De La Cruz vs.

Ramiscal
G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the
corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioner-
spouses are occupants of a parcel of land located at the back of Ramiscal’s property
owned by Concepcion de la Pena, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. The subject
matter of this case is a 1.10m wide by 12.60m long strip of land owned by respondent
which is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the
nearest public highway from their property. Petitioner had enclosed the same with a
gate, fence and roof. In 1995, a relocation survey and location plan for the respondent’s
properties were prepared and it was only then that respondent discovered that the
pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of her property. Respondent immediately
demanded that the petitioners demolish the structure constructed by them on said
pathway without her consent but such demand was unheeded.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of
right of way.
(2) Whether or not respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of way
being used by petitioners.

Held:
(1) Petitioners are entitled neither to a voluntary nor legal easement of right of
way. Petitioners failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare
claim that they and their tenants entered into an argument with the
respondent. Likewise futile are petitioners attempt to show that they are
legally entitled to the pathway under Art. 649 of the Civil Code. The
conferment of a legal easement of right of way under this article is subject to
proof of the following: 1) It is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) payment of proper indemnity; 3) the
isolation is not the result of its own acts; 4) the right of way claim is at the
point that least prejudicial to the servient estate; and 5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway be the shortest. The first three requirements are
not present in the instant case.

(2) Respondent is not barred by laches from closing the right of way being used
by petitioners. Laches is not applicable here since there was no knowledge
on the part of the respondent’s act for it was only in 1995 that she found out
that the pathway being used by the petitioners was part of her property.
Further, delay in the filing of suit is not a valid contention in this case for
respondent immediately demanded petitioners to demolish their property and
reasonably filed in complaint.
Title: Pilar Devlopment Corp. v Dumadag, et al.

GR No. 194336

Date: March 11, 2013

Ponente: Peralta, J.

Parties:

Petitioner: Pilar Development Corporation

Respondents: Ramon Dumadag, Emma Bacabac, Ronaldo Navarro, Jimmy Pagdalian,

Pay delos Santos, Armando Trillos, Felicisimo Trillos, Arcangel Flores, Eddie Martin,
Presilla Layog, Conrado Caguyong, Gina Gonzales, Arlene Pedrosa, Jocelyn Abelino,
Roque Villaraza, Rolando Villaraza, Camilo Genove, Nilda Roayana, Susan Roayana,
Juancho Panganiban, Bong de Guzman, Arnold Enverso, Donna dela Raza, Emelyn
Hagnaya, Freddie de Leon, Ronillo de Leon, Mario Martinez, and Precy Lopez

Facts:

The petitioner owned Pillar Village Subdivision at Las Piñas where the respondents
allegedly built their shanties without the petitioner’s knowledge or consent. Thus, a
Complaint for accion publiciana was filed against the respondents. The respondents
denied the material allegations of the Complaint asserting that it’s the local government
and not the petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them.

RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the land in question is situated on the sloping
area leading down a creek and within the three-meter legal easement and thus, it’s
considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article 502 of the New
Civil Code. With this, only the local government of Las Pinas City could insititute an
action for recovery of possession or ownership. CA dismissed the case but noted that
the proper party to seek recovery of the property is not the City of Las Pinas but the
Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG pursuant to Section 101 of the
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

Issues:

1. WON the land in question is part of public property- YES.

2. Who is the property party entitled to institute the case- the OSG or the LGU

Ratio:

Petitioner used Article 630 of the Civil Code as it provides the general rule that the
owner of the estate retains the ownership of the portion of the easement established,
Article 635 says that “all matters concerning easements established for public or
communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto.”
The applicable special laws are DENR A.O. No. 99021 dated June 11, 1999 which
prescribed the guidelines for the implementation of P.D. Nos. 705 and 1067 which was
issued for biodiversity preservation, P.D. 1216 and P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the
Philippines all of which states that such 3 meter allowance is reserved for public use.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that the subject land is public property.

In relation to this, the Court held that respondents have no better right to the property as
the petitioners because it is public land.

With regard to the second issue, “both the OSG and the local government of Las Pinas
City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former
shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may
also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992). Under RA No. 7279, all LGUs are mandated to
evict and demolish persons or entities occupying dangerous areas including riverbanks.
It also obliges the LGUS to strictly observe resettlement procedures and prohibition
against new illegal structures in Sections 29 and 30 respectively. Else, there will be
administrative and criminal liability.”

The Court suggests that petitioner should file an action for mandamus to compel the
local government of Las Piñas City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the eviction of
respondents under R.A. 7279.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009

Heirs of Joaquin Limense

vs Rita Vda. De Ramos

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:

Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided his property into
five and gave the divided lots to his daughters through a deed of donation on March 9,
1932.

In 1981, Joaquin Limense wanted to build a hollow block fence on his property but could
not because a substantial portion of the respondent's building encroached upon portion
of Limense property.

Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent ignored both oral
and written demands.

In the RTC, the respondents averred that they are daughters of on of the Lozada
daughters. . After subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in
favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac
Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of
Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C
has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since
1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin
Limense without causing damage and prejudice to respondents.

RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent easement of right of
way existed in favor of respondents. The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired
the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose
than as an alley.

Joaquin filed a notice of appeal but during the pendency of the appeal with the CA,
Joaquin died. His heirs then elevated the case to the SC via petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding

that respondent's ot has an easement of right of way.

Held: In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an
action for removal of obstruction and damages. Respondents raised the defense that
Joaquin Limense's title could have been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation
in the trial proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the nature of a collateral
attack, which is not allowed by law.

As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin,
as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and
Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we
see it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limense’s ownership
over Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-
owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin
Limense.

Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his
successors-in-interest, may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls,
ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.

Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C has
been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents in the
area for a long period of time.
The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and
17 meters in length; the stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share
allotted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a
showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on
Lot No. 12-C.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between
petitioners and respondents.

2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila, for further
proceedings without further delay to determine the facts essential to the proper
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

SOLID MANILA CORP. vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO.- Easement and Servitudes

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenement of which they form part, and even if
they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the
tenement or mortgaged separately.

Note: In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of,

and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public
at large. (Merger, which presupposes ownership, is not possible.)

FACTS:

Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The same lies in
the vicinity of another parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading whose title came from a
prior owner. In the deed of sale between Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot
was reserved as an easement of way.
The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hong’s title stating among
other things "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions
whatsoever shall be placed thereon; and (7) that the owner of the lot on which the alley
has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay
pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the
use thereof”

The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of neighboring
estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent
constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private
respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.

The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the
easement has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and
servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner.

CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it

does not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had
acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the
easement.

Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale executed between the Bio
Hong and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that
in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.

[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to cancel the annotation in
question, which it granted subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement or mortgaged
separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: NO to both
1) The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solid’s contention that the alley was
not included in the sale. It was included but there was a limitation on its use-the
easement. As a mere right of way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and
maintain an independent existence. (Art. 617)
Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property –– including the disputed
alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or
otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it,
because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

2) No genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private
respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of
the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires
full ownership of both estates.
Note that The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit of
a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong). In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement"
to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this
case, the public at large. Thus, merger could not have been possible.