MODULE 6: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

A. Governing Law - “The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997” (R.A. 8371: Sections 1-84):
October 29, 1997

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1997/10/29/republic-act-no-8371/

B. Declaration of State Policies - (Sec. 2)

C. Definition of Terms - (Sec. 3)

D. Rights to Ancestral Domain -

(Chap. 3, Secs. 4-12)

5. National Commission on Indigenous Peoples - (Chap. 7; Secs. 38-50)

6. Jurisdiction and Procedures for Enforcement of Rights - (Chap. 9; Secs. 65-68)

G. Punishable Acts - (Sec. 72)

38. Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449, Feb. 23, 1909

CARINO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT: Every presumption should be indulged against the US

claiming title to land in the Province of Benguet in the Philippines, which, for more than 50
years prior to the treaty of peace with Spain of April 11, 1899 has been held by the present native
Igorot holder and his ancestors under claim of private ownership.

(OWNED BY THE PRESENT NATIVE IGOROT HOLDER AND HIS ANCESTORS, THE
PARCEL OF LAND UNDER CLAIM OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP FOR MORE THAN 50
YEARS PRIOR TO THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH SPAIN)

A native title to land which for more than 50 years prior to the treaty of peace with Spain, a
native Igorot and his ancestors have been held in accordance with Igorot custom as private
property and should be recognized by the insular government although no title has been issued
from the Spanish crown.

(ALTHOUGH NO TITLE HAS BEEN ISSUED FROM THE SPANISH CROWN, THE SAID
PARCEL OF LAND SHALL BE RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS PRIVATELY
OWNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH IGOROT CUSTOMS)

Implementation of IPRA: Concept of ancestral lands or domains; Indigenous concept of

ownership; Rights to ancestral dominion.

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Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this Court.
The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a
judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of
Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.

Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who
actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902,
which applies to the whole archipelago.

While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a
question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will
insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it will
recognize actual facts. chanrobles.com-red

Page 212 U. S. 450

The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the
inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that
property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned
land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies
prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.

The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.

Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and
against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of
a subsequently enacted registration act.

Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine
Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of
Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued
possession thereof.

---

Doctrine: When, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land (native title).

Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and
against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of
a subsequently enacted registration act. Title by prescription against the crown existed under
Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and
one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof.

Facts: In 1903, Mateo Cariño filed a petition for him to be granted a certificate of title over a
40hectare land in Baguio, Benguet. He claimed that he and his predecessors in interest had been
in possession over said parcel of land since time immemorial; that the Igorot community where
the said land was located had always considered Mateo Cariño and his predecessors/ancestors as
the owner of said land; that said parcel of land had been transferred to his predecessors and unto
him in accordance with the Igorot custom. The land registration court granted his petition but the
government through the Solicitor General opposed said grant on the ground that Mateo Cariño
and ancestors failed to register said land during the Spanish Era. It was argued that in 1880, the
Spanish government decreed that all privately held land must be registered or else they will be
reverted back to the public domain (pursuant to the regalian doctrine). Th Supreme Court ruled
against Mateo Cariño hence, hence Cariño further appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue: W/N Mateo Cariño is the rightful owner of the disputed land.

Ruling: Yes. Mateo Cariño is the rightful owner of the disputed land. Mateo Cariño cannot be
deprived of his land simply because he failed to comply with the formalities required by the
Spanish law (or by a Philippine law). Cariño’s title, which he acquired from his ancestors
predates, by more than 50 years, the establishment of the American government in the
Philippines (in fact, even before the establishment of the Spanish government in the Philippines).

The US Supreme Court also ruled that to follow the stand of the Solicitor General is to deprive
the land titles of the natives (not only Igorots but all native inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands). Under the Constitution: “no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.” The term “any person” includes the natives (in this case, the
Igorots). All lands held under private ownership during the Spanish era shall therefore be
presumed to be such. Failure to register under Spanish Law did not revert said lands to the public
domain.

39. Cruz vs. Sec. of Environment, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

CRUZ V. SEC. OF DENR: assailed the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,
for granting ownership of natural resources to indigenous peoples. The Court ruled that ancestral
lands and domains are not lands of public dominion. They are private lands belonging to the
indigenous peoples by native title, which in their concept of private land title, existed
irrespective of a royal grant from the State.

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral

domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction
of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources
to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

Doctrine:

Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary
for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover
or reforestation."

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The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National
Economy and Patrimony," to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant

Note: Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated
therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State
ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.

Ruling:

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.

RATIONALE FOR ENACTING IPRA: When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to
collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural
resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its
distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by
discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by
Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical
injustice to our indigenous people.

The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous

Movement.

Before IPRA: Indigenous people have the right to possess but does not have the right to alienate
the property; has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.

After IPRA: Right to transfer, and redemption of the property.

WHAT IS IPRA?

THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the
IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands
and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
which traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to
customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer
is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the
transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-
governance and empowerment, social justice and human rights, the right to preserve and protect
their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop
their own sciences and technologies.

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is
composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic
areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including
Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western
Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. The NCIP took over the
functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a
revitalized structure.

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. The
NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in
accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from
₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.

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Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution

Ruling: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains
with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

MODULE 7: CLEAN AIR

A. Governing Law - “Clean Air Act of 1999 (R.A. 8749; Sections 1-12), June 23, 1999

B. Declaration of Principles -

(Sec. 2)

C. Declaration of Policy - (Sec. 3)

D. Recognition of Rights - (Sec. 4)

E. Air Quality Management -

(Chap. 2; Secs. 15)

F. Pollution from Stationary Sources- (Secs.19)

40. MMDA vs. JANCOM Environment Corp., G.R. No. 147465, Jan. 30, 2002

FACTS:

In 1994, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 creating the
Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the BOT implementation of solid waste management
projects, headed by the Chairman of the MMDA and the Cabinet Officer for Regional Development-
National Capital Region (CORD-NCR).

The EXECOM was to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in San
Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme. The terms of
reference for the waste-to-energy projects provided that its proponents should have the capability to
establish municipal solid waste thermal plants using incineration technology. This type of technology was
selected because of its alleged advantages of greatly reduced waste volume, prolongation of the service
life of the disposal site, and generation of electricity.

While eleven (11) proponents submitted their pre-qualification documents, most failed to comply with the
requirements under Section 5.4 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
6957, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-Transfer Law.
During the second bid conference, the bid proposals of First Philippines for the Carmona site and
JANCOM for the San Mateo site were found to be complete and responsive. Consequently, on February
12, 1997, JANCOM and First Philippines were declared the winning bidders, respectively, for the San
Mateo and the Carmona projects.

In a letter dated February 27, 1997, then MMDA Chairman Prospero I. Oreta informed JANCOM’s Chief
Executive Officer Jay Alparslan that the EXECOM had approved the PBAC recommendation to award to
JANCOM the San Mateo Waste-to-Energy Project on the basis of the final Evaluation Report declaring
JANCOM International Ltd., Pty., together with Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), as the sole complying
(winning) bidder for the San Mateo Waste Disposal site, subject to negotiation and mutual approval of the
terms and conditions of the contract of award. The letter also notified Alparslan that the EXECOM had
created a negotiating team.

On December 19, 1997, the BOT Contract for the waste-to-energy project was signed between JANCOM
and the Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management
through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR Chairman Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta.

On March 5, 1998, the BOT contract was submitted to President Ramos for approval but this was too
close to the end of his term which expired without him signing the contract. President Ramos, however,
endorsed the contract to incoming President Joseph E. Estrada.

With the change of administration, the composition of the EXECOM also changed. Memorandum Order
No. 19 appointed the Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Project to be the
EXECOM chairman.

Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999 was passed by Congress. And due
to the clamor of residents of Rizal province, President Estrada had, in the interim, also ordered the closure
of the San Mateo landfill. Due to these circumstances, the Greater Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee adopted a resolution not to pursue the BOT contract with JANCOM.

In the case at bar, the reasons cited by MMDA for not pushing through with the subject contract were: 1)
the passage of the Clean Air Act, which allegedly bans incineration; 2) the closure of the San Mateo
landfill site; and 3) the costly tipping fee. These reasons are bereft of merit.

ISSUE:

WoN the contract between EXECOM and JANCOM was valid and not violative of the Clean Air Act.

DOCTRINE:

MMDA v. JANCOM: The reason cited by MMDA for not pushing through with the contract was the
passage of the Clean Air Act which allegedly bans incineration. Sec. 20 does not absolutely prohibit
incineration as a mode of waste disposal rather only those burning processes which emit poisonous and
toxic fumes are banned.

BASIS:
Sec. 20 of the Clean Air Act pertinently reads:

SECTION 20. Ban on Incineration. — Incineration, hereby defined as the burning of municipal,
bio-chemical and hazardous wastes, which process emits poisonous and toxic fumes, is hereby
prohibited: . . ."

Section 20 does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal; rather only
those burning processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes are banned.

RULING:

Yes. The contract was valid. There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or
renounce the same without the consent of the other. From the moment of perfection, the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage, and
law (Article 1315, Civil Code). The contract has the force of law between the parties and they
are expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments, not weasel out
of them.

Stated differently, while the twenty-five year effectivity period of the contract has not yet started
to run because of the absence of the President’s signature, the contract has, nonetheless, already
been perfected.

As to the contention that there is no perfected contract due to JANCOM’s failure to comply with
several conditions precedent, the same is, likewise, unmeritorious.

Consequently, MMDA may not claim that the BOT contract is not valid and binding due to the
lack of presidential approval.

A. Pollution from Motor Vehicles

- (Sec. 21)

41. Henares vs. LTFRB & DOTC, G.R. No. 158290, Oct. 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles

(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Reason for petition: High growth and
low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke
engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to
present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental
hazards. Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and
liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions –
have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life.
Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react
to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates
smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it
reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in
plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned
but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With
prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.

According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing
small amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel
because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO
compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon
emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although,
according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases
blamed for global warming.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic
Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

ISSUE:

WoN writ of mandamus will lie.

DOCTRINE:

HENARES V. LTFRB: Compressed natural gas – cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much. LTFRB
cannot be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG through mandamus. The Constitution and the Clean Air
Act are both general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the
use of CNG by public vehicles. Writ of mandamus is unavailing since petitioners are unable to pinpoint
the law that imposes a legal duty on LTFRB and DOTC compelling the use of CNGs for PUVs.

BASIS: Clean Air Act and the Constitution

RULING:

No. Regrettably, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.

H. Pollution from Other Sources - (Sec. 24)

I. Pollution from Other Pollutants - (Sec. 30)

J. Institutional Mechanisms - (Sec. 34)

42. Ortigas & Co. vs. FEATI Bank, G.R. No. L-24670, Dec.14,1979

FACTS:

Plaintiff as vendor sold the lots namely 5 and 6 to vendees Padilla and Natividad and later on, the latter
transferred their rights over the lot to one Emma Chavez.

Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or
restrictions that:jgc:

"1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for
residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it
or any other lots belonging to the Seller.

2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time
in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern
sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c)
shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines."

Eventually, the said lot has been acquired by defendant-appellee from Emma Chavez the said lot 5 and
from Republic Flour Mills of the said lot 6 which was also acquired in the from Chavez in good faith free
from all liens and encumbrances.

On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the
construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant-
appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following
day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the
commercial building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the
building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant-appellee having
filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had
accordingly obtained building and planning permits to proceed with the construction.

Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719, 101613,
and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and
development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-
appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established.

Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and
industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong,
Rizal.9 It alleges that plaintiff-appellant "completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said
subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" 10 and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it
"only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area . . . had been declared a commercial and
industrial zone . . ."

ISSUE:
WoN the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among
others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building
restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question.

OR (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power; and (2) whether the said
Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by Defendant-Appellee.

DOCTRINE:

ORTIGAS & CO. v. FEATI BANK: Resolution No. 27 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. The lots themselves not only front the
highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place.

RULING:

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality.

The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished
about the place.

EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong,
through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in
passing the subject resolution.

1) YES. Assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to
raise the issue of the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the
opinion that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as
the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations " for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not
restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that
Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the
intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision.
2) YES. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." 35
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" 36 and
"in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," 37 the exercise of
the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
 whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Complaint DISMISSED.

43. Technology Developers vs. CA, G.R. No.94759, Jan.21,1991

FACTS:

Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette,
received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering
the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until
further order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with him to the
office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region
III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Bulacan, directed to
the Provincial Governor through channels. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after
an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the
fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.

Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a
building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6,1987.8

While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.9 Petitioner had not
exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution
and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

ISSUE:

WoN mayor, pursuant to his police power, may deny permit to operate a business on the ground that the
same affects the welfare of the people on health and other issues about pollution.

DOCTRINE:

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS V. CA: While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is
pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the EMB of the DENR, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may
deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate
measures are taken to control and/or injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emissions in the operation of the business

Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose
offensive odor not only pollute the air in the locality but also effect the health of the residents in the area
so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders
…and it was required to bring the following: (1) Building permit; (2) Mayor's permit; and (3) Region III-
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.

RULING:

Petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner

K. Actions - (Sec. 40)

44. AC Enterprises vs. Frabelle Properties, G.R.NO.166744,Nov. 02,2006

FACTS:

AC enterprises, petitioner, is a corporation who owns a 10-storey building in Makati City. On the other
hand, Frabelle, respondent herein, is a condominium corporation whose condominium development is
located behind petitioner. Respondent complained of the unbearable noise emanating from the blower of
the air-conditioning units of petitioner.

ISSUE:

1) WoN the “unbearable niose” in the case at bar is a nuisance as to be resolved only by the in the
due course of proceedings.
2) WoN the issue to be resolved in the case shall only be done by PAB

DOCTRINE:

AC ENTERPRISES V. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP.: The PAB has no primary jurisdiction over
the noise complained of by the respondent. The resolution of the issue before the RTC which is whether
the noise complained of is actionable nuisance, does nor require any, especial technical knowledge,
expertise and experience of the PAB or even of Makati City requiring the determination of technical and
intricate matters or fact. The case was more of an abatement of a nuisance and not a pollution case.

RULING:

1) YES. It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in due course of proceedings; the noise is
not a nuisance per e. Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the
listener. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive
characteristics will not render the house an actionable nuisance—in the conditions, of present
living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations. The
determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of such character as to
produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities rendering
adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.
2) NO. The resolution of the issue before the RTC which is whether the noise complained of is
actionable nuisance, does nor require any, especial technical knowledge, expertise and experience
of the PAB or even of Makati City requiring the determination of technical and intricate matters
or fact. The case was more of an abatement of a nuisance and not a pollution case.
MODULE 8: BIOFUELS

1. Governing Law - “Biofuels Act of 2006” (R.A. 9367; Sections 1 - 21), Jan. 12, 2007

2. Declaration of Policy - (Sec. 2)

3. Definition of Terms - (Sec. 3)

4. Phase out of use of Harmful Gasoline Additives - (Sec. 4)

5. Mandatory use of Biofuels -

(Sec. 5)

45. Henares vs. LTFRB & DOTC, G.R. No. 158290,Oct. 23,2006

6. Incentive schemes - (Secs. 6)

7. Role of government agencies -

(Sec. 7)

8. Prohibited Acts - (Sec. 12)

9. Penal Provisions - (Sec. 13)

MODULE 9: FISHERIES

A. Governing Law - “Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998” (R.A. 8550, Sections 1-133): February 25,
1998

2. Declaration of Policy - (Sec. 2)

3. Definition of Terms - (Sec. 4)

4. Municipal Fisheries - (Sec. 16)

5. Commercial Fisheries - (Sec. 26)

F. Prohibitions and Penalties -

(Secs. 86)
46. Shell vs. Jalos, G.R. No. G.R. No. 179918. Sept. 8, 2010

SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION v. JALOS: Although the complain of Jalos does not use the
word “pollution” in describing the cause of the alleged fish decline in the Mindoro Sea, it is unmistakable
that Shell’s pipeline produced some kind of poison or emission that drove the fish away from the coastal
areas. While the complain did not specifically attribute to Shell any specific act of “pollution”, it alleged
that “the pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led
stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea.” This constitutes “pollution” as defined by law.

Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the exploration
and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as the
exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the States full
control and supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the States agent within the meaning of
the law.

The essence of agency is the agent’s liability to represent his principal and bring about business relations
between the latter and third persons. Shell’s primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the
Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its contractual
commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations in behalf of the State.

MODULE 10: MINING

1. Governing Law - “Philippine Mining Act of 1995” (R.A. 7942: Sections 1-116): March 3,
1995

2. Declaration of State Policies -

(Sec. 2)

3. Definition of Terms - (Sec. 3)

4. Ownership of Mineral Resources - (Sec. 4)

5. MineralAgreements-(Sec.26)

47. La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882. Jan. 27, 2004

48. Didipio Earth-Saver’s Multi-purpose Association vs. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882. Mar. 30, 2006

6. Settlement of Conflicts - (Sec. 77)

7. Government Share - (Sec. 80)

8. Incentives - (Sec. 90)

9. Penal Provisions - (Sec. 1010)