2.
Constitutional Basis Petitioners alleged that they have
EDNA COLLADO, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition1 seeks to set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals,2 dated
June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597,
which declared null and void the
Decision3 dated January 30, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec.
No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect
title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
FACTS:
In 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed
with the land registration court an
application for registration of a parcel of
land with an approximate area of
1,200,766 square meters. The Lot is
situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly
known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal.
Attached to the application was the
technical description of the Lot "[t]his
survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed."
The Republic of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its
Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to
petitioners’ application. In due course,
the land registration court issued an
order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the
oppositors.
occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners.
The Lot was surveyed in the name of
Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as
March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the
Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the
corresponding real estate taxes.
According to them, there are now twenty-
five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of
five hectares each.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
It held that petitioners had adduced
sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. The court
confirmed the imperfect title of
petitioners. The Court said that all
Presidential Proclamations like the
Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed are subject to "private rights."
This was cited in the case of Municipality
of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals,
"private rights" is proof of acquisition
through among means of acquisition
of public lands.
The LRC believes that from the evidence
presented as above stated, Applicants
have acquired private rights to which the
Presidential Proclamation setting aside
the Marikina Watershed should be
subject to such private rights.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment pursuant to
Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground
that there had been no clear showing that
the Lot had been previously classified as
alienable and disposable making it
subject to private appropriation.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals granted the petition
and declared null and void the decision.
The Court of Appeals explained that
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is
enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1),
1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987
Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of
the public domain belong to the State.”
An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, for registration of
a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms
part of the public domain.
A positive Act of government is needed
to declassify a public land and to convert
it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic
vs. Bacas). The private respondents
failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as
described has been segregated from the
bulk of the public domain and declared by
competent authority to be alienable and
disposable.
The CA furthermore stated that even
assuming that petitioners did have the
said properties surveyed even before the
same was declared to be part of the
Busol Forest Reservation, the fact
remains that it was so converted into a
forest reservation, thus it is with more
reason that this action must fail. Forest
lands are inalienable and possession
thereof, no matter how long, cannot
convert the same into private property.
And courts are without jurisdiction to
adjudicate lands within the forest zone.
(Heirs of Gumangan vs. CA)
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have
registrable title over the Lot.
2. Whether or not the petitioners
acquire provate rights iver the
parcel of land prior the issuance of
EO 33 segregating the same as a
watershed reservation.
3. Whether or not the petition for
annulment of judgment should
have been given due course.
HELD:
1. No. The Court held that the
petitioners have no registrable
title over the Lot. It stated that it
is a plain error for the petitioners
to argue that under Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No.
926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the
legal presumption that the lands
are alienable and disposable.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. The Constitutions
prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain. Also, the 1987
Constitution was clear on stating that all
lands of the oublic domain and natural
resources belongs to the State.
The Court further stated that since the
most important product of a watershed is
water which is one of the most important
human necessit(ies). The protection of
watershed ensures an adequate supply
of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but also cause loss of
lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational" responsibility that
needs to be answered now."
2. No. The Court held that there
was no proof that the
petitioners had acquired
ownership or title to the Lot
either by deed or by any other
mode of acquisition from the
State with the issuance of EO 33
in 1904 – for instance by
acquisitive prescription.
As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only
been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the
parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the
confirmation of imperfect title. In
Municipality of Santiago v. CA, the Court
held that inalienable public lands “cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription, both acquisitive and
extinctive, does not run against the State,
unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant
from the State.
The evidence of record thus appears
unsatisfactory and insufficient to show
clearly and positively that the Lot had
been officially released from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation to form part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.
Hence, the Court stated that once a
parcel of land is included within a
watershed reservation duly established
by Executive Proclamation, as in the
instant case, a presumption arises that
the land continues to be part of such
Reservation until clear and convincing
evidence of subsequent declassification
is shown.
3. The Court held that in this case
since any title to the lot
concerned is ab initio, the LRC
never acquired any jurisdiction
over it. All the proceedings of the
LRC are therefore null and void.
Being a watershed reservation,
the Lot is not alienable and
disposable public land.
In Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that yhe Land Registration
Court has no jurisdiction over non-
registrable properties, such as public
navigable rivers which are parts of the
public domain, and cannot validly
adjudge the registration of title in favor of
private applicant.
It should be noted further that the
doctrine of estoppel or laches does not
apply when the Government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental
rights, nor does estoppel or laches
validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy, and that res judicata is to be
disregarded if its application would
involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality.
The Court further held that "the right of
reversion or reconveyance to the State of
the public properties registered and
which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does
not prescribe."
Hence, the environmental consequences
in this case override concerns over
technicalities and rules of procedure.
Wherefore, this petition is denied.

NOTES:
• The Spaniards first introduced the
doctrine to the Philippines
through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12,
Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias12 which laid the
foundation that "all lands that
were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public
domain."13 Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories
and possessions" in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.14
• The Maura Law was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in
the Philippines. It required the
"adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the
lands would revert to the state
• In 1903, the United States
colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed
Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act, which was described as
follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public
Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations
for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in
the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands,"
for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and
for the cancellation or confirmation
of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands." The term
"public land" referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and
are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar
lands."
• Act 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act. Act 496
placed all registered lands in the
Philippines under the Torrens
system.The Torrens system
requires the government to issue
a certificate of title stating that the
person named in the title is the
owner of the property described
therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the
title or reserved by law. The
certificate of title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible and all claims
to the parcel of land are quieted
upon issuance of the certificate.19
PD 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree enacted on
June 11, 1978,20 amended and
updated Act 496.
• Article 67 of the Water Code of the
Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
 "Art. 67. Any watershed or any • "A forested area classified as
area of land adjacent to any forest land of the public domain
surface water or overlying any does not lose such classification
ground water may be declared by simply because loggers or settlers
the Department of Natural may have stripped it of its forest
Resources as a protected area. cover. Parcels of land classified as
Rules and Regulations may be forest land may actually be
promulgated by such Department covered with grass or planted to
to prohibit or control such activities crops by kaingin cultivators or
by the owners or occupants other farmers. "Forest lands" do
thereof within the protected area not have to be on mountains or in
which may damage or cause the out of the way places. The
deterioration of the surface water classification is descriptive of
or ground water or interfere with its legal nature or status and
the investigation, use, control, does not have to be descriptive
protection, management or of what the land actually looks
administration of such waters." like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in
• An applicant for confirmation of an official proclamation to that
imperfect title bears the burden of effect so that it may form part of
proving that he meets the the disposable agricultural lands
requirements of Section 48 of CA of the public domain, the rules on
141, as amended. He must confirmation of imperfect title do
overcome the presumption that not apply."
the land he is applying for is part
of the public domain and that he
has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name
arising from an imperfect title. An
imperfect title may have been
derived from old Spanish grants
such as a titulo real or royal grant,
a concession especial or special
grant, a composicion con el
estado or adjustment title, or a
titulo de compra or title through
purchase.29 Or, that he has had
continuous, open and notorious
possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least thirty years
preceding the filing of his
application as provided by Section
48 (b) CA 141.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN
G.R. No. 157485 March 26, 2014
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24,
2003, which upheld the Decisions of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
New Washington and Batan, Aklan in
Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from
the Aklan National College of Fisheries
(ANCF) reservation the portion of land
being claimed by respondents.
FACTS:
Respondents claim that they are the
lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica
Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land
situated at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan. On August 26, 1991,
they respondent heirs instituted in the
RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against
Aklan National College of Fisheries
(ANCF) for recovery of possession,
quieting of title, and declaration of
ownership with damages claiming that
the latter usurped their rights over the
property.
ANCF countered that the subject land
was the subject of Proclamation No.
2074 of then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos allocating the area of said
property as civil reservation for
educational purposes of ANCF. The
ANCF Superintendent furthermore
averred that the subject parcel of land is
timberland and therefore not susceptible
of private ownership.
The respondents presented evidence
that they inherited a bigger parcel of land
from their mother who acquired it by
virtue of a deed of sale. That in 1988 a
potion thereof was occupied by ANCF
and converted into a fishpond for
educational purpose. Respondent heirs
asserted that they were previously in
possession of the disputed land in the
concept of an owner. To prove
possession, respondents presented
several tax declarations, the earliest of
which was in the year 1945.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals unanimously held that
respondents retain private rights to the
disputed property by virtue of their and
their predecessors’ open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession
amounts to an imperfect title, which
should be respected and protected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of the
respondents amounts to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
HELD:
No. At the outset, it must be noted that
respondents have not filed an
application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land
Act or the Property Registration
Decree. Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree provide the
requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself
or through his predecessors–in–interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12,
1945; and (2) the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right
to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond
the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title. The burden
of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying
for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable.
To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.
the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and
disposable.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the
respondents which have the burden to
identify a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. Since respondents failed to do
so, the alleged possession by them and
by their predecessors–in–interest is
inconsequential and could never ripen
into ownership. Accordingly, respondents
cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation
No. 2074 as to prevent the application of
said proclamation to the subject property.

There must be a positive act declaring

land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish

RP vs. TRI-PLUS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150000 September 26,
2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation
filed with the MTC an Application for
Registration of Title over two parcels of
land designated as Lots 1061 and 1062
of the cadastral survey of Consolacion,
Cebu and located at Barangay Tayud,
Consolacion. Tri-Plus alleged that it is the
owner in fee simple of the subject parcels
of land, including the improvements
thereon, having acquired the same
through purchase; and that it is in actual,
continuous, public, notorious, exclusive
and peaceful possession of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest.
The Republic opposed the application
stating that the tax declarations and
receipts of tax payments, do not
constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for or of its open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto; that the claim of ownership
in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish
title or grant may no longer be availed of
by the applicant because it failed to file
an appropriate application for registration
in accordance with the provisions P.D.
No. 892; and that the subject parcels of
land are portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and are not subject to private
appropriation.
The MTC and CA ruled in favor of the
respondents. Petitioner contends that a
mere notation appearing in the survey
plans of the disputed properties showing
that the subject lands had been classified
as alienable and disposable on June 25,
1963 is not sufficient to establish the
nature and character of these lands.
Petitioner asserts that there should be a
positive act on the part of the
government, such as a certification from
the DENR, to prove that the said lands
are indeed alienable and disposable.
Petitioner further contends that even if
the subject properties were classified as
alienable and disposable on June 25,
1963, the law, nonetheless, requires that
such classification should have been
made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands in question are
alienable or disposable.
Held: investigators, and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may also secure a
No. The Court held that the certification from the Government that
respondents failed to submit a the lands applied for are alienable and
certification from the proper disposable.
government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are Furthermore, while the Advance Plan
indeed alienable and disposable. The bearing the notation was certified by the
Court cannot, therefore, grant the Lands Management Services of the
application for registration. DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, plotted in the said plan and has nothing
as amended, provides that the to do whatsoever with the nature and
classification and reclassification of character of the property surveyed.
public lands into alienable or disposable, Respondents failed to submit a
mineral or forest land is the prerogative certification from the proper government
of the Executive Department. agency to prove that the lands subject for
registration are indeed alienable and
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is disposable.
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right
to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public
domain.

In the case at bar, the only evidence to

prove the character of the subject lands
as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in
effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this
is hardly the kind of proof required by law.
To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
RP vs. CANDY MAKER, INC.
G.R. No. 163766 June 22, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and
Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy
Maker, Inc. On June 16, 1999, Candy
Maker, Inc., filed an application for the
registration of its alleged title over subject
lands. The LRA and the LMB and FMB
were instructed to submit their respective
reports on the status of the parcels of
land before the initial hearing scheduled
on October 29, 1999.
The CENRO Officer of Antipolo City filed
his Report declaring that "the land falls
within the Alienable and Disposable Zone
On the other hand, the LRA, in its
September 21, 1999 Report,
recommended the exclusion of Lot No.
3138-B on the ground that it is a legal
easement and intended for public use,
hence, inalienable and indisposable. The
LLDA approved Resolution No. 113,
Series of 1993, providing that untitled
shoreland areas may be leased subject
to conditions enumerated therein.
The Republic and the LLDA filed its
Opposition to the Amended Application
of Candy Maker in which it alleged that
the lot subject of the application for
registration may not be alienated and
disposed since it is considered part of the
Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its
jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4850, as amended.
Cruz testified that his grandparents
owned the property, and after their
demise, his parents, the spouses
Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio
Cruz, inherited the lot; he and his father
had cultivated the property since 1937,
planting palay during the rainy season
and vegetables during the dry season;
his father paid the realty taxes on the
property, and he (Cruz) continued paying
the taxes after his father’s death. Cruz
insisted that he was the rightful claimant
and owner of the property.
Petitioner’s Contention
• The Engineer’s Survey Report
and the Laguna de Bay Shoreland
Survey both show that Lot No.
3138-A is located below the
reglementary lake elevation,
hence, forms part of the Laguna
Lake bed. It insists that the
property belongs to the public
domain as classified under Article
502 of the Civil Code.
• Respondent failed to present
incontrovertible evidence to
warrant the registration of the
property in its name as owner. The
testimonies of the two witnesses
only proved that the possession of
the land may be characterized as
mere casual cultivation; they failed
to prove that its predecessors
occupied the land openly,
continuously, exclusively,
notoriously and adversely in the
concept of owner since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the property subject
of the amended application is
alienable and disposable
property of the State, and, if
so,
2. Whether respondent adduced
the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove its
ownership over the property
under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
HELD:
The property subject of this
application was alienable and
disposable public agricultural land
until July 18, 1966. However,
respondent failed to prove that it
possesses registerable title over the
property.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. The presumption is
that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond
the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title. The statute
of limitations with regard to public
agricultural lands does not operate
against the State unless the occupant
proves possession and occupation of the
same after a claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.
No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant from the
government, whether express or implied.
It is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the State. The
rationale for the period "since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945"
lies in the presumption that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and
that the occupants or possessor claim
an interest thereon only by virtue of
their imperfect title as continuous,
open and notorious possession.
To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must conclusively establish
the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator or a legislative act or statute.
Until then, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply. A
certification of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources
Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
stating that the land subject of an
application is found to be within the
alienable and disposable site per a land
classification project map is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of
the land subject of the application.
The applicant is burdened to offer proof
of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land.
Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as a party would actually
exercise over his own property. A mere
casual cultivation of portions of the
land by the claimant does not
constitute sufficient basis for a claim
of ownership; such possession is not
exclusive and notorious as to give rise to
a presumptive grant from the State.
In this case, the evidence on record
shows that the property is alienable
agricultural land. Romeo Cadano of the
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal,
certified that the property "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable zone, under
Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per
L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on
March 11, 1927." However, under R.A.
No. 4850 which was approved on July
18, 1966, lands located at and below the
maximum lake level of elevation of the
Laguna de Bay are public lands which
form part of the bed of said lake.
Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances
of LLDA, registerable rights acquired by
occupants before the effectivity of the law
are recognized. However, the
respondent failed to adduce proof that its
predecessors-in-interest had acquired
registerable title over the property before
July 18, 1966
In light of the foregoing, the petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is granted.
RP v. CA
G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998
———————
PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL
ESTATE CORPORATION, v. CA
G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was
approved granting authority to all
municipalities and chartered cities to
undertake and carry out at their own
expense the reclamation by dredging,
filling, or other means, of any foreshore
lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No.
121 was passed by the city of Pasay for
the reclamation of foreshore lands within
their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It
contended, among others, that the
agreement between RREC and the City
of Pasay was void for the object of the
contract is outside the commerce of man,
it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the
object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader
meaning on the term “foreshore land”
than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of
Pasay City and RREC, and the decision
was affirmed by the CA with
modifications.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the term
“foreshore land” includes the
submerged area.
Court cannot broaden its meaning; much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the
intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did
not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the
term “foreshore lands.”
Therefore, it bears stressing that the
subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance
No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No.
158, and the Agreement under attack,
have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.

HELD:

1. No. The Court held that the

ordinanced issued by Pasay
City was invalid. It restated that
the term "foreshore lands" refers
to:

“The strip of land that lies between the

high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide.

A strip of land margining a body of water

(as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line
usually at the seaward margin of a low-
tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a
beach scarp or berm.” (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the

enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, the
RP v. LAKAMBINI C. JABSON, et.al.
G.R. No. 200223, June 06, 2018
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, seeking to reverse
and set aside the Amended Decision1
dated November 4, 2010 and
Resolution2 dated December 26, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
There are two parcels of land being
applied for registration - one is located at
Barrio San Jose, Pasig City, and the
other is situated in Barangay Bagong
Katipunan, Pasig City.
Both used to form part of seven parcels
of land owned and possessed by the
Jabson family as early as 1909. Each and
every applicant herein claims undivided
share and participation as follows:
Lakambini C. Jabson-1/5; Paraluman
Jabson1/5; Magpuri Jabson-1/5 & Tala J.
Olega-1/5; Manuel III, Edgardo, Renato,
Noel & Nestor Jabson as legal heirs of
their father Manuel Jabson, Jr.-1/5.
In 1978, applicants had already applied
for registration of the same parcels of
land. However this was dismissed for
failure of the applicants to comply with
the recommendation of the then Land
Registration Commission to include in
their application the complete names and
postal addresses of all the lessees
occupying the lands sought to be
registered.
RTC Ruling
RTC found that respondents Jabson
acquired the properties from their
predecessors-in-interest who, in tum,
have possessed the same since time
immemorial. Upon acquisition,
respondents Jabson possessed the
parcels of land for more than 30 years in
an open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious manner, and in the concept of
an owner.
Hence, it ruled that respondents Jabson
satisfactorily proved and established
their rights over the subject properties, in
compliance with Section 14(1) and (2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
CA Ruling
CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It
held that the applicant has the burden of
showing that he is the real and absolute
owner in fee simple of the land applied
for. To have his imperfect title confirmed,
the applicant must present evidence to
prove that his possession has been
adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful, and in the concept of an owner
However, the appellate court noted that
the rule on confirmation of an imperfect
title grounded on adverse possession
does not apply unless and until the
subject land has been released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable lands
of the public domain. To this end, the
applicant must secure a certification from
the Government that the land applied for
is in fact alienable and disposable.
It found that respondents Jabson did not
present any evidence showing that the
San Jose property had already been
classified as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
A plain photocopy of a purported
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) Certification
dated May 14, 1998, which tended to
show that the Bagong Katipunan
property is "within the alienable and
disposable zone," was submitted to the
trial court. 15 However, the Court of
Appeals noted that no party identified,
testified to, nor offered the certification in
evidence. Thus, the Court of Appeals
held that it cannot be admitted in
evidence.
RESPONDENTS FILED MR: CA
GRANTED
The Court of Appeals found that
respondents Jabson sufficiently
established that: (a) they have had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject properties; and
(b) such properties formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that
based on Llanes v. Republic,20 in the
interest of substantial justice and to
resolve a material issue in a land
registration case, the court is allowed to
admit a CENRO Certification in evidence
despite its belated submission and lack
of formal offer.
It ruled that respondents Jabson
sufficiently established their adverse
possession of the subject properties
through the following: (a) by exercising
specific acts of ownership such as
constructing residential houses on the
subject properties and leasing the same
to third parties, and (b) as admitted by
petitioner Republic, by possessing and
occupying the San Jose property since
1944.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of respondent
Jabson’s application for registration of
title to the subject property was proper
under the law and current jurisprudence
HELD:
No. It is a general rule that prevailing over
claims of land is the Regalian Doctrine,
which, as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, declares that the State
owns all lands of the public domain. Land
that has not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase, grant, or
any other mode recognized by law,
belongs to the State as part of the public
domain.
The Public Land Act governs the
classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain, except for timber and
mineral lands. The law also entitles
possessors of public lands to judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles.
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 provides that any applicant for
registration of title to land derived through
a public grant must sufficiently establish
three things:
(a) the subject land's alienable and
disposable nature;
(b) his or her predecessors' adverse
possession thereof, and
(c) the reckoning date from which such
adverse possession was under a bona
fide claim of ownership, that is, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
That land has been removed from the
scope of the Regalian Doctrine and
reclassified as part of the public
domain's alienable and disposable
portion cannot be assumed or
implied.
The prevailing rule is that the applicant
must clearly establish the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute to prove the alienable and
disposable nature of the subject land.
Thus the DENR Certification dated
February 19, 2009 was not sufficient
evidence to establish the subject
properties' alienable and disposable
character.
Wherefore, the decision is revesed and
the petition granted.
Note:
[FIRST: The respondents CANNOT use
the Llanes case as a defense. The
CENRO that was belatedly filed in Llanes
was merely a corrected or amended
certification, the unedited version of
which had been earlier presented in the
trial court as evidence of the alienable
and disposable nature of the land. And
the correction or amendment pertained
merely to the statement of the reckoning
date of adverse possession. HOWEVER,
respondents Jabson failed to present
during trial any evidence establishing the
subject properties' alienable and
disposable nature. The DENR
Certification dated February 19, 2009
was submitted for the first time by
respondents Jabson in their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
original Decision dated January 30,
2009. This document also cannot be
given probative value - it was not
presented and identified during trial,
much less formally offered in evidence.
SECOND: Carlito P. Castaneda, a DENR
Sr. Forest Management Specialist, was
not authorized to issue certifications as to
land classification, much less order for
the release of lands of the public domain
as alienable and disposable.
The Public Land Act vested the President
the authority to classify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable.
Subsequently, the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines also empowered
the DENR Secretary to determine and
approve land classification as well as
declare the same as alienable and
disposable. Only the DENR Secretary is
empowered to declare that a certain
parcel of land forms part of the alienable
and disposable portion of the public
domain.
THIRD: a certification alone is not
sufficient in proving the subject land's
alienable and disposable nature. We
have already ruled that a PENRO and/or
CENRO certification must be
accompanied by a copy of the original
classification.]
TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ v.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, et.al.
G.R. No. 168065, September 06, 2017
—————————
GERONIMO SACLOLO, et.al. v. CA
G.R. No. 168070, September 6, 2017
MARTIRES, J.:
FACTS:
In 1974, Geronimo, Josefino, and
Rodrigo, all surnamed Saclolo (the
Saclolos) filed before the then CFI a joint
application for registration of title over
three (3) parcels of land located at Sitio
Sinalam, Bario Sapang, Ternate,
Cavite.The Saclolos averred that they
had acquired title to the subject lands
through purchase and that together with
their predecessors-in-interest, they had
been in actual and exclusive possession,
occupation, and cultivation of the subject
lands since time immemorial.
The Director of Lands argued that the
subject lands are not alienable and
disposable because: they are located
within the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation, segregated from the public
domain by Proclamation No. 307 and that
by virtue of RA. 6236, the right to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48 of the Public Land Law, with
respect to lands having an area of more
than 144 hectares, has expired; that the
Saclolos had not acquired title over the
subject lands through any recognized
mode of acquisition of title; that the
Saclolos and their predecessors-in-
interest had not been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject
lands for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of the application. In
1993, Trinidad Diaz- Enriquez filed a
motion for intervention alleging that the
Saclolos had sold to her all their interests
and rights over the subject lands.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled that the subject lands are
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain because Proclamation No.
307 itself stressed that the segregation of
the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation
was subject to private rights. It opined
that the pieces of evidence presented by
the Saclolos proved that their rights over
the subject lands, being private in nature
and character, were excluded from the
reservation for military purposes.
Later, the RTC modified its earlier
decision by ordering the issuance of the
decree of registration to Enriquez.
The CA Ruling
The CA declared that the subject lands
are all within the Calumpang Point Naval
Resevation, thus, the said lands could
not be privately titled. It held that even if
Proclamation No. 307 qualifies the
reservation as being subject to private
rights, the Saclolos have not established
by adequate proof their open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession over the subject lands.
The appellate court concluded that the
subject lands could not be registered
because they lie within a naval
reservation and most of them are forest
and foreshore lands. It reversed the
decision rendered by the RTC.
Aggrieved, the Saclolos and Enriquez
moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the CA.
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appellate court
may declare that the lands sought
to be registered are not alienable
and disposable notwithstanding
the failure of the Director of Lands
to appeal from the decision of the
trial court decreeing the issuance
of certificates of title;
2. Whether or not the applicants for
registration of title have sufficiently
proved that the subject lands are
alienable and disposable.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court held that the
subject lands may still be
declared public lands
notwithstanding the Director of
Lands' failure to appeal from
the RTC decision.
In addition, an applicant is not
necessarily entitled to have the land
registered under the Torrens system
simply because no one appears to
oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of his land. He must show,
even though there is no opposition to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the
absolute owner, in fee simple.
Hence, the appellate court may still
determine whether the subject lands are
indeed alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, notwithstanding the
Director of Lands' failure to appeal from
the RTC decision.
 2. No. The Court held that the
applicants failed to prove that
the subject lots are alienable
and disposable.
The necessary requirements for the grant
of an application for land registration are
the following:
1. The applicant must, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-
interest, have been in possession
and occupation of the subject
land;
2. The possession and occupation
must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation
must be under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of
the application; and
4. The subject land must be an
agricultural land of the public
domain.
Among these requirements, the question
of whether the subject lands were
declared alienable and disposable is of
primordial importance because it is
determinative if the land can in fact be
subject to acquisitive prescription and,
thus, registrable under the Torrens
system. Without first determining the
nature and character of the land, all the
other requirements such as the length
and nature of possession and occupation
over such land do not come into play. The
required length of possession does not
operate when the land is part of the public
domain.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic
of the Philippines, the Court emphasized
that lands of the public domain, unless
declared otherwise by virtue of a statute
or law, are inalienable and can never be
acquired by prescription. No amount of
time of possession or occupation can
ripen into ownership over lands of the
public domain. All lands of the public
domain presumably belong to the State
and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also
presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or
disposed.
A positive act declaring land as alienable
and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive
act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.

Hence, in the case at bar, no such

proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court.
The records are bereft of evidence
showing that the subject lands were
proclaimed by the government to be
alienable and disposable. Time and
again, it has been held that matters of
land classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call for proof.