G.R. No.

L-9069             March 31, 1915 It is duly proven in the record that, upon presentation of an application by Hilaria Rojas, he municipal council of Cavite by
resolution No. 10, dated July 3, 107, Exhibit C, leased to the said Rojas some 70 or 80 square meters of Plaza Soledad, on
condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance according to the schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, land within sixty days
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE, plaintiff-appellant, 
subsequent to notification to that effect. The record shows (receipts, Exhibit 1) that she has paid the land tax on the house
vs.
erected on the lot. 
HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA, defendants-appellees. 

The boundary line between the properties of the municipality of Cavite and the naval reservation, as fixed in Act No. 1039 of
Attorney-General Villamor for appellant.
the Philippine Commission, appears in the plan prepared by a naval engineer and submitted as evidence by the plaintiff, Exhibit
J. Y. Pinzon for appellees. 
C of civil case No. 274 of the Cavite court and registered in this court as No. 9071. According to said plan, defendant's house is
erected on a plat of ground that forms part of the promenade called Plaza Soledad, and this was also so proven by the
TORRES, J.: testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses. 

Appeal filed through bill of exceptions by the Attorney-General, representing the plaintiff municipality of Cavite, from the By section 3 of the said Act No. 1039, passed January 12, 1904, the Philippine Commission granted to the municipality of Cavite
judgment of March 27, 1913, whereby the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge, dismissed the complaint with costs against the all the land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad. In the case of Nicolas vs. Jose (6 Phil. Rep., 589), wherein the municipality
plaintiff party, declaring that the said municipality had no right to require that the defendants vacate the land in question.  of Cavite, represented by its president Catalino Nicolas, sought inscription in its name of the land comprised in the said Palza
Soledad, with objection on the part of Maria Jose et al. who is sought that inscription be decreed in their name of the parcels of
By an instrument dated December 5, 1911, afterwards amended on March 14, 1912, the provincial fiscal of Cavite, land in this plaza occupied by them, this court decided that neither the municipality nor the objectors were entitled to
representing the municipality of that name, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said province alleging that the inscription, for with respect to the objectors said plaza belonged to the municipality of Cavite and with respect to the latter the
plaintiff municipal corporation, duly organized and constituted in accordance with Act No. 82, and as the successor to the rights said Plaza Soledad was not transferable property of that municipality to be inscribed in its name, because he intention of Act
s aid entity had under the late Spanish government, and by virtue of Act No. 1039, had exclusive right, control and No. 1039 was that the said plaza and other places therein enumerated should be kept open for public transit; herefore there
administration over the streets, lanes, plazas, and public places of the municipality of Cavite; that the defendants, by virtue of a can be no doubt that the defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land of the municipality leased by her, for it is an
lease secured from the plaintiff municipality, occupy a parcel of land 93 square meters in area that forms part o the public integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which if for public use and is reserved for the common benefit.
plaza known under the name of Soledad, belonging to the municipality of Cavite, the defendants having constructed thereon a
house, through payment to the plaintiff for occupation thereof of a rental of P5,58 a quarter in advance, said defendants being The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside he commerce of man may be the object of a
furthermore obligated to vacate the leased land within sixty days subsequent to plaintiff's demand to that effect; that the contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of
defendants have been required by the municipality to vacate and deliver possession of the said land, but more than the sixty February 12, 195, which says: "Communal things that cannot be soud because they are by their very nature outside of
days within which they having done so to date; that the lease secured from the municipality of Cavite, by virtue whereof the commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."
defendants occupy the land that is the subject matter of the complaint, is ultra vires and therefore ipso facto null and void and
of no force or effect, for the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of public domain and use, and the municipal
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby he municipality of Cavite leased to Hilaria Rojas a portion
council of Cavite has never at any time had any power or authority to withdraw it from public use, and to lease it to a private
of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be
party for his own use, and so the defendants have never had any right or occupy or to retain the said land under leasehold, or
the object of a contract. On the hyphotesis that the said lease is null and void in accordance with the provisions of article 1303
in any other way, their occupation of the parcel being furthermore illegal; and therefore prayed that judgment be rendered
of the Civil Code, the defendant must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality
declaring that possession of the sad land lies with the plaintiff and ordering the defendants to vacate the land and deliver
of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have received from her in the nature of
possession thereof to said plaintiff, with the costs against the defendants. 
rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased. For the same reasons as have been set forth, and as said
contract is null and void in its origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim that the
The demurrer filed to the foregoing complaint having been overruled, with exception on the part of the defendants, in their plaintiff municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the removal of her house from the said land.
answer of April 10, 1912, they admitted some of the allegations contained in the complaint but denied that the parcel of land
which they occupy and to which the complaint refers forms and integral part of Plaza Soledad, or that the lease secured by
For all the foregoing reasons we must reverse the judgment appealed from and declare, as we do declare, that the land
them from the municipality of Cavite was null and void and ultra vires, stating if they refused to vacate said land it was because
occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza called Soledad, and as the lease of said parcel of land is null and void,
they had acquired the right of possession thereof. As a special defense they alleged that, according to the lease, they could
we order the defendant to vacate it and release the land in question within thirty days, leaving it cleared as it was before hr
only be ordered to vacate the land leased when the plaintiff municipality might need it for decoration or other public use,
occupation. There is no ground for the indemnity sought in the nature of damages, but the municipality must in its turn to the
which does not apply in the present case; and in a cross-complaint they alleged that on the land which is the subject matter of
defendant the rentals collected; without finding as to the costs. So ordered. 
the complaint the defendants have erected a house of strong materials, assessed at P3,000, which was constructed under a
license secured from the plaintiff municipality; that if they should be ordered to vacate the said land they would suffer
damages to the extent of P3,000, wherefore they prayed that they be absolved from the complaint, or in the contrary case that
the plaintiff be sentenced to indemnify them in the sum of P3,000 as damages, and to pay the costs. 
G.R. No. 170757               November 28, 2011
After hearing of the case, wherein both parties submitted parol and documentary evidence, the court rendered the judgment
that he been mentioned, whereto counsel for the municipality excepted and in writing asked for a reopening of the case and
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed VALIAO and
the holding of a new trial. This motion was denied, with exception on the part of the appellant, and the forwarded to the clerk
NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners, 
of this court. 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents,
 DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for registration
of title over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners4 Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with
the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the
following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application for registration on the following grounds, among others: that neither
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the
death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of
Sale5 dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916
until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the
concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra
unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and
Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the subject property, petitioners submitted in
evidence Tax Declaration No. 95626dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for registration of the subject property, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the present
proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the applicants, who are declared the true and lawful owners of said
Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right to Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration and Certificate of Title be issued in the name of
the applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio Grandea,
subject to the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay over said lot whose fishpond permits are declared
VALID and will expire on December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal
with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the classification of
lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and in the absence of
such classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Further,
there exists a prior cadastral case involving the same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372
belongs to the Republic. The CA held that such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action for land
registration. It also ruled that the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to
prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated December 15,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees, DECLARE as moot
and academic any and all claims of private oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the subject parcel of land to
be inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence,
the present petition with the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO VALIAO,
ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST IS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR PRESCRIPTION.9
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The possession of applicants'
predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had been open, continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land
into a private land. The subject lot had already become private in character in view of the length of time the applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot, which entitles them to the confirmation of their title. Petitioners
further claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for
registration of a parcel of land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain and whether petitioners have the right to have the said property registered in their
name through prescription of time are questions of fact, which were already passed upon by the CA and no longer reviewable
by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA, when supported by sufficient evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties.
The OSG further claims that petitioners failed to prove that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain and that petitioners' application for land registration is already barred by a prior decision in a cadastral case.
Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to prove that their possession over the subject lot
applied for had been open, peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the principle is well-established that this
Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court.10 Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence
adduced before the lower courts.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.11 These the petitioners must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.12
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.13 Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.16
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.17 Verily, the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.1âwphi1
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July 11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral Case
No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to reopen the proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is Lot No.
2372. The lower court, in its Order18 dated October 20, 1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found that after
the subject lot was declared public land, it was found to be inside the communal forest. On appeal, the CA, in its
Decision19 dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible error and affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a
petition elevating the case to this Court was dismissed for lack of merit.20 In the present case, the CA, in its Decision dated June
23, 2005, ruled that such judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land registration on the same
land.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 4822 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public
lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part
of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the
law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer
general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.23 Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.24
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-in-interest's possession and ownership over
the subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax
declaration covering the subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947,
was presented in evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced
improvements on the subject property, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio
was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by law. Hence, petitioners'
assertion that Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and self-serving.
As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a
tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date. What is required is
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.25 Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-
interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that
they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does
not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.26
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their
application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The
application for registration of title filed by the petitioners Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao,
and Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia,
Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA, VICTOR, ANTONINA, LOURDES, TEODORO and MYRNA, all surnamed
MANECLANG, petitioners, 
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO CASTRO, SALOME RODRIGUEZ, EDUCARDO CUISON,
FERNANDO ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES CORDERO, CLETO PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE
PANLILIO, respondents.
Loreto Novisteros for petitioners. 
Corleto R. Castro for respondents. 
FERNAN, J.:
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for
quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95 of the Municipal Council of Bugallon
Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated August 15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water
traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in nature and
not subject to private appropriation. The lower court likewise held that Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the
Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95 authorizing public
bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by
respondents herein as members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative powers. 
Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the same on April 29, 1983. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.  ESGUERRA, J.:p
Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon. However, before respondents could do so,
petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of
the fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that
judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled
properties, stating therein, among other things, that "to pursue the case, the same will not amount to any benefit of the
parties, on the other hand it is to the advantage and benefit of the municipality if the ownership of the land and the water
found therein belonging to petitioners be recognized in their favor as it is now clear that after the National Irrigation
Administration [NIA] had built the dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the land. 1
The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of
herein petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was originally a creek
forming a tributary of the Agno River. Considering that as held in the case of Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59
Phil. 592 [1934], a creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a
property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a
public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual [Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102
Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 4551; and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes
by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its
conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain, the Court finds the
Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy. 
The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual determination binding upon
this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority to pass, as it
did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to
due process as mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world. 
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare the same null and void
for being contrary to law and public policy. The Court further resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 
G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Governor of the Land
Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-appellants, 
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in
his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor-General Antonio A. Torres, Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Magno
B. Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land Authority for petitioners-appellants.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents-appellees.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, in Civil Case No. 67946, dated
September 23, 1968, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid in
that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process and payment of just
compensation. Respondent Executive Secretary and Governor of the Land Authority are hereby
restrained and enjoined from implementing the provisions of said law. Respondent Register of Deeds of
the City of Manila is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 which he had issued in the
name of the Land Tenure Administration and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in the name
of the City of Manila which he cancelled, if that is feasible, or issue a new certificate of title for the same
parcel of land in the name of the City of Manila.1
The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case are as follows:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration court, rendered
judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more
or less. Pursuant to said judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 21, 1920, issued in favor of the City of Manila,
Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering the aforementioned parcel of land. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila
sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura Villanueva. As a consequence of the transactions Original
Certificate of Title No. 4329 was cancelled and transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Pura Villanueva for the
portions purchased by her. When the last sale to Pura Villanueva was effected on August 22, 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 21974 in the name of the City of Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22547
covering the residue thereof known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an area of 7,490.10 square meters, was issued in the
name of the City of Manila.
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antono J. Villegas, adopted a resolution
requesting His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by
Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a total area of
7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual
occupants thereof.2
The said resolution of the Municipil Board of the City of Manila was officially transmitted to the President of the Philippines by
then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on September 21, 1960, with the information that the same resolution was, on the same
date, transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines.3
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, House Bill No. 191 was filed in the House of Representatives by
then Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang seeking to declare the property in question as patrimonial property of the City of
Manila, and for other purposes. The explanatory note of the Bill gave the grounds for its enactment, to wit:
In the particular case of the property subject of this bill, the City of Manila does not seem to have use
thereof as a public communal property. As a matter of fact, a resolution was adopted by the Municipal
Board of Manila at its regular session held on September 21, 1960, to request the feasibility of declaring
the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets as a patrimonial property of the
City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. Therefore, it will be
to the best interest of society that the said property be used in one way or another. Since this property
has been occupied for a long time by the present occupants thereof and since said occupants have
expressed their willingness to buy the said property, it is but proper that the same be sold to them.4
Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen Manuel Cases,
Antonio Raquiza and Nicanor Yñiguez as House Bill No. 1453, with the following explanatory note:
The accompanying bill seeks to convert one (1) parcel of land in the district of Malate, which is reserved
as communal property into a disposable or alienable property of the State and to provide its subdivision
and sale to bona fide occupants or tenants.
This parcel of land in question was originally an aggregate part of a piece of land with an area of 9,689.8
square meters, more or less. ... On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila in its regular
session unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the President of the Philippines and Congress of
the Philippines the feasibility of declaring this property into disposable or alienable property of the State.
There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided and sold to bona fide
occupants. This parcel of land will not serve any useful public project because it is bounded on all sides
by private properties which were formerly parts of this lot in question.
Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the Administration of land for the landless and the Fifth
Declaration of Principles of the Constitution, which states that the promotion of Social Justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all people should be the concern of the State. We are ready and
willing to enact legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the people whenever an
opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.
In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure fairness and justice to the present bona fide occupants thereof, approval
of this Bill is strongly urged.5
The Bill having been passed by the House of Representatives, the same was thereafter sent to the Senate where it was
thoroughly discussed, as evidenced by the Congressional Records for May 20, 1964, pertinent portion of which is as follows:
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, it will be re called that when the late Mayor Lacson was still alive,
we approved a similar bill. But afterwards, the late Mayor Lacson came here and protested against the
approval, and the approval was reconsidered. May I know whether the defect in the bill which we
approved, has already been eliminated in this present bill?
SENATOR TOLENTINO: I understand Mr. President, that that has already been eliminated and that is why
the City of Manila has no more objection to this bill.
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, in view of that manifestation and considering that Mayor Villegas
and Congressman Albert of the Fourth District of Manila are in favor of the bill. I would not want to
pretend to know more what is good for the City of Manila.
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there being no objection, I move that we approve this bill on
second reading.
PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The biII is approved on second reading after several Senetors said aye and
nobody said nay.
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the President on June 20, 1964, and became Republic Act No. 4118. It reads as
follows:
Lot I-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, situated in the District of Malate,
City of Manila, which is reserved as communal property, is hereby converted into disposal or alienable
land of the State, to be placed under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration. The Land Tenure
Administration shall subdivide the property into small lots, none of which shall exceed one hundred and
twenty square meters in area and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide
occupants thereof and to individuals, in the order mentioned: Provided, That no down payment shall be
required of tenants or bona fide occupants who cannot afford to pay such down payment: Provided,
further, That no person can purchase more than one lot: Provided, furthermore, That if the tenant
or bona fide occupant of any given lot is not able to purchase the same, he shall be given a lease from
month to month until such time that he is able to purchase the lot: Provided, still further, That in the
event of lease the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per cent per annum of the
assessed value of the property leased: And provided, finally, That in fixing the price of each lot, which
shall not exceed twenty pesos per square meter, the cost of subdivision and survey shall not be included.
Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act no ejectment proceedings against any tenant or bona fide occupant of
the above lots shall be instituted and any ejectment proceedings pending in court against any such
tenant or bona fide occupant shall be dismissed upon motion of the defendant: Provided, That any
demolition order directed against any tenant or bona fide occupant shall be lifted.
 Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act, if the tenant or bona fide occupant is in arrears in the payment of any
rentals, the amount legally due shall be liquidated and shall be payable in twenty-four equal monthly
installments from the date of liquidation.
Sec. 4. No property acquired by virtue of this Act shall be transferred, sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
disposed of within a period of five years from the date full ownership thereof has been vested in the
purchaser without the consent of the Land Tenure Administration.
Sec. 5. In the event of the death of the purchaser prior to the complete payment of the price of the lot
purchased by him, his widow and children shall succeed in all his rights and obligations with respect to
his lot.
Sec. 6. The Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration shall implement and issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred fifty thousand pesos is appropriated out of any funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 20, 1964.
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and pursuant to the request of the occupants of the property involved,
then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land Authority (which succeeded the Land Tenure Administration) addressed a letter,
dated February 18, 1965, to Mayor Antonio Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the proposed subdivision plan of said lot as
prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for resale of the subdivision lots by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants.6
On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the
proposed subdivision plan of the property in question and informed the Land Authority that his office would interpose no
objection to the implementation of said law, provided that its provisions be strictly complied with.7
With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of Manila for the implementation of Republic Act No. 4118, the Land
Authority, thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the City Treasurer of Manila, thru the City Mayor, for the
surrender and delivery to the former of the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in order to obtain title
thereto in the name of the Land Authority. The request was duly granted with the knowledge and consent of the Office of the
City Mayor.8
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547, which had been yielded as above stated by the, City authorities
to the Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T. No. 22547) was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila and in
lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 was issued in the name of the Land Tenure Administration (now Land
Authority) pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.  classification is conclusive upon the courts; that if the City of Manila feels that this is wrong and its interests have been thereby
4118.9
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a complete turn-about, for on December 20,
1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized public
corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the
herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further
implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained in the partial stipulation of facts submitted to the trial court and
approved by respondent Judge, the parties waived the presentation of further evidence and submitted the case for decision.
On September 23, 1968, judgment was rendered by the trial court declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid
on the ground that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process of law and payment of just compensation.
The respondents were ordered to undo all that had been done to carry out the provisions of said Act and were restrained from
further implementing the same.
Two issues are presented for determination, on the resolution of which the decision in this case hinges, to wit:
I. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?
II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution?
I.
As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the land involved is a communal land or "legua comunal" which is a portion
of the public domain owned by the State; that it came into existence as such when the City of Manila, or any pueblo or town in
the Philippines for that matter, was founded under the laws of Spain, the former sovereign; that upon the establishment of a
pueblo, the administrative authority was required to allot and set aside portions of the public domain for a public plaza, a
church site, a site for public buildings, lands to serve as common pastures and for streets and roads; that in assigning these
lands some lots were earmarked for strictly public purposes, and ownership of these lots (for public purposes) immediately
passed to the new municipality; that in the case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such immediate
acquisition of ownership by the pueblo, and the land though administered thereby, did not automatically become its property
in the absence of an express grant from the Central Government, and that the reason for this arrangement is that this class of
land was not absolutely needed for the discharge of the municipality's governmental functions.
It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not been used by the City of Manila for any public purpose and had not
been officially earmarked as a site for the erection of some public buildings; that this circumstance confirms the fact that it was
originally "communal" land alloted to the City of Manila by the Central Government not because it was needed in connection
with its organization as a municipality but simply for the common use of its inhabitants; that the present City of Manila as
successor of the Ayuntamiento de Manila under the former Spanish sovereign merely enjoys the usufruct over said land, and
its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial property of the
City of Manila nor divest the State of its paramount title.
Appellants further argue that a municipal corporation, like a city is a governmental agent of the State with authority to govern
a limited portion of its territory or to administer purely local affairs in a given political subdivision, and the extent of its
authority is strictly delimited by the grant of power conferred by the State; that Congress has the exclusive power to create,
change or destroy municipal corporations; that even if We admit that legislative control over municipal corporations is not
absolute and even if it is true that the City of Manila has a registered title over the property in question, the mere transfer of
such land by an act of the legislature from one class of public land to another, without compensation, does not invade the
vested rights of the City.
Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. 4118 has treated the land involved as one reserved for communal use, and this
prejudiced, the matter should be brought to the attention of Congress for correction; and that since Congress, in the exercise
of its wide discretionary powers has seen fit to classify the land in question as communal, the Courts certainly owe it to a
coordinate branch of the Government to respect such determination and should not interfere with the enforcement of the law.
Upon the other hand, appellees argue by simply quoting portions of the appealed decision of the trial court, which read thus:
 The respondents (petitioners-appellants herein) contend, among other defenses, that the property in
question is communal property. This contention is, however, disproved by Original Certificate of Title No.
4329 issued on August 21, 1920 in favor of the City of Manila after the land in question was registered in
the City's favor. The Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of
the said land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the decree of confirmation and
registration in favor of the City of Manila ... shall be conclusive upon and against all persons including the
Insular Government and all the branches there ... There is nothing in the said certificate of title indicating
that the land was 'communal' land as contended by the respondents. The erroneous assumption by the
Municipal Board of Manila that the land in question was communal land did not make it so. The
Municipal Board had no authority to do that.
The respondents, however, contend that Congress had the power and authority to declare that the land
in question was 'communal' land and the courts have no power or authority to make a contrary finding.
This contention is not entirely correct or accurate. Congress has the power to classify 'land of the public
domain', transfer them from one classification to another and declare them disposable or not. Such
power does not, however, extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces and municipalities
in their 'patrimonial' capacity.
Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides that properties of provinces, cities and municipalities are divided into
properties for public use and patrimonial property. Art. 424 of the same code provides that properties
for public use consist of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades and public works for public service paid for by said province, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial. Tested by this criterion the Court finds and
holds that the land in question is patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
Respondents contend that Congress has declared the land in question to be 'communal' and, therefore,
such designation is conclusive upon the courts. The Courts holds otherwise. When a statute is assailed as
unconstitutional the Courts have the power and authority to inquire into the question and pass upon it.
This has long ago been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60, when the United States Supreme
Court speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall held:
... If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its validity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give effect? It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is ... So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very
essence of unconstitutional judicial duty.
Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a law unconstitutional it does not mean that the judicial power is
superior to the legislative power. It simply means that the power of the people is superior to both and that when the will of the
legislature, declared in statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be
governed by the Constitution rather than by the statutes.
There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind in resolving the character of the land involved, and it is that the
City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in
what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. It is true that the City of Manila as well as its
predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de Manila, could validly acquire property in its corporate or private capacity, following the
accepted doctrine on the dual character — public and private — of a municipal corporation. And when it acquires property in
its private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts or making transactions for the
transmission of title or other real rights. When it comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes
established by law for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by
the City of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such
land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally the
municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by the State not for its public but for private use.
Other properties it owns are acquired in the course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which
category a municipal corporation pertains.
Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence when a town or pueblo was established in this country under the
laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of the Philippines were not
entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the
usufruct of a portion of the public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal
purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the
ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327).
For the establishment, then, of new pueblos the administrative authority of the province, in
representation of the Governor General, designated the territory for their location and extension and the
metes and bounds of the same; and before alloting the lands among the new settlers, a special
demarcation was made of the places which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the
erection of the church, and as sites for the public buildings, among others, the municipal building or
the casa real, as well as of the lands whick were to constitute the common pastures, and propios of the
municipality and the streets and roads which were to intersect the new town were laid out, ... .
(Municipality of Catbalogan vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 220) (Emphasis supplied) 
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for
the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject
to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the
performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of
local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different
use (2 McQuilin,Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd 241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not absolute even when it comes to its property devoted to
public use, for such control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their property or rights without due
process of law, or in a manner impairing the obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the
municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its
administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it
did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
the people.
It has been held that a statute authorizing the transfer of a Municipal airport to an Airport Commission created by the
legislature, even without compensation to the city, was not violative of the due process clause of the American Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Minnessota in Monagham vs. Armatage, supra, said:
... The case is controlled by the further rule that the legislature, having plenary control of the local
municipality, of its creation and of all its affairs, has the right to authorize or direct the expenditures of
money in its treasury, though raised, for a particular purpose, for any legitimate municipal purpose, or to
order and direct a distribution thereof upon a division of the territory into separate municipalities ... .
The local municipality has no such vested right in or to its public funds, like that which the Constitution
protects in the individual as precludes legislative interferences. People vs. Power, 25 Ill. 187; State Board
(of Education) vs. City, 56 Miss. 518. As remarked by the supreme court of Maryland in Mayor vs. Sehner,
37 Md. 180: "It is of the essence of such a corporation, that the government has the sole right as trustee
 of the public interest, at its own good will and pleasure, to inspect, regulate, control, and direct the
corporation, its funds, and franchises."
We therefore hold that c.500, in authorizing the transfer of the use and possession of the municipal
airport to the commission without compensation to the city or to the park board, does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for communal use (terreno comunal). The act of classifying State
property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered with by the courts.
This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity of Republic Act No. 4118, viewed in the light of Article III, Sections
1, subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution which ordain that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law and that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
II .
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for allegedly depriving the City of Manila of its property without
due process of law and without payment of just compensation. It is now well established that the presumption is always in
favor of the constitutionality of a law (U S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1; Go Ching, et al. vs. Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703,
705). To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even
if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a
law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done
(Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424). That situation does not obtain in this case as the law
assailed does not in any manner trench upon the constitution as will hereafter be shown. Republic Act No. 4118 was intended
to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the Government program of "Land for the Landless". The
explanatory note of House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic Act No. 4118, reads in part as follows:
Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the administration of "land for the landless" and the
Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution which states that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all people should be the concern of the State." We are
ready and willing to enact legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the people
whenever an opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.
The respondent Court held that Republic Act No. 4118, "by converting the land in question — which is the patrimonial property
of the City of Manila into disposable alienable land of the State and placing it under the disposal of the Land Tenure
Administration — violates the provisions of Article III (Secs. 1 and 2) of the Constitution which ordain that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law". In support thereof reliance is placed on the ruling in Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of
Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440, March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 1334, which holds that Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its
private or patrimonial property without due process of law and without payment of just compensation since it has no absolute
control thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule if it is undisputed that the property sought to be taken is in reality a private or
patrimonial property of the municipality or city. But it would be simply begging the question to classify the land in question as
such. The property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or
proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in
trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its
creation. That the National Government, through the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, in the cadastral
proceedings did not contest the claim of the City of Manila that the land is its property, does not detract from its character as
State property and in no way divests the legislature of its power to deal with it as such, the state not being bound by the
mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.
One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila expressly recognized the paramount title of the State over said
land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas,
requested "His Excellency the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by
Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of 7,450
square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants
thereof." (See Annex E, Partial Stipulation of Facts, Civil Case No. 67945, CFI, Manila, p. 121, Record of the Case) [Emphasis
Supplied]
The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the ownership of the City of Manila is totally belied by the City's own
official act, which is fatal to its claim since the Congress did not do as bidden. If it were its patrimonial property why should the
City of Manila be requesting the President to make representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed
of in favor of the actual occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State
and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said land
for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by
squatters, no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim
that it is its own private or patrimonial property (Municipality of Tigbauan vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of Manila vs.
Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327; Municipality of Luzuriaga vs. Director of Lands, 24 Phil. 193). The conclusion of the
respondent court that Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila into a parcel of disposable
land of the State and took it away from the City without compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the last analysis the land in
question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom
the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.
Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as
communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: And this was done at the
instance or upon the request of the City of Manila itself. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent
domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a
manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property.
It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted upon formal written petition of the Municipal Board of Manila in
the form of a legally approved resolution. The certificate of title over the property in the name of the City of Manila was
accordingly cancelled and another issued to the Land Tenure Administration after the voluntary surrender of the City's
duplicate certificate of title by the City Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the City Mayor. To implement the
provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy Governor of the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to
the City Mayor furnishing him with a copy of the "proposed subdivision plan of the said lot as prepared for the Republic of the
Philippines for subdivision and resale by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants." On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila,
through his Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the subdivision plan and informed the Land Authority
that his Office "will interpose no objection to the implementation of said law provided that its provisions are strictly complied
with." The foregoing sequence of events, clearly indicate a pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the reversion
of the property to the National Government. All such acts were done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and
power of the Congress to dispose of the land involved.
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under the
eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of having the land
involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does
not, therefore, suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled
implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

  7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,  8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38

vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA 9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
— SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS
SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, 1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, 10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to 
MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.
WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD
MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants. 11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26

12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34

Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.
City Fiscal's Office for plaintiff-appellee. 13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88

SANCHEZ, J.: 14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32

15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets
in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947,
16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16
defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class
materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There
they lived thru the years to the present. 17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98

18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio
Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Paid up to
Sanchez, Honorio Beriño, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were 19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.
given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property
upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received 20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84
their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23
defendants exhibited none. 21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40

For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1äwphï1.ñët 22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60

23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48

Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:

Amt. due from  P7,580.69

Area  Monthly 
NAME date of delinquency 
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this school's
1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97 expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear
squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08 improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and
March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants
3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36 refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.2

4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24 The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore indicated opposite their
respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the costs.
5. Aquilino Barrios Defendants appealed.
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly found that the city needs that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we look into the validity of
the premises for school purposes. the permits granted defendants herein.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the
Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the
1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said
document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that
there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E,
aforesaid.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects
of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades
have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises
for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits.8 The city charter
enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila.9

It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is our considered view that the
conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court
Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving
its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.4
permits, or, for that matter, executing leases.

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act.
stand, the trial judge could well have taken — because the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of Ordinance
In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official
4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
norm of conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid
promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official
that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de
approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of
los Santos Elementary School.
government.

Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants have absolutely no
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or oral, to defendants,
right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to
and that the permits herein granted are null and void.
occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this
factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw
defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there 3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises. They clearly hinder and
was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing
below.7 school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of
defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is
paramount.10
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are wrong.

They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the
city. Their homes were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters:
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this,
for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the
prejudice of the education of the youth of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct
performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system
of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction".12

Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a widespread vice. It was and Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could well have been summarily
is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They constitute abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13
proof that respect for the law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are being flouted. Knowingly,
squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They say that the case should have
interests — without as much as leave, and even against the will, of the owner. They are emboldened seemingly
been started in the municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment that notice for them to vacate was
because of their belief that they could violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of some of them has tied
only served in September, 1961, and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the
up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means.
Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that their forcible entry dates back to the period from 1945 to
Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property, government
1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit
or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by means, fair or foul,
was filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the Manila Court of First Instance
are quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into government
has jurisdiction.14
lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of
these squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright encouragement or
protection. Said squatters have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong. To them, violation of Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-appellants. So ordered.
law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public interest. It is high time
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur. (1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of approximately 2,489.96
square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery; 

(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square meters and categorized as
a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and 
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, 
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO (3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is now
MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents. vacant. 

G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990  The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during
World War II. 
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, 
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years in
RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents. Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into those for use by the government
sector and those for private parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013. 
the private sector shall be made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned
entities in national development projects. 

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists
of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503).
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976
with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the
scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. 
of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose to
the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspire of strong public A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to
opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — which shall construct two
bidding process.  (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine
92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine
resolution dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government
parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon.  retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on this
proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino
created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a motion for an extension of thirty (30) through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D. 
days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we
granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of
time which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
been pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the
noted his motion and resolved to decide the two (2) cases.  Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause. 

I  Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its
decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court.
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:  Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price became merely a suggested floor price. 
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the
alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the
alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities.
These petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to stop the sale of
the Roppongi property. 
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues: 
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and  had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property? 
bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the government's intention to remove the Roppongi
property from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding
Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on March
30, 1989. 
III 
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. He
order contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of
the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates: 

(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to alienate the
and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).i•t•c-aüsl 
Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to non-
Filipino citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of
Philippine Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by (2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
denying them the right to be informed about the bidding requirements.  patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution); 

II (3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices; 

In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots were acquired as part of the (4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern (Section 7, Article III,
reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Constitution); 
Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article
420 of the Civil Code (See infra). 
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods
received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and 
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the
above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Section 28, Article
State. The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters,
III, Constitution). 
buildings and other improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they continue to be
intended for a necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66).
Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional executive order is a
nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the misapplication of public funds He states that since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly
Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property of public dominion so long as the disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in
government has not used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo, interested
use.  Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the
Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax under
Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted. 
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by our
Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke IV
Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the
inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property situated in Japan.  The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the three related
properties were through reparations agreements, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property property itself was specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy. 
has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for
public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts, Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for Japanese government. 
the possibility of alienating the four government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the
enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains
a provision stating that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. 
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a
special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and
resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino,
Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26). 
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are: 
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.  were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion 
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character; 
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.  authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property. 
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service. 
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has been Idle for some
years? Has it become patrimonial?  coverage and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its provision — is not presented to the Court It is simply asserted
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert
it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).  transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We
emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definiteAbandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]).
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original
purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated,
there simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and
conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties.  opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a provision in its text expressly
authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. The executive order does not
declare that the properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and
not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789
that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The
text of Executive Order No. 296 provides: 
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other
manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino citizens. 
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties
for the government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector properties
can be sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was
amended by Executive Order No. 296. 
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the
proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi
property from being classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers
to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not
to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any
property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds. 
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by insisting that Japanese law
and not our Civil Code should apply. 
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of
extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law - its
that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides. It is a ed on faith that
Japanese law would allow the sale. 
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation
arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A
foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence,
the need to determine which law should apply. 
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. 
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And
the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not
apply. 
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The
of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of
lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no
showing that it can be sold? 
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating committee to "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of
sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor did it
Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that
legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year.  in case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may
be used for national economic development projects including the CARP. 
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another
obstacle to its sale by the respondents.  Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi
property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the issues raised in 1989. 
There is no law authorizing its conveyance. 
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it
alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides 
constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda. 

Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. — In cases in which the
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying
cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will
the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some
thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which,
other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909],
together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).
approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the
President of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government of
the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not be sold: 
supplied) 
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).  reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military
occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the
homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. — Whenever real property of the Government
monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect economic or financial
government by the following: 
benefits from them. But who would think of selling these monuments? Filipino honor and national
dignity dictate that we keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the and suffered. Even if we should become paupers we should not think of selling them. For it would be
President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.  as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147) 

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states: 
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied) 
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in atonement for its
past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical dislocation and
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such economic devastation the whole Filipino people endured in World War II. 
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence. 
It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its significance today
remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspire of the passage of 32
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not years since the property passed on to the Philippine government. 
withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration
abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting
Roppongi is a reminder that cannot — should not — be dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9) 
hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of
the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan. 
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property
in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the constitutionality of Executive
Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress
Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi
must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public
property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the
dominion must be faithfully followed. 
constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat
petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property." In emphasizing that
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the
respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary
Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.  title thereon is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As sufficiently established, the area in question is a foreshore land
SO ORDERED. 
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur. 
 
CLEMENCIA B. VDA. DE VILLONGCO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,  decision: otherwise, this Office or its duly authorized representative shall remove the same at the expense of the
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Public Works and Communications  judicial action against them under the provisions of Section 3 of R. A. 2056." (Annex "C", pp. 20-21) .
and BENIGNO MUSNI, respondents-appellants.
E. Voltaire Garcia for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
The above-entitled case involves the application and interpretation of Republic Act. No. 2056, entitled "An Act to prohibit,
remove and/or demolish the construction of dams, dikes or any works in public navigable waters or waterways and in
communal fishing grounds, to regulate works in such waters or waterways and in communal fishing grounds, and to provide
penalties for its violation, and for other purposes." The pertinent provisions thereof in issue are Section 1 and the first part of
Section 2, which read as follows:  case was had, with the submission of a stipulation of facts, with exhibits, entered into between the parties, after which the
Sec. 2. — When it is found by the secretary of Public Works and Communications, after due notice and hearing, that
any dam, dike or any other works now existing or may hereinafter be constructed encroaches into any public
navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other public navigable waters or waterways, or that they are
contructed in areas declared as communal fishing grounds, he shall have the authority to order the removal of any
such works and give the party concerned a period not to exceed thirty days for the removal of the same; Provide,
That fishpond constructions or works on communal fishing grounds introduced in good faith before the areas were
proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided such constructions or
works do not obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river, stream, or would not cause inundations of
agricultural areas....".
The facts involved in the case may be briefly stated as follows: On August 15, 1958, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa complained with
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against several fishpond owners in Macabebe, Pampanga, among whom is
petitioner herein Clemencia B. Vda. de Villongco. The complaint charges that has appropriated a portion of the coastal waters
of Pampanga, locally known as "Pantion", converting portions of the coastal areas into fishponds. Investigations were
conducted under the authority of the Secretary, who thereafter rendered the following decision: .
Complainants allege that the conversion of this area into a fishpond by the respondents deprived them of the uses
of the area as a fishing ground and for navigation. On the other hand, the respondents contend that this area is
owned by them as shown by the title above-adverted to.
A relocation survey, based on the title, was made on the area in question to determine whether the fishpond
constructions and/or works of the respondents are within the titled property. Said survey shows that a portion of
Manila Bay covering an area of approximately 24,860 square meters was included as part of the fishpond by the
respondents.
The defense of respondents that the area in question being a private property, is not subject to the provisions of
Republic Act 2056, deserves consideration. The area being covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, the respondent's
and is disposable under Section 59 of the Public Land Law. However, of the enclosed portion, the area of 24,860
square meters has been conclusively shown by the relocation survey as not within the boundaries of the titled
property. Be that as it may, this portion is still of public ownership and the complainants should, therefore, not be
deprived of its uses as a fishing ground and passageway.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is hereby ordered that the respondents remove their fishpond works and/or
constructions insofar as it encroaches upon that portion of Manila Bay covering the area of approximately 24,860
square meters and restore the original condition of said coastal water within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
respondents within ten (10) days following the expiration of the thirty-day period, without prejudice to instituting
Clemencia B. Vda. de Villongco filed a motion to reconsider the decision, but the same was denied by the Undersecretary in a
resolution dated August 5, 1959. Thereupon, on August 20, 1959, petitioner herein filed the present suit in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, calling attention to the above proceedings, especially the decision of the Secretary and the resolution of the
Undersecretary denying the motion for reconsideration, and arguing that Republic Act. No. 2056, under which the Secretary
issued the order above-quoted, is null and void as to conferring upon the Secretary power to decide as to whether or not the
dikes and other constructions encroach upon coastal waters, public streams, communal fishing grounds, etc.; that the
Undersecretary acted without or in he excess of jurisdiction in delegating reception of evidence, in causing resurvey of the
premises by a person who is not a duly licensed surveyor, in violation of the agreement to that effect, in the absence of
petitioner Villongco; that the Secretary's order of demolition of the fishponds was beyond the jurisdiction of said Secretary and
is unconstitutional as an encroachment upon the private rights of the petitioners, etc. Upon the presentation of the petition,
the court below issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Secretary's disputed order. Trial of the
court, through Hon. Andres Reyes, rendered a decision declaring that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was
in error in ordering the demolition of the dikes and other constructions of the petitioner Vda. de Villongco, on the ground that
said dikes and other constructions fall under the exception mentioned in Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 2056. We quote the
order herein:.
Without the necessity of resolving the various incidental issues raised by the parties, the Court is of the opinion that
the case at bar hinges on only one vital issue-that is whether the petitioners properly fall within the benefits of the
exemption expressly provided for under section 2 of Republic Act 2056, to wit:.
PROVIDED, That fishpond constructions on communal fishing grounds introduced in good faith before
the areas were proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided
such constructions or works do not obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river, stream,
or would not cause inundations of agricultural areas..
AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, that the removal of any such works shall not impair fishponds completed or
about to be completed which do not encroach or obstruct any public navigable river or stream and/or
which would not cause inundations of agricultural areas and which have been constructed in good faith
before the area was declared communal fishing grounds.' .
A perusal of the above provisions reveals that the petitioners herein would be entitled to the benefits of
said exemptions provided the following requisites are present: first, that the constructions or works in
question were constructed in good faith before the areas were declared communal fishing grounds;
second, that said constructions or works would not impede the free passage of any navigable river or
stream; and lastly, that the same would not cause inundations of agricultural areas.
 There is no question that the constructions of petitioners would not cause inundations of agricultural
areas. This was admitted in the answer of respondent Secretary and later included in the stipulation of
facts. There is also no dispute as to the fact that the same were constructed in good faith before June 13,
1958 when Republic Act No. 2056 took effect and therefore before any fishing ground could have been
declared communal." (pp. 2-3, of the decision).
The respondent Secretary has appealed from the above decision, alleging the following errors: .
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT CASE FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION AND IN
DECIDING THE SAME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE ISSUES INVOLVED THEREIN.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2056 WHICH, OTHERWISE, IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS, AND IN CONSTRUING THE EXEMPTING CLAUSE PROVIDED IN SEC. 2 THEREOF TO INCLUDE FISHPOND
CONSTRUCTIONS OR WORK OUTSIDE THE AREAS DECLARED AS COMMUNAL FISHING GROUNDS.
III  foot and at low tide navigable to those of 1 foot draft. It is, therefore, a part of the water ways, taking into account that the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEES FAIL WITHIN SAID EXEMPTING PROVISION OF SECTION 2 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2056.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ISSUING EX-PARTE THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND LATER MAKING IT
PERMANENT..
V 2. The coast sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width recognized by international
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION. 
An examination of the facts adduced at the trial shows that petitioner Vda. de Villongco is the owner of a fishpond situated in
Macabebe, Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7087 dated January 28, 1952, containing an area of 90
hectares, 26 ares and 54 centares, bounded on the SW and W by the Manila Bay and on the NW by the Manila Bay and the
Supang Maruginas (Annex B-Stipulation). A competent surveyor in the person of the Dredge Operation Supervisor of the
Department of Public Works conducted an investigation and submitted a report (Annex E of the Stipulation of Facts), with an
accompanying sketch of the fishpond showing the disputed portion, included within the dike of the petitioner. The existing dike
of the petitioner is a straight line from point A of Annex E-1 to point D, and it includes a portion of public land indicated in red
(portion B-c in said Annex E-1, containing an area of 2 hectares, 48 ares and 60 centares (24,860 square meters). The surveyor
found the following: 
It seems that the average depth along the sea side of the dike A-D as shown in the attached plan may be about one
(1) foot M. L. L. W.1äwphï1.ñët
That section B-C of the dike is along the prolongation of section A-B towards point C and that no part of dike B-C
protruding towards the sea.
That navigation along dike A-D during low tide is limited to vessels with a draft of about one foot.
That section B-C of the dike will obstruct navigation towards a public domain (shaded red in the attached plan) with
an indicated area of about 24,880 square meters.
In my opinion, section B-C of the dike will not obstruct navigation along or parallel to it." (Annex E - Stipulation) .
The court below held that said portion falls under the exception of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2056, because it does not
interfere with navigation and does not produce inundation and the dikes were constructed before the area was a fishing
ground. (The parties have stipulated that there is yet no order declaring the area as a fishing ground.) 
A study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, especially the sections we quote above disclose that the authority granted
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications is to declare that the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other
works encroaching on navigable rivers, streams, or any other navigable public waters or waterways is prohibited and to order
their removal or demolition. The area included in the dikes of the petitioner, indicated in the red shaded portion in the
Stipulation, Exh. E-1, was not a part of the land titled in the name of the petitioner, as shown by the fact that the titled land
bounds on the W by a line from point 1 to point 19, point 19 to point 20 and point 20 to point 21 of Lot No. 2 indicated in the
plan of the land. Said red shaded portion, which contains an area of 24,860 square meters, is clearly, therefore, a portion of the
Manila Bay area or coastal area, which the petitioner has evidently included within her dikes, perhaps to straighten the same.
As the shaded portion has a depth of 1 foot and low tide, it is evidently navigable at high tide for vessels of deeper draft of 1
Manila Bay area, especially those bordering the fishponds in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan and Rizal are waterways,
especially used by fishermen and fishpond owners to bring in their catch to market. The shaded area, therefore, is a public
property, not susceptible to appropriation by any private individual, not only because it belongs to the State but also because it
belongs to the State but also because it is used as a waterway..
Article 1. — The following are part of the National domain open to public use:
xxx     xxx     xxx
law. ...." (Art. 1, paragraphs 1 and 2, Spanish Law of Waters; see also Insular Government v. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505.
510.) .
The error of the court below lies in the fact that it considered the coast sea as falling under the exception of Section 2. But an
examination of Section 2 shows that coastal waters or public waterways are not included in the exception. Only those works
constructed on communal fishing grounds are exempted; constructions on coastal waters or public waterways are not subject
to the exception. Aside from that fact, no inundation or free passage of any navigable river can take place on the coastal waters
or waterways, so coastal waters are not subject to the exception. The exception, apparently, applies only to constructions on
navigable rivers, when these constructions do not impede or obstruct the passage of the river and when they do not cause
inundation of agricultural areas. Coastal waters are not within the contemplation of the exception because there is no
navigable river or stream in coastal waters and neither may there be an inundation therein.
We, therefore, find that the court below erred in its decision that the constructions of the petitioner, subject matter of the case
at bar, fall within the exception mentioned in Sec. 2 of the Act and its order in issuing the prohibition is therefore,
unwarranted.
The other error is the failure of the petitioner to avail of the administrative remedy, which consists in appealing from the
decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines. We find this assignment of
error also to be well taken. We have, however, chosen to consider the merits of the issue involved for the more prompt
determination of the case and for a proper understanding of the provisions of Republic Act 2056.
WHEREFORE, the decision and the injunction issued by the court below are hereby set aside, and the petition against the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L40474 August 29, 1975
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner,  (34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
vs.
HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES Presiding Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District, and JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant Provincial
Fiscal, Province of Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's Office and the Bureau of Lands, respondents.
Jose Antonio R Conde for petitioner.
Office of the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney
David R. Hilario for respondents. .
CONCEPCION, Jr., J.:
This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner's application for
registration of title over a parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu.
The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968,
the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M.
Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development
Plan.1 Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City
Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the
highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the
herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed
an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered.4
On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the
property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.5
After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974 the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for
registration of title.6 Hence, the instant petition for review.
For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions:
(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the
City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned? and
(2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu
which may be the object of a common contract?
(1) The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:
Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding,
the City Council shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.
From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. In the case
of Favis vs. City of Baguio,7 where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or withdraw
the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said:
5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu
Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts
well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the
authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled
or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the
public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not
invalidate the vacation ordinance.
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public
use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property
thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
City may be lawfully used or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.
Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No.
N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's
application for registration of title.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J, Fernando, Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur.
 
G.R. No. 100709 November 14, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent constitute sufficient ground for the
nullification of such land grant? Should such property revert to the State once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes
foreshore land?
The Case
These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing the Court of Appeals' 1 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02667
promulgated on June 13, 1991 which answered the said questions in the negative. 2 Respondent Court's dismissed 3 petitioner's
appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court4 of Calauag, Quezon, dated December 28, 1983 in Civil Case
No. C-608. In turn, the Regional Trial Court's decision dismissed petitioner's complaint for cancellation of the Torrens
Certificate of Title of Respondent Morato and for reversion of the parcel of land subject thereof of the public domain.
The Facts
The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of the Philippines, recites the following facts: 5
Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application No. III-3-8186-B on a
parcel of land with an area of 1,265 square meters situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On
January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City issued on
February 4, 1974 Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. Both the free paten and the title specifically
mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five years from the date of the
issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No. 141, as amended).
Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that respondent Morato had
encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter,
it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under
water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on
October 24, 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co
and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25, Folder of Exhibits). The spouses Quilatan constructed a
house on the land. Another portion of the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at
P100.00 a month, where a warehouse was constructed.
On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato, spouses
Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and
reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of respondent
Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-
year prohibitory period (p. 46, Records).
After trial, the lower court, on December 28, 1983, rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's complaint.
In finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5-year period
ban against alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not alienated. It
also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only the improvement and not
the land itself.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
present petition. 6
The Issues
Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by Respondent Court: 7
I
Respondent court erred in holding that the patent granted and certificate of title issued to Respondent
Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after one
year from the issuance of the title.
II
Respondent Court erred in holding that the questioned land is part of a disposable public land and not a
foreshore land.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title
In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court held: 8
. . . As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Alivalas, 168 SCRA 198. ". . . The rule is well-
settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the
nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part
of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the
issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498
(1960); Lopez v. Padilla, (G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44). A homestead patent, one
registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v. San
Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144
(1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676). (p. 203).
Again, in Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Branch I, (123 SCRA 516 (1983) and Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, et al. (39 SCRA 676 (1971) held
that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to
Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a
Torrens Title issued under the Land Registration Act.
 Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General, from filing an
action for reversion, as ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, (supra), as follows:
But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas' title to the property
having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been
any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor
General would be the proper remedy (Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-
14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra). (p. 204).
Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV-3) 275 and the subsequent issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-
17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato were subject to the conditions provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It
alleges that on October 24, 1974, or nine (9) months and eight (8) days after the grant of the patent, mortgaged a portion of
the land" to Respondent Nenita Co, who thereafter constructed a house thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and "within
the five-year prohibitory period," Respondent Morato "leased a portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent of
P100.00 who, shortly thereafter, constructed a house of concrete materials on the subject land."9 Further, petitioner argues
that the defense of indefeasibility of title is "inaccurate." The original certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato "contains
the seeds of its own cancellation": such certificate specifically states on its face that "it is subject to the provisions of Sections
118, 119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as amended." 10
Respondent Morato counters by stating that although a "portion of the land was previously leased," it resulted "from the fact
that Perfecto Advincula built a warehouse in the subject land without [her] prior consent." The mortgage executed over the
improvement "cannot be considered a violation of the said grant since it can never affect the ownership." 11 She states further:
. . . . the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed not because of the principle of indefeasibility of title but
mainly due to failure of the latter to support and prove the alleged violations of respondent Morato. The
records of this case will readily show that although petitioner was able to establish that Morato
committed some acts during the prohibitory period of 5 years, a perusal thereof will also show that what
petitioner was able to prove never constituted a violation of the grant. 12
Respondent-Spouses Quilatan, on the other hand, state that the mortgage contract they entered into with Respondent Morato
"can never be considered as [an] 'alienation' inasmuch as the ownership over the property remains with the owner." 13 Besides,
it is the director of lands and not the Republic of the Philippines who is the real party in interest in this case, contrary to the
provision of the Public Land Act which states that actions for reversion should be instituted by the solicitor general in the name
of Republic of the Philippines. 14
We find for petitioner.
Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act:
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops
on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years
after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (As amended
by Com. Act No. 456, approved June 8, 1939.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a right of way, no
corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right, title, interest, or property right
whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this
Act or to any permanent improvement on such land. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved May 5,
1941)
Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienation or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, association, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or
to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefore by their charters.
Except in cases of hereditary successions, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired under the
free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent
improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of this own,
shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation
hereto shall be null and void. (As amended by Com Act No. 615, Id.).
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in
violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one
hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this
Actshall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumatively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. (Emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or
homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the
grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Encumbrance has been defined as "[a]nything that impairs the use or
transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon
property." It may be a "legal claim on an estate for the discharge of which the estate is liable; and embarrassment of the estate
or property so that it cannot be disposed of without being subject to it; an estate, interest, or right in lands, diminishing their
value to the general owner; a liability resting upon an estate." 15 Do the contracts of lease and mortgage executed within five
(5) years from the issuance of the patent constitute an "encumbrance" and violate the terms and conditions of such patent?
Respondent Court answered in the negative: 16
From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been proved that the area of the portion of the land,
subject matter of the lease contract (Exh. "B") executed by and between Perfecto Advincula and Josefina
L. Morato is only 10 x 12 square meters, where the total area of the land granted to Morato is 1,265
square meters. It is clear from this that the portion of the land leased by Advincula does not significantly
affect Morato's ownership and possession. Above all, the circumstances under which the lease was
executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant intent to violate the conditions provided for in the patent
issued in her favor. On the contrary, Morato was compelled to enter into that contract of lease
out of sympathy and the goodness of her heart to accommodate a fellow man. . . .
It is indisputable, however, that Respondent Morato cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the duration of the lease
contract. This restriction on the enjoyment of her property sufficiently meets the definition of an encumbrance under Section
118 of the Public Land Act, because such contract "impairs the use of the property" by the grantee. In a contract of lease which
is consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative, the owner temporarily grants the use of his or her property to another who
undertakes to pay rent therefor. 17 During the term of the lease, the grantee of the patent cannot enjoy the beneficial use of
the land leased. As already observed, the Public Land Act does not permit a grantee of a free patent from encumbering any
portion of such land. Such encumbrance is a ground for the nullification of the award.
Morato's resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed allegedly out of the goodness of her heart without any intention of
violating the law, cannot help her. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments
based on equity contra legem. 18
Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered an encumbrance. Indeed, we do not
find any support for such contention. The questioned mortgage falls squarely within the term "encumbrance" proscribed by
Section 118 of the Public Land Act. 19 Verily, a mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of such
mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property. 20
Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated within the prohibited period of five years from the issuance of the
patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion of the whole estate to the State. As a condition for the grant of a
free patent to an applicant, the law requires that the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five years from
the issuance of
the patent. The sale or the alienation of part of the homestead violates that condition. 21
The prohibition against the encumbrance — lease and mortgage included — of a homestead which, by analogy applies to a
free patent, is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.: 22
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the
State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the
State prohibits the sale or incumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant
of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in
line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such
alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader,
his widow or heirs within five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It
aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State
had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as
we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the
conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from
the terms of the statute.
By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 and in conformity with the policy of the law, any transfer or
alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies
said alienation and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the State.
The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every
application. 23 Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law, Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to the
property; such property remained part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance.
Conversely, when a "homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for [a]
particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner
thereof." 24 However, for Respondent Morato's title of ownership over the patented land to be perfected, she should have
complied with the requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the property for herself and her family within the
prescribed period of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment of all requirements of the law, Respondent Morato's title over the
property was incomplete. Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the State as the grantor could petition for
the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of the title.
Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar the state from questioning its
transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly stipulated that its award was "subject to the conditions
provided for in Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141." Because she violated Section 118, the
reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily follows, pursuant to Section 124.
Second Issue: Foreshore Land
Revert to the Public Domain
There is yet another reason for granting this petition.
Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it nevertheless sustained the award thereof to
Respondent Morato: 25
First of all, the issue here is whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands. The
Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA 455, 464, as follows:
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the "extraordinary" action of
nature, rainful, for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered
part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be
said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land
capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high
and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides . . . . (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August
31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532; Government vs. Colegio de San
Jose, 53 Phil 423)
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water
marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide. (Rep. vs. CA, supra, 539).
The factual findings of the lower court regarding the nature of the parcel of land in question reads:
Evidence disclose that the marginal area of the land radically changed sometime in
1937 up to 1955 due to a strong earthquake followed by frequent storms
eventually eroding the land. From 1955 to 1968, however, gradual reclamation
was undertaken by the lumber company owned by the Moratos. Having thus
restored the land thru mostly human hands employed by the lumber company, the
area continued to be utilized by the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his
death in 1965. On or about March 17, 1973, there again was a strong earthquake
unfortunately causing destruction to hundreds of residential houses fronting the
Calauag Bay including the Santiago Building, a cinema house constructed of
concrete materials. The catastrophe totally caused the sinking of a concrete bridge
at Sumulong river also in the municipality of Calauag, Quezon.
 On November 13, 1977 a typhoon code named "Unding" wrought havoc as it
lashed the main land of Calauag, Quezon causing again great erosion this time than
that which the area suffered in 1937. The Court noted with the significance of the
newspaper clipping entitled "Baryo ng Mangingisda Kinain ng Dagat" (Exh. "11").
x x x           x x x          x x x
Evidently this was the condition of the land when on or about December 5, 1972
defendant Josefina L. Morato filed with the Bureau of Lands her free patent
application. The defendant Josefina Morato having taken possession of the land
after the demise of Don Tomas Morato, she introduced improvement and
continued developing the area, planted it to coconut tree. Having applied for a
free patent, defendant had the land area surveyed and an approved plan (Exh. "9")
based on the cadastral survey as early as 1927 (Exh. "10") was secured. The area
was declared for taxation purposes in the name of defendant Josefina Morato
denominated as Tax Declaration No. 4115 (Exh. "8") and the corresponding realty
taxes religiously paid as shown by Exh. "8-A"). (pp. 12-14, DECISION).
Being supported by substantial evidence and for failure of the appellant to show cause which would
warrant disturbance, the aforecited findings of the lower court, must be respected.
Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore land:
Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of the subject land was
invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land (632.5 square meters)
is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay shore has extended
up to a portion of the questioned land.
While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the
water, however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had
permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As disclosed at the trial, through the testimony of the
court-appointed commissioner, Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was under water during high tide in the
month of August 1978. The water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the water is
about a kilometer (TSN, July 19, 1979, p. 12). Also, in 1974, after the grant of the patent, the land was
covered with vegetation, but it disappeared in 1978 when the land was reached by the tides (Exh. "E-1",
"E-14"). In fact, in its decision dated December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the erosion of
the land was caused by natural calamities that struck the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18). 26
Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is "unfair and unjust if Josefina Morato will be deprived of the whole
property just because a portion thereof was immersed in water for reasons not her own doing." 27
As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, unless such factual
findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of
facts. 28 The application for a free patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land
Act. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabañgis  29 explained the rationale for this proscription:
Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:
Art. 339. Property of public ownership is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1, case 3, of the law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:
Art. 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use.
xxx xxx xxx
3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the
tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctal tides. Where the tides are
not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms
or tempests.
In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223), with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code
just quoted, this Court said:
We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion
by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become "property of public ownership." as
defined in article 339 of the code, where it appear that the owner has to all intents and purposes
abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the "playa" (shore of the
sea), "rada" (roadstead), or the like. . . .
In the Enciclopedia Juridica Española, volume XII, page 558, we read the following:
With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and private
properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they become part of the shore or
breach. The then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to
the natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not
subject to indemnity.
In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to
the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis 30 annulled the registration of land subject of
cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. 31 In another case, the Court voided the
registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or
entity. 32 The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the assailed Decision of Respondent Court
and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of Free Patent No. (IV-3) 275 issued to Respondent Morato and the subsequent Original
Certificate of Title No. P-17789. The subject land therefore REVERTS to the State. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITY
OF PARAÑAQUE, METRO MANILA, PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE, respondents.
Ceferino, Padua Law Office for Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for service.
Manuel de Guia for Municipality of Parañaque.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for by respondents Municipality of
Parañaque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag for brevity) against petitioner herein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J.
Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open
spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.
On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council of
respondent municipality subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents
do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are
developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to
enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea
markets and/or vending areas.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent
Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered
the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to
respondent Palanyag.
On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days
to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition
and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of
October 16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality' of
Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.
Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of the Solicitor General alleging grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge in issuing the assailed order.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of
Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public service and are therefore public
properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation or private contract by any person, even by the
respondent Municipality of Parañaque. Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated to public use cannot be used for
another public purpose and that absent a clear showing that the Municipality of Parañaque has been granted by the legislature
specific authority to convert a property already in public use to another public use, respondent municipality is, therefore,
bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for the establishment of a flea market. Petitioner also submits that assuming
that the respondent municipality is authorized to close streets, it failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval of the ordinance providing for the establishment of flea markets on public
streets. Lastly, petitioner contends that by allowing the municipal streets to be used by market vendors the municipal council
of respondent municipality violated its duty under the Local Government Code to promote the general welfare of the residents
of the municipality.
In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance, the trial court ruled:
 . . . that Chanter II Section 10 of the Local Government Code is a statutory grant of power given to local
government units, the Municipality of Parañaque as such, is empowered under that law to close its
roads, streets or alley subject to limitations stated therein (i.e., that it is in accordance with existing laws
and the provisions of this code).
xxx xxx xxx
The actuation of the respondent Brig. Gen. Levi Macasiano, though apparently within its power is in fact
an encroachment of power legally vested to the municipality, precisely because when the municipality
enacted the ordinance in question — the authority of the respondent as Police Superintendent ceases to
be operative on the ground that the streets covered by the ordinance ceases to be a public thoroughfare.
(pp. 33-34, Rollo)
We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of whether the disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the flea
market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in force during the time the said ordinance was
enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local Government Code, in connection with established
principles embodied in the Civil Code an property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423,
Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service
paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public
service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which
are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del
Norte v. City of Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example
of this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of
the Local Government Code, which states:
Sec. 10. Closure of roads. — A local government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close
any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any
part of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus
withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. (Emphasis ours).
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close roads and other similar
public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. These basic
principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare.
Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made
available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing
a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public
use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is
already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned
(Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only
then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg.
337, known as Local Government Code. In one case, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal road
of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan.
Thereafter, the City Council passes another resolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding.
We held therein that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use.
Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No.
L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However, those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and
ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. This limitation on the
authority of the local government over public properties has been discussed and settled by this Court en banc in "Francisco V.
Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macaria Asistio, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. 93654, May 6, 1992." This Court ruled:
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought
to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is
property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside
the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or others contract (Villanueva, et al. v.
Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142 citing the Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu v.
Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; And Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street,
the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or
licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not
be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the
greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the
respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a
vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general
law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe
upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e.,
as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same
cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-
compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance, to wit:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents
do(es) not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are
developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. (p. 38, Rollo)
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated December 17, 1990
approval of the ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not used for vehicular traffic which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command
and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any from enforcing the demolition of market stalls along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets is
evidence that will show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the designation by respondents of a time schedule hereby RESERVED and SET ASIDE.
during which the flea market shall operate is absent.
SO ORDERED.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic brought about
by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel,
G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion.
We take note of the other observations of the Solicitor General when he said:

. . . There have been many instances of emergencies and fires where ambulances and fire engines,
instead of using the roads for a more direct access to the fire area, have to maneuver and look for other
streets which are not occupied by stalls and vendors thereby losing valuable time which could,
otherwise, have been spent in saving properties and lives.

Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. Rita Hospital. However, its ambulances and the people
rushing their patients to the hospital cannot pass through G.G. Cruz because of the stalls and the
vendors. One can only imagine the tragedy of losing a life just because of a few seconds delay brought
about by the inaccessibility of the streets leading to the hospital.

The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy of the roads by stalls and vendors, normal
transportation flow is disrupted and school children have to get off at a distance still far from their
schools and walk, rain or shine.

Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litter left by vendors on the streets at the end of the day.
Needless to say, these cause further pollution, sickness and deterioration of health of the residents
therein. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)

Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing findings and observations of petitioners. Instead, respondents want this
Court to focus its attention solely on the argument that the use of public spaces for the establishment of a flea market is well
within the powers granted by law to a local government which should not be interfered with by the courts.

Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by toe Constitution
and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations
of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact
measures that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general
prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting
towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.

As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public have a legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally
constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising
from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in
laws applicable during its time. However, at this point, We find it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local
Government Lode, has already been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991 which took
effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of
the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed
by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested.