
5572 ...................................... 174 ...................................... Burleigh
5573 ...................................... 178 ...................................... Burleigh
5585 ...................................... 171-B ...................................... Burleigh
5586 ...................................... 173 ...................................... Burleigh
5587 ...................................... 172-A ...................................... Burleigh

We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each other and in turn
are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built, as per records appearing herein and
in the Bureau of Lands. Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots constitute the
appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools, and partake of the nature of the same.

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do not
disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when
Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to
authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, 14 it can be
assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence,
Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in
question.
 But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere
accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands,
i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and
benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province
then — and its successors-in-interest — are not really deprived of the benefits thereof.

But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the
value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being
utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Said lots are:

TCT Number Lot Number Use

5577 ......................................
13198 ......................................
5569 ......................................
5558 ......................................
5559 ......................................
5560 ......................................
5561 ......................................
5563 ......................................
5566 ......................................
5568 ......................................
5574 ......................................
5575 ......................................
5576 ......................................
5578 ......................................
5579 ......................................
5580 ......................................
5581 ......................................
5582 ......................................
5584 ......................................
5588 ......................................
5589 ......................................
5590 ......................................
5591 ......................................
5592 ......................................
5593 ......................................
7379 ......................................
177 ...................................... Mydro, Magay
127-0 ...................................... San Roque
169 ...................................... Burleigh 15
175 ...................................... Vacant
188 ...................................... "
183 ...................................... "
186 ...................................... "
191 ...................................... "
176 ...................................... "
179 ...................................... "
196 ...................................... "
181-A ...................................... "
181-B ...................................... "
182 ...................................... "
197 ...................................... "
195 ...................................... "
159-B ...................................... "
194 ...................................... "
190 ...................................... "
184 ...................................... "
187 ...................................... "
189 ...................................... "
192 ...................................... "
193 ...................................... "
185 ...................................... "
4147 ...................................... "

Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are
truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also
registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. 16

We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more along the
domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law.
Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service
is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private
properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse
possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of
properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the
Civil Code — is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the
principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws".
Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as
public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest are "guilty of laches is without
merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga
Province arose only in 1949 after the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question.
While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved transfer said properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a
reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952, the old province was dissolved. As
successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to
get a reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected
subsequently and it was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present
controversy arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative laches.

It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga
the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to
computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated
March 26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.

Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already
returned to defendant City. The return of said amount to defendant was without legal basis. Republic
Act 3039 took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been
made. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed
act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by defendant City to plaintiff
province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots
should then be paid by defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's prayer,
particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of the first cause of action recited in the
complaint 17clearly shows that the relief sought was merely the continuance of the quarterly
payments from the internal revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on
reciprocal obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has
been so far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in question. The titles to the
registered lots are not yet in the name of defendant Zamboanga City.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:.

(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in
lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of
P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and

(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance
remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the
sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal
Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of
defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-appellant,

vs.
CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL., claimants-appellees.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.

Abad Santos, Camus & Delgado for appellees.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The Government of the Philippine Islands appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in cadastral proceeding No. 373 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, G.
L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 373, adjudicating the title and decreeing the registration of lots Nos.
36, 39 and 40, block 3055 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila in favor of Consuelo,
Consorcia, Elvira and Tomas, surnamed Cabangis, in equal parts, and dismissing the claims
presented by the Government of the Philippine Islands and the City of Manila.

In support of its appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the trial
court in its judgment, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in not holding that the lots in question are of the public domain, the
same having been gained from the sea (Manila Bay) by accession, by fillings made by the
Bureau of Public Works and by the construction of the break-water (built by the Bureau of
Navigation) near the mouth of Vitas Estero.

2. The lower court erred in holding that the lots in question formed part of the big parcel of
land belonging to the spouses Maximo Cabangis and Tita Andres, and in holding that these
spouses and their successors in interest have been in continuous, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of said lots up to the time this case came up.

3. The lower court erred in holding that said lots existed before, but that due to the current of
the Pasig River and to the action of the big waves in Manila Bay during the south-west
monsoons, the same disappeared.

4. The lower court erred in adjudicating the registration of the lands in question in the name
of the appellees, and in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial.

A preponderance of the evidence in the record which may properly be taken into consideration in
deciding the case, proves the following facts:

Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral proceeding No. 71 of the City of Manila, G. L. R. O.
Record No. 373, were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the
herein claimants and appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action
of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in
water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the
dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from
the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with water, surrounding that
belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots,
the subject matter of this proceeding.

Up to the month of February, 1927 nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it
was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and appellees, declared lot
No. 40 for such purpose.

In view of the facts just stated, as proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the question arises:
Who owns lots 36, 39 and 40 in question?

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel
of land belonging to their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in
interest, Tomas Cabangis, having taken possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed, giving
his permission to some fishermen to dry their fishing nets and deposit their bancas thereon, said lots
belong to them.

Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:

Article 339. Property of public ownership is —

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shorts, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:

xxx xxx xxx

3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the
movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest
equinoctial tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at
the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms or tempests.

In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil., 223), with reference to article 339 of the Civil
Code just quoted, this court said:

We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or
erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become 'property of public
ownership,' as defined in article 339 of the code, where it appears that the owner has to all intents
and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the
'playa' (shore of the seas), 'rada' (roadstead), or the like. . . .

In the Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, volume XII, page 558, we read the following:
 With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and
private properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they become part
of the shore or beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus
dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new
nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not subject to indemnity.

Now then , when said land was reclaimed, did the claimants-appellees or their predecessors recover
it as their original property?

As we have seen, the land belonging to the predecessors of the herein claimants-appellees began to
wear way in 1896, owing to the gradual erosion caused by the ebb and flow of the tide, until the year
1901, when the waters of Manila Bay completely submerged a portion of it, included within lots 36,
39 and 40 here in question, remaining thus under water until reclaimed as a result of certain work
done by the Government in 1912. According to the above-cited authorities said portion of land, that
is, lots 36, 39 and 40, which was private property, became a part of the public domain. The
predecessors of the herein claimants-appellees could have protected their land by building a
retaining wall, with the consent of competent authority, in 1896 when the waters of the sea began to
wear it away, in accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of the aforecited Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, and their failure to do so until 1901, when a portion of the same became completely
covered by said waters, remaining thus submerged until 1912, constitutes abandonment.

Now then: The lots under discussion having been reclaimed from the seas as a result of certain work
done by the Government, to whom do they belong?

The answer to this question is found in article 5 of the aforementioned Law of Waters, which is as
follows:

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or
by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the
grant of authority.

The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and depositing
their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not confer on the latter
or his successors the ownership of said lots, because, as they were converted into public land, no
private person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by the law.

In the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government and City of Manila (13 Phil., 324), cited by the
claimants-appellees, this court, admitting the findings and holdings of the lower court, said the
following:

If we heed the parol evidence, we find that the seashore was formerly about one
hundred brazas distant from the land in question; that, in the course of time, and by the
removal of a considerable quantity of sand from the shore at the back of the land for the use
of the street car company in filling in Calle Cervantes, the sea water in ordinary tides now
covers part of the land described in the petition.
 The fact that certain land, not the bed of a river or of the sea, is covered by sea water during
the period of ordinary high tide, is not a reason established by any law to cause the loss
thereof, especially when, as in the present case, it becomes covered by water owing to
circumstances entirely independent of the will of the owner.

In the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguilar (G.R. No. 22034),1 also cited by the claimants-appellees,
wherein the Government adduced no evidence in support of its contention, the lower court said in
part:

The contention of the claimants Cabangis is to the effect that said lots are a part of the
adjoining land adjudicated to their deceased father, Don Tomas Cabangis, which, for over
fifty years had belonged to their deceased grandmother, Tita Andres, and that, due to certain
improvements made in Manila Bay, the waters of the sea covered a large part of the lots
herein claimed.

The Government of the Philippine Islands also claims the ownership of said lots, because, at
ordinary high tide, they are covered by the sea.

Upon petition of the parties, the lower court made an ocular inspection of said lots on
September 12, 1923, and on said inspection found some light material houses built thereon,
and that on that occasion the waters of the sea did not reach the aforesaid lots.

From the evidence adduced at the trial of this cause, it may be inferred that Tita Andres,
during her lifetime was the owner of a rather large parcel of land which was adjudicated by a
decree to her son Tomas Cabangis; the lots now in question are contiguous to that land and
are covered by the waters of the sea at extraordinary high tide; some 50 years before the
sea did not reach said strip of land, and on it were constructed, for the most part, light
material houses, occupied by the tenants of Tita Andres, to whom they paid rent. Upon her
death, her son Tomas Cabangis succeeded to the possession, and his children succeeded
him, they being the present claimants, Consuelo, Jesus, Tomas, and Consorcia Cabangis.

The Government of the Philippine Islands did not adduce any evidence in support of its
contention, with the exception of registry record No. 8147, to show that the lots here in
question were not excluded from the application presented in said proceeding.

It will be seen that in the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government and City of Manila, cited above, the
rise of the waters of the sea that covered the lands there in dispute, was due not to the action of the
tide but to the fact that a large quantity of sand was taken from the sea at the side of said land in
order to fill in Cervantes Street, and this court properly held that because of this act, entirely
independent of the will of the owner of said land, the latter could not lose the ownership thereof, and
the mere fact that the waters of the sea covered it as a result of said act, is not sufficient to convert it
into public land, especially, as the land was high and appropriate for building purposes.

In the case of the Director of Lands vs. Aguilar also cited by the claimants-appellees, the Insular
Government did not present any evidence in support of its contention, thus leaving uncontradicted
the evidence adduced by the claimants Aguilar et al., as to the ownership, possession and
occupation of said lots.

In the instant case the evidence shows that from 1896, the waves of Manila Bay had been gradually
and constantly washing away the sand that formed the lots here in question, until 1901, when the
sea water completely covered them, and thus they remained until the year 1912. In the latter year
they were reclaimed from the sea by filling in with sand and silt extracted from the bed of Vitas
Estuary when the Government dredged said estuary in order to facilitate navigation. Neither the
herein claimants-appellees nor their predecessors did anything to prevent their destruction.

In conclusion, then, we hold that the lots in question having disappeared on account of the gradual
erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such a state until they were
reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government, they are public land. (Aragon vs.
Insular Government, 19 Phil., 223; Francisco vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 28 Phil.,
505).

By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is reversed and lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40 of cadastral
proceeding No. 373 of the City of Manila are held to be public land belonging to the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
So ordered.