ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO et al., vs. JUSTO LUKBAN et al.(G.R. No.

L-14639; 39 Phil 778, March 25,

1919)Ponente: Malcolm, J.

Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Habeas Corpus.

Facts:

1. Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the closing of the city’s red light
district. The brothels were closed & the workers (170 women) were rounded up & kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police for a little more than a week.

2. On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor &
Negros & sent off to Davao to work as laborers w/o their consent, w/o opportunity to collect their
belongings, & apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for
an investigation.

3. The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed & receipted
for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, & by Feliciano Yñigo & Rafael Castillo.
The governor & hacendero had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been
expelled from the city of Manila.

4. The attorney for the relatives & friends of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus
to a member of the SC, alleging that Justo Lukban, along w/ Anton Hohmann (the police chief), & others
illegally restrained the women of their liberty.

5. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus in an order of November 4 that directed Lukban,
Hohmann, Sales, Yñigo to bring before the court the persons alleged to be deprived of their liberty on
December 2, 1918. On the day named in the order, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
issued were produced in court by the respondents.

6. The court issued a second order directing that those of the women not in Manila be brought before
the Court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, Yñigo on January 13, 1919 unless the women should,
in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that
court, renounce that right, or unless respondents demonstrate other legal motives that made
compliance impossible.

7. On January 13, 1919, respondents had succeeded in bringing from Davao 8 women. They allege that
81 women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
transportation free, renounced the right through sworn statements; 59 had already returned to Manila
by other means, and despite all efforts 26 could not be located.

8. The counsel for petitioners asked the Court to find the respondents in contempt of court. The
respondents challenged the contempt proceeding and the issuance of the writ.

Issues:1. Whether the petitioners had standing to file the petition for habeas corpus
2. Whether the Supreme Court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus

3. Whether the women were illegally restrained of their liberty

4. Whether the respondents were guilty of contempt

Held/ Ratio:

1. Yes. When it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, another
person may submit it in his/her behalf. In thecase at bar, the way the expulsion was conducted by the
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. Theywere first isolated
from society and then shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in
their behalf, in this case,the petitioners who were relatives and friends of the deportees.

2. No. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the SC or any judge thereof enforceable anywhere
in the Phils. Whether the writ shall bemade returnable before the SC or before an inferior court rests in
the discretion of the SC & is dependent on the particular circumstances. In thecase at bar, it was not
shown that the CFI of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before thatcourt. On the other hand, the petitioners and their attorneys were in Manila and it
was shown that the case involved parties situated in differentparts of the Islands. The failure of the
superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial
ofthe benefit of the writ.

3. Yes. The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in adistant region, deprived these women of their liberty & their
freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. In thiscase, there was no law,
order, or regulation which justified the action of the respondents in restraining the petitioners of their
liberty. There wasno showing of any law or order which authorized or conferred upon the Mayor of the
city or the Chief of Police the right to force the women tochange their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Phil. penal law during that time specifically punishes any public officerwho, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

4. No. Only Mayor Lukban is guilty of contempt. He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole
chain of events and had under hispower as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the
women to Manila but failed. The rest of the respondents are not guilty ofcontempt. Some were merely
following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was merely drawn into the
casethrough miscommunication. An officer’s failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a
writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contemptcommitted in the face of the court.

Dispositive: In resume- as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary .
The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax,Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are not found to be in contempt
of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of theclerk of the
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos.