Free Movement of Goods solved answer

Introduction
This topic concerns one of the four fundamental freedoms mentioned and guaranteed by the
Treaty of Rome, namely the freedom of free movement of goods. Italy and Germany both Since
both are members of the European Union (EU), the treaty provisions will apply to both. We will
now look at whether the case in the question can be challenged and how it will unfold.
By examining the treaty articles, it is evident that economic integration was an integral part of
the agreements. In order to accomplish this, there must be no unnecessary restrictions on the
free flow of products between member states. In the relevant query, we must determine
whether wine qualifies as a good. In the case of Commission v Italy, it was held that that those
products would constitute as goods which have monetary value. In this situation, wine has
monetary value and is a tangible entity; therefore, it easily qualifies as good. Article 34 of the
TFEU prohibits any form of quotas or limits on imports of goods, as well as any measures that
have the same effect as such quantitative restrictions. In this particular case, the German
authorities have impounded Bruschini's wine shipment, which qualifies as a measure having an
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (MEQRS). Bruschini would advance arguments
based on the Dassonville decision, in which the court ruled that "all trading rules enacted by
Member States that are capable of impeding intracommunity trade, either directly or
indirectly" qualify as MERQs. In response, my arguments on behalf of Germany would be that,
pursuant to Article 36 of the TFEU, certain exceptions are accorded to those Member States
that are required to refrain from impeding commerce. As long as they are proportionate, such
restrictions must be justified. The numerous grounds for derogations include public policy,
public morality, public safety, and protection of human, animal, or plant health and life.
bruschini would contend that he specializes in the production of wine and that his wine is not
hazardous to human health because he obtained the required quality certification from the
Italian authorities; therefore, his shipment should not be stopped. Moreover, he would argue
that this is an indistinctly applicable measure that imposes a double burden (cassis de Dijon) on
him because, unlike German wine producers, he must conform to the rules of Italy as well as
those of Germany in order for his products to enter the German market. To these arguments, I
would counter with the same cassis de Dijon example. The court ordered that the mandatory
requirements be used to justify the imposition of national regulations on imports. I would base
my argument on the requirement that public health be safeguarded, as the Italian wine did not
comply with German health standards because it failed a test conducted using the most
advanced technology in German laboratories. Science is an ever-expanding field in which
inventions are occasionally produced. The cassis de Dijon dual burden test only applies to
restrictions that apply to both local and imported products. If the aforementioned technique
were to be employed in locally brewed wines as well, the cassis de Dijon dual burden test
would not apply.
Therefore, Bruschini's argument that the rule imposes a double burden fails. Additionally,
Bruschini would argue against the permissible derogations. He would cite the case Commission
vs. Italy (caffeine) to argue that the burden of proof is on the member state to demonstrate the
product's detrimental effects. Even if the sample contained impurities, he would assert that it
was identical to water! How can a shipment be impounded because wine contained water? In
the relevant case of Commission v. Germany (beer additives), the CJEU was astounded by the
argument that additives would be detrimental to the German people, given that Germany is
one of the largest beer consumers. In this instance, the mere addition of water to wine, if
present, should not constitute a restriction on the free movement of products.
In addition, he would argue that the measure taken on potential grounds of public health or
consumer protection is not at all proportionate, as a blanket ban on wine sales in Germany is
not justified, even if there is a slight negative role of water in wine.Perhaps a warning or even a
fine would have been a more appropriate punishment.
He may also argue that, according to gourmet, any action restricting market access for goods
must be prohibited unless it applies equally to locally produced goods as well. I would contend,
on the other hand, that if the precise risks to health are uncertain, greater discretion is
accorded to the member states (Commission v. Netherlands) because public health and
consumer protection are of paramount importance to every Member State. On the basis of
proportionality, I would argue that a fine or a simple warning would be ineffective if the
products were still available to the general public. The only method to ensure consumer
protection was to restrict the public's access to unsafe wine, which the German government
effectively did.