PASEI v.

Drilon
G.R. No. 81958
June 30, 1988

FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing
the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.”
It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing
for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of
DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power
of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban
in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
the Filipino workers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:
“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution
does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
EMILIO GANCAYCO vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 177807
October 11, 2011

FACTS:
The consolidated petitions stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining to Construction of
Arcades, and the clearing of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he
was able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey commercial building. The Quezon
City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the construction of Arcades for
Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not require the properties located
at the Quezon City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle
Street to construct the arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition
to have his property, already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the
ordinance. MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904,
part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days,
which Gancayco did not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall,
or “wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition
of his property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that Ordinance no.
2904 was discriminatory and selective. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek
nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the
presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council, taking
to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as a public
nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property.

HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided that the
wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of endangers the health or safety
of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency
or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance
may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se are those which
affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under
the undefined law of necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to
construct the building, it was implied that the city engineer did not consider the building
as such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA
was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not
supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such by the
constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted.
Therefore, MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s property, and
was solely liable for the damage.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 135962
March 27, 2000

Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government
Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner
to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of
Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate
the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating
the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the
MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority
to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.

Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police
power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be
delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it
cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act
No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable
in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area.
Knights of Rizal Vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., DMCI Project Developers, Inc., City of Manila,
National Commission for Culture and the Arts, National Museum, and National
Historical Commission of the Philippines
G.R. No. 213948
April 25, 2017

FACTS:
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of Manila. The said lot was
earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila Condominium project. After having
acquired all the necessary permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI was ready to commence
the intended project. However, the City of Manila Council issued a resolution to
temporarily suspend the Building Permit until such time that issues had been cleared.
Consultations after consultations had he been initiated both by the City of Manila and
DMCI-PDI. Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City Council of Manila, issued another resolution
ratifying and confirming all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by
the City for Torre de Manila.

Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO, and later
a permanent injunction, against the construction of the project. The KOR argued that the
building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the monument, an endangerment to
the nation’s cultural heritage, and a construction borne out of bad faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus against the City Officials to
stop the construction of Torre de Manila.

RULING:
No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project. It was
not even considered as contrary to morals, customs and public order. The project was
way well from the Park where the monument was located. The SC ruled further that a
mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus
is issued when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to
be compelled to perform an act, and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right
to the performance of such act.” In the case at bar, such factors were wanting. Nowhere
was it found in the ordinance, or in any Law or rule that the construction of such building
outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the building was within the background sightline
or vision of the Rizal Monument. Thus, the petition was lacking of merit and, thus
dismissed.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs. BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., and the HEIRS OF
ROSARIO MERCADO, namely, VICENTE LOZADA, MARIO M. LOZADA, MARCIA L.
GODINEZ, VIRGINIA L. FLORES, BERNARDO LOZADA, JR., DOLORES GACASAN,
SOCORRO CAFARO and ROSARIO LOZADA, represented by MARCIA LOZADA
GODINEZ
G.R. No. 176625
February 25, 2010

FACTS:
Respondents were the registered owners of Lot No. 88 situated in the City of Cebu, the
subject lot. The property was expropriated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines by
virtue of a decision of the CFI of Cebu in a civil case. The public purpose for which the
property was expropriated was for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport.
The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO)
proposed a compromise settlement that the expropriated lots would be resold at the
price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport.
Because of this, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. Then President Corazon Aquino
directed the Department of Transportation and Communication to transfer general
aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority and to close the Lahug Airport after such transfer, therefore, the public purpose
of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized,
or implemented. Herein respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession
and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The RTC rendered judgment in their favor.
This was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the ownership and possession of Lot No. 88 should be restored to respondents.

HELD:
Yes, the ownership and possession of Lot No. 88 should be restored to respondents.
The taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject
to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that
just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the
nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemn or to
keep the property expropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of public
use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated
in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the
new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose
for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would
be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property
owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
656 SCRA 60
G.R. No. 165828
August 24, 2011

FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant
Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.
On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer
for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer
grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING:
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain
has been attempted by the taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly
entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable
to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled
that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual
physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable
taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful
manner, lessening or destroying its value
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), 1 vs. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL
CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 192100
March 12, 2014

Facts:
Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation (respondent) is the registered owner of a
17,175-square meter property situated in Barangay Sta. Monica, Municipality of San
Simon, Province of Pampanga and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
271813-R.

On March 1, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) through the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) instituted expropriation proceedings against the respondent
over a portion of their property. The affected area, consisting of 2,024 square meters,
shall be traversed by the expansion of the San Simon Interchange, an integral component
of the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX
Project). Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of
possession, stating that it deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) the
amount of P607,200.00 (100% of the value of the property based on current zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR]) in accordance with Section 4 (a) of
Republic Act No. 8974 6 (R.A. 8794), and hence the court has the ministerial duty to place
petitioner in possession pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue:
What is the proper basis for determining the amount of just compensation in
expropriation cases pursuant to RA 8974

Ruling:
Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of expropriated
land taken for national government infrastructure projects.
It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just compensation can only
be made after due ascertainment of the requirements set forth under R.A. 8974 and not
merely based on the declarations of the parties. 32 Since these requirements were not
satisfactorily complied with, and in the absence of reliable and actual data as bases in
fixing the value of the condemned property, remand of this case to the trial court is in
order.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE vs.V.M. REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 127820
July 20, 1998

FACTS:
The Municipality of Parañaque filed an expropriation case against Private Respondent
V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution. The expropriation was allegedly “for the purpose of alleviating the living
conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project.” Petitioner, pursuant to the resolution made an offer to enter
into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not
accept.

Private respondent, on the other hand, filed its Answer alleging that (a) the complaint of
petitioner was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the
Local Government Code; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata.

ISSUES:
Whether a resolution has the same force and effect of an ordinance for expropriation case.
Whether Res Judicata can bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property.

HELD:
First Issue: Resolution Different from an Ordinance
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. An LGU may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and
restraints. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:

An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council;

The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless;
There is payment of just compensation;
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Second Issue: Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata

The Court holds that the principle of res judicata cannot bar the right of the State or its
agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent
power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata.