CASE

NUMBER TITLE OF THE CASE

9 Sibal vs. Valdez, 50 Phil 512
29 Villanueva vs Castañeda, 21 Sept 1987
49 Ortiz vs Rayanan, 92 SCRA 146
69 Grande vs CA, 5 SCRA 524
89 Ragasa vs Sps Roa, 30 June 2006
109 Vda de Bacaling vs Laguna, 54 SCRA 243
129 De Guzman vs Rivera, 4 Phil 620
149 Acebedo vs Hon. Abesamis, 18 Jan 1993
169 Salvador vs CA, 05 April 1995
189 North Negros Sugar vs Hidalgo, 63 Phil 664
209 Abellana vs CA, 208 SCRA 316
229 Taningco vs Reg of Deeds, 05 SCRA 281
249 Canlas vs Tubil, 25 Sept 2009
269 Sternberg vs Soriano, 41 Phil 210
289 Timoner vs People, 125 SCRA 830
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT GROWING CROPS MAY BE
CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL PROPERTY

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Sibal vs. Valdez

G.R. No. 26278, August 04, 1927
JOHNSON, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Growing crops may be considered as personal property, and may thus be the
subject of a chattel mortgage.

FACTS:

In a case brought by plaintiff against defendant, the latter won. For

the purpose of satisfying the judgment won by the defendant, the sheriff
attached the sugar cane that was then growing on the lots of the plaintiff.
Said lots incidentally had already been previously attached by another
judgment creditor of the plaintiff. Within the one-year period given by law
for redemption, the plaintiff wanted to redeem the lots from one creditor,
and the sugar cane from the other creditor.

The lots were redeemed, the redemption of the sugar cane was
however refused by the defendant, who contended that the sugar cane was
personal property, and therefore could not be the subject of the legal
redemption sought to be enforced. The plaintiff upon the other hand claimed
that the sugar cane was real property for same could be considered as
“growing fruits” under par. 2 of Art. 415.

ISSUE:

How should the sugar cane be regarded — as real property or as

personal property?

RULING:

The sugar cane, although considered as “growing fruits” and therefore

ordinarily real property under Par. 2 of Art. 415 of the Civil Code, must be
regarded as PERSONAL PROPERTY for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
and also for purposes of attachment, because as ruled by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the right to the growing crops mobilizes (makes personal, as
contradistinguished from immobilization) the crops by ANTICIPATION. More
specifically, it said that the existence of a right on the growing crop is a
mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were, in advance, rendering
the crop movable.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT PROPERTY OWNED BY THE STATE
CANNOT BE THE OBJECT OF A CONTRACT

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Villanueva vs. Castaneda

G.R. No. 61311, September 21, 1987
CRUZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject
of lease or any other contractual undertaking.

FACTS:

In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No.

218 authorizing 24 members of Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the subject property
within the vicinity of the public market. The Resolution was protested and
Civil Case No. 2040 was filed. CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent the construction of stalls.

While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution
No. 29 which declared the subject area as a parking place and as the public
plaza of the municipality. CFI decided Civil Case No. 2040 and held that the
subject land was public in nature and was beyond the commerce of man.
The preliminary injunction was made permanent.

The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not
evicted from the place. They were assigned specific areas and were made to
pay daily fees to the municipal government for use of the area.

On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after CFI decision), the
Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a
petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore
the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza.

After investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney, Macalino,

officer‐in-charge of the office of the mayor, issued a resolution ordering the
demolition of the stalls in the subject area.

Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was
denied.
 Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
Petitioners argued that they had right to occupy the area by virtue of lease
contracts entered into with the municipal government, and later, by virtue of
space allocations made in their favor for which they paid daily fees. The
municipality denied that they entered into said agreements. It argued that
even if the leases were valid, the same could be terminated at will because
rent was collected daily.

ISSUE:

Had the vendors the right to occupy and make use of the property?

RULING:

No, because a public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so

cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. The
town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of
residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law.

Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public

use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the
common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT POSSESSION MAY BE LEGALLY
INTERRUPTED

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Ortiz vs. Kayanan

G.R. No. L-32974, July 30, 1979
ANTONIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the

possession is legally interrupted. This occurs from the moment defects in the
title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the
filing of an action in court.

FACTS:

Plaintiff, Bartolome Ortiz used to be the legal guardian of Martin

Dolorico II. When his ward died, plaintiff continued to cultivate and possess
the latter’s property, which was formerly a subject of homestead application.
In the said application, the ward’s uncle, Martin Dolorico I, was named as his
heir and successor in interest. Thus, the uncle executed an affidavit
relinquishing his rights over the property in favor of Comintan and Zamora,
his grandson and son-in-law and requested the Director of Lands to cancel
the homestead application. The homestead application was cancelled to the
protest of Ortiz saying that he should be given preference to purchase the
lot inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has been in continuous
possession of the same. Still, the lot in question was sold at a public auction
wherein defendant Comintan was the only bidder.

The plaintiff’s protest was investigated upon but his claim was not
given due course. On appeal, respondent court rules that half of the portion
of land should be given to the defendant, being the successful bidder. The
other half should be awarded to Zamora without prejudice to the right of
Ortiz to participate in the public bidding of the lot. If Ortiz is to be not
declared the successful bidder, defendants should reimburse jointly said
plaintiff for the improvements introduced on the land, with him, having the
right to retain the property until after he has been paid for.

Plaintiff appealed the judgment. It was later found out that Ortiz
collected tolls on a portion of the property wherein he has not introduced
any improvement. The judgment became final and executory. Private
respondents filed a motion for its execution requesting that they file a bond
in lieu of the amount that should be paid to Ortiz, on the condition that after
the accounting of the tolls collected by plaintiff, there is still and amount due
and payable to the said plaintiff, the bond shall be held answerable.

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending since said

judgment declared the petitioner a possessor in good faith, he is entitled to
the payment of the value of the improvements introduced by him on the
whole property, with right to retain the land until he has been fully paid such
value. He likewise averred that no payment for improvements has been
made and, instead, a bond therefor had been filed by defendants (private
respondents), which, according to petitioner, is not the payment envisaged
in the decision which would entitle private respondents to the possession of
the property. Furthermore, with respect to portion "B", petitioner alleges
that, under the decision, he has the right to retain the same until after he
has participated and lost in the public bidding of the land to be conducted by
the Bureau of Lands. It is claimed that it is only in the event that he loses in
the bidding that he can be legally dispossessed thereof.

It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the property,

including the tolls collected by him from the passing vehicles, which
according to the trial court amounts to P25,000.00, belongs to petitioner and
not to defendant/private respondent Quirino Comintan, in accordance with
the decision itself, which decreed that the fruits of the property shall be in
lieu of interest on the amount to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for
improvements. Any contrary opinion, in his view, would be tantamount to an
amendment of a decision which has long become final and executory and,
therefore, cannot be lawfully done.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner still entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all the
fruits of the property, such as the tolls collected by him from March 1967 to
December 1968, and September 1969 to March 31, 1970, amounting to
about P25,000.00?

RULING:

No. Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the

moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true owner for the
recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may receive
from the time he is summoned in court, or when he answers the complaint,
must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
 However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in fact can
still retain the property, pursuant to Article 546 of the New Civil Code, until
he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful expenses made
by him on the property. This right of retention has been considered as one of
the conglomerate of measures devised by the law for the protection of the
possessor in good faith. Its object is to guarantee the reimbursement of the
expenses, such as those for the preservation of the property, or for the
enhancement of its utility or productivity. It permits the actual possessor to
remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed by the person who
defeated him in the possession for those necessary expenses and useful
improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The principal
characteristic of the right of retention is its accessory character. It is
accessory to a principal obligation. Considering that the right of the
possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases, it is
necessary in order that this right to retain may be useful, to concede to the
creditor the right to secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by
utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the principal
of the debt while he remains in possession.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT THE RIPARIAN OWNER
AUTOMATICALLY OWNS THE ALLUVION BUT IT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
BECOME REGISTERED PROPERTY IN HIS NAME.

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Grande vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962
BARRERA, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or
give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under
the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures
have been provided.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 3.5

hectares in Magsaysay, Isabela. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan
River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the
northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the river, so much
so, that by 1958, a 19,964 sq. m. had been added to the registered area
Respondents in this case claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they
have been in occupation of said portion of land since 1933. Petitioners
moved for an action to quiet title to the land. The trial court adjudged the
ownership of the land to petitioners.

ISSUE:

Is the alluvial property belong to petitioners and if it is, will such

becomes automatically a registered land?

RULING:

No. There can be no dispute that petitioners are the lawful owners of
said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it
adjoins. It does not however, become a registered land just because the lot
which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property imprescriptible.
 Ownership of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens
system is quite another.

Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining the river
is governed by the civil code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided
in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms
and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection,
the land must be placed under the operation of the registration Laws.

The fact remains that petitioners never sought registration of said

alluvial property. The increment therefore never became registered property,
and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of Imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens System.

Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by 3rd

persons
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT PETITIONER’S ACTION TO QUIET
TITLE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO PRESCRIPTION.

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Spouses Ragasa vs. Spouses Roa

G.R. No. 141964, June 30, 2006
CORONA, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are

imprescriptible.

FACTS:

In 1989, plaintiffs entered into a contract with Oakland Development

Resources Corporation for the purchase in installments of a piece of Property
in Quezon City. Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs took possession of the said
property covered by TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City
and resided thereat together with their relatives who continued to occupy
the same whenever the plaintiffs would leave for Italy where they both
worked. From May of 1989 up to the present date, plaintiffs were in
continuous and notorious possession of the said property to the exclusion of
others and in the concept of an owner; In March 992, plaintiffs were able to
fully pay for the agreed purchase price of the property accordingly, a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated March 12, 1992 was executed by and between
Oakland Development Resources Corporation and the original owner's copy
of TCT was turned over to them. Sometime March of 1999, upon learning
that Oakland Development Resources Corporation was no longer functional
as a corporate entity, she decided to cause the transfer of registration of
TCT No. 27946 of Registry of Deeds for Quezon City herself since the vendor
thereof was apparently in no position to undertake the same; She was thus
surprised to learn from the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City that on April
14, 1995, the property in question was sold by defendant Ex-Officio Sheriff
of Quezon City [a respondent here] to defendants Sps. Roa [respondents
here] as the highest bidder for the price and consideration of P511,000.00
as shown in the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale. Aggrieved, plaintiff filed a case
against defendants in the RTC. RTC dismissed the case upon motion by the
respondents to dismiss the case, characterizing the suit as an action "upon
an injury to the rights of the plaintiff" which, according to Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, and said action is already barred by prescription for having been
filed more than four years after the registration of the execution sale.
Plaintiff elevated the case to the SC through a petition for review on
certiorari raising only a pure question of law.

ISSUE:

Is the action based on Article 1146 or Article 476?

RULING:

The action is based on Article 476 based on the allegations in the

complaint. To make out an action to quiet title under the foregoing
provision, the initiatory pleading has only to set forth allegations showing
that (1) the plaintiff has "title to real property or any interest therein" and
(2) the defendant claims an interest therein adverse to the plaintiff’s arising
from an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable."

Thus, the averments in petitioners' complaint that (1) they acquired

ownership of a piece of land by tradition or delivery as a consequence of sale
and (2) private respondents subsequently purchased the same piece of land
at an allegedly void execution sale were sufficient to make out an action to
quiet title under Article 476. Also Art 476 should apply as the respondents
was not able to dispute the allegation of the plaintiffs that they had been in
continuous and notorious possession of the property to the exclusion of
others and in the concept of an owner.

ISSUE:

Whether the action to action to quite title has prescribed?

RULING:

No, the action has not prescribed. Art. 480 provide that actions to
quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land
quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon,
is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of
the land, claiming to be owners thereof. The reason for this rule being that
while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon
the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title,
or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
However the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense
to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a
complainant when he is in possession.

One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it

seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT LESSEES ARE NOT POSSESSORS IN
GOOD FAITH AND THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF
REASONABLE EXPENSES

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Vda. De Bacaling vs. Laguda

G.R. No. L-26694, December 18, 1973
ESGUERRA, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew
that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the
lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are
reimbursed.

FACTS:

Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land situated at

La Paz, Iloilo City. Many years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr.
Ramon Bacaling, with the acquiescence of private respondent Laguda,
constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot fronting Huevana
Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. Unable to pay the lease rental
from July 1959 to September 1961, totaling P2,160.00, an action for
ejectment was filed by private respondent Laguda against petitioner in her
capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of her latehusband, Dr.
Bacaling. The filing of said case spawned various court suits.

Petitioner suffered a series of legal reverses and ended up with a

compromise agreement with the respondent. Trial court approved the
amicable settlement however the petitioner failed to comply with the terms.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to

reimbursement, and/or reasonable expenses that may be incurred in
transferring the house to another place?

RULING:

Petitioner's contention that she be considered a builder in good faith

and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses
that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place, the same
cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled that lessees, like
petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their
occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and
they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements
from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed.

Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which
allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their
improvements if the lessor so elects.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT A POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH CAN BE
EJECTED FROM THE LAND

SUBJECT: Law on Property

De Guzman vs. Rivera

G.R. No. 1666, July 28, 1905
TORRES, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A possessor of the land is deemed in bad faith when she knows that she has
no title thereto, because she bought the house erected thereon from one
whom she knew was merely a tenant on the land.

FACTS:

Plaintiff asked the court to find that she had a better right to the land
in question, she having purchased the same from one Jose Torres for the
sum of 273 pesos. Defendant denied the same and filed a cross complaint
against the plaintiff in which he asked the court to declare that he, the
defendant, was the owner of the land in question, and to direct that plaintiff
vacate the premises and remove from the lot in question the house built
thereon by her, and to pay the costs of proceedings and indemnify
defendant for the damages incurred by him, alleging that the property in
question was sold by Jose Torres, to the defendant, Rivera, and his wife
Agueda Asuncion, and not to the plaintiff, Paula de Guzman. Defendant
further alleged that plaintiff had been in possession of the land by mere
tolerance on his part and that she had continued to withhold the same
unlawfully and unjustly from defendant, notwithstanding the fact that she
had been required through a notary public to vacate the premises..

The trial court ruled that the land in question belonged to the
defendant and that he was entitled to recover the same from the plaintiff,
and expressly directed the latter to remove her house from the premises
within three months from the date the prevailing party should apply for an
execution of the judgment, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. The trial
court upon a consideration of the whole case found that the lot was sold to
the defendant, Fidel Rivera, who acquired title thereto, and that the
defendant, and not the plaintiff, Paula de Guzman, was the owner of the
land. Jose Torres, the former owner, testified and his testimony is conclusive
as to the title of the purchaser, Rivera, to the land in question.
ISSUE:

Who is the rightful owner of the land in question?

RULING:

The defendant is the rightful owner of the land in question.

The plaintiff introduced no proof tending to show that she was the
owner of the land in question to overcome the testimony or evidence of the
defendant. It was her duty to prove that she had a better right to the land.

If the defendant, Fidel Rivera, was the lawful owner of the land, it
cannot be denied that he had a right to maintain an action to recover the
same from the wrongful possessor, excluding her from the use and
enjoyment of the property.

The plaintiff having failed to prove that she was the owner of the land,
we must conclude that she was wrongfully in possession thereof, and that
she occupied the same by the mere tolerance of the defendant. The
judgment of the court below, which is in accordance with the prayer of the
cross complaint, is, therefore, hereby confirmed.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT ARTICLE 533 RECOGNIZES THE
RIGHT OF AN HEIR TO DISPOSE OF HIS SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE
SUBJECT TO THE RESULT OF ANY PENDING ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Acebedo vs. Abesamis

G.R. No. 102380, January 18, 1993
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE:

The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir

without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted.

FACTS:

The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate
properties located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative
estimated value of about P30 million with unsettled claims. The decedent
was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and
the others are the private respondents. Due to the prolonged pendency of
the case before the respondent Court for sixteen years, respondents-heirs
filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale on several parcel of lands for the
consideration of twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they already had
a buyer, Yu Hwa Ping. However, the administrator Herodotus Acebedo,
opposed the sale of the subject estate.

ISSUE:

Can the heir dispose the decedent’s property even if the same is under
administration?

RULING:

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the

same is under administration, is based on Art. 533 of the Civil Code stating
that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted.

Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. The Civil
Code (Art. 493) under the provision on co-ownership, further qualifies this
right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and bene fits pertaining thereto, and
thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In
other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT POSSESSION OF A CO-OWNER IS
LIKE THAT OF A TRUSTEE

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Salvador vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 109910, April 05, 1995
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE:

Possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded

as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them.

FACTS:

The property which is the subject of dispute was a two parcel of lot
situated at Cagayan de Oro City. Said property was owned by one Alipio
Yabo and upon his death his properties devolved to his nine (9) children.
Pastor Makilabo was married to one of the children of Alipio Yabo. Makilabo
successively bought eight (8) shares of the subject lots. Except for the
portion corresponding to one share which he did not buy, he occupied,
cultivated, and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully, and exclusively
the two parcels of land. He then prayed that he be declared the absolute
owner of 8/9 of the lots in question.

ISSUE:

Has Makibalo acquired by prescription the shares of his other co-heirs

or co-owners?

RULING:

The Court held, prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership requires a

continuous, open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a period of
time fixed by law. That the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee
and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as
beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers
may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere
silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from
the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees
thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he
exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. Thus, in order that a co-
owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur:

1. that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to

an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
2. that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and
3. that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself

the whole estate of his wife by means of an affidavit filed with the Office of
the Register of Deeds as allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, or that he caused the issuance of a certificate of title in his name or
the cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's name and the issuance of a
new one in his own name. The only act which may be deemed as repudiation
by Pastor of the co-ownership over the lots is his filing on 28 April 1976 of
an action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The period of prescription
started to run only from this repudiation. However, this was tolled when his
co-heirs, the private respondents herein, instituted on 8 October 1976 an
action for partition (Civil Case No. 5174) of the lots. Hence, the adverse
possession by Pastor being for only about six months would not vest in him
exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent acquisitive prescription
of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in
favor of Pastor.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THE EASEMENT OF WAY VOLUNTARILY
CONSTITUTED IN FAVOR OF A COMMUNITY

SUBJECT: Law on Property

North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo

G. R. No. 42334, October 31, 1936
RECTO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Being an easement for the benefit of the community, the (hacienda) owner
can close the road, if he wants to, but he cannot, as long as it is open,
discriminate against, one person, and still allow others to cross the private
road.

FACTS:

Plaintiff, is the owner of an hacienda in which is located its sugar

central, with its factory building and residence for its employees, known as
the “mill site.’’ Across its properties, Plaintiff constructed a road connecting
the “mill site’’ with the provincial highway. Through this road, Plaintiff
allowed and still allows vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge.
Pedestrians are allowed free passage through it. Immediately adjoining the
above-mentioned “mill site’’ is a hacienda where Defendant has a billiard hall
and a tuba saloon.

Defendant used to pass through the said road of Plaintiff. Later on, by
order of Plaintiff, every time that Defendant passed driving his automobile
with a cargo of tuba, Plaintiff’s gatekeeper would stop him and prevent him
from passing through said road. Plaintiff, therefore, filed a complaint praying
that an injunction be issued, restraining Defendant from entering or passing
through the properties of Plaintiff, especially through the “mill site’’ of
Plaintiff’s sugar central.

ISSUE:

Has Plaintiff the right to prevent Defendant, who never refused to pay
tolls, from using the road in question?

RULING:

No. The road in question was constructed by Plaintiff on its own lot and
made it accessible to the general public regardless of class or group of
persons or entities. Here is a case of an easement of way voluntarily
constituted in favor of a community. The owner of an immovable may
burden it with such easements as he may deem fit, and in such manner and
form as he may consider desirable, provided he does not violate the law or
public order. There is nothing in the constitution of this easement in violation
of law or public order, except perhaps that the right to open roads and
charge passage fees therefor is the State’s by right of sovereignty and may
not be taken over by a private individual without the requisite permit. This,
however, would affect the right of Plaintiff to charge tolls, but not that of
Defendant or of any other person to make use of the easement.

Having been devoted by Plaintiff to the use of the public in general,

upon paying the passage fees required in the case of motor vehicles, the
road in question is charged with a public interest, and while so devoted,
Plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions against any private
person.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN AN EXAMPLE OF A DISCONTINUOUS
EASEMENT

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Abellana vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97039, April 24, 1992
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Easement of right of way is an example of a discontinuous easement

because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man.

FACTS:

The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern

side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right
of way over a subdivision road which, according to the petitioners, used to
be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had been using since
time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired, through prescription,
an easement of right of way therein. The construction of a wall by the
respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the
subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access to the public
highway. They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the subdivision
and cutting off their access to the subdivision road be removed and that the
road be opened to them. The private respondents denied that there was a
pre-existing footpath in the place before it was developed into a subdivision.
They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the
shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from the
petitioners’ land to the public highway.

The trial court rendered judgment and ordered the defendants to

demolish the subject fences or enclosures at the dead ends of Road Lots 1
and 3 of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision at their expense and to leave them
open for the use of the plaintiffs and the general public, within fifteen (15)
days from finality of this judgment.

ISSUE:

Can an easement of right of way be acquired by prescription?

RULING:

Petitioners’ assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous

and apparent and may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the
Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but
it is not a continuous easement because its use is at intervals and depends
upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his
feet over somebody else’s land.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT THERE IS A LIMITATION IN THE
REGISTRATION OF CO-OWNED PROPERTIES

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Taningco vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna

G.R. No. L-15242, June 29, 1962
MAKALINTAL, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, although the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

FACTS:

Petitioners took a mortgage, for a loan of P9,000 extended by them to

Nieves Mediarito, on all the "rights, interests, and participation" of the latter
in six parcels of land co-owned by her and her children, his husband being
dead already and she and her children being the heir. The deed of mortgage
was duly signed by the mortgagor but when presented to the Register of
Deeds for registration it was denied registration. The Register of Deeds said
that Mediarito could not alienate her ½ conjugal share without previous
liquidation of conjugal properties. Respondent also assailed that its
registrability is questionable because the mortgagor "does not appear yet to
be the registered owner of the property being mortgaged."

ISSUE:

Can co-owned properties be subject of registration?

RULING:

The Court held as provided in article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
although the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
 In the case at bar the mortgage sought to be registered by appellants
does not refer to any specific portions of the six parcels of land described in
the mortgage instrument but to the mortgagor’s rights, interest and
participation therein — whatever they may actually turn out to be upon
liquidation and partition. If such mortgage is legal and valid, as the law says
it is, there can be no justifiable reason why it should not be registered,
registration being an essential requirement in order that the mortgage
may be validly constituted.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THE JURISDICTION OVER UNLAWFUL
DETAINER CASE AND ACCION PUBLICIANA CASE

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Canlas vs. Tubil

G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Unlawful detainer falls under the MTC jurisdiction; while accion

publiciana falls under the RTC jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Iluminada Tubil was the owner of a residential lot in Guagua,

Pampanga. Rudy, Victoria and Felicidad Canlas erected a house on the
aforementioned lot and occupied it as their residential house upon mere
tolerance by the owner. Tubil now wanted to use the land fruitfully so
demands were made to vacate the lot. Canlas refused so a complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed by Tubil before the MTC. Canlas filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the MTC was without jurisdiction over the
subject matter and that the parties were not the real parties-in-interest.

The motion to dismiss was denied. Canlas filed an answer stating that
they were in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the land; that
Tubil’s title over the land issued by a Free Patent was dubious; that the
action was actually accion publiciana which is beyond MTC’s jurisdiction.

MTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer on the grounds that
Tubil failed to show that there was mere tolerance. RTC affirmed.
Respondent files a petition for review with the CA which reversed the MTC’s
decision and ordered the RTC to decide on the merits of the case.

Canlas now files a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari contending that the RTC
does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter, thus, it cannot
validly decide on the merits pursuant to Rule 40, Section 8, Paragraph 2 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Is Rule 40, Section 8 applicable in this case?

RULING:

No. Rule 40, Sec 8, par 2 states that “If the case was tried on the
merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction BUT
shall decide the case without prejudice to the admission of amended
pleadings and additional evidence.”

The SC held that the case was of unlawful detainer to which the MTC
has original jurisdiction over the subject matter, not accion publiciana where
the RTC has original jurisdiction.

Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction, it properly exercised

its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure of the respondent to
prove mere tolerance by sufficient evidence. Rule 40, Section 8 of the Rules
of Court has no application in this case.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT PRESCRIPTION BY LACHES WILL LIE
AGAINST EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Soriano vs. Sternberg

G.R. No. 15628, November 18, 1920
MALCOLM, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The plaintiff must, consequently, by reason of his own laches, be considered

to have waived any right which he may have had to compel the windows to
be closed.

FACTS:

The plaintiff desires to obtain a judicial order, to compel the defendant

to close the windows in the wall of his house adjacent to the property of the
plaintiff, because the wall of defendant's house is less than 2 meters from
the division line. The defendant pleads prescription and relies exclusively
upon these defenses. The lower court agreed with the plaintiff's contention
and ordered the windows of the defendant's house to be closed, with costs
against the defendant.

The provisions of law upon which plaintiff bases his action concern
easements, and are found in the Civil code. Reliance is principally made
upon the first paragraph of article 582 of the Civil Code reading as follows:
"No windows or balconies or other similar projections which directly overlook
the adjoining property may be opened or built without leaving a distance of
not less than 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and such
adjoining property.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not a right of action to enforce article 582 of the Civil code
may be lost by failure to prosecute within the prescriptive period fixed by the
Code of Civil Procedure?

RULING:

The Court held that plaintiff right of action under article 582 of the
Civil Code accrued in 1905 when the windows in defendant's house were
opened, and that, in accordance with Chapter III of the Code of Civil
Procedure, his action has prescribed.

It should first be noted that the defendant in this case has never
prohibited the plaintiff from building on his, the plaintiff's, own land, any wall
that he may desire to construct. Further, it should be noted that the
offending edifice of the defendant was constructed in 1905. This was the
year when the defendant violated the law. This was the date when the cause
of action accrued. Nevertheless, the windows complained of were permitted
to be open for thirteen years without protest. The plaintiff must,
consequently, by reason of his own laches, be considered to have waived
any right which he may have had to compel the windows to be closed. The
argument of plaintiff that it was only in 1917, when he bought the land in
question, that the statute of limitations began to run, is not convincing, for
the general rule is, that once the statute begins to run, it never stops, and
the transfer of the cause of action does not have the effect of suspending its
operation.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THAT ABATEMENT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IS ALLOWED BY LAW

SUBJECT: Law on Property

Timoner vs. People

G.R. No. 62050, November 25, 1983
ESCOLIN, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Abatement of public nuisance without judicial proceedings will not

make the municipal mayor criminally liable when he acted in good faith.

FACTS:

At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then

Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen,
arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway Upon order, laborers
proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which
protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway Among the structures
thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining
witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These
establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health
Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for
judicial abatement of their stalls. Timoner alleged that this stall constituted
public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to
reopen his barbershop business. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
full the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the present recourse. Timoner’s
argument was that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was
done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful
authority.

ISSUE:

Were the complainants in this case considered a public nuisance?

RULING:

Yes, the complainants were public nuisance for affecting a considerable

number of persons in their neighborhood. Petitioner, as mayor of the town,
merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health
Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty,
petitioner incurred no criminal liability.

Abatement of public nuisance without judicial proceedings, municipal

mayor is not criminally liable when he acted in good faith in authorizing the
fencing of a barbershop for being a public nuisance because it occupied a
portion of the sidewalk. Art 699 authorizes the abatement of a public
nuisance without judicial proceedings.