142) Villarico vs. Sarmiento, G.R. No.

13648, November 11, 2004

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court

of Appeals dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883, affirming in
toto the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City,
Branch 259, dated November 14, 1996, in Civil Case No. 95-044.

The facts of this case, as gleaned from the findings of the Court of
Appeals, are:

Petitioner, Teofilo C. Villarico, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Paranaque

City, Metro Manila with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of
Deeds, same city.

Petitioner's lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a

strip of land belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by
four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at
several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have
access to the highway.

Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and

her husband Beth Del Mundo, respondents herein, had a building
constructed on a portion of said government land. In November that same
year, a part thereof was occupied by Andok's Litson Corporation and Marites'
Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents.

In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner

acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the same area owned by the
government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in
the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.

In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque City, a
complaint for accion publiciana against respondents, docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-044. He alleged inter alia that respondents' structures on the
government land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and
encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.

Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioner's allegations,

claiming that they have been issued licenses and permits by Parañaque
City to construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right
over the subject property as it belongs to the government.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the defendants to have a better right of possession over the

subject land except the portion thereof covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 74430 of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque;

2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the subject premises

described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 and gives its possession
to plaintiff; and

3. Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiff against the defendants,
and likewise dismissing the claim for attorney's fees of the latter against the
former.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED."3

The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any
portion of the public land in question. On the contrary, the defendants are
the ones who have been in actual possession of the area. According to the
trial court, petitioner was not deprived of his "right of way" as he could use
the Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.

On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming

the trial court's Decision in toto, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the judgment hereby appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in

toto, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED."4

In this petition, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following

assignments of error:

"I

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS CONTAINED A

CONCLUSION WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE
SAME WAS BASED.
II

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE ONLY

ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS
ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF WAY OVER THE LAND OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH
IS BETWEEN HIS PROPERTY AND THE NINOY AQUINO AVENUE.

III

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCION

PUBLICIANA IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY IN THE CASE AT BAR.

IV

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

EXISTENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF WAY DOES NOT
CARRY POSSESSION OVER THE SAME.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF

WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LAND
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES." 5

In their comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not
err in ruling that petitioner's action for accion publiciana is not the proper
remedy in asserting his "right of way" on a lot owned by the government.

Here, petitioner claims that respondents, by constructing their buildings on

the lot in question, have deprived him of his "right of way" and his right of
possession over a considerable portion of the same lot, which portion is
covered by his T.C.T. No. 74430 he acquired by means of exchange of real
property.

It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioner's alleged "right of way"
exists belongs to the state or property of public dominion. Property of public
dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:

"ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
other of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth."

Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to
the indefinite public."6 Records show that the lot on which the stairways
were built is for the use of the people as passageway to the highway.
Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.

Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it:
(1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of
contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is
not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by
any voluntary easement.7

Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a

property of public dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement
of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is
by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot
appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession
over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:

"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession."

Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents have better right of possession over the subject lot.

However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants'
buildings were constructed on the portion of the same lot now covered by
T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioner's name. Being its owner, he is entitled to its
possession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that neither petitioner nor respondents have a
right of possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were built as it
is a property of public dominion. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

\
143) Jabonete vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. L-17482, March 31, 1966, 123 Phil 295-300

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, dated March 11,
1960, finding the respondent-appellant, Antonio Legaspi, guilty of contempt of court, and
imposing upon him a fine of P100.

On March 11, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Davao, in view of its finding in Case No.
824, entitled Jabonete vs. Monteverde, et al., that Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in
question with the knowledge that a "gravamen" or easement of right of way existed
thereon, promulgated a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

Ordena al demandado Antonio Legaspi la demolicion de la parte del corral construido a lo

largo de su terreno que impide a lote demandantes tener acceso con la vereda que
communica con la carretera principal, Tomas Claudio.

Declara que los demandantes tienen derecho el uso de la vereda (Exh. A-3), de 3 metros de
ancho, unico paso que disponen para communicarse con la Calle Tomas Claudio, para el
paso de sus jeeps, y los vehiculos, reparados que entran y salen del taller de reparacion de
aquellos.

The respondent-appellant received a copy of the decision on May 12, 1954. Two days later,
May 14, 1954 he filed his notice of appeal therefrom. On May 21, 1954 however, upon a
previous motion of the plaintiffs, the lower court issued an order granting discretionary
execution of the said decision. In view of this last mentioned order, the plaintiffs
immediately proceeded to the premises in question and opened in the fence of the
defendant Antonio Legaspi a sufficient opening for the passage of men and vehicles. Even
then, however, the defendant filed with the court below on that very same day, May 21,
1954, a motion for the reconsideration of the order granting discretionary execution.
Thereafter, and upon the lower court's suggestion, the parties entered into an amicable
agreement which was later embodied in an order or "auto" dated May 24, 1954, to wit:

A raiz de la mocion del demandado pidiendo antre otras cosas, la reconsideracion de la

orden de ejecucion de la decision dictada en esta causa, el 22 del Mayo de 1954, el Juez
que preside esta sala se constituyo para una inspeccion ocular en el lugar en conflicto.

Durante la inspeccion ocular, los demandantes y demandado, Antonio Legaspi, llegaron a un

acuerdo:

1. Los demandantes no instalaran en su terreno su taller de reparacion de vehiculos de

motor.

2. Los demandantes pueden construir su garaje dentro de su terreno para su jeep (AC),
pero no los tendran parados en la calle privada del demandados construida por este en su
terreno a lo largo del terreno de los demandantes;

3. Los demandantes contribuiran a prorata con el demandado los gastos de reparacion de la

calle privada construida por el referido demandado en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de
los demandantes.
 4. El demandado, Antonio Legaspi, permitira el uso y paso en la calle privada construida
por el en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de los demandantes, a estos, su familia, sus
amigos, chofers, servidumbre y de sus jeeps.

5. Para los fines del uso de la calle, el demandado permitira a los demandantes, frente de la
casa de estos, abrir una puerta de 4 metros de ancho en el corral construido por el
demandado que separa la calle privada y el terreno de los demandantes, a su
(demandantes) costa; sus hojas tendran por dentro, que los demandantes tendran cerradas
para evitar que los ni�os, hijos de los inquilinos del demandado tengan acceso a los jeeps
de los demandantes, cuyo garaje tendran dentro de su (demandantes) terreno.

El Juzgado ordena a las partes litigantes complan estrictamente con lo estipulado; de los
contrario, los mismos estaran sujetos a las ordenes de este Juzgado.

As a result of the above agreement and Order of May 24, 1954, the defendant abandoned
the prosecution of his appeal. At the same time, both parties complied with its terms until
the plaintiffs, unable to continue with their repair shop, transferred to another place in
December 1959 whereupon the defendant reconstructed his fence and its footing, closing
thereby the opening previously made by the plaintiffs.

In the course of time, the plaintiffs' lot was foreclosed by the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) which, later still, conveyed it under a conditional sale to Mrs. Luz Arcilla.
On her acquisition of the said lot, Mrs. Arcilla demanded of the defendant the re-opening of
the fence in question as it was her plan to construct her house in the said lot. When the
defendant refused, the Development Bank filed with the lower court a petition to hold the
said defendant in contempt. To this petition, Mrs. Luz Arcilla later intervened and was so
allowed by the lower court. The Development Bank of the Philippines and Mrs. Luz Arcilla
contended that the refusal of the defendant to cause or allow the making of an opening in
his fence was a defiance of the said court's decision of March 11, 1954 and was, therefore,
contemptuous. After due hearing, the lower court sustained the petitioners and found the
defendant guilty of contempt with orders "to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00)
and to open the vereda or alley leading to the lot owned by the Development Bank of the
Philippines and conveyed to Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla under a conditional deed of sale, otherwise
he should be imprisoned until he does so." Thus, the instant appeal.

The respondent-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of
contempt because:

1. The decision of March 11, 1954 was novated by the order of May 24, 1954.
Consequently, he could not have violated the former decree since with its novation it ceased
to have any legal effect.

2. Even assuming that the said decision was not novated by the subsequent order of May
24, 1954, still he could not be deemed to have violated the said decision because the same
never became final and executory. The respondent-appellant argued that since the decision
of March 11, 1954 ordered the opening of a right of way in his property without providing
for this corresponding compensation to him, contrary to Article 649 of the Civil Code, 1 there
was in the said decision "a void which ought to be filled or to be done in order to completely
dispose of the case. It was not clear, specific and definitive," and consequently, a judgment
that could not have acquired finality.
3. The right to file contempt proceedings against him, with respect to the decrees contained
in the decision of March 11, 1954, has prescribed. The respondent-appellant conceded that
there is no prescriptive period for the institution of contempt proceedings. However, he
contended that inasmuch as contempt under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is punishable
by arresto mayor, it should prescribe in five years just as crimes for which the said penalty
is imposed prescribe, under the Penal Code, in five years.

Without passing on the merits or demerits of the foregoing arguments, this Court believes
that the order finding the respondent-appellant guilty of contempt should be reversed. It is
clear that the order of May 24, 1954 superseded and was fully intended by the lower court
to modify or stand in substitution of the decision of March 11, 1954. More than the
expression of the parties amicable agreement on the dispute, the said order was the lower
court's resolution of the respondent-appellant's motion for reconsideration of the decision of
March 11, 1954. In the determination, therefore, of the said appellant's obligation relative
to the easement in question, the latter and not the decision of March 11, 1954 is the proper
point in reference.

Under the aforesaid order of May 24, 1954, the easement awarded or secured by the lower
court to the plaintiffs was strictly a personal one. The right of way granted was expressly
limited to the latter and their "family, friends, drivers, servants and jeeps." In the very
language of the agreement the following appears:

El demandado Antonio Legaspi, permitira el uso y paso en la calle privada construida por el
en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de los demandantes, a estos, su familia, sus amigos,
chofers, servidumbre y de sus jeeps.

The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the plaintiffs and the persons
above enumerated and it is clear that the lower court, as well as the parties addressed by
the said order, did not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs'
successors-in-interest. In other words, the right acquired by the original plaintiffs was a
personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a predial servitude that
inures to the benefit of whoever owns the dominant estate.

In resisting the extension of the aforementioned easement to the latter, the plaintiffs'
successors-in-interest, the respondent-appellant, therefore, was not defying the decision of
March 11, 1954 which was then no longer subsisting, nor the order of May 24, 1954 since
the said successors-in-interest had no right thereunder.

Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the plaintiffs is the fact that
the same was granted to the latter without any compensation to the respondent-appellant.

Wherefore, the order of the lower court dated March 11, 1960 finding the respondent-
appellant guilty of contempt is hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Endnotes:

1
ART. 649. "The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons without
adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after the payment of the proper indemnity."

145) Valisno vs. Adriano, G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 244 Phil
419-425

This case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 10,
1973, the sole issue being a question of law and beyond its jurisdiction to decide.

Admitted by the parties in their pleadings and established during the trial on the merits are the
following material facts: virtual 1aw library

On June 20, 1960, the plaintiff-appellant file against the defendant-appellee an action for
damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3472 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The
complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a 557,949-
square-meter parcel of land in La Fuente, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and more particularly
described in his Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-16281. The plaintiff-appellant Valisno
bought the land from the defendant-appellee’s sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco, on June 6,
1959. (Deed of Absolute Sale, Exh. "A." ) The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts,
corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of
the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata Adriano Francisco
and her brother, Felipe Adriano, from their father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of the sale of the
land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about
seventy (70) meters long, traversing the appellee’s land.

On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that the
appellant was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare
land.

The appellant filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered on March 22, 1960 ordering Adriano to
reconstruct the irrigation canal, "otherwise judicial action shall be taken against him under the
provisions of Section 47 of Act 2152 (the Irrigation Act), as amended." Instead of restoring the
irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of Public
Works and Communications. A reinvestigation was granted.

In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his
need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.

On June 20, 1960, he filed a complaint for damages in the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 3472) claiming that he suffered damages amounting
to P8,000 when he failed to plant his fields that year (1960) for lack of irrigation water, P800 to
reconstruct the canal on defendant Adriano’s land, and P1,500 for attorney’s fees and the costs
of suit.
On October 25, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the
Bureau’s decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno’s complaint. The Secretary
held that Eladio Adriano’s water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by
him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right since
then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the
water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among
themselves. Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father’s estate did
not acquire any water rights with the land purchased.

In his answer to the damage suit (Civil Case No. 3472), the defendant Felipe Adriano admitted
that he levelled the irrigation canal on his land, but he averred: that neither his late father nor his
sister Honorata possessed water rights for the land which she sold to the appellant; that he (the
appellee) applied for water rights for his land in 1956 and obtained the same in 1958; and that
he had a perfect right to level his land for his own use because he merely allowed his sister to
use his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land. He set up a counterclaim for P3,000
as damages incurred by him in levelling the land on which the appellant dug an irrigation canal,
P2,000 as actual damages, P3,000 as attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation.

In a decision dated April 21, 1966, the trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to pass
through the defendant’s land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that under
Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a
stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and his decision on the matter
is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty days. The court may not pass
upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally. Furthermore, there
was nothing in the plaintiff’s evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It dismissed the
complaint and counterclaim.

The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the trial court. The
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to Us upon the legal question
of whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should
apply to this case.chanrobles law library : red

The plaintiff-appellant argues that while the trial court correctly held that the Secretary of Public
Works may legally decide who between the parties is entitled to apply for water rights under the
Irrigation Act, it erred in ruling that the Secretary has authority to hear and decide the plaintiff’s
claim for damages for the defendant’s violation of his (plaintiff’s) right to continue to enjoy the
easement of aqueduct or water through the defendant’s land under Articles 642, 643, and 646
of the Civil Code, which provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 642. Any person who may wish to use upon his own estate any water of which he can
dispose shall have the right to make it flow through the intervening estates, with the obligation to
indemnify their owners, as well as the owners of the lower estates upon which the waters may
filter or descend.

"Article 643. One desiring to make use of the right granted in the preceding article is obliged:

"(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is
intended;

"(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to
third persons;

"(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws and
regulations.

"Article 646. For legal purposes, the easement of aqueduct shall be considered as continuous
and apparent, even though the flow of the water may not be continuous, or its use depends
upon the needs of the dominant estate, or upon a schedule of alternate days or hours."
virtua1aw library

The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land for the passage of water from the
Pampanga River to Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata’s land to the
plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it, as provided in
Article 624 of the Civil Code:

"Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established
or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered should either of them be alienated, as a
title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively unless at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of
the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by
two or more persons" (Civil Code)

This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which
provided:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a
single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or
more owners, the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to the
water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any
compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance." (Art. 122,
Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.)

No enlightened concept of ownership can shut out the idea of restrictions thereon, such as
easements. Absolute and unlimited dominion is unthinkable, inasmuch as the proper enjoyment
of property requires mutual service and forbearance among adjoining estates (Amor v.
Florentino, 74 Phil. 403).

As indicated in the decision dated March 22, 1960 of the Bureau of Works "the principal issue
involved in this case falls under the subject of servitude of waters which are governed by Article
648 of the new Civil Code and the suppletory laws mentioned in the cases of Lunod v. Meneses
(11 Phil. 128) and Osmeña v. Camara (C.A. 380 62773) which are the irrigation law and the
Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, specifically Article 122 thereof.

The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights
add improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano’s property. By the terms of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred
to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above-
described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge
500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe
with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements
appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to the appellant, the water right was
the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata’s property, for without it the property
would be unproductive.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantors land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person
(Watson v. French, 112 Me 371, 19 C.J. 868-897). The fact that an easement by grant may also
have qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as property
right, which survives the determination of the necessity (Benedicto v. CA, 25 SCRA 145).

As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy
it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee’s
act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside, and a new one is entered ordering the
appellee to grant the appellant continued and unimpeded use of the irrigation ditch traversing
his land in order to obtain water from the Pampanga River to irrigate appellant’s land. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for the reception of evidence on the
appellant’s claim for damages.

SO ORDERED.