REGALIAN DOCTRINE; CONCEPT; RATIONALE

Cruz v Sec of DENR (GR No. 135385)

December 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Right Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR).
In its resolution, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous People, the agency
created the IPRA to implement its provision, they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
Sometime in October 1988, respondents Secretary of the DENR and Secretary of DBM filed
through the Solicitor General. In view of the Solicitor general, IPRA is partly unconstitutional on
the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.
Thereafter, sometime in October 1988, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member or the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and other leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples filed their
Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the National Commission in Indigenous People in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
The CHR likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae. CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of people like those indigenous people. And for this reason
that the petition be dismissed.
Another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources filed a motion to Intervene and agree that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition be dismissed.
An oral arguments were heard. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalia doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or Not the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution.
HELD
The Court held that the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the constitution. By examining the
IPRA, the court ruled that there is nothing in the law that grants to the Indigenous People
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. It mentioned that the
ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the Indigenous People over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of those resources, and at the same time, a priority
in their large scale development and exploitation.
The Court also contends that the ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the indigenous people by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by the Indigenous people of their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. 

**ADDITIONAL NOTE FROM THE CASE**

The SC deliberated upon the matter, after deliberation, they voted and reached a 7-7 vote.
They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s
petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
natural resources---- somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Carino v Insular Development (GR No. 2869)

The Case:
 This case is about the application for land registration to the Philippine Court of Land
Registration, which the court granted March 4, 1904.
 The Philippines and US Government, those governments having taken possession of the
property for public and military purposes, appealed the decision to CFI of Province of
Benguet, which dismissed the application of the plaintiff and affirmed by the SC.
 The Plaintiff brought to US Supreme Court by of virtue of error and not by appeal.

Facts:

Mateo Cariño is an Igorot of the province of Benguet. For more than 50 years before the
Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained
fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for
pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as
owners by the Igorot and he had inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance
with Igorot custom. He applied for the registration of a certain land. There was no document of
title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land
in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish
Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the
Crown. 
 In 1893 -1894 and 1896 -1897; he made an application but with no avail. In 1901, the
plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were
registered to him, that process, however, establishing only possessory title. Even if the applicant
have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of
1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation

 The government argued that the Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in
the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired (Regalian
Doctrine). Such title was acquired by the US by virtue of the Treaty of Paris signed on
April 11, 1899.

ISSUES

a. Whether or not the Regalian Doctrine applies to lands previously occupied by tribes such
as the Igorots, who acquired native title thereof

b. Whether or not Carino owns the land

HELD

a. No. The Regalian Doctrine does not apply to lands previously occupied by tribes that
already acquired native title thereof, such as the Igorots.

By Section 12 of the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by
the United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.” The same
statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that "no law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."

In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from Section 12, it is hard to believe that the
United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association -- one of the
profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.

Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way (private ownership) before the Spanish conquest, and never to have
been public land. (Principle of Native Title)

There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of

possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any
grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of (jura regalia) Regalian
Doctrine.

b. YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through
a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. The grant to the plaintiff was
the result of the principle of Prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states:
“where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if
they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.
 
Moreover, the decree of june 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be deemed
owners; if a cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years.
 
Here the plaintiff’s father was the owner of the land by the very terms of this decree – by
Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the US are to be
administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.” Obiter Writ of error is the general
method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity
in the main.
 
Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.
 
The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to the
occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private
gain.
 
The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
 Federation of Coron et.Al. v Sec. of DENR (GR No. 247866)
September 15, 2020
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705,
otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines.
Petitioners Federation of Coron, Busuanga, Palawan Farmer’s Association, Inc (FCBPFAI) and
Sandigan ng mga Bukidnon Coro, Inc., (SAMBICO) are federations consisting of fanners in
Palawan. Sometime in 2002, the farm lands occupied by the members of SAMBICO in Sitio
Dipangan and Langka, Brgy. Bintuan, Coron, Palawan were placed under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). The lands placed under CARP had titles in the name of Mercury Group of
Companies.
However, the implementation of the CARP over the subject lands was stopped because the said
lands were unclassified forest land under Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 and thus, are inalienable and
belong to the government. As these are forest lands, they are under the administration of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and not the DAR.

The members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka ng Sto. Nino (SAMMASA) alleged that they

farmed the lands. Farming was their means of livelihood even before their barangay was
established in the 1960s. Sometime in 1980, the farm lands they tilled were placed under the
coverage of CARP. The land tilled by the farmers was originally titled under the name of a
certain Jose Sandoval. However, the land distribution was stopped under the CARP because the
DENR stated that the said lands were unclassified forest land under Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705
and these forest lands belong to the government.

Hence, this petition to declare Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 unconstitutional.

ISSUES
Whether or Not section 3 (a) of PD No. 705 is unconstitutional
HELD
Section 3 (a) PD No. 705 is constitutional.
Section 3(a) PD No. 705 provides that Public forest is the mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purposes and which are not.
The Court finds that petitioners failed to discharge the heavy burden in assailing the
constitutionality of the law. Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 705 is consistent with the constitution,
which adapted the Regalian Doctrine that all land of public domain belong to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable

In the case at bar, as petitioners failed to assail Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705, which is consistent
with the Regalian Doctrine, wherein the subject lands remain within the ownership of the State.
To repeat, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. In other words,
petitioners have no vested right over the subject lands because these unclassified lands belong to
the State, hence, no private right was violated by the State.

Verily, Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 is not unconstitutional because it merely enforces the Regalian
Doctrine in favor of the State. No amount of possession will expose the subject lands to private
ownership. Petitioners should not seek to devoid the said statutory provision; instead, they
should proceed to the Executive Department, through the Secretary of DENR, to establish that
the subject unclassified forest lands must be re-classified to alienable and disposable lands of
public domain.Only when the lands of public domain are classified as alienable or disposable,
may petitioners assert their property rights over the subject lands

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 Valiao v Republic (GR No. 170757)
November 28, 2011
FACTS
Petitioners4 Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio
Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration of
a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 sqm, situatuated in Barrio Galicia, Negros Occidental.
A private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to dismiss the
application on the following grounds:
1. the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable
2. res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration
3. The application has no factual or legal basis.
Sometime in 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others:
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question; that the muniment/s
of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or
alleged in the application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of owner that the parcel of land applied for is a portion
of public domain belonging to the Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and
that the present action is barred by a previous final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted
between the same parties and involving the same parcel of land.
The RTC denied private oppositors’ Motion to Dismiss and granted petitioner’s application for
registration of the subject property and hereby orders and decrees registration of Lot No. 2372
subject of the present proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the applicants,
who are declared the true and lawful owners of said Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico
Valiao, who sold his right to Macario Zafra.
Aggrieved by the Decision, Private Oppositors and Republic filed an appeal with the CA. The
CA ruled that the classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and in the absence of such classification, the lands
remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Further,
there exists a prior cadastral case involving the same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372,
which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that such judgment
constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that the
subject property is part of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to
prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in question.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or Not Lot No. 2371 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
HELD
The Court held that under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and
not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.  To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.

In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government.

The court added that no such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in
question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual
evidence of possession.Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

WHEREFORE, The decision and resolution of the CA AFFIRMED and the application for
registration of title filed by the Petitioners DENIED.