1.

Barangay Sindalan San Fernando, Pampanga vs CA

G.R. NO. 150640 : March 22, 2007

Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against the respondents, who are also the
registered owners of a parcel of land certified by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R.
The petitioners wanted a portion of land to become a feeder road for public use because the
petitioners claimed that it was the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road. The
claimed public purposes of the portion of land is supported by the Barangay Resolution No.6.
The respondents, on the other hand, claimed that the land which the petitioners wanted is of
private use. The land is for the benefits of the homeowners of the Davsan II Subdivision. They
pointed out also that under Presidential Decree No. 957, it is the subdivision owner who is
obliged to provide a feeder road to the subdivision residents.

Issue:
Whether or not the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent because the petition lacks merit.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1)
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article
III(Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or
property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation.
Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher
Good, which is public use, and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without
these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void,
but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to
property as well.

For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the property owner and
must perform a more thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the
expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving complaints for condemnation, such that
when a serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public use of property, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the property owner and against the State.

_________________________
2. REPUBLIC VS. DE CASTELLVI
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623,
an expropriation proceeding.

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed,
on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda.
de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter
referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,
Pampanga.
On July 1, 1947, the Republic through the AFP occupied Castellvi’s land by virtue of a lease
agreement on a year to year basis. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956
the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the
leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the
Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue
leasing the property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter,
and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy. A
follow-up letter was sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of the property
within one month from said date. On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano,
Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate
the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00
that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse,
the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to
the President. The Republic commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner
maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the
said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of
eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property
for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and
occupied the property as lessee.
HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in
1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for
more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public
use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
Here, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property
under a contract of lease.

_____________________________
4. Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to
have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution
No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land
to be a national historical landmark. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General,
instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf
of the NHI. Respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it
to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a
hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional market and assessed values of the
property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would
have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the
National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national historical landmark.
HELD: Yes the “public use” requirement is present. Public use should not be restricted to the
traditional uses.
For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use
proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit"
accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for
the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It
is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

______________________________
5. G.R. No. 125218 January 23, 1998 |. 284 SCRA 716, January 23, 1998
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, Petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S. TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA,
Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties situated in
Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. On November 5, 1993, Ordinance No. 7813 was
approved authorizing Manila Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation,
purchase, or other legal means of certain parcels of land, some of which are registered properties
of the petitioner. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the
area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
A Writ of Possession was awarded by the trail court in favor of City of Manila. Petitioner’s
motion to quash the writ and its petition for Certiorari was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not City of Manila validly expropriated Filstream’s properties.
RULING:
No. There is no valid expropriation of Filstream’s properties.
The right of City of Manila to expropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to
it under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code and more specifically under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409) in pursuit of its urban land reform and housing
programs.
Expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is governed by Republic Act No.
7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Sections 9 and 10 specifically provide the
following, to wit:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. - Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. - The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act
shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, that expropriation shall be resorted to only
when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted... (Emphasis supplied)
Local government units are not however given an unbridled authority when exercising their
power of eminent domain. The basic rule of due process still has to be followed as a means of
safeguarding the rights of owners of private property.
Upon scrutiny of records presented, it was established that the City of Manila failed to comply
with the provisions of R.A. 7279 particularly that of Section 9 (f) and 10 upon expropriation of
Filstream’s properties. Clearly, there was a violation of petitioner's right to due process which
must accordingly be rectified.
Petition granted. Decision of Court of Apples reversed.
In the words of the Supreme Court:
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of
eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private
property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private
property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by
the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this
superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the
property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process
requirements is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. In G.R. 125218, the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP NO. 36904 dated March 18, 1996 and May 20, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

______________________________

6. City of Manila vs Estrada, G.R. No. 7749

Facts:
The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its improvements
for use in connection with a new market at that time being erected in the district of Paco.
A complaint was filed setting forth the necessary allegations, answer joined, and
commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing the premises and receiving
evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two reports to the court. The lower
court duly rendered its decision, confirming the majority report as to the improvements,
but reducing the price of the land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority
report, to P15 per square meter. Motions for a new trial having been made by both
parties and denied by the court, both parties appealed from that part of the decision
fixing the value of the land at P15 per square meter. The record was therefore elevated
to this SC for a review of the evidence and assigned errors of the parties.
George C. Sellner, a real estate agent, testified that he was familiar with real estate
values in the city of Manila. He stated that the land in question, fronting as it did on
Calles Herran and Looban and the Paco Estero, was worth 60 per cent more than other
land nearby, and placed its value at P10 per square meter. Enrique Brias, another real
estate man, testified that P10 was a good price for the land. He stated that he was the
owner of the land on the opposite side of the estero which had been sold for P6 per
square meter about one month prior to the hearing, but that this land was not in such a
good commercial location.
The president of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila testified that a parcel of
land on the opposite side of Calle Herran but on the same side of the Paco Estero,
owned by one Clarke, had been expropriated by the city in 1908 . The commissioners
appraised the total area, consisting of 1,399.03 square meters at P6.50 per square
meter. The city desired only 353.21 square meters facing on Calle Herran, and the
commissioners therefore found consequential damages to the remained, due to
depriving it of its Herran frontage, to be P4.50 per square meter. These consequential
damages were included in the price paid by the city for the land taken, making the
apparent price of the 353.21 square meters P7,002.05, or P19.85 per square meter.
Ariston Estrada, one of the defendants, estimates estimate that the land in
question should be worth on the market at this time P25 per square meter for the
reason that about P19.85 per square was paid for Mr. Clarke's land and this was three
years ago; and, on the one hand, property values have increased in the last three years,
and, on other hand, with the opening of the market, property values along Calles Herran
and Looban have increased.
Issue:
Whether or not the compensation rendered is considered as a “just compensation”.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land.
The court justifies such action, first, upon the ground that the great
preponderance of the evidence submitted to the commissioners showed that P10 per
square meter was just compensation for the land taken.
The amount fixed upon the court which is P10 per square meter for the
condemned lane is based on the testimony of the two real estate agents, Brias and
Sellner, which was based upon a sale of similarly situated land made only thirty days
previous to the date of the hearing; and the assessment of the property for taxation, at
P6 per square meter. This was the evidence upon which the dissenting commissioner
predicated his appraisement of the land. There is a considerable difference between this
valuation and P25 per square meter, as fixed by Estrada, or of the price fixed by the
majority report of the commissioners of P20 per square meter. It is to be noted that no
witnesses other than Estrada were called who could confirm the higher valuation or
even testify to an intermediate price. The price of P10 per square meter is 66 percent
greater than that obtained for land on the opposite side of the estero, and this difference
would seem amply sufficient to compensate for the more favored location of the
condemned land.
"Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land (property) taken.
Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation. To
compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,
ample. "Just compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained."
 The exercise of the power being necessary for the public good, and all property
being held subject to its exercise when, and as the public good requires it, it would be
unjust to the public that it should be required to pay the owner more than a fair
indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the public and of
the owner and all the circumstance of the particular appropriation should be taken into
consideration. (2 Lewis on Em. Do., § 562.)
The compensation must be just to the public as well as to the owners.
____________________________________
 __________________________

9.

___________________________

10. LBP Vs Wycoco

Facts:
Felicia I Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell his 94hectare unirrigated land to the DAR for
14.9 m upon the passage of CARP. After DAR's evaluation of the application and determination
of just compensation by the LBP, Wycoco received an offer of 2.2 M on his 84 hectare land by
which he rejected. The case was later indorsed to the DARAB( status- dismissed bec. Wycoco
failed to file the necessary pleadings) then to the RTC of Cabanatuan City for the determination
of just compensation.

The RTC took judicial notice of the prevailing market value of agricultural lands (then
135-150k) and decided in favour of Wycoco ordering LBP to pay Wycoco the amount of 13.4
M as just compensation.

LBP brought the case to the CA which decided against Wycoco. Hence this mandamus.

Issue:
Is there just compensation by the RTC judge?

Held:
Doctrine:

While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the
same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in
arriving at the fair market value of the property (e.g. cost of acquisition, current value of like
properties, size , shape, location as well as the tax declarations thereon).

The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of
practically assuming a valuation without basis. Since these factors are not considered, a
remand for determination of just compensation is necessary.

Mandamus partially granted

____________________________

12. G.R. No. 189127 : April 25, 2012] 


NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES
BERNARDO AND MINDALUZ SALUDARES, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Sometime in the 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed high-tension transmission lines to implement the Davao-
Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project. These transmission lines traversed a 12,060-square meter
portion of a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15343 and
owned by Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras.



In 1981, NAPOCOR commenced expropriation proceedings covering TCT No. T-15343 in National
Power Corporation v. Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras.
These proceedings culminated in a final Decision ordering it to pay the amount of P300,000 as just
compensation for the affected property.


Respondent Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Pereyras-Saludares are registered owners of a 6,561-square-
meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109865.



A parcel of land, being a portion of Lots situated in the Barrio of Magugpo, Mun. of Tagum, Province of
Davao, Island of Mindanao. 



On 19 August 1999, respondents filed the instant Complaint against NAPOCOR and demanded the
payment of just compensation. They alleged that it had entered and occupied their property by erecting
high-tension transmission lines therein and failed to reasonably compensate them for the intrusion.



Petitioner averred that it already paid just compensation for the establishment of the transmission lines by
virtue of its compliance with the final and executory Decision in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras.
Furthermore, assuming that respondent spouses had not yet received adequate compensation for the
intrusion upon their property, NAPOCOR argued that a claim for just compensation and damages may
only be filed within five years from the date of installation of the transmission lines pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395.



Pretrial terminated without the parties having entered into a compromise agreement. Thereafter, the court
appointed Commissioners for the purpose of determining the valuation of the subject land. NAPOCOR
recommended Loreto Monteposo as the third Commissioner, but later clarified that its conformity to the
appointment of commissioners was only for the purpose of determining the exact portion of the subject
land, and that it was not admitting its liability to pay just compensation.



After the proceedings, the Commissioners recommended the amount of ?750 per square meter as the
current and fair market value of the subject property based on the Schedule of Market Values of Real
Properties within the City of Tagum effective in the year 2000.



Trial on the merits ensued. On 10 September 2002, the Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent
spouses.



Defendant-National Power Corporation, have to pay the plaintiffs Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz
Saludares just compensation of their 6,561 square meters, more or less, titled land covered by TCT No.
T-109865, the amount of P4,920,750.00, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from
January 01, 1982, until said amount is fully paid, or deposited in Court;



NAPOCOR appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA. After a review of the respective parties’ Briefs,
the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision on 21 July 2009, denying NAPOCOR’s appeal and
affirming the trial court’s Decision, but reducing the rate of interest to 6% per annum.



Aggrieved, petitioner then filed the instant Rule 45 Petition before this Court.

Issue:

1.Whether NAPOCOR has previously compensated the spouses for establishing high-tension
transmission lines over their property;



2.Whether the demand for payment of just compensation has already prescribed.

Held:
1. No

NAPOCOR failed to prove that it had adequately compensated respondents for the establishment of high
tension transmission lines over their property



NAPOCOR argues that the parcel of land involved in the instant Petition had already been
expropriated in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras. In support of this argument, it alleges
that one of the sources of the spouses’ TCT No. T-109865 is TCT No. 39660; and that TCT No.
39660 is a transfer from TCT No. T-15343, the subject land in National Power Corporation v.
Pereyras. Thus, having paid just compensation to Tahanan Realty Development Corporation, the
successor-in-interest of defendants Pereyras in the aforementioned case, petitioner submits that it
should no longer be made to pay just compensation in the present case.



The Court disagree.



While it is true that respondent spouses’ TCT No. T-109865 was indeed indirectly sourced from
TCT No. T-15343, the CA correctly ruled that NAPOCOR failed to prove that the lands involved
in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras and in the instant Petition are identical.



Furthermore, the evidence before us supports respondent spouses’ contention that the lands
involved in both cases are different. National Power Corporation v. Pereyras involved Lot 481-B,
Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of
Tagum, Davao. On the other hand, the instant Petition involves Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd.,
which is a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718; 480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 and 463-A-2
(LRC), Psd-150796, in Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao. Clearly, these lots refer
to different parcels of land.


We rule, therefore, that NAPOCOR failed to prove its previous payment of just compensation for
its expropriation of the land in question.

2. No

The demand for payment of just compensation has not prescribed




Petitioner maintains that, in the event respondent spouses have not been adequately compensated
for the entry into their property, their claim for just compensation would have already prescribed,
pursuant to Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 380, 395,
758, 938, 1360 and 1443. This provision empowers the NAPOCOR to do as follows:



x x x [E]nter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business or
purposes, including the construction of the transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of
 such private property shall be paid the just compensation therefor in accordance with the
provisions hereinafter provided; Provided, further, that any action by any person claiming
compensation and/or damages shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-of-way,
transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have been established; Provided,
finally, that after the said period no suit shall be brought to question the said right-of-way,
transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities nor the amounts of compensation and/or
damages involved. (Emphasis supplied.)



NAPOCOR’s reliance on this provision is misplaced.



The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states
in clear and categorical language that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.” This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription.
Thus, the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to
recover just compensation. It would be a confiscatory act on the part of the government to take
the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just
compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings within
five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the
duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of
NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their property. In the
normal course of events, before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file
an action for eminent domain and deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property. Due to its omission, however, respondents were
constrained to file inverse condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just
compensation before the trial court.

We therefore rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent
spouses’ constitutional right to just compensation.

The Court’s Ruling




We uphold the Decisions of the CA and the RTC.

___________________________

13. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE T. LAJOM, et al.

G.R. No. 184982, 20 August 2014,

Facts:
A big portion of the land owned by Jose T. Lajom, and his mother, Vicenta Vda. De Lajom,
was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to P.D.
27 otherwise known as the “Tenant’s Emancipation Decree”. The Department of
Agriculture (DAR), through the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), offered to pay
Lajom just compensation but despite its non- payment, DAR has already granted twelve
(12) Emancipation Patents. Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and alleged that computation
of just compensation must be based on the provision of RA 6657, the “Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988” and not P.D. 27 and/or E.O. 228. LBP alleged that P.D. 27 and E.O. 228
were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rejected the DAR valuation and, under P.D. 27
and E.O. 228, fixed the just compensation at the total amount of P2,858,912.00, with
 legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from 1991, when the subject portion was actually
expropriated, until fully paid. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision. It applied the provisions of RA 6657 as basis in the computation of just
compensation, deleted the award of 6% interest p.a. and ordered petitioner LBP to pay 12%
interest on the just compensation by way of damages from the time of issuance of emancipation
patents until fully paid.

ISSUES:
a. Whether the provisions of RA6657 applied in that in computing the amount of just compensation
valid and constitutional.
b. Whether the reckoning period to determine just compensation is on the date of actual payment
instead of the date of taking.

RULING:

a. Yes. The application of RA 6657 instead of PD 27 and EO 228 is valid. Case law instructs that when
the agrarian reform process under PD 28 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657 , such as when
the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, as in this case, such just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only
suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6658 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO are superseded.

b. As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be determined at the
time of the property’s taking and taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the time emancipation
patents are issued by the government.

___________________________

14. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY


G.R. No. L-59603 APRIL 29, 1987

FACTS:
Proclamation No. 1811 was issued reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). However, not all the
reserved area was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land
owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to
purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in
Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464. The parties failed to reach an agreement
regarding the sale of the property. The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private
respondent for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. The respondent
judge issued a writ of possession, order of condemnation and order to appointing certain persons
as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties
sought to be expropriated. The petitioner Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the grounds
that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the
ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not
exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
ISSUE:
Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533
valid and constitutional.
RULING:
The Supreme Court is constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation
unconstitutional and void. The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would
be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under the Rules of Court. The determination of “just compensation” in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed
compensation.
_________________

15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LIM

G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005

Gist: 57 years have lapsed from the time the decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became
final, but still the Republic has not compensated the owner of the property. Just compensation is not only
the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the
property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just.

FACTS:
On September 5, 1938, the Republic filed an expropriation case with the CFI which involved Lots 932 and
939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate to establish a military reservation for the army. These lots were
registered under the Denzons. After depositing P9.5k, the Republic took possession. In 1950, Galeos –
an heir of the Denzons – filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals of the two lots, but
NAC denied knowledge.
With the Republic failing to pay, the successors Valdehueza and Panerio filed with CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages. On July 31, 1962, CFI rendered a decision in favor of the
successors, stating that they are owners and retained their right because the Republic failed to pay. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court, the SC affirmed the CFI decision. No record of Republic paying owners/
successors. Despite disbursing P9.5k, payees were not ascertained. However, the successors in this
ruling were not allowed to recover possession of the lots, but they could only demand fair market value
since it was still devoted to public use.

In 1964, the successors mortaged Lot 932 to Lim as security for loans. Failing to pay Lim despite the
demand, Lim foreclosed the mortgage in 1976. In 1992, Lim filed a complaint for “quieting of title” and
impleaded the Republic, where the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim.

Republic appealed to the CA, and CA sustained RTC decision. Petitioned for certiorari with SC, stating
that the Republic was still the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as
May 14, 1940.

HELD:
No.

Under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.” The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay
respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. Delay in over 50 years
cannot be viewed as fair. If the compensation is not paid for in a reasonable amount of time (5 years from
the finality of the decision), the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio. Art III Sec. 9 of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power, strictly interpreted against expropriator, the
government, and liberally in favor of property owner.

The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there
can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic’s
acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable
time.

The expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right
to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners.

When Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners and
their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did.
 __________________

16. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority and Air

Transportation Office v. Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr., and the
heirs of Rosario Mercado
G.R. No. 176625 | February 25, 2010

Doctrine: The taking of private property, consequent to the

Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if
this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received.

FACTS:
Respondents were the registered owners of Lot No. 88 situated
in the City of Cebu, the subject lot. The property was
expropriated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue
of a decision of the CFI of Cebu in a civil case. The public
purpose for which the property was expropriated was for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The affected
landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) proposed a compromise settlement that the
expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were
expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug
Airport. Because of this, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
Then President Corazon Aquino directed the Department of
Transportation and Communication to transfer general aviation
operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority and to close the Lahug Airport
after such transfer, therefore, the public purpose of the said
expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually
initiated, realized, or implemented.

Herein respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of

possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The
RTC rendered judgment in their favor. This was affirmed by the
CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the ownership and possession of Lot No. 88 should be
restored to respondents.

HELD:
Yes, the ownership and possession of Lot No. 88 should be
restored to respondents.

The taking of private property by the Government’s power of

eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1)
that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements
partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be
complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due
process of law, and the judgment would violate the property
owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In the case at bar, the public purpose of the said expropriation

(expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized,
or implemented.The old airport became commercial complex (Ayala ITPark) and lot
88 became a jail and portion of it was inhabited by squatters. Thus, the ownership
and possession of Lot No. 88 should be restored to respondents.

___________________
17. GR 165354: RP vs Heirs of Saturnino Borbon
Full Case Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San

Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon
owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City
(RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way
over a portion of the property.

The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not

negotiated with them before entering the property and that the
entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered
no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just
compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated
but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.

During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a

Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an
amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated
was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the
intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the
respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for which
such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the
proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the
State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners;
and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation
proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be

discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.

Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at

the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as
the court deems just and equitable.

Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of

the power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain is
“the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not
only the public but the private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of
such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements
should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property
owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied
conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.”

However, the concept has expanded to include utility, advantage
or productivity for the benefit of the public. “Public use” has
now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public
benefit,” and “public convenience.”

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be

maintained throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The
effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to
wit:

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the

expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due
process of law, and the judgment would violate the property
owner’s right to justice, fairness and equity.

It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire

the land in question for public use. The fundamental basis then
of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the
power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the
very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that
the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the
action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation
is for some public use. That must be true even during the
pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings.
If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the
expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty
and the obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And
even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be made to
appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the
expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the
duty and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.

Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily

stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public
use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the
definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would
result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the
expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of
public use.

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the

proceedings subject to the conditions to be shortly mentioned
hereunder, and requires the return of the property to the
respondents. Having said that, we must point out that
NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent
and without paying just compensation to the respondents.
Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its
entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government
and its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any
person of his or her property for public use. Considering that in
the process of installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR
destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the
installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of
the land as to divide the property into three lots, thereby
effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any future
use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to
the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from
the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession of
the property.

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the

eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no
need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property
would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value
of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the
time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession by
paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.

This should mean that the compensation must be based on what

they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession
of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit
trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction
of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the
appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation
proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into
an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The court of
origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for
damages.

___________________

18. PPI VS COMELEC

PPI vs COMELEC, GR L-11994 (En Banc) 22 May 1995

FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of
not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or
periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public
issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon
the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose
upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established
guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is viewed as
mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication
and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private
personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may
be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the
taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been
shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell
print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem.  Similarly, it has not been
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either
by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.
 ___________________

19. Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v.

COMELEC
289 SCRA 337 / G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998

Facts:
The Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
and the GMA Network inc., herein petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 92,
B.P. No. 881. However, TELEBAP, an organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies, was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among
other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a
result of the subject law. On the other hand, GMA Network, one of the petitioners, had the
requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. This is due to the fact that petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides that:

“The Commission on Election shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For
this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television
broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Moreover, petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to
advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking which
is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property.”
According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free
airtime of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays
and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lose
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time. Hence, this petition

Issue:
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting,
whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have
to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to
assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In
granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations,
the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of
the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print
media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair
exchange for what the industry gets.

Eminent domain is the power of the state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private
property for a public use upon payment of just compensation. In this case, since radio and
television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. Thus, there’s no need for just
compensation.
________________

20. City Government of Quezon City v Ericta

G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" provides:

“Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and
should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.”

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after
the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
“RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon
City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof
have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.”
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced
Respondent: HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. Petitioners: CITY GOVERNMENT OF
ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; QUEZON CITY
HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.
HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. Filed for a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction - There
being no issue of fact and the questions raised
being purely legal both petitioners and
respondent agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings. The respondent
court, therefore, rendered the decision
declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
S-64 null and void.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends Argued that the taking of the respondent's
that the taking or confiscation of property is property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
obvious because the questioned ordinance police power and that the land is taken for a
permanently restricts the use of the property public use as it is intended for the burial ground
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon
purpose and deprives the owner of all City Council is authorized under its charter, in
beneficial use of his property. the exercise of local police power, " to make
such further ordinances and resolutions not
They stressed that the general welfare clause is repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry
not available as a source of power for the into effect and discharge the powers and duties
taking of the property in this case because it conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
refers to "the power of promoting the public necessary and proper to provide for the health
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
liberty and property." The respondent points morals, peace, good order, comfort and
out that if an owner is deprived of his property convenience of the city and the inhabitants
outright under the State's police power, the thereof, and for the protection of property
property is generally not taken for public use therein."
but is urgently and summarily destroyed in
order to promote the general welfare. The
respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or
the destruction of a house to prevent the spread
of a conflagration.

Issue:
W / N the ordinance by Quezon City is a valid way of taking property?
Held:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is not the valid practice of the state’s power of eminent domain it is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries.
State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the
ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process,
would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken
will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward
and not the police power of the state.

________________

21. G.R. No. 170945 September 26, 2006

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MARIA
MENDOZA SAN PEDRO, represented by VICENTE, HERMINIA and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed SAN PEDRO, respondents.

Facts: For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No.
SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an
easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and
partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00386.
The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square
meter) was then processed.7 However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No.
97-2468 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m
for the agricultural portion.
On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan against Maria and other landowners.
Maria San Pedro prayed, among others, that she should be paid the consideration stated in the Right of
Way Grant, P600.00 per sq m for the residential portion of the land as agreed upon by her and NPC, and
to base the values from Resolution No. 97-00512 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee.
The RTC rendered judgment, declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the
property. NPC appealed the amended decision to the CA, asserting that the lower court gravely erred in
fixing the just compensation for Respondents. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal; NPC
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Right of way easement resulting to the deprivation of use of the property is
considered a taking.
Ruling: Yes, The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the
land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term
“expropriation.” Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding
transfer of title or possession. The reported constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from
the towers and transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners
that the large transmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge tower in front of their lot
will affect their safety and health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested to buy the
remaining portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the damage of the
landowners, both as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to be derived therefrom, all fall
within the term expropriation.
_________________________

Case 22: Eminent Domain

Key Points:
1. Constitution of the United States: Fifth Amendment (Amendment V) a. No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
2. Easement
a. A right to cross or otherwise use someone else's land for a specified purpose.
b. An easement is a nonpossessory right to use and/or enter onto the real property of another
without possessing it. It is "best typified in the right of way which one landowner, A, may enjoy
over the land of another, B.
3. Ad Coelum Doctrine
a. Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos
b. “whoever's is the soil, it is theirs all the way to Heaven and all the way to Hell”
c. A principle of property law, stating that property holders have rights not only to the plot of
land itself, but also to the air above and (in the broader formulation) the ground below.
4. 1926 Air Commerce Act
a. May 20, 1926
b. US Congress passed the Air Commerce Act, placing in federal
hands responsibility for fostering air commerce, establishing new airways, improving aids to
navigation, and making and enforcing flight safety rules.
c. Under the act, which President Calvin Coolidge signed into law, management of air routes was
shifted to a newly established aeronautics branch under the Commerce Department. William
MacCracken Jr., an aviation law expert who had largely crafted the act, became its first head.

Case Digest:
Facts:
Respondents Lee and Tinie Causby, owned 2.8 acres of land near an airport, less than half a mile
from the end of the runway of Lindley Field outside of Greensboro, North Carolina.
Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of
the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over the
property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above
the highest tree.
The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and
ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the
end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier.
Various military aircrafts of the United States used the airport and they frequently came so close
to the respondents’ property that they barely missed the tops of trees and the glare from their
landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. Respondents’ chicken farm production had to
stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. Further, it caused loss of
sleep, nervousness and fright on the part of the respondents.
Respondents sued in the Court of Claims to recover for an alleged taking of their property and
for damages to their poultry business. Respondents’ claim was that their property was taken,
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by the regular army and navy aircraft flights over
their house and chicken farm.
In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement over the
property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property depreciation as the result of the
easement was $2,000.00.
The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s property has been taken within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment?

Ruling:
Yes. The court through the ruling of Justice Douglas, ruled that the respondents are entitled to
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.

The Court of Claims granted respondents a judgment for the value of property destroyed and
damage to their property resulting from the taking of an easement over their property by low-
flying military aircraft of the United States.
The court notes that the common law doctrine (Ad Coelum) that ownership of land extends to the
periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world and is inapplicable in the present
case.
The court does concede however, that the air above the minimum safe altitude of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a public highway and part of the public domain,
as declared by Congress in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, this essentially had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the
air space.
However, flights below that altitude are not within the navigable air space which Congress
placed within the public domain, even though they are within the path of glide approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Authority and that flights of aircraft over private land which are so low and
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land are
as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it.
In the case at bar, there was a taking of private property for public use, further the United States
had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents’ property rendered it
uninhabitable then there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full
enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build buildings, plant
trees or run fences.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The
court does not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation.
Flights over private land are not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, unless,
like in the case given, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference
with the enjoyment of the land.
Since the court's findings of fact contain no precise description of the nature or duration of the
easement taken, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims so
that it may make the necessary findings. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the
value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent easement.

__________________________

23. Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

(PARC)
FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there
are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them
the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco),
and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10,
1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11,
1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita
to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

RULING:

The Court partially granted the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with
respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to
remain with petitioner HLI. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the
qualified FWBs.

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since,
contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws
but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force
and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be
applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the
Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to
retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given
the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof
is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is
no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011
decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless
that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of
constitutionality.

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which
only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule
only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR,
under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other
agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly
covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too
restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are
considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the
area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the
DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified
FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita
per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and
enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall
determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of
Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by
intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation
(LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used
for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the
date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the
agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that
is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under
compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of
coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just
compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to
justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only
preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an
original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court
has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT
lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10
years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership
award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the
instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the
issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the
subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day,
these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject
lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs
in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote
to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control
means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting
shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the
majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI
share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the
295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.

__________________________

24. Secretary of DPwH v. Sps Heracleo and Ramona Tecson

(2013)

FACTS:
Heracleo and Ramona Tecson own a parcel of land in Malolos, Bulacan. In
1940, it was taken by the government for the construction of Mac Arthur
Highway. There was neither just compensation nor expropriation.
In 1994, the Tecsons demanded compensation based on the fair market value
at current rates (P 1,500/ sqm). The district engineer offered to pay based on
the rate in 1940 (P 0.70/sqm), but they refused. The Tecsons filed an action in
court.
The action was dismissed die to state immunity. On appeal, the trial court was
ordered to determine the amount of compensation. An amount was computed
based on current rates. The Court of Appeals affirmed it. Thus, the DPWH
appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Which rate should be the basis for just compensation: value at the time of
taking or the value at the time of payment/

RULING
The value at the time of taking should be the basis for just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the fair market value of the property
between one who receives and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of
taking by the government.
In this case, the property was taken in 1940. Thus, 1940 rates will apply.
(PART 2)

Secretary of DPwH v. Sps Heracleo and Ramona Tecson (2015)

FACTS
Sps Heracleo and Ramona Tecson urged the court to reconsider its 2013
decision. The decision stated that the value of the property at the time of
taking is the basis for just compensation.
The Tecsons argue that the 1940 rate is unjust, and that they would settle for a
“happy middle ground.”

ISSUE
Is the compensation awarded in the 2013 decision unjust?

RULING
No, the compensation is not unjust.
Just compensation makes up for what is lost, i.e. the property. Property value
changes over time, thus using the current rates is unfair. To be fair to the
property owners and to be public (who are the ones paying), the rate to be
used in just compensation is the market value at the time of taking.

NOTE
The Tecsons were awarded exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. They will
also be paid attorney’s fees. In sum, they get about P 1.7 M from this.