Judicial review

Consider whether there is a meaningful difference between the terms ‘procedural fairness’ and
‘natural justice

The terms "procedural fairness" and "natural justice" are often used interchangeably in legal discourse,
suggesting a close relationship between the two concepts. However, it is worth exploring whether there
is a meaningful distinction between these terms. While both concepts pertain to the fair conduct of legal
procedures and decision-making, they may have nuanced differences in scope and application. By
examining the origins, evolution, and interpretations of these terms, we can gain a deeper
understanding of their similarities and potential divergences. This analysis will shed light on whether
"procedural fairness" and "natural justice" are truly interchangeable or if they encompass distinct
dimensions within the realm of legal principles.

Natural justice is a broader concept that encompasses the principles of procedural fairness. It is a
fundamental principle of law that seeks to ensure fair treatment and prevent the abuse of power by
public authorities. Natural justice includes two core principles: the rule against bias and the right to a fair
hearing. The rule against bias requires decision-makers to be impartial and unbiased in their decision-
making, while the right to a fair hearing entail that individuals affected by a decision have the
opportunity to present their case and be heard in an impartial forum. In the case of McInnes v Onslow-
Fane, it was explained that natural justice is a flexible term and that the requirements it imposes may
vary depending on the context of each case. This means that the specific requirements of natural justice
can be shaped and adapted based on the particular circumstances and nature of the decision being
made. The flexibility of natural justice allows it to be applied in a manner that is fair and appropriate to
the specific situation at hand.

On the other hand, Procedural fairness or procedural impropriety is an important ground for judicial
review as established in the case of GCHQ. Procedural fairness refers to the fairness of procedures
followed in decision-making processes. It focuses on ensuring that the procedures used are fair,
transparent, and equitable. Procedural fairness encompasses both statutory requirements and common
law principles that dictate how decisions should be made and how individuals should be treated during
the process. It is concerned with the fairness of the procedures themselves, regardless of the outcome of
the decision. Procedural impropriety refers to the failure to adhere to prescribed procedures as outlined
by the law or established in the principles of natural justice. Fair, transparent, and equitable procedures
not only lend credibility to decisions or actions but also demonstrate respect for human dignity and
contribute to effective decision-making. The case of Agricultural Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms
(1972) exemplifies the importance of complying with statutory consultation requirements. In this
instance, the court deemed the consultation mandatory, and the failure to consult with the relevant
body, the Mushroom Growers' Association, rendered the order invalid. Procedural fairness refers to the
fairness of procedures in decision-making. It encompasses statutory requirements and common law
principles governing how decisions are made and individuals are treated. It ensures fair, transparent, and
equitable procedures, irrespective of the decision's outcome. Procedural fairness safeguards individuals'
rights by allowing them to present their case and be heard.
The rule against bias is a common law principle of natural justice that requires public bodies to act fairly
and ensure that the decision they made is free from bias. The concept of bias is subdivided into three
categories. Firstly, Actual bias occurs when a decision is influenced by a desire to favor one side over the
other. The classic definition of actual can be found in the words of Lord Goff in R v Gough which states,
“a person is actually biased if motivated by a desire to favour one side or disfavor the other.” If it is
proven that a decision has been influenced by bias from the decision maker, then the affected person
has the right to request the decision to be overturned. This principle is based on the belief that justice
should not only be done but should also be seen to be done, and it is widely accepted. Secondly, A
presumed bias can be seen when a decision-maker has a direct or indirect personal or financial interest
in the outcome of a decision. In such cases, it is not necessary to prove actual bias because the fact that
there is an interest in the outcome is enough to call into question the impartiality of the decision-maker.
In Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Co Proprietors (1852), the Lord Chancellor had shares in a company
owned by one of the parties. House of Lords set aside the decision and held that no one can be a judge
in their own cause. So, he was deemed ineligible to preside over the case due to his interest in the
action. Lastly, Apparent bias can also occur when there is no direct interest but an appearance of bias
arises. Automatic disqualification occurs where a party has a financial or proprietary interest in the case
or is a party to the case, while in other circumstances it depends on whether a fair-minded and informed
observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias as seen in Porter v Magill [2001]

The fairness of a hearing in a specific case is contingent upon the unique circumstances and the nature
of the decision at hand. However, it is fundamental that individuals are afforded the chance to present
their case. In instances where individuals have legitimate expectations, such as license renewals, the
principles of natural justice may necessitate an oral hearing and the provision of reasons prior to any
rejection. This principle was established in the landmark case of Ridge v Baldwin. The case involved the
dismissal of a chief constable by a watch committee under the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, citing
his unsuitability for the position. The chief constable had been acquitted of conspiracy charges, but the
sentencing judge had made disparaging remarks about his character and suitability. The watch
committee dismissed him without informing him of the charges or granting him an opportunity to
present his case. Initially, the Court of Appeal held that the principles of natural justice solely applied to
judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, excluding administrative ones. However, the House of Lords
overturned this ruling and allowed the appeal, ruling that the dismissal of the chief constable violated
natural justice. The committee should have informed him of the charges and provided him with a chance
to be heard.

In contrast to other legal systems, the English administrative law does not impose a general obligation on
public authorities to provide reasons for their decisions which can also be seen as an important
requirement for procedural fairness. However, the importance of providing reasons for decisions has
become widely acknowledged as an essential aspect of sound decision-making. As stated by Lord
Denning, "the provision of reasons is a fundamental element of good administration."

Procedural fairness refers to the idea that a decision-making process should be fair by ensuring that all
parties have a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present their case. It emphasizes the importance
of fair procedures and due process in decision-making. Procedural impropriety refers to a failure to
comply with procedures that are either prescribed by law or established in the common law principles of
natural justice. So, it is clear that natural justice is a wider concept. In essence, procedural fairness can be
considered as a specific aspect for ensuring natural justice. So, while the terms are similar and often used
interchangeably, there is a meaningful difference between the two.

 Assess the extent to which judicial review protects fairness in the procedures used by public
bodies when arriving at an administrative decision.
 Discuss whether the principles of procedural fairness ensure that public bodies retain
substantial flexibility in decision-making to the detriment of applicants
 ‘The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What
fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into
account in all its aspects.’ Discuss in the context of administrative law with reference to case
law.

Judicial review serves as a critical mechanism for upholding fairness in the procedures employed by
public bodies when reaching administrative decisions. It allows the courts to scrutinize the decision-
making processes of these bodies, ensuring they adhere to the principles of procedural fairness, natural
justice, and the rule of law. By providing a means to challenge the legality and fairness of administrative
decisions, judicial review plays a vital role in safeguarding individuals' rights, holding public bodies
accountable, and maintaining the integrity of the administrative justice system. This essay will assess the
extent to which judicial review effectively protects fairness in the procedures employed by public bodies
when arriving at administrative decisions, examining both the strengths and limitations of this legal
mechanism.

Procedural impropriety refers to a failure to comply with procedures that are either prescribed by law or
established in the common law principles of natural justice. This ground can be separated into two parts.
Those are statutory procedural requirements, which are relatively straightforward, and adherence to the
rules of natural justice. Procedures that are fair, transparent, and equitable not only provide legitimacy
to a decision or action, but are also considered valuable in themselves as they demonstrate respect for
human dignity. In addition, good procedures are important for effective decision-making. The common
law principle of 'natural justice' traces its origins back to 17th-century decisions such as Dr Bonham's
case (1610) and Bagg's case (1615). These cases established that individuals whose rights have been
impacted by an official decision have the right to be informed in advance of the decision and to be
granted a fair hearing before an impartial judge.

Statutory procedural requirements often arise in the context of consulting with interested or affected
parties. This requirement may be considered as statutory. If the requirement is mandatory and has not
been followed, the decision or action in question may be held invalidated. The case of Agricultural
Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms (1972) is a good example of this. In this case, the legislation
required the Minister to consult with relevant bodies before making certain types of orders. Due to a
clerical error, the Mushroom Growers' Association who was the "relevant body" was not consulted. The
court held that the consultation requirement was mandatory and the failure to consult with the
association made the order invalid. The common law principles of procedural fairness include the rule
against bias and the right to a fair hearing. Essentially, these principles require public bodies to act in a
fair manner. The courts have developed these principles, and they are not specifically set out in
legislation. In the case of McInnes v Onslow-Fane, it was explained that natural justice is a flexible term
and that the requirements it imposes may vary depending on the context of each case. There are three
key ways by which judicial review protects fairness in the procedures used by public bodies when
arriving at an administrative decision.

The rule against bias is a common law principle that requires public bodies to act fairly and ensure that
the decision they made is free from bias. The concept of bias is subdivided into three categories. Firstly,
Actual bias occurs when a decision is influenced by a desire to favor one side over the other. The classic
definition of actual can be found in the words of Lord Goff in R v Gough which states, “a person is
actually biased if motivated by a desire to favour one side or disfavor the other.” If it is proven that a
decision has been influenced by bias from the decision maker, then the affected person has the right to
request the decision to be overturned. This principle is based on the belief that justice should not only
be done but should also be seen to be done, and it is widely accepted. Secondly, A presumed bias can be
seen when a decision-maker has a direct or indirect personal or financial interest in the outcome of a
decision. In such cases, it is not necessary to prove actual bias because the fact that there is an interest
in the outcome is enough to call into question the impartiality of the decision-maker. In Dimes v Grand
Junction Canal Co Proprietors (1852), the Lord Chancellor had shares in a company owned by one of the
parties. House of Lords set aside the decision and held that no one can be a judge in their own cause. So,
he was deemed ineligible to preside over the case due to his interest in the action. Lastly, Apparent bias
can also occur when there is no direct interest but an appearance of bias arises. Automatic
disqualification occurs where a party has a financial or proprietary interest in the case or is a party to the
case, while in other circumstances it depends on whether a fair-minded and informed observer would
conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.

In contrast to other legal systems, the English administrative law does not impose a general obligation on
public authorities to provide reasons for their decisions. However, the importance of providing reasons
for decisions has become widely acknowledged as an essential aspect of sound decision-making. As
stated by Lord Denning, "the provision of reasons is a fundamental element of good administration."

The fairness of a hearing in a particular case depends on the specific circumstances and the type of
decision being made. However, at the very least, it is essential that the individual has an opportunity to
present their case. In situations where a person has legitimate expectations, such as the renewal of a
license, the principles of natural justice may demand an oral hearing and the requirement that reasons
be given before any rejection is made. This principle was established in the landmark case of Ridge v
Baldwin.

A person seeking judicial review can have a valid expectation that their case will be treated fairly
according to standards of procedural fairness. This expectation may arise in several ways, such as when a
public authority has made a promise or representation to the individual or group involved. For example,
in the case of R v Liverpool Corporation (1972), the local authority had promised not to increase taxi
licenses for a specified period but did so without consulting the affected association. The court, in
granting a judicial review, ruled that a fair hearing was required before increasing the licenses. Legitimate
expectations can also stem from past practices or conduct. In the GCHQ case, the House of Lords
deemed it justiciable and subject to judicial review when the Minister for the Civil Service prevented
GCHQ staff from joining a trade union based on national security concerns. Sometimes, an individual or
group may rely on a policy or guidelines that have previously governed a particular area of administrative
action, creating a legitimate expectation that the public authority will continue to act accordingly. In R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Khan [1984], a Pakistani man wanted to adopt his
brother's child in Pakistan, and the Home Secretary had issued a circular that allowed for this under
certain conditions. The court ruled that the Home Secretary could not change the policy without a
hearing as this would frustrate legitimate expectations. However, judges generally do not declare policy
decisions illegal based on substantive legitimate expectation. In the rare case of R v North and East
Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001], a substantive legitimate expectation was upheld as the
decision was deemed an abuse of power and unfair.

 Consider the legal meaning and scope of Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality
as grounds for judicial review proceedings.

Judicial review is a crucial aspect of the UK's legal system, as it allows for the review of decisions made
by public bodies to ensure that they are lawful, rational, and fair. Two key grounds for judicial review are
Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality. The legal concepts of Wednesbury
unreasonableness and proportionality are essential tools for courts to assess whether a public authority
has acted within its legal powers and to determine whether its decision is proportionate to the aims it
seeks to achieve. In this question, we will explore the legal meaning and scope of Wednesbury
unreasonableness and proportionality as grounds for judicial review proceedings.

Judicial review grounds include irrationality because it enables courts to assess public authorities'
decisions to ensure that they are not so absurd that no rational decision-maker would have made the
same choice. Therefore, the courts ensure that public authorities make rational, logical, and evidence-
based decisions. This is essential for ensuring accountability and upholding the principles of fairness and
natural justice. The legal concept of Wednesbury Unreasonableness or irrationality is derived from
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] where it was stated that if a
decision on a particular matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have arrived at it,
then the courts can intervene. This extreme sense of irrationality requires something that is
overwhelming. According to Lord Diplock, ‘a decision so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted
moral standards that no sensible person who applied his mind to the question to be decided could have
arrived at it’.

In Wednesbury case, a local authority imposed a condition that allowed adult-only cinema screenings on
Sundays. Although this condition may seem highly unlikely and unreasonable, it was found to be lawful
by the Court of Appeal. As a judicial authority, the court's role was not to override the local authority's
decision but to determine whether the authority had acted in excess of its power. While this condition
may not be something that many authorities would impose, it was not so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could have made such a decision. The court's intervention in cases of irrationality is
uncommon because it goes against the traditional concept of judicial review that is it focuses on the
decision-making process rather than the decision itself. Unlike procedural impropriety and illegality,
irrationality challenges the substance of the decision and requires the court to assess its merits. This
poses a constitutional issue because a high threshold of unreasonableness is required for court’s
intervention and the varying standard of reviews also plays a significant role here. In determining
reasonableness, the court must evaluate the decision itself. The ground of irrationality in judicial review
allows the courts to verify if public authorities are making decisions that align with the principles of
fairness and natural justice, and if their actions are not arbitrary. It provides an important check on the
exercise of power by public authorities, and ensures that they are held accountable for their decisions.

Where complex policy decisions, political matters, economic issues, and resource allocation are involved,
courts typically use a light-touch approach and only intervene if the decision is highly unreasonable,
known as "super-Wednesbury" approach. When a matter relates to fundamental rights, the courts adopt
a more rigorous approach known as "anxious scrutiny" which can be seen in the case of Bugdaycay v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987]. In this case, Lord Bingham, the then Master of the
Rolls, stated that “the more significant the interference with human rights, the more justification the
court will require to consider the decision reasonable.” Wednesbury unreasonableness has been widely
criticized over the years. According Jowell and Lester, the concept of irrationality was “opaque,
unrealistic, tautologous, and perplexing.” As an alternate criterion, proportionality has frequently been
proposed.

Lord Diplock suggested in the GCHQ case that the principle of proportionality might become a ground for
judicial review in the future. Proportionality is a concept that is more straightforward than Wednesbury
unreasonableness and is commonly used in European Union law and the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights. It is also well-recognized in the administrative law of most European countries.
Prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act in the UK, the courts did not accept a proportionality
test as part of common law. However, this began to change after the Human Rights Act was introduced in
1998, as British courts became more familiar with the doctrine of proportionality.

Lord Clyde set out a three-part test for proportionality in De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands & Housing (1999). The test requires a legislative objective which is
sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right, rationally connected measures designed to
meet the legislative objectives and the means used to impair the right or freedom. This test was later
endorsed by the House of Lords in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001]. Since
then, the UK courts have adopted a twin-track approach, using proportionality in cases relating to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), but continuing to
use Wednesbury unreasonableness as the test at common law. Despite calls to replace Wednesbury
unreasonableness with proportionality, the courts have not yet abandoned this ground for review, as
seen in Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2015).

Proportionality is considered to be a better and more accurate test than irrationality. Although
irrationality examines whether a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have
made it, proportionality examines whether the decision strikes a fair balance between the rights or
interests at risk and the goal that the decision seeks to achieve. It entails a more in-depth examination of
the decision's reasoning. Following the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
integration of EU law into the UK legal system, there has been a growing trend of considering and
applying the proportionality test in relevant cases. Lord Steyn expressed in the Alconbury Developments
v Secretary of State (2001) case that judges should apply the proportionality test even in domestic law
cases. Consequently, some argue that there is no longer a need for the coexistence of both the
Wednesbury test and the proportionality test. Scholars and commentators support this perspective,
emphasizing that a clearer and more structured approach to the proportionality test would be beneficial.
This shift reflects the evolving understanding of how courts assess the lawfulness and reasonableness of
administrative decisions, placing greater emphasis on proportionality as a guiding principle.

 With case illustration, explain how the principles of judicial review protect citizens from the
unlawful use of discretionary statutory powers.

The principles of judicial review play a crucial role in safeguarding citizens from the unlawful exercise of
discretionary statutory powers by public authorities. Judicial review allows individuals to challenge the
legality, procedural fairness, and reasonableness of administrative decisions and actions. This essay will
explore the protective nature of judicial review by examining relevant case illustrations where the
principles of judicial review have effectively safeguarded citizens from the unlawful use of discretionary
statutory powers, highlighting the significance of this legal mechanism in upholding the rule of law and
protecting individual rights.

Judicial review is an integral part of administrative law, which governs the conduct of public bodies in
fulfilling their functions. It serves to hold government officials and public bodies accountable for their
actions and decisions. By promoting transparency and accountability, judicial review operates within the
broader framework of the administrative system, which encompasses various mechanisms for holding
public bodies accountable. Rather than being a substitute for political accountability, judicial review
focuses on legal accountability and ensures that the exercise of public power is lawful. However, it
should be emphasized that judicial review should not be misused for politically motivated challenges.
Both statutory and prerogative powers of public bodies are subject to judicial review. Judicial review is
often considered as a ‘remedy of last resort’, meaning that it should only be used when all other
available remedies have been exhausted as it can be seen in Glencore Energy UK Ltd v Revenue and
Customs Commissioners [2017].

In the case of GCHQ, Lord Diplock identified three grounds for judicial review: illegality, irrationality, and
procedural impropriety. These grounds serve as the traditional basis for challenging administrative
decisions. However, Lord Diplock also acknowledged the potential inclusion of a fourth ground:
proportionality. Proportionality, as a ground of review, refers to assessing whether the actions of a public
body are proportionate to the legitimate aim they seek to achieve. It involves a balancing exercise
between the public interest and the impact on individual rights or interests. While not originally
recognized as a distinct ground of review at common law, proportionality has gained significance in
relation to issues arising from the Human Rights Act.

One of the grounds for judicial review in the UK is illegality, which occurs when a public authority acts
outside its legal powers or fails to follow required processes. Courts will intervene where illegality is
found and ensure that public authorities act within the limits of their legal powers. The concept of "ultra
vires" refers to public bodies acting beyond their authorized powers, and errors of law can also occur
when they misunderstand the statutory provisions that enable them to act. In Attorney-General v
Fulham Corporation (1921), the introduction of a new scheme by the corporation was deemed unlawful
as it exceeded its authorized powers. Similarly, in R v Richmond upon Thames Council, ex p McCarthy
and Stone Ltd (1992), the council's charging of developers was found unlawful as it was not reasonably
incidental to its planning powers. Public bodies may also make errors of law by misinterpreting their legal
powers, leading to misunderstandings in their authority to act as seen in the case of Venables where the
Home Secretary considered an irrelevant factor (public protest) while disregarding relevant factors
(progress and development of detainees). Improper purpose refers to using discretionary power for a
purpose different from its intended use. In Congreve, the Home Office's motive of making money was
deemed improper.

Irrationality is one of the grounds for judicial review, as it allows courts to assess the decisions of public
authorities to ensure they are not so absurd that no rational decision-maker would have made the same
choice. This ensures that public authorities make logical, evidence-based decisions and promotes
accountability and the principles of fairness and natural justice. The legal concept of Wednesbury
Unreasonableness, derived from Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation
(1948), states that if a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it,
the courts can intervene. This extreme sense of irrationality requires something overwhelmingly
outrageous. In the Wednesbury case, although a local authority imposed a seemingly unlikely condition
allowing adult-only cinema screenings on Sundays, the Court of Appeal deemed it lawful. The court's
role was not to override the authority's decision but to determine if it exceeded its power, and the
condition was not so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it.

Procedural fairness refers to the principles and standards that ensure a fair and impartial process in legal
and administrative proceedings. It encompasses the right to be heard, the right to a fair and unbiased
decision-maker, and the right to advance notice of the issues and an opportunity to present evidence
and arguments. Procedural fairness aims to safeguard individuals' rights, promote transparency, prevent
arbitrary decision-making, and ensure that decisions are reached through a fair and just process. It is a
fundamental aspect of the rule of law and essential for upholding justice and protecting the rights of
individuals involved in legal and administrative proceedings. In Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Co
Proprietors (1852), the Lord Chancellor had shares in a company owned by one of the parties. House of
Lords set aside the decision and held that no one can be a judge in their own cause. So, he was deemed
ineligible to preside over the case due to his interest in the action. In the case of Ridge v Baldwin, it was
held that the principles of natural justice may demand an oral hearing and the requirement that reasons
be given before any rejection is made. A person seeking judicial review can have a valid expectation that
their case will be treated fairly according to standards of procedural fairness. This expectation may arise
in several ways, such as when a public authority has made a promise or representation to the individual
or group involved. For example, in the case of R v Liverpool Corporation (1972), the local authority had
promised not to increase taxi licenses for a specified period but did so without consulting the affected
association. The court, in granting a judicial review, ruled that a fair hearing was required before
increasing the licenses.

Judicial review is a legal process by which a court examines the lawfulness and validity of a decision or
action taken by a public authority. When a decision is subject to judicial review, the court does not
substitute its own decision for that of the public authority. Instead, the court assesses whether the
decision was made within the scope of the authority's powers, in accordance with the applicable law,
and in a manner that upholds fairness and procedural requirements. If a court determines that a
decision was made unlawfully or with procedural impropriety, it does not prevent the public body from
making the same decision again, provided that it does so in a lawful manner. As Lord Bingham explained
in R (Corner House Research) v Director of Serious Fraud Office (2008), “the court's role is to examine
the legality of the decision or action, not its merits.”

Explain the significance on the subsequent development of judicial review of ONE of the following
cases:

a) Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation (1948)

b) Ridge v Baldwin (1964)

c) Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1984)

a) Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] is a landmark case in UK
administrative law that established the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness, which relates to the
standard of review for judicial review of administrative decisions.

Judicial review grounds include irrationality because it enables courts to assess public authorities'
decisions to ensure that they are not so absurd that no rational decision-maker would have made the
same choice. Therefore, the courts ensure that public authorities make rational, logical, and evidence-
based decisions. This is essential for ensuring accountability and upholding the principles of fairness and
natural justice. The legal concept of Wednesbury Unreasonableness or irrationality is derived from
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] where it was stated that if a
decision on a particular matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have arrived at it,
then the courts can intervene. This extreme sense of irrationality requires something that is
overwhelming.

In this case, a cinema company, Associated Provincial Picture Houses (APPH), challenging the decision of
the local authority, Wednesbury Corporation, to refuse to grant a license for Sunday film screenings for
adults only and not permitting anyone under 15 years old. Although this condition may seem highly
unlikely and unreasonable, it was found to be lawful by the Court of Appeal. As a judicial authority, the
court's role was not to override the local authority's decision but to determine whether the authority
had acted in excess of its power. While this condition may not be something that many authorities would
impose, it was not so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made such a decision.
According to Lord Diplock, ‘a decision so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived
at it’.

b) Ridge v Baldwin was a landmark case in English judicial review, as it marked a shift towards a
contextual approach to determining what constitutes procedural fairness. In the case of Ridge v Baldwin,
the question arose as to whether there had been a breach of the doctrine of natural justice in the
dismissal of a chief constable by a watch committee. The appellant, a chief constable of a borough police
force, had been arrested and charged with conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice. Although he was
later acquitted of the charge, the sentencing judge had made adverse comments about his character and
suitability for the post.

Following the acquittal, the watch committee exercised its powers under section 191(4) of the Municipal
Corporations Act 1882 to dismiss the appellant from his office on the grounds of negligence or unfitness.
However, the committee did so without informing him of the charges against him or giving him an
opportunity to present his case. The Court of Appeal held that the principles of natural justice did not
apply in this case because the decision to dismiss the chief constable was administrative in nature, rather
than judicial or quasi-judicial. According to the court, the principles of natural justice only applied to
decisions of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, where there is a duty to act fairly and impartially.

However, the House of Lords took a different view and allowed the appeal. They held that there had
been a breach of natural justice in this instance. The appellant should have been informed of the charges
made against him and given the opportunity to be heard before the decision to dismiss him was made.
The House of Lords emphasized that the principles of natural justice are not limited to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings, but apply to administrative decisions as well, especially when they have a
significant impact on the rights or interests of individuals. This case established an important precedent
by expanding the scope of natural justice beyond traditional judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. It
recognized that fairness and procedural safeguards should be upheld in administrative decision-making,
particularly when fundamental rights or livelihoods are at stake. The decision reaffirmed the principle
that individuals should have the opportunity to present their case and respond to allegations before
adverse decisions are made against them, regardless of the nature of the decision-making body.

Lord Reid, in the case of Ridge v Baldwin, emphasized the importance of the principle of natural justice
and its application to administrative decisions. He acknowledged that while there may not be a clear
definition of natural justice, this does not negate its existence. Lord Reid pointed out that there is a
consistent line of authority establishing that an individual cannot be lawfully dismissed without being
informed of the allegations against them and given an opportunity to defend themselves.

In the context of the 1882 Act, Lord Reid concluded that the power of dismissal could not be lawfully
exercised until the appellant had been properly informed of the charges and provided with an
opportunity to make representations in their defense. Since the decision to dismiss the appellant was
made without adhering to the principles of natural justice, Lord Reid deemed it to be void. This landmark
case, Ridge v Baldwin, marked a shift in English judicial review by adopting a more contextual approach
to procedural fairness. It signaled a departure from a sole focus on protecting individuals from abuse of
power to a broader goal of curbing abuses of public power and upholding the rule of law. The judgment
in this case, along with other significant rulings such as Padfield and Anisminic, contributed to the
reformation of English administrative law, aiming to ensure that the exercise of public power is subject to
proper scrutiny and accountability.

c) The GCHQ case, also known as Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] is
a landmark case in the context of judicial review in the UK. In the GCHQ case, Margaret Thatcher, serving
as the Minister for the Civil Service, made a decision to prohibit employees of the British Intelligence
Agency (GCHQ) from joining trade unions due to national security concerns. This decision was
implemented through an Order in Council, utilizing the royal prerogative power to regulate terms of
service. The Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) sought judicial review of this decision. However, the
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, stating that it would be inappropriate for the courts to intervene
in matters of national security. In essence, the court upheld the government's authority to make
decisions based on national security interests, recognizing it as an area where the judiciary should not
intervene. The case raised two key issues: First, whether the decision to exercise prerogative power was
subject to judicial review, and second, whether it was lawful to prevent GCHQ employees from joining
trade unions.

However, the case was subsequently heard by the House of Lords, the highest court in the UK at that
time. The House of Lords unanimously held that the decision to exercise prerogative power was indeed
justiciable, meaning it could be reviewed by the courts. Regarding the lawfulness of preventing GCHQ
employees from joining trade unions, the House of Lords upheld Thatcher's decision. They concluded
that it was reasonable to restrict trade union membership for British Intelligence employees in the
interests of national security. According to Lord Diplock, for a decision to be subject to judicial review, it
must have an impact on an individual's private rights or obligations, or it must deprive them of a benefit
or advantage that they previously had or legitimately expected to have. He argues that just because a
decision-making power is derived from common law and not statute, it should not be immune from
judicial review. In the current case, civil servants who were members of national trade unions had a
legitimate expectation to continue enjoying the benefits and representation provided by the unions. This
would typically give them a right to be consulted before any decision to withdraw those benefits.

However, the decision in question was based on national security concerns. Lord Diplock acknowledges
that the assessment of national security is the responsibility of the executive government, not the
courts. He argues that the judicial process is ill-equipped to deal with complex issues of national security.
In this case, the government decided not to consult the civil servants or provide advance notice to the
national unions about their intention to withdraw the benefits. The rationale behind this decision was to
prevent disruptive actions that could pose a threat to national security.

This case established the three traditional grounds of judicial review under common law: illegality,
irrationality and procedural impropriety. Illegality refers to situations where the authority has made an
error of law by attempting to exercise a power that it does not legally possess. Irrationality comes into
play when the authority exercises its power in such an unreasonable manner that it becomes subject to
review based on the Wednesbury principles, which require a decision to be so absurd that no reasonable
authority would have made it. Procedural impropriety, the third ground, applies when the authority acts
contrary to the principles of natural justice, which encompass the basic notions of fairness in decision-
making processes. These three grounds provide the basis for assessing the lawfulness and validity of
executive actions through the process of judicial review.

 Discuss the rules relating to standing in applications for judicial review, and the forms of relief
that a claimant may request the court to make.

In applications for judicial review, the rules regarding standing and the available forms of relief play
crucial roles in determining who can bring a claim and what remedies they can seek from the court.
Standing refers to the legal right and interest a claimant must have in the case to challenge the
lawfulness of a decision, action, or lack of action by a public body. It ensures that only those directly
affected by the decision can seek judicial review. Alongside standing, the claimant may request various
forms of relief from the court, such as quashing the decision, declaring it unlawful, granting injunctions,
or awarding damages. Understanding these rules and remedies is essential for navigating the judicial
review process effectively.

In case of Judicial review, the claimant must request the court's permission or "leave" to apply for
judicial review. Standing plays an important role in this permission stage. Standing refers to the right to
be heard in court. When seeking permission for a judicial review claim, the court will only grant
permission if it believes that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter being contested, as
stated in the Senior Courts Act 1981, s.31(3). The court has significant discretion in applying the test of
‘sufficient interest’ which is derived from the National Federation of Self-Employed and Small
Businesses case. The claimant must have a connection to the contested action of the public law body. At
the permission stage, the court may refuse to hear claims from those who are not affected by the action
or do not have a legitimate concern. However, at the substantive hearing, other questions of standing
may be raised. But courts are often hesitant to reject a claim based solely on standing grounds if there is
legitimate merit to the case.

The Human Rights Act 1998 introduced a different standing test. Section 7 of the HRA requires that a
claim can only be brought by a "victim" of the act, as defined in Article 34 of the ECHR. In R v Hull Prison
Board of Visitors, ex p St Germain (No. 2) a prisoner wished to challenge a decision that found him
guilty of disciplinary offences and punished him. The prisoner had standing to bring the challenge. In
Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] a student sought to challenge the Home Office's
refusal to allow them to remain in the country. This case also demonstrated sufficient interest and
therefore had no difficulty with standing. However, In R v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, a member of the House of Lords was granted standing to challenge the Foreign
Secretary's decision to approve the Maastricht Treaty based on his sincere concern for constitutional
issues, but the claim ultimately failed on the facts.

Representative groups can also have standing in judicial review cases where they act on behalf of their
members who are directly affected by a decision or action. This is known as "associational standing".
Examples of such groups include professional bodies or trade unions. In cases where the group is acting
in relation to a decision that directly affects its own interests, there is usually no issue with standing as
the group is acting as a proxy for its members. In the case of R v Liverpool Corporation (1972), the local
authority had promised not to increase the number of taxi licenses for a specified period but then did so
without consulting the Taxi Fleet Operators' Association. The Association successfully applied for a
judicial review, and was granted standing by the court. The authority was then prohibited from
increasing the number of taxi licenses without giving the Association a fair hearing first.

In the case of R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Rose Theatre Trust Co [1990], the trust
sought protection for the remains of an old Shakespearean theatre discovered during a development
project, but the Secretary of State refused. The trust then requested a judicial review, but the court
denied their standing on the basis that a group of people, none of whom had standing individually, could
not establish standing simply by forming a company or trust. This limited the trust's ability to challenge
the ministerial decision.
In the case of R v Inspectorate of Pollution ex p. Greenpeace Ltd (No. 2), a more liberal approach to
standing was observed compared to the Rose Theatre case. Greenpeace, an environmental NGO, sought
to challenge a decision on nuclear waste discharge at Sellafield through judicial review. Although their
claim failed, the court granted them standing based on their reputation as a well-known and respected
environmental pressure group, along with their members' local presence. The court distinguished this
case from Rose Theatre by highlighting that Greenpeace had an established national and international
status, whereas the company in the Rose Theatre case was specifically formed for legal action. However,
the court clarified that the grant of standing to Greenpeace did not establish an automatic precedent for
similar cases in the future.

The case of R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995]
demonstrates a permissive approach to standing in cases of significant public concern. In this case, a
pressure group sought judicial review of the Foreign Secretary's refusal to provide assurances regarding a
controversial aid project in Malaysia. The court granted the group standing based on their prominent
role in the development aid field and the importance of the issue to the public. This case indicates that
campaign groups can obtain standing if the issue is of public importance, there is no other responsible
challenger, and the claimant holds a significant position in the relevant field. However, a careful balance
must be struck to avoid an overly open approach that may invite political challenges while still upholding
the rule of law.

Relief refers to the remedies or outcomes that a claimant may request from the court if their application
for judicial review is successful. The specific forms of relief can vary depending on the nature of the case
and the jurisdiction. A quashing order is the most common remedy granted in successful applications for
judicial review. It reflects the court's recognition that a decision has been improperly made, but it is up
to the decision-maker to make the final decision, as the court's role is supervisory and it cannot
substitute its own opinion. In cases where the defendant has acted beyond its powers, a quashing order
may also be accompanied by an order to remit the decision back to the decision-maker to ensure that it
is made in a lawful manner and all relevant factors are considered. The Judicial Review and Courts Bill,
currently going through parliament, aims to give courts the power to suspend quashing orders to allow
defects to be remedied. This will provide the courts with more flexibility in judicial review cases.

A prohibiting order prevents a tribunal or authority from acting beyond the scope of its powers, while a
mandatory order compels public authorities to fulfill their duties. A declaration clarifies the respective
rights and obligations of the parties without making any order, while an injunction stops a public body
from acting unlawfully. In judicial review, damages are not a common remedy and are only available in
specific situations. Simply acting unlawfully does not automatically entitle the claimant to compensation.
Instead, damages may be awarded if there is a recognised private law cause of action, such as negligence
or breach of statutory duty, or if there is a claim under European law or the Human Rights Act 1998.