Gargantos vs. Tan Yanon G.R. No.

L-14652 I June 30, 1960

FACTS:
In 1927 Tan Yanon purchased a parcel of land with a house of strong materials. This house has
on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the parcel of land acquired by Juan
Gargantos, herein petitioner, together with the camarin and small building thereon.

In May 1955 Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for a permit to construct a
combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this
application. Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a
building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through the
window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters
from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against
the property of petitioner Gargantos.

DECISION:
Respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's
property. The two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owned by respondent, were
formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements
on both properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in
such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion
now belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors
which serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when
respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the
easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered by
Article 624 of the New Civil Code which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one
of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at
the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation
of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The
existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is
equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that
characterizes its existence. Thus, by reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his
land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line separating the two estates.

DRAINAGE, WATERS, ETC:

Tañedo v. BernadG.R. No. L-66520 | August 30, 1988 | 165 SCRA 86 | Padilla, J.
FACTS:Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said two lots, a
septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots. Cardenassold Lot 7501-A
to herein petitioner Tañedo and the other Lot 7501-B was also mortgaged to Tañedo as a security
for the payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him.
However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning
of the said sale, Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Sim
blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the
septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching on
Lot 7501-B. Tañedo was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking
Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute
owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the
Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by
Tañedo.ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner’s right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot
7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who
do not have the same interest.

HELD:No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing or extinguishing
the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo.
Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A
before he sold saidlot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by
operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient
estate (Lot 7501-B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude

Ayala de Roxas vs. City of Manila

FACTS: Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license to construct a terrace over “the
strip of land which is 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said
canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto; which strip of land belongs exclusively to her.” The defendant refused to
grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to rize the plaintiff to build the terrace for the build the
terrace for the sole reason that “the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and
without any construction whatev construction whatever thereon the said strip er thereon the said strip
of 3 meters in width which is a meters in width which is a portion of the ground portion of the ground
belonging to  belonging to her, in o her, in order to use rder to use the sam the same as the w e as the
wharf or publi harf or public way so c way so that the that the plaintiff will plaintiff will only be only be
able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general, thus
losing the enjoymen enjoyment, use, and t, use, and exclusiv exclusive possession of the e possession of
the said strip of said strip of the property which the plaintiff and the property which the plaintiff and the
former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years.
Additionally, it was agreed between both parties thatthe strip above referred to had not been
expropriated in whole or in part expropriated in whole or in part by the municipalit by the municipality
of Manila, and that neither had y of Manila, and that neither had the latter the latter offered any offered
any compensation for the same to the owner thereof. ISSUE: Whether the non-issuance of a license to
the petitioners is tantamount to a taking that requires  just compe  just compensation. nsation. RULING:
YES. What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use,
and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when they
applied for alicense to construct a terrace over said strip, and er said strip, and the defendants
prevented it with the intention of establishing a public easement provided for in an ordinance of their
own which they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the law of waters and of provisions of the law
of waters and of the civil c the civil code in force. In the decision entered by the court on the 5th of May
1906, regarding the demurrer, the following was setforth: The easement of a zone for public use,
authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters in 1866, is developed in articles 160 and 161., inclusive, of
said law; the general interest on behalf of which the easement issupported is determined, for
navigation, by articles 160 and 161; for flotation, by article 162; for salvage, by article 163; and for
fishing, by article 164; in all of them the owner of the riverside property supports the easement
“upon being previously indemnif previously indemnified for ied for loss and damage” Said zone for
public use, the same as Said zone for public use, the same as a towpath, is a towpath, is solely available
for the purposes of solely available for the purposes of navigation, flotation,fishing, and salvage, being
closed to any other use which be attempted; therefore, it is erroneous to pretend that the right of the
owner of the property bordering upon the stream can be reduced to the level of the public right; on the
contrary he should only be called upon to bear those burdens which are in the general interest, but not
without prior, or but not without prior, or subseqent indemnity. subseqent indemnity. (Arts 154-157)
(Arts 154-157) If as affirmed in statement No. 4 and accepted by the defendants, the Sibacon creek- is a
canal —  let usgrant that it is navigable, because it has been held by competent authority —  and that
under the

LUNOD VS MENESES

Facts: -14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, et.al., alleging that they each owned and possessed farm
lands, situated in the places known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that the
defendant Higino Meneses, is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan,
adjoining the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the other; that from time immemorial,
andconsequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the
rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of water over the said land in
Paraanan, which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water
collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip River. From
that year however, the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a
fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through
said place into the Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and
damaged by the stagnant waters,-They therefore asked that judgment be entered against the
defendant, declaring that the said tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting
the flow of water from the property of the plaintiffs,-Meneses denied each and everyone of the
allegations of the complaint, and alleged that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of
the lands described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that he, together
with his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang,the area and boundaries of which were stated by him,
and which he and his brothers had inherited from their deceased mother.Held: Upon the evidence
adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th of March, 1907, entered judgment declaring
that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in their favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the
dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in
the barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy the obstacles to the free passage of the waters
through the strip of land in ParaananRatio: -It appears to have been clearly proven in this case that the
lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as well as the small adjoining lake, named
Calalaran, are located in places relatively higher than the sitio called Paraanan where the land and fish
pond of the defendant are situated, and which border on the Taliptip River; that during the rainy season
the rain water which falls on he land ofthe plaintiffs, and which flows toward the small Calalaran Lake at
flood time, has no outlet to the Taliptip River other than through the low land of Paraanan: that the
border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has existed from time immemorial a dam,
constructed by the community for the purpose of preventing the salt waters from the Taliptip River, at
high tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of ParaananAccording to
article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of another
estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which the easement isestablished is
called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate.The lands of Paraanan being
the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding from
the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by agreement between
the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had imposed it for the common public
utility in view of the difference in the altitude of the lands in the barrio Bambang.Article 552 of the Civil
code provides:Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.Neither
may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this easement, nor the one of the higher
estate works increasing the burden.The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article
111 of which, treating of natural

easements relating to waters, provides:Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters
that flow naturally, without the work ofman, from the higher lands together with the stone or earth
which they carry with them.The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to
make and maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the strict and necessary
obligation to respect the statutoryeasement of waters charged upon his property, and had no right to
close the passage and outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of
Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estates by
obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the
plaintiffs

SALAZAR vs GUTIERREZ 33 SCRA 242, GR No. L-21727 FACTS: Petitioner Crispino Salazar is the registered
owner or Lot 433 situated in Tugo, Balanga, Bataan. Her lot is bounded by Lot No. 361, NE; Sapang Tuyo,
a public stream, SE; Lot 435, SW; and Lot 433, NW. On the other hand private respondents ,Guillermo
Gutierrez and Damaso Mendoza, are the owners and lessee of Lot 433 respectively. Private Guillermo
Gutierrez acquired Lot 433 by inheritance which was registered under the Torrens Title way back May 4,
1927 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1059 was issued in his name on June 11, 1928. No annotation
of any lien or encumbrance affecting the land appears on either title. Before the controversy arose,
Sapang Tuyo was the source of water for irrigation in its surrounding estates. It delivers water through a
dike which transversed Lots 431, 434, 433 and 436. A portion of the dike passed through Lot 433 and
branched into a canal which ran across Lot 433 to Lot 436. Sometime in February 1953, private
respondent Mendoza, who was then a lessee of Lot 433 demolished the said canal stopping the flow of
water and deprived petitioner Salazar of the irrigation facilities. She requested that the canal be rebuild
so that the flow of water could be restored, however her efforts were in vain prompting her to file the
present suit for the damages she incurred. CFI ruled in her favor, finding that the demolished canal had
been in existence for more than thirty years and that the big dike from which it extended had been
constructed for the use of Lot 436 as well as several other lots belonging to different owners, rendered
judgment on April 10, 1956, ordering the defendants to restore at their expense the canal in question, to
connect it with the canal found in Lot 436 and to cause the corresponding annotation of the
encumbrance on Transfer Certificate of Title 1059 covering Lot 433; and ordering the defendants to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P1,360 annually beginning the agricultural year 1956-1957 until the restoration
of the canal, P4,700 as actual damages, P5,000 as moral damages and P1,000 as attorney's fees, plus
costs. However, decision was reversed on appeal, rendering that easement of aqueduct over Lot 433 is a
voluntary one and that upon registration, there was no annotation of said easement as a subsisting
encumbrance. Hence this review by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether appellate court erred in holding that petitioner failed to comply with the requisites laid
down by Article 643 in order to claim legal easement set forth in Article 642 of the New Civil Code.
RULING: On the first requisite of Article 643 — that the petitioner must prove that he can dispose of the
water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended — there is the statement of the trial
court that the disputed canal had been in existence since the Spanish regime, or at least prior to the
original registration of Lot 433 in 1923, and that of the Court of Appeals itself confirmatory of this
second alternative finding. If, as thus found, the petitioner had been using water from Sapang Tuyo to
irrigate Lot 436 since she acquired said lot in 1949, as the Municipality of Balanga had been doing before
her, and that such use had lasted continuously for at least thirty years, it is a fair presumption that she
had a right to do so and that the water she could dispose of was sufficient for the purpose. Indeed it
would be a superfluity to require her to produce a permit from the proper authorities, for even without
it the right had already become vested both under Article 194 of the Spanish Law of Waters and under
Article 504 of the Civil Code, which respectively state: ART. 194. Any person who has enjoyed the use of
public waters for a term of twenty years without objection on the part of the authorities or of any
third person, shall continue in its enjoyment, even though he may not be able to show that he secured
proper permission. ART. 504. The use of public waters is acquired: (1) By administrative concession; (2)
By prescription for ten years. The extent of the rights and obligations of the use shall be that
established, in the first case, by the terms of the concession, and, in the second case, by the manner and
form, in which the waters have been used. The third requisite of Article 643 of the Civil Code refers to
the matter of indemnity to the owner of the servient estate. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner it
would be nigh impossible now to present actual proof that such indemnity has been paid, considering
the number of years that have elapsed since the easement had first come into existence and the
subsequent changes in ownership of the lots involved. It stands to reason, however, that if the
easement had continued for so long in fact, not only before Lot 433 was registered in 1923
RELOVA v. LAVAREZ- Easement and Servitude

The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct and a dam
on the lands of defendant for a period of more than 20 years confers title thereto upon the plaintiff by
virtue of prescription and burdens the lands of the defendants with a corresponding servitude.

FACTS:

The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the aid of water brought from a
river through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. This was by virtue of an
easement the use of which had been with the plaintiff for more than thirty years. On the land of the
defendants there was a dam with a small gate or aperture in its face which was used to control the flow
of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a greater or less quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also
on the land of the defendants.

One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the drainage ditch,
so that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the plaintiff
had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water resulting
from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop. Defendants claim that the plaintiff is
not the owner of any lands watered by the aqueduct of the class known as padagat (rice lands planted in
May). It was also alleged that the plaintiff suffered no damage by the destruction of the dam, because all
the lands of plaintiff which are cultivated with the aid of water from the aqueduct are of the class known
as binanbang (rice lands planted in August or September), and the destruction of the dam in May and
the consequent failure of water in the aqueduct at that period did not, and could not, damage the
plaintiff or interfere with the proper cultivation of his lands.

Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not establish the existence of the servitude
in the lands of the defendants in favor of the lands of the plaintiff landowner for the maintenance of the
aqueduct and dam in question.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the parties.

HELD:

Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all other allegations of defendants were outrightly
disregarded as they were clearly unmeritorious in light of the findings of fact. However, the Court ruled
that there was a valid easement in light of the fact that the aqueduct and the dam had been in existence
for more than 30 years, during which time the plaintif had exercised its use. It was alleged that no
benefit was granted to the plaintiff since his (plaintiff's) land is situated higher than defendants' land.
Moreover, even if defendants had the right to open the gates of the dam to prevent destructive
overflow upon their land, this does not give them the right to stop the flow of water altogether.