VALIAO V.

REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 170757
November 28, 2011

FACTS
The petitioners (Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, and Nemesio
Grandea) filed with the RTC of Kabankalan an application of a parcel of land with an
area of 504, 535 square meters in Barrio Galicia, Ilog, Negros Occidental under the
conditions of PD 1529. They claim that they have acquired the property in 1947 after
the death of their uncle Basilio Milliarez who purchased the land from Fermin Payogao
through a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916, entirely handwritten in Spanish. Upon
their uncle’s death, they have possessed the land until 1966 when oppositor Macario
Zafra disposed them of their property compelling them to file complaints of Grave
Coercion and Qualified Theft against him. The petitioners submitted a Tax Declaration
No. 9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio
Millarez. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision to grant the petitioner’s
application for registration.
ISSUES
1. Whether Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
2. Whether they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a claim
of ownership.
RULING
The petitioners’ application under PD 1529 should be denied.
1. The petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was classified as part
of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been reclassified
or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond
the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming
the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application
(or claim) is alienable or disposable.
In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government.
2. The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
There is nothing in the records that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that
Basilio was in possession of the property during the period of possession
required by law.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. As regards petitioners’
possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support
the same with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can
only prove possession since said date.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported for other evidence. It does not necessarily
prove ownership.

REPUBLIC V. VEGA
G.R. NO. 177790
January 17, 2011

FACTS
Respondents Vega sought to register a parcel of land, claiming that they
inherited the same from their deceased mother. Respondent-intervenors Buhay
claimed a portion of the lot in question. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the claim. The Republic maintains that the parcel of land is public
domain, and that respondents failed to substantiate that such was alienable.
Respondents presented as witness an officer from CENRO who testified that the land
in question is indeed alienable. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered
titles to be issued in favor of Vega and Buhay. The Republic appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the lower court. The Respondent files
a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Republic claims that respondents were unable
to prove that the parcel in question is not part of the public domain. Respondent-
intervenor Buhay challenged the petition as it raises a question of fact, which is outside
the scope of Rule 45, a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Is the parcel of land in dispute part of public domain?

RULING:
The rule for the registration of government land is that there must be open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
government land. The fact of occupation and that the land is alienable government
land must be proven. Here, the Republic does not question the fact of occupation, but
that of the alienability of the land. They also contended that the testimony of the
CENRO officer is insufficient. It has been held in Jurisprudence that a CENRO
certificate is inadequate proof that the land is alienable. There must also be
certification from the Secretary of Natural Resources. However, in light of a recent
ruling, the CENRO certification is held to be substantial compliance to the needed
proof. Since respondents sought certification from the CENRO before, they are in good
faith in claiming the land. The proof that they presented may be considered as
competent and sufficient proof. It is to be noted, however, that this ruling applies pro
hac vice.

DEL ROSARIO V. GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION

G.R. NO. 170575
June 8, 2011

FACTS:
The petitioner Manuel Del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-
A of PSD 301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by TCT No.
T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas.
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession
and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by
and between it and the City or Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in
the character of being lessee thereof.
In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the
respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such
notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of
said land.
On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City.

ISSUE:
Whether there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.

RULING:
NO. Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the complaint establish a cause of
action for forcible entry and not for unlawful detainer.
“In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.” “Where the defendant’s
possession of the property is illegal ab initio.” Summary action for forcible entry is the
remedy to recover possession.
In their complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession
and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming
that these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondent’s possession was
illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioner’s complaint is
one for forcible entry that is “the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person
who has entered without the right.” Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can
be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondent’s possession was illegal at the
inception.
Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession,as alleged in petitioners'
Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court
finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible
Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.